Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Employees of Veolia Water Contract Operations USA, Inc. filed a lawsuit in Massachusetts state court, claiming they were entitled to prevailing wages under the Massachusetts Prevailing Wage Act (PWA) for work performed. They argued that their work fell within the scope of the PWA. Veolia removed the case to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted summary judgment in favor of Veolia. The court concluded that the Special Act of 1997, which pertains to the Springfield Water and Sewer Commission, exempted Veolia from the obligation to pay prevailing wages under the PWA. The employees appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The central issue was whether the Special Act required Veolia to pay prevailing wages. The court noted that the outcome depended on unresolved questions of Massachusetts law and significant policy concerns. Consequently, the First Circuit decided to certify the dispositive state law questions to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court for clarification.The First Circuit certified two questions: the meaning of "construction and design of improvements" in the Special Act and whether the Special Act is incompatible with the PWA under the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's decision in Metcalf v. BSC Group, Inc. The First Circuit retained jurisdiction over the appeal pending the resolution of these certified questions. View "Nicholls v. Veolia Water Contract Operations USA, Inc." on Justia Law

Katrina Robertson, an independent contractor working as a polygraph examiner for the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), was involved in an automobile accident while exiting the DIA campus. She sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), alleging that a DIA employee's negligence caused the accident. The government moved to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that it had not waived its sovereign immunity under the FTCA because a private employer in similar circumstances would be immune from suit under Virginia law.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted the government's motion to dismiss. The court found that the DIA was a "statutory employer" under the Virginia Workers' Compensation Act (VWCA) and that Robertson's injury occurred during the course of her work. Therefore, the VWCA provided the exclusive remedy, and the government was immune from the suit. The district court also denied Robertson's motion to certify a question to the Supreme Court of Virginia as moot.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Fourth Circuit held that under the FTCA, the United States is liable only to the extent that a private party would be liable in similar circumstances. Since a private employer in Virginia would be immune from a negligence suit under the VWCA if it were a statutory employer, the United States had not waived its sovereign immunity. The court concluded that the district court properly dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Robertson v. United States" on Justia Law

Lieutenant Staci K. Shepherd, a Rhode Island State Police officer with a commendable 22-year career, suffered a heart attack during a firearms requalification program on May 2, 2017, which left her permanently disabled. She applied for a disability pension under Rhode Island law and the collective-bargaining agreement (CBA) between the State of Rhode Island and the Rhode Island Troopers Association. Superintendent Colonel James M. Manni denied her application, concluding that she failed to prove her heart attack was causally related to her employment. Shepherd then filed a declaratory-judgment complaint.The Superior Court found Superintendent Manni's decision arbitrary and capricious, declaring Shepherd entitled to a disability pension. The court criticized the superintendent's requirement for causation to a reasonable degree of medical certainty and his failure to consider the CBA's heart-attack presumption provision. The court granted Shepherd's motion for partial summary judgment, leading to the defendant's appeal.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo. The court noted that the superintendent applied an incorrect causation standard, requiring proof that the heart attack was caused by employment, rather than whether employment conditions contributed to the injury. The court emphasized that under the correct standard, it is sufficient if employment conditions contributed to the injury. Given the undisputed facts, including the stress and physical demands of Shepherd's job, the court concluded that her employment contributed to her heart attack. Consequently, the court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment, declaring Shepherd entitled to a disability pension. View "Shepherd v. Rhode Island State Police" on Justia Law

Kheloud Allos filed a lawsuit against her former employer, Poway Unified School District (PUSD), alleging violations of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) and the Labor Code. Allos claimed that PUSD's refusal to allow her to work exclusively from home during the COVID-19 pandemic constituted disability discrimination, failure to provide reasonable accommodation, failure to engage in an interactive process, associational discrimination, and retaliation. She also alleged that PUSD failed to maintain a safe and healthy workplace and retaliated against her in violation of the Labor Code.The Superior Court of San Diego County granted PUSD's motion for summary judgment, finding that Allos's claims were barred by Government Code section 855.4, which provides immunity to public entities for decisions related to preventing disease or controlling its spread. The court also found that Allos failed to establish a triable issue of fact regarding her disability, the essential functions of her job, and whether she experienced an adverse employment action. The court noted that PUSD had engaged in multiple interactive meetings with Allos and provided various accommodations.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the trial court's judgment. The appellate court agreed that section 855.4 provided immunity to PUSD for its decisions related to COVID-19 safety measures. The court also found that Allos failed to present evidence of a qualifying disability under FEHA, as her alleged vaccine allergy and other health conditions did not constitute a disability. Additionally, the court held that PUSD's interactive process and accommodations were reasonable and that Allos did not suffer an adverse employment action, as she voluntarily retired. The court concluded that Allos's claims for associational discrimination, retaliation, and Labor Code violations were without merit. View "Allos v. Poway Unified School District" on Justia Law

Wanda Brown, the elected treasurer of the City of Inglewood since 1987, raised concerns in late 2019 and early 2020 about the city's financial management, specifically alleging that the mayor had misappropriated public funds. Following these allegations, Brown claimed she faced retaliatory actions from the city and its officials, including a reduction in her salary and authority, exclusion from meetings and committees, and other punitive measures. Brown subsequently filed a lawsuit against the city, its mayor, and council members for retaliation under California Labor Code section 1102.5, which protects whistleblowers.The Los Angeles County Superior Court denied the defendants' anti-SLAPP motion, which sought to strike Brown's retaliation claim on the grounds that she was not an "employee" under section 1102.5. The court reasoned that Brown's claim did not arise from protected speech activities but from alleged retaliatory actions. The Court of Appeal reversed this decision, concluding that Brown's retaliation claim did arise from protected activities and that she was not an "employee" under section 1102.5, as the statute did not explicitly include elected officials within its protections.The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeal's judgment. The court held that elected officials, such as Brown, are not considered "employees" under Labor Code section 1106 and therefore cannot invoke the protections of section 1102.5. The court's decision was based on the statutory language, legislative history, and the context of related whistleblower statutes, which indicated that the Legislature did not intend to include elected officials within the scope of these protections. View "Brown v. City of Inglewood" on Justia Law

A group of entities managing a university hospital and a union representing the hospital’s service workers have been negotiating a successor agreement since 2016. The hospital proposed three key changes: granting itself unilateral control over employment terms, imposing a no-strike clause, and eliminating binding arbitration. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) found that these proposals collectively constituted bad faith bargaining, as they would leave union employees worse off than if no contract existed.An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) initially sustained the complaint against the hospital, concluding that the hospital violated Sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) by bargaining in bad faith. The ALJ found that the hospital’s proposals, including a restrictive grievance-arbitration procedure and a broad management rights clause, indicated an intent to undermine the bargaining process. The hospital’s regressive bargaining tactics further supported this conclusion.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court upheld the NLRB’s findings, agreeing that the hospital’s conduct amounted to bad faith surface bargaining. The court found substantial evidence supporting the NLRB’s conclusion that the hospital’s proposals, taken together, would strip the union of its representational role and leave employees with fewer rights than they would have without a contract. The court also upheld the NLRB’s procedural decisions, including vacating an earlier decision due to a board member’s financial conflict of interest and seating a new member for the final decision.The court denied the hospital’s petition for review and granted the NLRB’s cross-application for enforcement, affirming the NLRB’s order for the hospital to recognize and bargain with the union, rescind unilateral changes, compensate affected employees, and submit periodic reports on bargaining progress. View "District Hospital Partners, L.P. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

The case involves members of the Auburn University Board of Trustees and various Auburn University employees (defendants) who were sued by Patti Northcutt and her husband, Walter Northcutt (plaintiffs). Patti, a former employee and doctoral student at Auburn, alleged that the defendants retaliated against her for previous lawsuits and grievances she had filed, which were settled through agreements. She claimed that the defendants breached these settlement agreements and interfered with her ability to complete her doctoral program and obtain employment at Auburn.The plaintiffs initially filed their complaint in the Lee Circuit Court, which they amended multiple times. The third amended complaint included claims under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for First Amendment retaliation, equal protection, and procedural due process violations, as well as state-law claims for breach of contract, intentional interference with contractual relations, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The defendants moved to dismiss these claims, asserting federal qualified immunity and State immunity under the Alabama Constitution.The Lee Circuit Court granted the motion to dismiss the First Amendment and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims but denied the motion regarding the other claims. The defendants then petitioned the Supreme Court of Alabama for a writ of mandamus to direct the trial court to dismiss the remaining claims.The Supreme Court of Alabama granted the petition in part, directing the trial court to dismiss the claims for monetary damages against the employee defendants in their individual capacities under § 1983 for equal protection and procedural due process violations, based on federal qualified immunity. The Court also directed the dismissal of the plaintiffs' request for attorneys' fees related to state-law claims for prospective injunctive relief, based on State immunity. However, the Court denied the petition regarding the plaintiffs' request for attorneys' fees related to federal-law claims for prospective injunctive relief and the state-law claims for monetary damages against the employee defendants in their individual capacities. View "Ex parte B.T. Roberts" on Justia Law

The case involves the Citizen Action Defense Fund (Fund) requesting the initial offers for collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) from the Washington State Office of Financial Management (OFM) under the Public Records Act (PRA). The key issue is whether the deliberative process exemption under RCW 42.56.280 applies to these initial offers after the tentative CBAs have been signed by the parties and submitted to the OFM director but before they are signed by the governor or funded by the legislature.The Thurston County Superior Court found that OFM violated the PRA by withholding the records, ruling that the deliberative process exemption did not apply once the CBAs were signed by the state’s negotiation representative and the union. The Court of Appeals reversed this decision, holding that the records were still exempt because the CBAs had not been presented to the governor for approval or funded by the legislature, and thus were not yet final.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that the deliberative process exemption continues to apply until the legislature has funded the CBAs. The court reasoned that the collective bargaining process is not complete until the final step in the statutorily required implementation process, which is the approval of funding by the legislature. Therefore, the deliberative process exemption protects the documents related to collective bargaining until the CBAs are funded by the legislature. View "Citizen Action Def. Fund v. Off. of Fin. Mgmt." on Justia Law

Miller Plastic Products Inc. fired Ronald Vincer in March 2020, during the early weeks of the COVID-19 pandemic. Vincer had expressed concerns about the company's pandemic protocols and its operating status, believing it was not an essential business. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) determined that Vincer’s termination violated Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) because it was motivated, at least in part, by his protected concerted activity.The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that Vincer’s conduct was protected under the NLRA and that his termination was motivated by his protected activity. The ALJ also disallowed testimony regarding after-acquired evidence at the liability stage of the proceeding. Miller Plastic petitioned for review of the Board’s order, and the Board cross-applied for enforcement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that substantial evidence supported the Board’s determination that Vincer’s conduct was protected under the NLRA and was a motivating factor for his termination. The court also agreed with the ALJ’s decision to disallow testimony regarding after-acquired evidence at the liability stage, noting that such evidence is typically considered during compliance proceedings.However, the court found that the NLRB failed to adequately address certain evidence related to Miller Plastic’s affirmative defense that it would have fired Vincer even absent his protected conduct. The court remanded the case to the Board to address the significance of that evidence. The court denied Miller Plastic’s petition for review in part and granted the Board’s cross-application for enforcement in part, affirming the finding that Vincer was terminated because of his concerted activity. View "Miller Plastic Products Inc v. NLRB" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between several plaintiffs, who are foreign nationals participating in an au pair program, and Cultural Care, Inc., a Massachusetts company that places au pairs with host families in the U.S. The plaintiffs allege that Cultural Care violated their rights under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and various state wage and hour laws by failing to pay them legal wages. They also claim violations of state deceptive trade practices laws.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts denied Cultural Care's motion to dismiss the complaint, including its defense of derivative sovereign immunity under Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Construction Company. Cultural Care appealed, but the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision, concluding that Cultural Care had not established entitlement to protection under Yearsley. After the case returned to the District Court, Cultural Care filed a motion to compel arbitration based on agreements in contracts signed by the au pairs with International Care Ltd. (ICL), a Swiss company. The District Court denied this motion, ruling that Cultural Care had waived its right to compel arbitration and that it could not enforce the arbitration agreement as a nonsignatory.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's denial of the motion to compel arbitration. The court held that Cultural Care, as a nonsignatory to the ICL Contract, could not enforce the arbitration agreement under either third-party beneficiary theory or equitable estoppel. The court emphasized that the arbitration agreement did not demonstrate with "special clarity" that the signatories intended to confer arbitration rights on Cultural Care. Additionally, the plaintiffs' statutory claims did not depend on the ICL Contract, making equitable estoppel inapplicable. View "Posada v. Cultural Care, Inc." on Justia Law