Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

A firefighter employed by a county for over two decades reported safety violations concerning the maintenance of fire extinguishers on county fire engines. After raising these concerns with his superiors, he was barred from working in fire prevention, which he believed was retaliation for his whistleblowing activities. Although he filed internal complaints with the county’s Office of Human Resources and the Civil Service Commission, he withdrew his appeal after assurances that his concerns would be addressed. Later, he was investigated for alleged misconduct and ultimately terminated for violations of county rules. He then filed a claim under the Government Claims Act, which the county rejected.The Superior Court of Kern County granted the county’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding that the plaintiff’s failure to exhaust the internal administrative remedies—specifically, by not appealing his dismissal to the Civil Service Commission—barred his whistleblower retaliation lawsuit. The court denied the plaintiff’s request for leave to amend his complaint, holding that he could not allege exhaustion of remedies.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case. It held that the plaintiff was not required to exhaust the county’s internal administrative remedies before bringing his whistleblower retaliation claims because the county’s ordinances and rules did not provide a clearly defined process for submitting, evaluating, and resolving such claims. The court distinguished between general disciplinary appeals and procedures for discrimination or harassment claims, noting that there was no specific administrative remedy for whistleblower retaliation. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the judgment and remanded the matter with instructions to deny the county’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. The holding clarifies that, where an internal administrative process does not address a particular type of claim, exhaustion of that process is not required before filing suit. View "Romero v. County of Kern" on Justia Law

A registered nurse who worked for the Indian Health Service during the COVID-19 pandemic claimed that she and similarly situated nurses were required by supervisors to work overtime without compensation. After resigning, she filed a class action lawsuit in the United States Court of Federal Claims, alleging, among other things, that the government violated the federal overtime statute by failing to pay for overtime that was allegedly induced by supervisors. Specifically, she argued that the statutory requirement for overtime to be “officially ordered or approved” should cover such induced overtime, even in the absence of written authorization.The United States Court of Federal Claims dismissed all counts of her complaint for failure to state a claim. With respect to the overtime claim (Count II), the court found that she did not allege that she or any potential class members had written authorization for their overtime, as required by the relevant Office of Personnel Management (OPM) regulation.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, reviewed the validity of the OPM’s regulation that requires overtime orders or approvals to be in writing, in light of the statutory language and recent Supreme Court precedent on agency rulemaking authority. The court held that the statute delegates to OPM the authority to prescribe necessary regulations for administering the overtime pay statute, and that this includes the discretion to require written authorization as part of the “officially ordered or approved” process. The court concluded that the writing requirement is a valid exercise of OPM’s rulemaking authority and does not contradict the statute. The Federal Circuit therefore affirmed the Court of Federal Claims’ dismissal of the overtime claim and remanded the remaining claims to the original panel for further consideration. View "Lesko v. United States" on Justia Law

Several current and former employees of the City of Chicago, including police officers and an emergency management officer, challenged the City’s COVID-19 vaccination policy. The policy, issued in October 2021, required city employees to either be vaccinated against COVID-19 or undergo regular testing and report their status through an employee portal. Religious exemptions from vaccination were available and granted to these plaintiffs, but the plaintiffs objected to having to submit their vaccination status and test results in the portal, arguing that this reporting requirement violated their constitutional and statutory rights.The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, raising claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the First and Fourteenth Amendments via 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act (IRFRA). The district court dismissed the Third Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim. It found the Title VII claims factually implausible and concluded that the plaintiffs did not allege a religious practice conflicting with the reporting requirements. The court also held that, since the plaintiffs were granted their requested exemptions from vaccination, they could not succeed on claims based on their refusal to comply with reporting requirements.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The Seventh Circuit held that the policy’s reporting requirements were neutral and generally applicable, subject only to rational-basis review, which the policy satisfied. The court determined that the reporting and disciplinary provisions were rationally related to the City’s legitimate interest in public health and workplace safety. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of all constitutional, statutory, and state-law claims, finding the plaintiffs’ arguments insufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. View "Kondilis v City of Chicago" on Justia Law

The plaintiff was an employee who brought claims for wrongful termination, Labor Code violations, and breach of contract against two defendants: the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) and the Public Transportation Services Corporation (PTSC). MTA had created PTSC, a nonprofit public benefit corporation, to provide retirement and employment benefits to certain workers and to manage employees who support MTA’s transportation functions. The plaintiff did not file a prelitigation claim under the Government Claims Act (GCA) before suing these entities.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County first granted a motion for judgment on the pleadings in favor of both defendants, finding that the plaintiff had not alleged compliance with the GCA’s claim presentation requirements. The plaintiff was given leave to amend but continued to argue that PTSC was not a public entity subject to the GCA, and that even if it was, the claims presentation requirement should not apply because PTSC had not registered as required by statute. The trial court sustained a demurrer without leave to amend, finding both defendants to be public entities and that PTSC was not required to register separately from MTA. The court entered judgment for both defendants.On appeal to the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, the plaintiff did not challenge the judgment in favor of MTA but contested the ruling as to PTSC. The appellate court held that PTSC qualifies as a public entity for purposes of the GCA’s claims presentation requirement, given its creation and control by MTA. However, the court found that if PTSC failed to register properly on the Registry of Public Agencies—including with county clerks where it maintains offices—this would excuse the plaintiff’s noncompliance with the GCA. The judgment for MTA was affirmed, but the judgment for PTSC was reversed and remanded to allow the plaintiff to amend his complaint. View "Black v. L.A. County Metropolitan Transp. Authority" on Justia Law

An employee of a company specializing in training security officers raised concerns to management about unsafe working conditions, including the handling of weapons and a hazardous firing range where bullet ricochets had resulted in injuries. The employee, along with other instructors, formally complained to supervisors about these dangers, especially during the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, when he also questioned restrictions on personal protective equipment. After voicing these safety concerns, the employee was suspended and later terminated, allegedly for insubordination.The employee filed a charge with the Regional Director of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), asserting that his termination was unlawful retaliation for engaging in protected concerted activity under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). After investigation, an NLRB administrative law judge (ALJ) held a hearing and determined that the employee was not a managerial employee and was therefore protected by the NLRA. The ALJ found that the primary reason for the suspension and termination was the employee’s repeated advocacy regarding workplace safety, not insubordination. The ALJ concluded that the employer had committed unfair labor practices. The employer appealed, and the NLRB affirmed the ALJ’s decision with minor modifications.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the NLRB’s order. Applying the substantial evidence standard, the court held that the Board’s conclusion—that the employee was not a managerial employee—was supported by the record. The court found that the employee lacked authority to formulate or implement management policy and did not possess the discretion characteristic of managerial status. Therefore, the employee was entitled to the NLRA’s protections. The court granted the NLRB’s application for enforcement of its order and denied the employer’s cross-petition for review. View "National Labor Relations Board v. Constellis, LLC" on Justia Law

An agricultural company opposed a unionization effort initiated by the United Farm Workers of America, who sought certification as the exclusive bargaining representative for the company's employees under a new statutory procedure. The union filed a Majority Support Petition with the Agricultural Labor Relations Board, presenting evidence that a majority of employees supported union representation. The company responded by submitting objections and employee declarations alleging misconduct by the union during the signature collection process. The Board's regional director investigated and determined that the union had met the statutory criteria for certification, leading the Board to certify the union as the employees' representative.Following the certification, the company filed additional objections with the Agricultural Labor Relations Board, including constitutional challenges to the underlying statute. The Board dismissed most objections and set others for a hearing, but stated it could not rule on constitutional questions. While administrative proceedings were ongoing, the company filed a petition in the Superior Court of Kern County seeking to enjoin the Board from proceeding and to declare the statute unconstitutional. The Board and the union argued that the court lacked jurisdiction due to statutory limits on judicial review, but the superior court nonetheless issued a preliminary injunction halting the Board's proceedings. Appeals and writ petitions followed, consolidating the matter before the reviewing court.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fifth Appellate District, held that the superior court lacked jurisdiction to consider the challenge at this stage. The court reaffirmed that under California law, employers may not directly challenge union certification decisions in court except in extraordinary circumstances, which were not present here. The proper procedure is for employers to wait until an unfair labor practice proceeding or mandatory mediation is completed and a final order is issued before seeking judicial review. The court reversed the preliminary injunction and ordered dismissal of the company’s petition for lack of jurisdiction. View "Wonderful Nurseries v. Agricultural Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

A senior account manager at a telecommunications company was terminated after several major accounts she managed decided to discontinue the company’s services. In the months leading up to her termination, she took eight and a half days of paid leave to care for her ill daughter and mother. Her supervisor had expressed concerns about her performance, particularly with her newer accounts, but consistently granted all her leave requests without referencing the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). Despite meeting some of her performance objectives, the loss of major accounts and her supervisor’s ongoing performance criticisms culminated in her dismissal.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment to the employer on the employee’s FMLA interference and retaliation claims. The district court found that the employee had not shown she was denied any FMLA benefits or that her termination was in retaliation for taking leave. The court also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her related claim under the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL), dismissing it without prejudice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the employee did not establish an FMLA interference claim because her supervisor’s criticisms were unrelated to her leave requests, which were fully granted, and she was not prejudiced by the employer’s failure to provide FMLA notice. The court also held that the employee failed to show retaliation, as her termination was based on documented performance issues rather than the exercise of FMLA rights. Finally, the court upheld the district court’s decision to dismiss the NYCHRL claim without prejudice. View "Haran v. Orange Business Services, Inc." on Justia Law

A Concord police officer discovered her firearm missing from the station’s lockers in 2013. Investigation revealed that another officer, the plaintiff, had mistakenly taken the firearm while transporting a prisoner to a hospital. The plaintiff gave inconsistent accounts about when she realized the mistake, telling supervisors she noticed it at the station, while her partner reported she only realized it at the hospital. An internal affairs investigation found the plaintiff’s statements lacked credibility and concluded she had lied to colleagues and supervisors about the incident. The police chief sustained these findings, terminated her employment, and submitted her name for inclusion on the Exculpatory Evidence Schedule (EES), formerly known as the “Laurie List.”The plaintiff appealed her termination to the City of Concord’s Personnel Appeals Board, which upheld the decision, finding her lacked credibility. She then filed a complaint in the Superior Court alleging gender discrimination and wrongful termination, which was settled. The settlement required the City to remove documents related to the incident from her personnel file and maintain them in a separate investigative file, and to report her departure as a negotiated resignation.Years later, the plaintiff sued the City and the New Hampshire Department of Justice in Superior Court, seeking removal of her name from the EES under RSA 105:13-d. She argued the alleged misconduct was immaterial, the records were no longer in her personnel file, and her inclusion on the EES was unwarranted given the passage of time. The Superior Court granted summary judgment for the defendants.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed, holding that RSA 105:13-d governs EES inclusion and applies to “personnel information,” not just personnel files. The court found the plaintiff’s untruthfulness constituted potentially exculpatory evidence and that it was reasonably foreseeable her misconduct could be admissible to impeach her credibility if she were called as a witness in a future case. View "Doe v. Concord Police Department" on Justia Law

Anton’s Services Inc. was a subcontractor on two public works projects in San Diego: the Torrey Pines Road Project and the Voltaire Street Project. On both projects, Anton’s classified its workers under the “Tree Maintenance” prevailing wage category, paying them accordingly. The Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (DLSE) investigated and determined that Anton’s work was construction-related and should have been classified under the “Laborer (Engineering Construction)” category, which carries a higher prevailing wage. Additionally, Anton’s failed to comply with apprenticeship requirements, including submitting contract award information, employing the required ratio of apprentices, and requesting apprentices from local committees.After the DLSE issued civil wage and penalty assessments for both projects, Anton’s challenged these findings in administrative proceedings before the Director of Industrial Relations. The parties submitted stipulated facts and documentary evidence. The Director affirmed the DLSE’s assessments, finding Anton’s had misclassified workers, underpaid prevailing wages, failed to comply with apprenticeship requirements, and was liable for penalties and liquidated damages. The Director also found Anton’s violations were willful, given its prior record and lack of prompt correction.Anton’s then sought judicial review in the Superior Court of San Diego County through a petition for writ of administrative mandamus. The trial court, applying the substantial evidence standard, upheld the Director’s decision and rejected Anton’s attempt to introduce extra-record evidence.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the administrative record for substantial evidence. The court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, holding that Anton’s misclassified workers, underpaid prevailing wages, failed to comply with apprenticeship requirements, and was properly assessed penalties and liquidated damages. The court clarified that liquidated damages are owed until wages are actually paid to workers, not merely withheld by a contractor. The judgment was affirmed. View "Anton's Services v. Hagen" on Justia Law

Two police associations negotiated collective bargaining agreements with the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department and the City of Las Vegas to designate certain dates—specifically Christmas Eve, New Year's Eve, and Juneteenth—as paid holidays in addition to those recognized by Nevada statute. These agreements provided for increased holiday pay on those days. The Nevada Public Employees' Retirement System (PERS), which is responsible for collecting retirement contributions based on employees’ regular compensation, refused to collect contributions on the additional holiday pay for these negotiated holidays, arguing that only holidays listed in Nevada’s statutory list qualified.The associations filed an action for declaratory relief in the Eighth Judicial District Court, seeking to compel PERS to collect retirement contributions on the negotiated holiday pay. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the associations, ordering PERS to collect the appropriate employer contributions for holiday pay on Christmas Eve, New Year's Eve, and Juneteenth. PERS appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada reviewed the case de novo, as it involved questions of statutory interpretation and no disputed facts. The court held that, under the plain language of NRS 288.150(2)(d) and NRS 286.025, PERS is required to collect retirement contributions on all holiday pay negotiated in collective bargaining agreements, not just those for statutory holidays. The court also determined that Juneteenth became a legal holiday in Nevada in 2021 following the federal declaration, and contributions for that holiday are required retroactively to 2022, when it was included in the agreements. The court rejected PERS’s arguments regarding its authority and potential conflicts with the Internal Revenue Code. The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment. View "PUB. EMPLOYEES' RET. SYS. OF NEV. VS. LAS VEGAS MANAGERS AND SUPERVISORS ASS'N" on Justia Law