Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Las Vegas Police Managers and Supervisors Association and the Las Vegas Peace Officers Association negotiated additional holidays with the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department and the City of Las Vegas. These holidays included Christmas Eve, New Year's Eve, and Juneteenth. The Nevada Public Employees' Retirement System (PERS) refused to collect increased retirement contributions on the holiday pay for these additional holidays, arguing that they were not included in Nevada's statutory list of holidays.The Associations filed a declaratory relief action in the Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, seeking to compel PERS to collect the appropriate contributions. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Associations, directing PERS to collect the contributions for the additional holiday pay.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and held that PERS is required to collect additional retirement contributions for the increased wages earned on the negotiated holidays. The court concluded that the plain text of NRS 288.150(2)(d) supports the Associations' authority to negotiate holidays and that PERS must comply with these agreements. The court also determined that Juneteenth became a legal holiday in Nevada in 2021 following a presidential declaration and that PERS must collect contributions for this holiday retroactively to 2022. Additionally, the court found that the Associations have the statutory power to negotiate holiday pay for Christmas Eve and New Year's Eve, and PERS is obligated to collect contributions for these holidays as well.The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment, requiring PERS to collect the appropriate employer contributions for the additional holiday pay as negotiated by the Associations. View "PUB. EMPLOYEES' RET. SYS. OF NEV. VS. LAS VEGAS MANAGERS AND SUPERVISORS ASS'N" on Justia Law

East Penn Manufacturing Company, Inc. (East Penn) did not fully compensate its workers for the time spent changing into uniforms and showering after shifts, which was required due to the hazardous nature of their work involving lead-acid batteries. The company provided a grace period for these activities but did not record the actual time spent. The U.S. Department of Labor sued East Penn under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) for failing to pay employees for all time spent on these activities.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted summary judgment in favor of the government, determining that changing and showering were integral and indispensable to the workers' principal activities. The jury subsequently awarded $22.25 million in back pay to 11,780 hourly uniformed workers. The District Court, however, declined to award liquidated damages. East Penn appealed the decision, and the government cross-appealed the denial of liquidated damages.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's rulings. The Third Circuit held that employers bear the burden of proving that any unpaid time is de minimis (trivial). The court also held that employers must pay for the actual time employees spend on work-related activities, not just a reasonable amount of time. The court found that the District Court's jury instructions and the admission of the government's expert testimony were proper. Additionally, the Third Circuit upheld the District Court's decision to deny liquidated damages, concluding that East Penn had acted in good faith based on legal advice, even though that advice was ultimately incorrect.In summary, the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgment, requiring East Penn to compensate employees for the actual time spent on changing and showering, and placing the burden of proving de minimis time on the employer. View "Secretary United States Department of Labor v. East Penn Manufacturing Inc" on Justia Law

Randell Shepherd, a career coal miner, filed a claim for benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act (BLBA), invoking the Act’s presumption that he was entitled to benefits due to his over fifteen years of mining and total disability from chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), bronchitis, and emphysema. Incoal, Inc., Shepherd’s most recent employer, contested his entitlement, arguing that his disability was caused by smoking, not mining. An administrative law judge (ALJ) found Incoal’s expert opinions unpersuasive and inconsistent with the Act’s regulations and preamble, which recognize pneumoconiosis as a latent and progressive disease. The ALJ ruled that Incoal failed to rebut the presumption that Shepherd was entitled to benefits. The Benefits Review Board (BRB) affirmed the ALJ’s decision.Incoal petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit for review, arguing that the ALJ improperly relied on the regulatory preamble over their evidence and that the presumption was effectively irrebuttable, violating the Constitution and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The court reviewed the case de novo, focusing on whether the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence and correctly applied the law.The Sixth Circuit held that the ALJ was entitled to reference the preamble to assess the credibility of expert opinions and found that the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence. The court noted that the BLBA’s rebuttable presumption is constitutional, as it is based on a rational relationship between the length of a miner’s career and the risk of pneumoconiosis. The court concluded that Incoal’s arguments were unpersuasive and that the ALJ applied the correct legal principles. Consequently, the court denied Incoal’s petition for review. View "Incoal, Inc. v. OWCP" on Justia Law

A police officer in Buffalo, Texas, was terminated by the City Council after engaging in a high-speed chase with a civilian in his patrol vehicle, resulting in an accident. The officer, Gregory Moliere, received a written reprimand from the Chief of Police, which he accepted. Subsequently, the City Council voted to terminate his employment. Moliere sued, claiming the City Council lacked the authority to fire him and that his due process rights were violated.The trial court dismissed Moliere's suit, finding that the City Council had the authority to terminate him. Moliere appealed, and the Court of Appeals for the Tenth District of Texas reversed the trial court's decision, concluding that there was a fact issue regarding the City Council's authority to terminate Moliere. The appellate court noted ambiguities in the City's employee manual and the police department's policy-and-procedure manual and remanded the case for further proceedings without addressing Moliere's due process claim.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and determined that the City Council had the authority to terminate Moliere under Texas Local Government Code Section 341.001, which allows the governing body of a Type A general-law municipality to establish and regulate a municipal police force. The court held that the City Council's authority to regulate the police force included the power to terminate officers for cause. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Texas reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment and reinstated the trial court's judgment dismissing Moliere's claims based on the alleged lack of authority to fire him.However, the Supreme Court of Texas remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to address Moliere's due process claim, which had not been considered previously. View "City of Buffalo v. Moliere" on Justia Law

The City of Great Falls unilaterally revised its drug and alcohol policy in 2019, expanding the scope of employees subject to random testing and imposing stricter penalties without negotiating with the affected labor unions. The unions filed unfair labor practice complaints, alleging that the City's actions violated the Montana Public Employees Collective Bargaining Act (MPECBA). The Montana Board of Personnel Appeals (MBPA) consolidated the complaints and referred them to a hearing examiner, who ruled in favor of the unions, concluding that the City's unilateral policy changes constituted unfair labor practices.The City did not file exceptions to the hearing examiner's proposed decision, which became the final agency decision by default. Instead, the City petitioned for judicial review, arguing that the hearing examiner's decision involved purely legal questions that should be reviewed by the court. The District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, Cascade County, dismissed the petition, citing the City's failure to exhaust administrative remedies by not seeking final agency review.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's decision. The Court held that the City's failure to exhaust the final agency review remedy provided by MPECBA and the Montana Administrative Procedure Act (MAPA) precluded judicial review. The Court clarified that there is no jurisprudential exception to the exhaustion requirement for purely legal or constitutional questions in the context of MAPA contested case proceedings. The City's petition for judicial review was thus correctly denied and dismissed. View "Great Falls v. Assoc. of Firefighters" on Justia Law

Adrianne Cotton filed a charge of discrimination against the Montana Department of Corrections (DOC), alleging retaliation for protected activity when her position was eliminated. Cotton had been employed by DOC since 2011 and held the position of government relations director. She reported concerns about the conduct of DOC Director Reginald Michael in 2017, which led to an investigation. Subsequently, an organizational assessment recommended eliminating Cotton's position, among others, due to budgetary and structural issues.The case was first reviewed by Hearing Officer Holien, who held a contested case hearing and found that DOC had legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for eliminating Cotton's position and did not retaliate against her. Cotton appealed to the Human Rights Commission, which rejected Holien's conclusions of law, citing the temporal proximity between Cotton's protected activity and the adverse employment action as sufficient evidence of retaliation. The Commission did not find that Holien's findings of fact were unsupported by substantial evidence.The case was then reviewed by the District Court of the First Judicial District, which found that the Commission exceeded its statutory authority by reweighing the evidence and substituting its judgment for that of the hearing officer. The District Court reversed the Commission's order and reinstated Holien's decision as the final agency decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's decision. The Court held that the Commission had abused its discretion by not adhering to the proper standard of review and by reweighing evidence that supported Holien's findings. The Supreme Court concluded that the District Court did not err in reinstating Holien's findings as the final agency decision, as they were supported by substantial evidence in the record. View "Cotton v. Dept. of Corrections" on Justia Law

Capstone Logistics, LLC, a company providing labor to other businesses, began supplying auditors to Associated Wholesale Grocers in 2019. The auditors, including Joyce Henson, were responsible for checking groceries and ensuring order accuracy. Henson, hired as lead auditor, raised concerns about safety, training, and pay on behalf of the auditors. She also contacted Donny Rouse, a major customer, about her pay. After a meeting with Capstone officials, Henson sent a LinkedIn message to Rouse about the auditors' pay issues. Following a brief interaction with Associated Wholesale Grocers' Director Chris Griffin, Henson was terminated by Capstone's Vice President Tim Casey.The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) issued a complaint against Capstone, alleging violations of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) for discharging Henson due to her protected concerted activities. An administrative law judge (ALJ) dismissed the allegations, finding no sufficient causal connection between Henson's protected activities and her termination. The ALJ concluded that Henson's termination was more likely due to her efforts to secure better compensation for herself.The NLRB reversed the ALJ's decision, finding that Henson was discharged for engaging in protected concerted activity by sending the LinkedIn message to Rouse and because Capstone believed she had engaged in such activity during her conversation with Griffin. Capstone petitioned for review, and the NLRB cross-petitioned for enforcement of its order.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found insufficient evidence to support the NLRB's finding that Capstone discharged Henson for sending the LinkedIn message. However, the court affirmed the NLRB's alternative determination that Capstone violated Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA by discharging Henson because it believed she had engaged in protected concerted activity. The court denied Capstone's petition for review and granted the NLRB's cross-application to enforce its order. View "Capstone Logistics v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

Mark Johnson sued the Clarksdale Public Utilities Authority (CPU) and its members in federal district court, alleging he was fired for reporting inefficiency and incompetence to the state auditor. His initial complaint asserted retaliation under the Mississippi Whistleblower Protection Act (MWPA), later amended to include First Amendment retaliation and breach of contract. The defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings, which the district court granted, holding that Johnson failed to comply with the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA) notice requirements and that the MWPA claim was barred by the MTCA’s one-year statute of limitations. The court also found Johnson’s First Amendment and breach-of-contract claims time-barred.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case, focusing on whether the MTCA’s procedural requirements apply to MWPA claims. The defendants argued that the MTCA’s broad application and limited immunity waiver necessitate compliance with its procedural requirements for MWPA claims. Johnson countered that the MWPA provides a separate right to monetary relief and should not be subject to the MTCA’s requirements.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the certified question from the Fifth Circuit. The court concluded that the MWPA is a remedial statute separate from the MTCA. The MWPA does not prescribe a statute of limitations or notice requirement, and the reference to the MTCA’s damages cap does not incorporate its procedural requirements. Therefore, the court held that MWPA claims are not subject to the MTCA’s statute of limitations and notice requirements. The certified question was answered accordingly. View "Johnson v. Miller" on Justia Law

Amanda Shrewsbury, the respondent, was employed as a teacher’s aide in a pre-kindergarten classroom at Cumberland Heights Elementary School during the 2018-2019 school year. She reported witnessing abuse and neglect of students by the classroom teacher, Alma Belcher, to the school principal, Steve Hayes, and later to the superintendent, Dr. Deborah Akers. Following her complaints, Shrewsbury alleges that her employment was terminated. She subsequently filed a lawsuit against the Mercer County Board of Education, Dr. Akers, and others, claiming wrongful discharge and other related grievances.The Circuit Court of Mercer County reviewed the case and denied the petitioners' motion for summary judgment, which was based on the assertion of qualified immunity. The court found that the petitioners were not entitled to qualified immunity under the circumstances presented.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the petitioners, as a political subdivision and an employee of a political subdivision, were not entitled to qualified immunity solely because the claims against them fell within the exceptions to statutory immunity set forth in the West Virginia Governmental Tort Claims and Insurance Reform Act. The court clarified that the mere inapplicability of the Tort Claims Act due to specific exemptions does not permit the petitioners to claim qualified immunity. Therefore, the circuit court's denial of the motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity was upheld. View "Mercer County Board of Education v. Shrewsbury" on Justia Law

The case involves the termination of a police chief, Erica Barga, by the Village Council of St. Paris. Barga was placed on administrative leave by the mayor, who filed charges against her for insubordination and neglect of duty. Barga requested a public hearing to address these charges. The village council conducted the hearing in public but deliberated in executive session before voting to terminate Barga's employment.The Champaign County Court of Common Pleas upheld the village council's decision, concluding that Barga did not have a substantive or procedural right to have the entire disciplinary hearing open to the public. The court also found that the village council's decision was presumed valid and that Barga had not overcome this presumption.The Second District Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision regarding the Open Meetings Act, relying on a federal district court decision that exempted quasi-judicial proceedings from the Act. However, it found that the common pleas court had applied the wrong standard of review and remanded the case for a de novo review.The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the court of appeals' decision, holding that the village council violated the Open Meetings Act by deliberating in executive session after Barga requested a public hearing. The court emphasized that the plain terms of the Act required the council to consider the charges in a public hearing. The court remanded the case to the village council for a public hearing in compliance with the Open Meetings Act. View "Barga v. St. Paris Village Council" on Justia Law