Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Labor & Employment Law
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After 14 years of employment, Clare Byrd received a Notice of Pending Dismissal from her position as Administrative Analyst/Specialist at San Diego State University (SDSU), part of the California State University (CSU) system. In December 2014, SDSU provided Byrd with a Notice which stated that she was dismissed from her employment effective December 15. Byrd then filed a Service Retirement Election Application with CalPERS, with a retirement date of December 31, 2014. CalPERS accepted her application and proposed effective retirement date. Byrd appealed after she was denied by a trial court for writ of mandate and declaratory judgment, asking the court to intervene following the breakdown of a settlement agreement between her and CSU, which the State Personnel Board (SPB) initially approved. But following a refusal to comply with material terms of the settlement by CalPERS, SPB changed its position and rejected the settlement in a decision vacating its prior approval. Among other provisions, the settlement agreement directed that Byrd would be reinstated to a classification with a significantly higher salary, which she had never held, and that she would receive compensation at the higher salary during the period that CSU, with her assistance, would apply for medical retirement benefits. Byrd requested that the trial court compel CalPERS to process her reinstatement at the higher salary level. CalPERS maintained it was unable to do so because Government Code section 21198 only authorized Byrd's reinstatement to a job classification she previously held before her termination. The trial court agreed with CalPERS and denied Byrd's petition. On appeal, Byrd argued section 21198 allowed CalPERS to reinstate Byrd to employment as a straightforward matter and did not require reinstatement to the same specific classification or pay rate. She emphasized that the bargained-for terms of the settlement agreement contemplated a scenario in which Byrd would return to work, at least for a short period, while her application for medical retirement benefits was processed. The Court of Appeal determined that in the typical case, section 21198 directs CalPERS to reinstate an employee who was involuntarily terminated but then returned to that same classification as a result of an administrative or judicial proceeding. There may be atypical circumstances in which an individual can be properly reinstate, but if there are those instances, the statute requires a nexus between the new classification and the underlying dispute. In the absence of any such connection here, the Court found section 21198 prevented CalPERS's compliance with the settlement agreement. View "Byrd v. State Personnel Bd." on Justia Law

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The State of Delaware appealed a superior court order that affirmed a determination by the Industrial Accident Board (the Board) that Nicholas Gates was working within the course and scope of his employment when he was injured in a motor vehicle collision. At the time of the collision, Gates was employed by the State as a road-maintenance equipment operator for the Department of Transportation (DelDOT). The collision occurred while he was responding to a “call-back” after his normal work hours. He was called back to attend to a roadside accident. Gates sought workers’ compensation benefits from the State for his injury. At the hearing before the Board, the State argued that State of Delaware Merit Rule 4.16 1 and a document titled “Call-Back Pay Guidelines and Recommended Procedure” (the Call-Back Pay Guidelines) were part of Gates’s employment contract. According to these provisions, Gates was not to be paid for a call-back until he arrived at the DelDOT yard. Because Gates’s collision occurred before he arrived at the yard, the State argued, his injury occurred outside the course and scope of his employment and was, therefore, not compensable under Delaware’s Workers’ Compensation Act (the Act).3 The Board looked to the parties’ prior course of conduct to determine the terms of the employment contract and found that Gates’s injury was compensable under the Act because, based on the parties’ prior course of conduct, he “was working within the course and scope of his employment contract when the motor vehicle accident occurred.” The Superior Court affirmed the Board’s decision. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court, and therefore the Board. Specifically, the Court determined the Board applied the correct legal standard and acted within its discretion in finding, based on Gates’s unrebutted testimony as to the parties’ course of conduct prior to the collision, that the terms of Gates’s employment contract established he was to be paid for a callback from the time he received the call and that, at the time of the collision, he was working within the course and scope of this contract. These factual findings were supported by substantial evidence; the Board did not err in determining that Gates’s injury was compensable under the Act. View "Delaware v. Gates" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Special Appeals reversing the decision of the circuit court affirming the decision of the Workers' Compensation Commission modifying an order that provided Officer Peter Gang, who was injured working as a correctional officer for Montgomery County, a compensation award for a permanent partial disability resulting from his injury, holding that the Commission was authorized to retroactively modify the compensation award.Specifically, the Commission retroactively adjusted the rate of compensation because, as a public safety employee, Officer Gang had been entitled to a higher rate of compensation than that which he initially received. The Court of Appeals concluded that the Commission was not statutorily authorized to retroactively modify Officer Gang's rate of compensation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) under section 9-736(b) of the Workers' Compensation Act, the Commission may modify the compensation award within five years from the date of the last compensation payment; and (2) because Officer Gang applied for the correction before the statutory five-year period expired the Commission properly exercised its continuing jurisdiction to retroactively correct the rate of compensation in Officer Gang's award for permanent partial disability based on an error of law. View "Gang v. Montgomery County" on Justia Law

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Christopher Ross appealed the grant of summary judgment entered in favor of the County of Riverside on Ross's claims for violation of Labor Code section 1102.5 and for violation of the provisions in the Fair Employment and Housing Act (Gov. Code, sec. 12900 et seq.; FEHA) prohibiting disability discrimination, failure to reasonably accommodate, failure to engage in the interactive process, and failure to prevent disability discrimination. Ross worked for the County as a deputy district attorney. He was assigned to the homicide prosecution unit and was "responsible for however many cases were assigned to [him] by [his] supervisor." In May 2013, Ross learned he was exhibiting neurological symptoms that required evaluation and testing to determine whether he had a serious neurological condition, and told his supervisor he might be very seriously ill with a neurodegenerative disease and needed to undergo medical testing. He requested a transfer to another assignment during the testing. His supervisor declined his request, telling him the district attorney's office would worry about his cases and transferring him if and when he found out he could not continue in his position. Ross also asked not to be assigned any new cases until after he completed the medical testing. His supervisor declined this request without explanation. In late September 2013, Ross met with his supervisor, the chief deputy district attorney, and the assistant district attorney to discuss transferring him from the Homicide Unit to the Filing Unit for the next three months because he was not able to go to trial or accept new cases. In the assistant district attorney's view, Ross's inability to accept new cases or go to trial in the near term made him insufficiently productive to be a member of the Homicide Unit. By April 2014, the County wrote Ross explaining that for the County to engage in a good faith interactive process and to evaluate his request for accommodation the County needed medical documentation from an appropriate healthcare professional or from the board-certified specialist selected to perform the fitness-for-duty examination. Through counsel, Ross deemed himself constructively terminated as of the date of the letter. By June 2014, the County considered Ross to have abandoned his job. The Court of Appeal concluded there were triable issues of material fact on the questions of whether Ross engaged in protected activity under Labor Code section 1102.5 and whether Ross had a physical disability under the FEHA. The Court therefore reversed judgment as to these claims and remanded the matter for further proceedings. View "Ross v. County of Riverside" on Justia Law

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Eight Ball Trucking, Inc., and David and Laurie Horrocks (collectively “defendants”) appealed from an order entered after the district court denied their motion under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b) for relief from a summary judgment. The Horrocks are officers of Eight Ball, a Utah trucking company doing business in North Dakota during the relevant time period. A dispute arose over Eight Ball’s allocation of employees between North Dakota and Utah and Eight Ball’s obligation to procure North Dakota workers compensation insurance for its North Dakota employees. In late March and early April 2016, Workforce Safety & Insurance (“WSI”) commenced an action against the defendants by serving them with a summons and complaint to enjoin them from employing individuals in North Dakota and to collect $802,689.84 in unpaid workers compensation insurance premiums, penalties, and interest. The complaint alleged that WSI had issued an August 28, 2015 notice of an administrative decision finding the Horrocks personally liable for unpaid premiums and penalties owed by Eight Ball, that the Horrocks did not request reconsideration nor appeal from that decision, and that the administrative decision was res judicata. WSI filed the pending lawsuit in district court and moved for summary judgment. According to the Horrocks, they did not respond to the summary judgment motion because they thought they had submitted necessary documentation to WSI to resolve the issue. The district court ultimately granted WSI’s motion for summary judgment, awarding WSI $812,702.79 in premiums, penalties, and costs and disbursements and enjoining Eight Ball from engaging in employment in North Dakota. On December 19, 2016, WSI sent the Horrocks a letter, informing them the judgment had been entered against them on December 15, 2016, and requesting payment. The defendants did not appeal the summary judgment. Defendants moved to set aside the summary judgment on grounds of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect. The district court denied the motion, determining the defendants’ disregard and neglect of the legal process was not excusable neglect and failed to establish extraordinary circumstances necessary to set aside the judgment under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b). After review of the district court record, the North Dakota Supreme Court concurred and affirmed judgment. View "WSI v. Eight Ball Trucking, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

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James Sabo and Fun-Co., Inc., appealed a judgment affirming a decision of Job Service North Dakota determining Sabo was overpaid unemployment benefits in the amount of $14,638 and requiring him to refund those previously paid benefits. Sabo was an officer, employee, and owner of all shares of stock in Fun-Co., Inc., which operated a bar and restaurant in Fargo. After a fire damaged the building which housed the bar and restaurant, Sabo filed a claim for unemployment benefits. Job Service mailed a reconsidered monetary determination informing Sabo he was entitled to $67 per week for 26 weeks because he failed to disclose that he had a one-fourth or greater ownership interest in Fun-Co., Inc. The reconsidered monetary determination informed Sabo that if he disagreed with the determination, he “must file an appeal no later than 11/21/2017.” Sabo did not appeal. On December 1, 2017, Job Service issued a notice of overpayment and informed Sabo he had twelve calendar days to appeal the overpayment amount. Then, Sabo appealed. Because Job Service’s decision was in accordance with the law and was supported by a preponderance of the evidence, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. View "Sabo, et al. v. Job Service" on Justia Law

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Frank Cuozzo appeals from a judgment dismissing his breach of contract action against the State, doing business as the University of North Dakota (UND), and its president Mark Kennedy. Cuozzo was a tenured faculty member in UND’s Anthropology Department. After failing to inform his department of convictions for driving under the influence and driving with a revoked license, Cuozzo was placed on a performance improvement plan which he subsequently violated. On January 30, 2017, Cuozzo was terminated from his position and he filed a formal grievance. The Standing Committee on Faculty Rights held a hearing and issued a four-page report finding there was clear and convincing evidence of adequate cause to terminate Cuozzo, but recommending that he be allowed to resign instead of being terminated for cause. The Standing Committee submitted its findings and conclusions to Kennedy. Four days after receiving the report, Kennedy wrote a letter to Cuozzo upholding the University's decision to terminate Cuozzo's employment. Cuozzo responded to Kennedy’s letter and complained about “such a quick decision,” alleging Kennedy failed to comply with the UND Faculty Handbook relating to dismissals which stated “[t]he president shall make a decision and provide written notice of the decision, including findings of fact and reasons or conclusions based on the hearing record.” Cuozzo sued UND and Kennedy claiming they breached his employment contract because Kennedy failed to review the hearing record and make his own findings and conclusions. When unsuccessful at district court, Cuozzo appealed to the North Dakota Supreme Court, arguing the district court erred in ruling UND and Kennedy substantially complied with their obligations under the employment contract. The Supreme Court concluded Kennedy and UND substantially complied with their contractual obligations in terminating Cuozzo’s employment, and affirmed dismissal of Cuozzo's case. View "Cuozzo v. North Dakota, d/b/a University of North Dakota, et al." on Justia Law

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Officer Corey Corbo became gravely ill while at home with his girlfriend and colleague, Officer Jessica Garcia. Garcia called 9-1-1 and later admitted that Corbo had ingested cocaine five days earlier. The paramedics rushed Corbo to the hospital, where his laboratory results came back positive for cocaine. Relying on the hospital records, which included the positive lab results, and Garcia’s statement about the cocaine, Union City terminated Corbo’s employment with the UCPD. The Appellate Division reversed the decision removing Corbo from the UCPD, holding that the ALJ erred when she admitted the hospital records into evidence without first requiring the City to lay foundational testimony to satisfy the requirements of the business records hearsay exception. It also held that the City failed to establish the reliability of the lab results or to introduce other competent evidence at the hearing but did not remand for further evidentiary proceedings. The New Jersey Supreme Court modified the judgment of the Appellate Division and remanded matter to the Office of Administrative Law for further proceedings to allow the City the opportunity to demonstrate that the hospital records were admissible as business records, and for the opportunity to present any other theories of admissibility. View "In the Matter of Corey Corbo" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court dismissing Appellant's petition for judicial review of an administrative decision by the director of the Arkansas State Police, holding that the circuit court erred in concluding that the petition was barred by the State's sovereign immunity from suit.Appellant, a California resident, submitted an application to the state police to become licensed as a private investigator in Arkansas. The application was denied, and Appellant filed an administrative appeal. Colonel William J. Bryant, in his capacity as the director of the state police, found that Appellant was ineligible to receive a license due to his prior convictions. The circuit court concluded that Appellant's petition for judicial review was barred by the State's sovereign immunity. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the State's sovereign immunity from suit did not apply to this proceeding. View "Hackie v. Bryant" on Justia Law

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At issue in this case was whether Brent Austin filed a timely complaint for additional worker's compensation benefits with the Idaho Industrial Commission when it was filed more than a year after his employer, Bio Tech Nutrients, and its surety, Employers Compensation Insurance Company, (collectively “Defendants”) stopped paying worker’s compensation benefits. The Commission held that the one-year statute of limitations to file a complaint was tolled because the Defendants did not send a Notice of Claim Status (“NOCS”) when they submitted Austin’s final payment; as such, the Commission concluded Austin’s complaint was timely filed. After review, the Idaho Supreme Court determined the Commission was correct in tolling the statute of limitations, and affirmed. View "Austin v. Bio Tech Nutrients" on Justia Law