Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Lincolnshire's Ordinance 15-3389-116 Section 4 bans union-security agreements within the village by forbidding any requirement that workers join a union, compensate a union financially or make payments to third parties in lieu of such contributions and bars any requirement that employees “be recommended, approved, referred, or cleared for employment by or through a labor organization.” Section 5 prohibits employers from making payments to unions on a worker’s behalf except under a “signed written authorization” that may be revoked by the employee at any time by written notice. The Ordinance provides civil remedies and criminal penalties for its violation. Unions sued, asserting preemption by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). The district court entered summary judgment, finding that all of the unions had standing to challenge the membership and fee provisions and the checkoff regulation (section 5), but that only one union could challenge the section 4 prohibition of hiring halls. The Seventh Circuit agreed. The district court also held that all three provisions were preempted and that the unions failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Localities may not address the subjects of hiring halls or dues checkoffs. The authority conferred in 29 U.S.C. 14(b)), allowing states to bar compulsory union membership as a condition of employment, does not extend to political subdivisions. View "International Union of Operating Engineers v. Village of Lincolnshire" on Justia Law

Petitioners Northern New England Telephone Operations, LLC and FairPoint Logistics, Inc. (collectively, “FairPoint”), appealed the final decision of the New Hampshire Department of Employment Security (NHES), claiming that it erred in rulings that: (1) upheld the decision of the commissioner of NHES to reopen the ruling of the appeal tribunal which found (a) certain unionized employees of FairPoint (claimants) were not entitled to collect unemployment benefits during the period they were on strike against the company because the strike resulted in a “stoppage of work” and (b) strike pay received by some of the workers constituted income deductible from their benefits; (2) affirmed a subsequent order of a second appeal tribunal which found that benefits were payable because the strike did not result in a stoppage of work; and (3) reversed the second tribunal’s determination that strike pay was deductible from benefits. After review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court reversed the appellate board’s decision, reinstated in part the order of the first appeal tribunal, and found it unnecessary to address the issue of strike pay. The Court found the commissioner erred in his determination that the first tribunal’s decision resulted from a mistake of law. Contrary to the commissioner’s view that the tribunal based its decision merely on what he described (but did not define) as a “negative impact” analysis, the Court concluded the tribunal had sufficient evidence before it from which it could find that the strike resulted in a substantial curtailment of FairPoint’s operations and thus constituted a stoppage of work under RSA 282-A:36. For the same reason, the Court also concluded the appellate board erred as a matter of law insofar as it ultimately upheld the commissioner’s decision to reopen and did not affirm the decision of the first tribunal with respect to the stoppage of work issue. Because the stoppage of work disqualified claimants from receiving unemployment benefits during the period when they were on strike, it was unnecessary to address the issue of whether the strike pay received by some of the claimants constituted deductible wages. View "Appeal of FairPoint Logistics, Inc." on Justia Law

The contracts between the Drivers and Joseph Cory, a motor carrier business, purported to establish that the Drivers would work as independent contractors. The Drivers claim the realities of the relationship made them employees under the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act (IWPCA), 820 ILCS 115/1–115/15. The contracts expressly permitted Joseph Cory to take “chargebacks” for any expense or liability that the Drivers had agreed to bear, including costs for “insurance, any related insurance claims, truck rentals, . . . uniforms,” and “damaged goods,” from the Drivers’ paychecks without obtaining contemporaneous consent. The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of Joseph Cory’s motion to dismiss the Drivers’ suit. The Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (FAAAA), 49 U.S.C. 14501–06, does not preempt the IWPCA. Wage laws like the IWPCA are traditional state regulations and part of the backdrop that all business owners must face. IWPCA does not single out trucking firms and its impact is too tenuous, remote, and peripheral to fall within the scope of the FAAAA preemption clause. IWPCA’s limited regulation of ministerial aspects of the manner in which employees are paid does not have a significant impact on carrier rates, routes, or services of a motor carrier and does not frustrate the FAAAA’s deregulatory objectives. View "Lupian v. Joseph Cory Holdings LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the Workers’ Compensation Board’s decision affirming the decision of the administrative law judge concluding that Katherine Rudd was entitled to the two-multiplier under under Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.730(1)(c)(2), holding that a workers’ compensation claimant is entitled to the two-multiplier when that individual voluntarily chooses to retire.At issue was whether the two-multiplier under section 342.730(1)(c)(2) applies to a claimant’s benefits when the claimant returns to work and later retires for reasons not solely related to the work-related injury itself. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment below, holding that, under the circumstances presented in this case, the two-multiplier must be applied to comply with the unambiguous language of the statute. View "Active Care Chiropractic, Inc. v. Rudd" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the Industrial Commission and granted Jackson Tube Service Inc.’s request for a writ of mandamus compelling the commission to vacate its order that granted Chad Thompson’s application for an additional award due to the violation of a specific safety requirement (VSRR) and to issue an order denying the VSSR application, holding that there was no evidence to support the commission’s decision to grant the VSSR award.Thompson’s workers’ compensation claim was allowed for a femur fracture. Thompson also filed an application for a VSSR award. The commission granted the VSSR application and rejected Jackson Tube’s argument that it was impossible to comply with the specific safety requirement. On appeal, Jackson Tube argued that the court of appeals erred when it rejected Jackson Tube’s impossibility defense. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the commission abused its discretion in granting the VSSR award because it relied on speculative testimony regarding the existence of alternative means of performance proved nonexistent and that the evidence demonstrated that Jackson Tube established the defense of impossibility. View "State ex rel. Jackson Tube Service, Inc. v. Industrial Commission" on Justia Law

In determining whether John Klein was entitled to continued temporary-total-disability compensation where he voluntarily left his position of employment for reasons unrelated to his workplace injury, the Supreme Court overruled State ex. Rel. Reitter Stucco, Inc. v. Industrial Commission, 881 N.E. 2d 861 (Ohio 2008), and State ex rel. OmniSource Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 865 N.E.2d 41 (Ohio 2007), and applied the longstanding principles of voluntary abandonment to Klein’s claim for temporary-total-disability compensation.On Klein’s request for mandamus, the court of appeals determined that the Industrial Commission of Ohio abused its discretion in determining that Klein voluntarily abandoned his employment at Precision Excavating & Grading Company for reasons unrelated to his workplace injury without determining whether Klein was medically capable of returning to work. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and denied the writ of mandamus, holding that when a workers’ compensation claimant voluntarily removes himself from his former position of employment for reasons unrelated to his workplace injury, he is not eligible for temporary-total-disability compensation even if he remains disabled at the time of his separation from employment. View "State ex rel. Klein v. Precision Excavating & Grading Co." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal granted the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s (Department) petition for review (Petition) of a Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (Board) opinion, which raised an issue of statutory construction. The Petition posited whether a finding of permanent total disability had to be made in accordance with Labor Code section 4660, or did section 4662 (b), provide a separate path to such a finding. The Court of Appeal concluded section 4660 governed how the finding and award of permanent total disability shall be made “in accordance with the fact,” as provided in section 4662 (b). View "Department of Corrections etc. v. W.C.A.B. etc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals concluding that the Kentucky Coal Employers Self-Insurers Guaranty Fund was fully responsible for McCoy Elkhorn Coal Corporation’s workers’ compensation liabilities, including a thirty percent enhancement arising from the employer’s safety violations.Farley Sargent II was fatally injured while working in a mine. The decedent’s statutory beneficiaries settled their workers’ compensation claims with his employer, McCoy Elkhorn, leaving a bifurcated issue regarding enhanced benefits. The administrative law judge concluded that the decedent’s survivors and estate were entitled to the thirty percent increase of workers’ compensation payments that would otherwise be if the accident was caused by the employer’s failure to comply with statutes or regulations regarding workplace safety. See Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.165(1). At issue before the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court was whether the Guaranty Fund, which assumed the obligations of McCoy Elkhorn, its insolvent member, could be held responsible for the thirty percent enhancement. The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the Guaranty Fund was fully responsible for McCoy Elkhorn’s workers’ compensation liabilities. View "McCoy Elkhorn Coal Corp. v. Sargent" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Diane Smith, a former employee of the Pointe Frontier assisted living facility in Cheyenne, Wyoming, filed suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, alleging that she was unlawfully terminated by Pointe Frontier in 2014 in retaliation for filing a complaint with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) in 2012. Finding that Smith had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies, the district court dismissed her claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and, in the alternative, found that there was no genuine issue of material fact and granted summary judgment for Defendant. After review of the district court record, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision that Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies, and remanded this case with instructions to vacate the order and dismiss the suit without prejudice. View "Smith v. Cheyenne Retirement Investors" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court affirming the decision of the Maine Labor Relations Board in favor of the Fraternal Order of Police (the Union) on Plaintiff’s prohibited practice complaint alleging a breach of the duty of fair representation by the Union on its negotiations with the Town of Madison, holding that the facts found by the Board were supported by substantial evidence in the administrative record.Plaintiff, a member of the Town’s former police department, argued that the Union acted arbitrarily in handling collective bargaining over the impact of the Town’s elimination of its police department. The Board determined that Plaintiff failed to meet his burden of proof. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the record did not compel a determination that the Union’s actions and its representatives were so outside a wide range of reasonableness as to be irrational. View "Trask v. Fraternal Order of Police" on Justia Law