Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Capitol Police and the Union were negotiating a new collective bargaining agreement. The Police notified the Union of planned changes to its personnel policies. The Union responded with its own proposals. The Police declined to negotiate some proposals. The Compliance Board ruled for the Police as to some proposals but for the Union as to others and ordered the Police to bargain with the Union. In related cases, the Federal Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction over the Police’s petitions for direct review of the negotiability decisions but that it had jurisdiction over the Office of Compliance petitions to enforce those decisions. In ruling on the enforcement petitions, the court reviewed the underlying negotiability decisions under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 706, default standard of review. In this decision, the court held that whether the Board refers a negotiability petition to a hearing officer is a matter for the Board's discretion, not a matter of statutory compulsion, and that the opportunity for such a referral may be lost if not timely requested. The court separately dismissed the Police’s petitions for direct review of the negotiability decisions regarding 12 specific proposals; held that it has jurisdiction over the enforcement action under 2 U.S.C. 1407(a)(2); granted the petition for enforcement with respect to five proposals while denying the petition with respect to six proposals; and set aside the order with respect to one proposal, remanding for determination of whether that proposal involves a change in conditions of employment. View "Office of Compliance v. United States Capitol Police" on Justia Law

The Congressional Accountability Act (CAA) conferred rights and protections to employees of the legislative branch, modeled after and incorporating executive branch labor and employment statutes. CAA section 1351 gives legislative branch employees the right to bargain “with respect to conditions of employment" through their chosen representative, 5 U.S.C. 7117, but does not define “conditions of employment.” The Compliance Board issues regulations to implement section 1351; its regulations track the language in the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute, defining “conditions of employment” as “personnel policies, practices, and matters, whether established by rule, regulation, or otherwise, affecting working conditions, except that such term does not include policies, practices, and matters . . . [t]o the extent such matters are specifically provided for by Federal statute.” A negotiability dispute arose between the U.S. Capitol Police and the Union during negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement (CBA). The Police proposed to exclude employee terminations from the scope of the CBA’s grievance and arbitration procedures. The Union proposed language to ensure that terminations would continue to be covered by the grievance procedures. The Police refused to negotiate. The Compliance Board found the Union’s proposals negotiable. The Federal Circuit dismissed the Police’s petition for lack of jurisdiction, but, applying the Administrative Procedure Act standard of review, granted an enforcement petition, finding that the Compliance Board’s decision not contrary to law or otherwise invalid. View "United States Capitol Police v. Office of Compliance" on Justia Law

Petitioners the New England Police Benevolent Association, Inc. (NEPBA) and the State Employees’ Association of New Hampshire, Inc., SEIU, Local 1984 (SEA), appealed a decision of the New Hampshire Public Employee Labor Relations Board (PELRB) dismissing their unfair labor practice complaints filed against respondent State of New Hampshire. After several bargaining sessions, the State rejected all wage proposals, explaining that “the Governor was not offering any wage increases . . . given anticipated increases in prescription drug costs in the healthcare market.” As a result, the Teamsters and the NHTA declared an impasse. Although no other unions declared an impasse, the State took the position that all five unions must proceed to impasse mediation. The SEA challenged the State on this position, and subsequently, petitioners each filed complaints with the PELRB. During the pendency of these complaints, the State advised all five unions that it would select a mediator and continued to assert that all of the unions must participate in impasse mediation “because the issues to be resolved affected all bargaining units.” The PELRB consolidated the petitioners’ complaints and found in a 2-1 vote that RSA 273-A:9, I, “requires all five unions to utilize the Union Committee format at the bargaining table and during impasse resolution proceedings until such time as the common terms and condition[s] of employment are settled.” The PELRB, therefore, dismissed the complaints and ordered the petitioners to coordinate with the other unions “to determine the forum in which negotiations will go forward.” Petitioners unsuccessfully moved for rehearing, and this appeal followed. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's dismissal of petitioners' complaints, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the PELRB. View "Appeal of New England Police Benevolent Association, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the Board of Review in these consolidated workers’ compensation cases, holding that the four claimants’ applications for occupational pneumoconiosis (OP) benefits were properly rejected pursuant to W. Va. Code 23-4-15(b).Section 23-4-15(b) provides that a claimant may either file an OP claim within three years of the claimant’s date of last exposure to the hazards of OP or within three years of the date a diagnosed impairment due to OP was made known to the claimant by a physician. None of the claimants here filed an application within three years of their date of last exposure. Relying on the second time limitation, however, the claimants asserted that because they were not informed by a physician that they had a diagnosed impairment due to OP, they were not barred from filing new claims with the same date of last exposure as in their prior claims. The Supreme Court ruled that the claims were properly rejected, holding that the claimants’ interpretation of the statute was unconvincing. View "Pennington v. W.Va. Office of Insurance Commissioner" on Justia Law

At issue was the role of the courts on judicial review of a final decision of the Kentucky Retirement Systems (KERS) as to a KERS member’s entitlement to disability retirement.A hearing officer recommended granting Plaintiff’s disability benefits application. The Board of Trustees of KERS (Board) denied Plaintiff’s application for disability benefits. The trial court affirmed the Board’s final order. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that substantial evidence compelled a finding in favor of Plaintiff. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the KERS Board’s final decision must be supported by substantial evidence; (2) the standard set forth in McManus v. Ky. Retirement Systems, 124 S.W.3d 454, 458 (Ky. App. 2003), in conjunction with Ky. Rev. Stat. 13B.150, provides the proper standard for judicial review of KERS disability retirement decisions; (3) the hearing officer’s credibility determinations are not binding on the Board; and (4) substantial evidence supported the Board’s decision in this case, and the evidence in favor of Plaintiff was not so compelling that no reasonable person could have failed to be persuaded by it. View "Kentucky Retirement Systems v. Ashcraft" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that Plaintiff failed to meet the standard for judicial reversal of the Kentucky Retirement System (KERS) Board’s administrative decision to deny Plaintiff disability retirement benefits and thus affirmed the denial of benefits.The Board denied Plaintiff, a member of KERS, disability retirement benefits. The circuit court reversed on judicial review. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for reinstatement of the Board’s final decision denying Plaintiff’s claim, holding that the standard for judicial reversal of the Board’s decision was not met. On discretionary review, Plaintiff challenged the standard of judicial review set forth in McManus v. Kentucky Retirement Systems, 124 S.W. 3d 454 (Ky. App. 2003), and expressly adopted by the Supreme Court in Kentucky Retirement Systems v. Brown, 336 S.W.3d 8 (Ky. 2011). The Supreme Court held (1) the McManus standard remains proper; and (2) Plaintiff did not meet the standard for judicial reversal of the Board’s administrative decision. View "Bradley v. Kentucky Retirement Systems" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, retired or separated from their VA positions in 1993-1999, with accrued but unused leave. The Lump Sum Pay Act (LSPA), 5 U.S.C. 5551-5552, provides that an employee “who is separated from the service . . . is entitled to receive a lump-sum payment for accumulated and current accrued annual or vacation leave” equal to the pay the employee would have received had he remained in federal service until the expiration of the period of annual or vacation leave. Plaintiffs received lump-sum payments for their accrued and unused annual leave and later received supplemental lump-sum payments that reflected statutory pay increases and general system-wide pay increases that became effective before the expiration of their accrued annual leave. Plaintiffs sued, alleging that the VA omitted increases included Cost of Living Adjustments (COLAs) and Locality Pay Adjustments and that payments made to certain plaintiffs improperly omitted non-overtime Sunday premium pay or evening and weekend “additional pay” that they would have received had they remained in federal service. They sought pre-judgment interest under the Back Pay Act, 5 U.S.C. 5596. The claims for additional COLAs, Locality Pay Adjustments, and non-overtime Sunday premium pay were resolved. The Claims Court held, and the Federal Circuit affirmed, that, as members of the class, plaintiffs were not entitled to have evening and weekend “additional pay” included in their payments. They were not entitled to receive pre-judgment interest on amounts improperly withheld from their payments. View "Athey v. United States" on Justia Law

The Alabama Peace Officers' Standards and Training Commission ("the Commission") petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for mandamus relief to direct the circuit court to dismiss a complaint against it filed by Bryan Grimmett. The Commission revoked Grimmett's law-enforcement certification. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed that portion of the trial court's judgment fully reinstating Grimmett's law-enforcement certification because Grimmett had conceded in the record that he had not satisfied the 80-hour refresher-training course required for reinstatement of his certification. At the time the Court of Civil Appeals issued its May 2017 opinion, the Commission had in place a rule requiring a previously certified law-enforcement officer absent from employment as a law-enforcement officer for two years or more to successfully complete an approved 80-hour academy recertification course. In October 2017, the Commission amended its rule on certification to include, among other things, a provision that, if the Commission approves an application for admission to certification training of a law-enforcement officer absent from law enforcement for more than 10 years, that applicant must satisfactorily complete the regular basic-training academy, which is a 520-hour course. It was undisputed that Grimmett had been not employed as a law-enforcement officer since 2000. Grimmett filed his complaint with the circuit court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the Commission, asserting that he was provisionally offered a job in law enforcement in December 2017; that he attempted to enroll in the 80-hour refresher- training program; and that the Commission refused to allow him to enroll in the refresher-training program, instead requiring him to complete the full 520-hour basic-academy training course. The Commission moved the circuit court to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the Commission, as an agency of the State of Alabama, is entitled to sovereign immunity. Finding that the Commission established a clear legal right to mandamus relief, the Alabama Supreme Court granted its petition and directed the circuit court to dismiss Grimmett's complaint. View "Ex parte Ex parte Alabama Peace Officers' Standards and Training Commission." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals denying a writ of mandamus to compel the Ohio Police & Fire Pension Fund to award Appellant on-duty-percentage disability benefits for injuries he alleged were sustained during the course of his employment, holding that the Fund’s board of trustees did not abuse its discretion in denying benefits.Appellant filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus challenging the board’s decision not to award on-duty disability benefits for his injuries. The court of appeals adopted the decision of the magistrate recommending denying the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because some evidence supported the board’s decision, the court of appeals did not err in denying the requested writ. View "State ex rel. Wegman v. Ohio Police & Fire Pension Fund" on Justia Law

In 2016, the California Legislature created two new statutes to address a financial crisis plaguing the workers’ compensation system, however, the remedy came at a significant cost to all participating medical providers and related entities. Specifically, the new anti-fraud scheme cast a very broad net to halt all proceedings relating to any workers’ compensation liens filed by criminally charged medical providers, as well as any entities “controlled” by the charged provider (noncharged entities). The Legislature created this new scheme because existing laws permitted charged providers to collect on liens while defending their criminal cases, allowing continued funding of fraudulent practices. Pursuant to these two new statutes, the Government gained authority to automatically stay liens filed by charged providers and noncharged entities, without considering if the liens were actually tainted by the alleged illegal misconduct. Michael Barri, Tristar Medical Group (Tristar), and Coalition for Sensible Workers’ Compensation Reform (CSWCR) petitioned the Court of Appeal seeking a peremptory or alternative writ of mandate, prohibition, or other appropriate relief directing the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) to perform its duties and adjudicate Tristar’s lien claims and not enforce certain unconstitutional provisions contained in newly enacted anti-fraud legislation. The Court of Appeal declined petitioner’s request to issue a peremptory or alternative writ of mandate, prohibition, or other relief directing the WCAB to adjudicate the stayed liens and not enforce the newly enacted anti-fraud legislation. The Court rejected Barri’s assertion the suspension and special lien hearing were really criminal proceedings hidden under a “civil label.” The Legislature clearly stated its intention was to enact a civil regulatory scheme and remedy; the Court determined the Legislature exerted its plenary power to create a civil regulatory scheme designed to prevent the unnecessary processing and payment on liens tainted by fraud and other misconduct. “[T]he anti-fraud legislation at issue may have some punitive aspects, but it primarily serves important nonpunitive goals.” View "Barri v. WCAB" on Justia Law