Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Labor & Employment Law
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Rosalyn Musker worked in sales for Suuchi, Inc., which sells software subscriptions to apparel manufacturers. In addition to her base salary, Musker was eligible for commissions under Suuchi’s Sales Commission Plan (SCP). In March 2020, Suuchi decided to sell Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) on a commission basis due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Musker generated approximately $34,448,900 in gross revenue by selling PPE. The parties disputed whether her 4% commission was based on gross or net revenue and whether these commissions were considered "wages" under the Wage Payment Law (WPL) or excluded as "supplementary incentives."The trial judge dismissed Musker’s WPL claims, holding that her PPE commissions were not "wages" under the WPL. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision, agreeing that the commissions were "supplementary incentives" and not "wages" under the WPL. Musker appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case. The Court held that under the WPL, "wages" are defined as "direct monetary compensation for labor or services rendered by an employee, where the amount is determined on a time, task, piece, or commission basis." The Court concluded that compensating an employee by paying a "commission" for "labor or services" always constitutes a wage under the WPL. Therefore, a "commission" cannot be excluded from the definition of "wages" as a "supplementary incentive."The Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed the Appellate Division’s judgment, vacated the trial judge’s order dismissing Musker’s WPL claims, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Court clarified that Musker’s PPE commissions are "wages" under the WPL, regardless of whether they are based on gross or net revenue, and that receiving a base salary does not turn "commissions" into "supplementary incentives." View "Musker v. Suuchi, Inc." on Justia Law

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The plaintiff, Matthew Theisz, was assaulted by an MBTA bus driver with a known history of anger management issues and prior violent incidents. The MBTA had hired, promoted, and retained the driver despite his problematic behavior, including a previous assault on a passenger and an arrest following a confrontation with a police officer. On the day of the incident, Theisz, lost and frustrated, attempted to get the driver's attention, leading to a violent altercation where the driver severely beat him, resulting in a traumatic brain injury.The Superior Court denied the MBTA's motion for summary judgment, which argued that it was immune from liability under the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act (MTCA), specifically G. L. c. 258, § 10 (j). The MBTA contended that the claim was based on a failure to prevent harm by a third person. The Appeals Court affirmed the denial, and the MBTA sought further appellate review.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and concluded that § 10 (j) does not provide immunity to the MBTA for its own negligence in hiring, promoting, retaining, and supervising the bus driver. The court held that the MBTA's affirmative act of placing the driver in a public-facing position, despite his known violent tendencies, materially contributed to the harm suffered by Theisz. The court also reaffirmed that § 10 (c) of the MTCA, which provides immunity for intentional torts, does not shield the MBTA from liability for its own negligent supervision and retention of the driver. The court affirmed the denial of summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Theisz v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority" on Justia Law

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Space Exploration Technologies Corp. (SpaceX) operates a space launch business and a global satellite-based internet service called Starlink. In June 2022, a group of SpaceX employees sent an open letter demanding certain actions from the company and solicited support through a survey. SpaceX discharged four employees involved in the letter's distribution for violating company policies. Additional employees were later discharged for lying during a leak investigation and for unrelated performance issues. These employees filed charges with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) in November 2022, alleging violations of the National Labor Relations Act.The NLRB Regional Director found merit in the claims and issued an order consolidating the employees' cases with a hearing set for March 2024. SpaceX sued the NLRB in the Southern District of Texas (SDTX) in January 2024, challenging the NLRB's structure as unconstitutional and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The NLRB moved to transfer the case to the Central District of California (CDCA), arguing improper venue. The SDTX granted the transfer motion in February 2024. SpaceX petitioned for an emergency writ of mandamus to vacate the transfer order, which was initially stayed but later denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. SpaceX argued that the district court effectively denied its motion for a preliminary injunction by failing to rule on it by May 2, 2024. The Fifth Circuit found that SpaceX did not demonstrate the "serious, perhaps irreparable, consequence" required for an immediate appeal. The court noted that participating in the administrative proceeding did not constitute irreparable harm and that the district court did not act unreasonably in waiting to resolve procedural challenges. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit dismissed SpaceX's appeal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. View "Space Exploration Technologies Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff, an intelligence analyst with the FBI, was required to complete the FBI Basic Field Training Course (BFTC), which included in-person training sessions and various tasks and assessments, some of which were scheduled outside working hours. Plaintiff filed a complaint in the Court of Federal Claims, alleging that they were not compensated for all overtime hours worked during the BFTC.The United States Court of Federal Claims denied the government's motion for summary judgment, holding that the OPM regulation 5 C.F.R. § 551.423(a)(3), which bars overtime compensation for entry-level training, was invalid. The court reasoned that the regulation was inconsistent with the Department of Labor (DOL) regulations and that the government failed to justify the categorical rule against overtime compensation for entry-level training. The court certified the validity of the regulation for interlocutory appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and vacated the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that the OPM regulation 5 C.F.R. § 551.423(a)(3) is valid. The court reasoned that the differences between OPM and DOL regulations are justified by the need to accommodate the differences between federal and non-federal employment, particularly considering the Government Employees Training Act (GETA), which generally prohibits overtime pay for training for federal employees. The court concluded that OPM's regulation is a legitimate policy choice consistent with both the FLSA and GETA. The case was remanded to determine whether the OPM regulation is consistent with the FLSA. View "DOE NO. 1 v. US " on Justia Law

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The Santa Ana Police Officers Association (SAPOA) and certain anonymous City of Santa Ana police officers (Doe Officers) sued the City of Santa Ana, alleging wrongful disclosure of confidential personnel records, failure to investigate a complaint about the disclosure, and denial of a request for related communications. The first amended complaint included four causes of action: violation of Penal Code section 832.7 and Evidence Code sections 1043 and 1045, negligence, failure to investigate under Penal Code sections 832.5 and 832.7, and violation of the Meyers-Milias Brown Act (MMBA).The Superior Court of Orange County sustained the City’s demurrer to the first amended complaint without leave to amend, leading to the dismissal of the case. The court found that the Doe Officers could not proceed anonymously without statutory authority or court authorization. It also concluded that the SAPOA lacked standing and that there was no private right of action for the alleged violations of the Penal Code and Evidence Code sections cited.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the judgment as to the Doe Officers, agreeing they lacked authorization to proceed anonymously. It also affirmed the trial court’s decision regarding the first, second, and fourth causes of action, finding no private right of action for damages under the cited statutes and that the SAPOA failed to exhaust administrative remedies for the MMBA claim. However, the appellate court reversed the judgment concerning the third cause of action, holding that the SAPOA had standing to seek mandamus relief to compel the City to investigate the complaint and notify the SAPOA of the disposition, as required by Penal Code sections 832.5 and 832.7. The case was remanded for further proceedings on this cause of action. View "Santa Ana Police Officers Assn. v. City of Santa Ana" on Justia Law

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A minor, through his mother, filed a lawsuit against Best Academy after his teacher, Aaron Hjermstad, sexually assaulted him. Hjermstad had a history of sexual abuse allegations from his previous employment, which Best Academy did not uncover during their hiring process. The school did not obtain reference letters or contact references, which were part of their hiring protocol.The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Best Academy, reasoning that hiring decisions are always protected by the discretionary-function exception to municipal tort liability under Minnesota Statutes section 466.03, subdivision 6. The court of appeals affirmed this decision, applying the same reasoning.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that a municipality’s hiring decision is not categorically a policy-level decision involving weighing competing economic, social, political, and financial considerations. The court emphasized that the discretionary-function exception should be interpreted narrowly and that municipalities bear the burden of proving that their conduct involved such considerations. The court found that Best Academy did not provide evidence that its decision not to investigate Hjermstad’s background was based on balancing policy considerations. The court reversed the decision of the court of appeals and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. View "Minor Doe 601 v. Best Academy" on Justia Law

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Gerry Serrano, a police officer for the City of Santa Ana, took a leave of absence to serve as president of the Santa Ana Police Officers Association. The Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) determined that certain special pay additives Serrano received before and during his service as Association president could not be included in his pension. The Administrative Board of CalPERS and the Superior Court of Sacramento County affirmed the exclusion of most of these pay additives from Serrano’s pension. Serrano appealed, arguing that Government Code section 3558.8 mandates he cannot lose any compensation, including pensionable compensation, while serving as the Association president. He also challenged the specific exclusion of a confidential premium and holiday pay from his pensionable compensation.The Superior Court of Sacramento County denied Serrano’s petition for writ of administrative mandamus, which sought to vacate the Board’s decision and include all pay additives in his retirement calculation. Serrano then appealed to the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, affirmed the lower court’s decision. The court held that section 3558.8 did not require the compensation Serrano earned as a police sergeant to be entirely pensionable while he served as Association president. The court concluded that the confidential premium was not pensionable because it constituted nonpensionable overtime and did not meet the regulatory definition for the confidentiality premium. Additionally, the court found that Serrano’s holiday pay was not pensionable because he was not required to work on holidays, as required by the relevant regulation. The court’s decision was based on the interpretation of the Retirement Law and the specific definitions and requirements for pensionable compensation under that law. View "Serrano v. Public Employees' Retirement System" on Justia Law

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John Lowry, a harbor patrol officer, suffered physical and psychiatric injuries, including PTSD, from a workplace accident. His psychiatrist deemed him unfit to return to work, and the Port San Luis Harbor District (the District) indicated that his only option was retirement. Lowry applied for disability retirement, but the District denied his application, stating insufficient information to determine disability. The California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) also denied his application, and the District terminated his employment, claiming he voluntarily resigned, which was later admitted to be untrue.The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the District, concluding that Lowry was not eligible for relief under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) because he could not perform his essential job duties with or without reasonable accommodations. The court found that disability retirement does not qualify as a term, condition, or privilege of employment under FEHA.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, affirmed the trial court's decision. The court held that the denial of disability retirement payments is not an adverse employment action under FEHA. Disability retirement payments serve as income replacement for employees who can no longer work and do not facilitate continued employment, job performance, or advancement opportunities. The court concluded that an individual who is not a qualified employee cannot bring a disability discrimination claim under FEHA for the denial of disability retirement payments. The judgment in favor of the District was affirmed. View "Lowry v. Port San Luis Harbor Dist." on Justia Law

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Claudia C. Conner, the plaintiff, was employed by the Oklahoma Employment Security Commission (OESC) as General Counsel and Chief of Staff. She was terminated in November 2021, at the age of over sixty, despite having satisfactory job performance and receiving a raise a month prior. Conner alleges that her termination was due to age and gender discrimination, and retaliation for reporting sexual harassment by a state vendor. She filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, which issued a right to sue letter, leading her to file a lawsuit in the Oklahoma County District Court.The OESC moved to dismiss the case, arguing that Conner failed to comply with the notice provisions of the Governmental Tort Claims Act (GTCA). The District Court of Oklahoma County denied the motion, citing material conflicts between the GTCA and the Oklahoma Anti-Discrimination Act (OADA). The OESC then sought and was granted a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case and held that there are no material or irreconcilable conflicts between the GTCA and the OADA regarding the notice provisions. The court found that the GTCA's notice requirements apply to claims under the OADA. Consequently, the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The Supreme Court emphasized that compliance with the GTCA notice provisions is a jurisdictional requirement for tort suits against governmental entities. View "CONNER v. STATE" on Justia Law

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Mark L. Sadler, a former employee of the United States Army, was suspended and then removed from his position for insubordination. Sadler claimed that these actions were retaliatory under the Whistleblower Protection Act and sought corrective action from the Merit Systems Protection Board (Board). He also requested sanctions against the government for the destruction of evidence. The Board denied both his motion for sanctions and his request for corrective action.The Merit Systems Protection Board initially dismissed Sadler’s first complaint, finding it did not sufficiently allege protected activity. For his second complaint, the Board acknowledged that Sadler engaged in protected whistleblower activity but concluded that the Army had shown by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same actions regardless of the protected activity. The Board also denied Sadler’s motion for sanctions, finding that the destruction of evidence was part of the Army’s ordinary procedures and did not warrant sanctions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the Board’s decision. The court agreed that Sadler’s first complaint did not allege protected activity and that the Army had provided clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same actions absent the whistleblowing. The court also upheld the Board’s decision on the sanctions issue, agreeing that the destruction of evidence was part of routine procedures and did not meet the intent standard required for sanctions under Rule 37(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. View "SADLER v. ARMY " on Justia Law