Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Mr. Palmeri began his employment with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in 1997 and was promoted to the Senior Executive Service (SES) in 2020. He was not informed that joining the DEA SES would affect his appeal rights. In January 2022, the DEA proposed his removal based on alleged misconduct, but before the removal was finalized, Mr. Palmeri retired. The agency stated that, had he not retired, he would have been removed. He then appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board (the Board), claiming his retirement was involuntary and constituted a constructive removal.The DEA moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing that SES employees in the DEA do not have the right to appeal adverse actions to the Board under 5 U.S.C. § 3151. After allowing for discovery and briefing, an Administrative Judge dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The full Merit Systems Protection Board affirmed and adopted this initial decision, explaining that DEA SES employees can only appeal adverse actions through procedures established by the Attorney General, but no such procedures or regulations have been promulgated.On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit considered whether the Board had jurisdiction over Mr. Palmeri’s appeal. The court held that the governing statutes clearly exclude DEA SES employees from Board appeal rights and require any hearing or appeal to be decided pursuant to regulations issued by the Attorney General, which do not exist. The court rejected arguments that lack of notice or absence of regulations should confer jurisdiction on the Board, and clarified that any constitutional claims must be pursued in a different forum. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. View "PALMERI v. MSPB " on Justia Law

A corrections officer at the Anamosa State Penitentiary was killed during a prison escape attempt in March 2021, along with a nurse, when two inmates armed themselves with tools from the prison’s machine shop and attacked staff in the infirmary. The inmates were apprehended and convicted of first-degree murder. The officer’s surviving spouse filed compensation claims with the state appeal board against co-employees of the Iowa Department of Corrections, alleging gross negligence contributed to the security lapses that enabled the attack. The claims identified several co-employees by name as potential parties at fault.After the claims were withdrawn due to lack of resolution, the surviving spouse filed suit in the Iowa District Court for Jones County against twenty-six co-employees, including some not previously named in the administrative process. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that Iowa’s workers’ compensation law precluded gross negligence claims against state or local government co-employees, that the spouse failed to comply with administrative requirements under the Iowa Tort Claims Act (ITCA), and that the pleading was insufficient under qualified immunity standards. The district court denied the motion on all grounds.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case after treating the appeal as an interlocutory application. The court held that Iowa Code section 85.2 does not bar gross negligence claims against state co-employees; such claims are permissible under section 85.20(2). The court also found that, while the administrative claims process under the ITCA was satisfied as to those co-employees named in the initial claims, it was not satisfied for those not identified. Therefore, the motion to dismiss was properly denied for co-employees named in the administrative claims and should have been granted for those who were not. The denial was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and the case remanded. View "Montague v. Skinner" on Justia Law

A member of the United States Army National Guard, Stacy Gonzales, worked as a local disease intervention specialist at the Finney County Health Department in Kansas. Her position was funded primarily through Aid-to-Local grants distributed by the Kansas Department of Health and Environment (KDHE), which set substantive job expectations and supervised both state and local disease intervention specialists. Gonzales’s salary and benefits were determined and paid by Finney County, but her day-to-day work, training, and performance evaluations involved significant oversight from KDHE. When KDHE decided not to renew the Aid-to-Local grant in 2010 due to perceived performance deficiencies, Finney County was forced to terminate Gonzales’s position, resulting in her unemployment.The United States filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas, alleging that KDHE had violated the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA) by discriminating against Gonzales based on her military service obligations. Both sides moved for summary judgment on the threshold issue of whether Kansas, through KDHE, was Gonzales’s “employer” under USERRA. The district court granted summary judgment to Kansas, concluding that KDHE was not Gonzales’s employer because it did not have direct authority to hire, fire, supervise, or determine her salary or benefits.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The appellate court held that the definition of “employer” under USERRA includes entities that exercise control over employment opportunities, not limited to direct authority over hiring, firing, or pay. The court found sufficient evidence that KDHE retained significant control over Gonzales’s employment opportunities to preclude summary judgment. The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "United States v. Department of Health & Environment" on Justia Law

A firefighter employed by a county for over two decades reported safety violations concerning the maintenance of fire extinguishers on county fire engines. After raising these concerns with his superiors, he was barred from working in fire prevention, which he believed was retaliation for his whistleblowing activities. Although he filed internal complaints with the county’s Office of Human Resources and the Civil Service Commission, he withdrew his appeal after assurances that his concerns would be addressed. Later, he was investigated for alleged misconduct and ultimately terminated for violations of county rules. He then filed a claim under the Government Claims Act, which the county rejected.The Superior Court of Kern County granted the county’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding that the plaintiff’s failure to exhaust the internal administrative remedies—specifically, by not appealing his dismissal to the Civil Service Commission—barred his whistleblower retaliation lawsuit. The court denied the plaintiff’s request for leave to amend his complaint, holding that he could not allege exhaustion of remedies.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case. It held that the plaintiff was not required to exhaust the county’s internal administrative remedies before bringing his whistleblower retaliation claims because the county’s ordinances and rules did not provide a clearly defined process for submitting, evaluating, and resolving such claims. The court distinguished between general disciplinary appeals and procedures for discrimination or harassment claims, noting that there was no specific administrative remedy for whistleblower retaliation. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the judgment and remanded the matter with instructions to deny the county’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. The holding clarifies that, where an internal administrative process does not address a particular type of claim, exhaustion of that process is not required before filing suit. View "Romero v. County of Kern" on Justia Law

A registered nurse who worked for the Indian Health Service during the COVID-19 pandemic claimed that she and similarly situated nurses were required by supervisors to work overtime without compensation. After resigning, she filed a class action lawsuit in the United States Court of Federal Claims, alleging, among other things, that the government violated the federal overtime statute by failing to pay for overtime that was allegedly induced by supervisors. Specifically, she argued that the statutory requirement for overtime to be “officially ordered or approved” should cover such induced overtime, even in the absence of written authorization.The United States Court of Federal Claims dismissed all counts of her complaint for failure to state a claim. With respect to the overtime claim (Count II), the court found that she did not allege that she or any potential class members had written authorization for their overtime, as required by the relevant Office of Personnel Management (OPM) regulation.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, reviewed the validity of the OPM’s regulation that requires overtime orders or approvals to be in writing, in light of the statutory language and recent Supreme Court precedent on agency rulemaking authority. The court held that the statute delegates to OPM the authority to prescribe necessary regulations for administering the overtime pay statute, and that this includes the discretion to require written authorization as part of the “officially ordered or approved” process. The court concluded that the writing requirement is a valid exercise of OPM’s rulemaking authority and does not contradict the statute. The Federal Circuit therefore affirmed the Court of Federal Claims’ dismissal of the overtime claim and remanded the remaining claims to the original panel for further consideration. View "Lesko v. United States" on Justia Law

Several current and former employees of the City of Chicago, including police officers and an emergency management officer, challenged the City’s COVID-19 vaccination policy. The policy, issued in October 2021, required city employees to either be vaccinated against COVID-19 or undergo regular testing and report their status through an employee portal. Religious exemptions from vaccination were available and granted to these plaintiffs, but the plaintiffs objected to having to submit their vaccination status and test results in the portal, arguing that this reporting requirement violated their constitutional and statutory rights.The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, raising claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the First and Fourteenth Amendments via 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act (IRFRA). The district court dismissed the Third Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim. It found the Title VII claims factually implausible and concluded that the plaintiffs did not allege a religious practice conflicting with the reporting requirements. The court also held that, since the plaintiffs were granted their requested exemptions from vaccination, they could not succeed on claims based on their refusal to comply with reporting requirements.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The Seventh Circuit held that the policy’s reporting requirements were neutral and generally applicable, subject only to rational-basis review, which the policy satisfied. The court determined that the reporting and disciplinary provisions were rationally related to the City’s legitimate interest in public health and workplace safety. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of all constitutional, statutory, and state-law claims, finding the plaintiffs’ arguments insufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. View "Kondilis v City of Chicago" on Justia Law

The plaintiff was an employee who brought claims for wrongful termination, Labor Code violations, and breach of contract against two defendants: the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) and the Public Transportation Services Corporation (PTSC). MTA had created PTSC, a nonprofit public benefit corporation, to provide retirement and employment benefits to certain workers and to manage employees who support MTA’s transportation functions. The plaintiff did not file a prelitigation claim under the Government Claims Act (GCA) before suing these entities.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County first granted a motion for judgment on the pleadings in favor of both defendants, finding that the plaintiff had not alleged compliance with the GCA’s claim presentation requirements. The plaintiff was given leave to amend but continued to argue that PTSC was not a public entity subject to the GCA, and that even if it was, the claims presentation requirement should not apply because PTSC had not registered as required by statute. The trial court sustained a demurrer without leave to amend, finding both defendants to be public entities and that PTSC was not required to register separately from MTA. The court entered judgment for both defendants.On appeal to the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, the plaintiff did not challenge the judgment in favor of MTA but contested the ruling as to PTSC. The appellate court held that PTSC qualifies as a public entity for purposes of the GCA’s claims presentation requirement, given its creation and control by MTA. However, the court found that if PTSC failed to register properly on the Registry of Public Agencies—including with county clerks where it maintains offices—this would excuse the plaintiff’s noncompliance with the GCA. The judgment for MTA was affirmed, but the judgment for PTSC was reversed and remanded to allow the plaintiff to amend his complaint. View "Black v. L.A. County Metropolitan Transp. Authority" on Justia Law

An employee of a company specializing in training security officers raised concerns to management about unsafe working conditions, including the handling of weapons and a hazardous firing range where bullet ricochets had resulted in injuries. The employee, along with other instructors, formally complained to supervisors about these dangers, especially during the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, when he also questioned restrictions on personal protective equipment. After voicing these safety concerns, the employee was suspended and later terminated, allegedly for insubordination.The employee filed a charge with the Regional Director of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), asserting that his termination was unlawful retaliation for engaging in protected concerted activity under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). After investigation, an NLRB administrative law judge (ALJ) held a hearing and determined that the employee was not a managerial employee and was therefore protected by the NLRA. The ALJ found that the primary reason for the suspension and termination was the employee’s repeated advocacy regarding workplace safety, not insubordination. The ALJ concluded that the employer had committed unfair labor practices. The employer appealed, and the NLRB affirmed the ALJ’s decision with minor modifications.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the NLRB’s order. Applying the substantial evidence standard, the court held that the Board’s conclusion—that the employee was not a managerial employee—was supported by the record. The court found that the employee lacked authority to formulate or implement management policy and did not possess the discretion characteristic of managerial status. Therefore, the employee was entitled to the NLRA’s protections. The court granted the NLRB’s application for enforcement of its order and denied the employer’s cross-petition for review. View "National Labor Relations Board v. Constellis, LLC" on Justia Law

An agricultural company opposed a unionization effort initiated by the United Farm Workers of America, who sought certification as the exclusive bargaining representative for the company's employees under a new statutory procedure. The union filed a Majority Support Petition with the Agricultural Labor Relations Board, presenting evidence that a majority of employees supported union representation. The company responded by submitting objections and employee declarations alleging misconduct by the union during the signature collection process. The Board's regional director investigated and determined that the union had met the statutory criteria for certification, leading the Board to certify the union as the employees' representative.Following the certification, the company filed additional objections with the Agricultural Labor Relations Board, including constitutional challenges to the underlying statute. The Board dismissed most objections and set others for a hearing, but stated it could not rule on constitutional questions. While administrative proceedings were ongoing, the company filed a petition in the Superior Court of Kern County seeking to enjoin the Board from proceeding and to declare the statute unconstitutional. The Board and the union argued that the court lacked jurisdiction due to statutory limits on judicial review, but the superior court nonetheless issued a preliminary injunction halting the Board's proceedings. Appeals and writ petitions followed, consolidating the matter before the reviewing court.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fifth Appellate District, held that the superior court lacked jurisdiction to consider the challenge at this stage. The court reaffirmed that under California law, employers may not directly challenge union certification decisions in court except in extraordinary circumstances, which were not present here. The proper procedure is for employers to wait until an unfair labor practice proceeding or mandatory mediation is completed and a final order is issued before seeking judicial review. The court reversed the preliminary injunction and ordered dismissal of the company’s petition for lack of jurisdiction. View "Wonderful Nurseries v. Agricultural Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

A senior account manager at a telecommunications company was terminated after several major accounts she managed decided to discontinue the company’s services. In the months leading up to her termination, she took eight and a half days of paid leave to care for her ill daughter and mother. Her supervisor had expressed concerns about her performance, particularly with her newer accounts, but consistently granted all her leave requests without referencing the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). Despite meeting some of her performance objectives, the loss of major accounts and her supervisor’s ongoing performance criticisms culminated in her dismissal.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment to the employer on the employee’s FMLA interference and retaliation claims. The district court found that the employee had not shown she was denied any FMLA benefits or that her termination was in retaliation for taking leave. The court also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her related claim under the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL), dismissing it without prejudice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the employee did not establish an FMLA interference claim because her supervisor’s criticisms were unrelated to her leave requests, which were fully granted, and she was not prejudiced by the employer’s failure to provide FMLA notice. The court also held that the employee failed to show retaliation, as her termination was based on documented performance issues rather than the exercise of FMLA rights. Finally, the court upheld the district court’s decision to dismiss the NYCHRL claim without prejudice. View "Haran v. Orange Business Services, Inc." on Justia Law