Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

This case involves a dispute between Union Pacific Railroad Company and its employee, Randy G. Franklin. Franklin, a long-time employee of Union Pacific, brought a gun to work and stored it in his locked vehicle, which was parked in Union Pacific's parking lot. This action was in compliance with Arkansas law, but violated Union Pacific's company policy that bans employees from carrying firearms onto its property. As a result, Union Pacific terminated Franklin's employment, which was later reduced to a lengthy suspension by an arbitration panel.Union Pacific filed a declaratory-judgment action in federal court, seeking a declaration that Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-5-117, which allows employees to store firearms in their vehicles on their employer's property, is preempted by the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA) when applied to Union Pacific parking lots in Arkansas. Franklin counterclaimed, seeking a declaratory judgment that Union Pacific must allow him to bring his firearm onto railroad property, as long as the firearm is legally possessed for a lawful purpose and stored out of sight in his locked car.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas certified a question to the Supreme Court of Arkansas: whether the prohibitions in Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-5-117 are severable from the liability-immunity provisions in section 16-120-802(a) such that section 11-5-117 would still apply when the liability-immunity provisions of section 16-120-802(a) cannot apply.The Supreme Court of Arkansas answered the certified question in the affirmative. The court found that section 11-5-117, which protects the rights of employees to store firearms in their vehicles on their employer's property, is not dependent on the liability-immunity provisions of section 16-120-802. Therefore, even if the latter is preempted by FELA, section 11-5-117 is not likewise preempted. The court concluded that regardless of whether FELA preempts section 16-120-802(a), section 11-5-117 still applies. View "UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY V. FRANKLIN" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a workers' compensation claim filed by Billy J. Ottinger, who suffered a severe injury while working for B&B Wrecking & Excavating, Inc. Ottinger fell from a roof and landed on his legs, resulting in significant weakness and immobility. The Bureau of Workers’ Compensation awarded Ottinger compensation for the loss of use of both legs. However, the Industrial Commission of Ohio later vacated this decision, denying Ottinger's request for loss-of-use compensation.The Bureau's decision was initially challenged by the Industrial Commission, which argued that there was a lack of medical evidence to support the award for loss-of-use compensation. The Commission exercised its continuing jurisdiction and vacated the Bureau's decision, citing a clear mistake of fact and law. The Commission found that the Bureau's decision was based on an incorrect diagnosis of paraplegia, leading to the incorrect conclusion that Ottinger was completely paralyzed.Ottinger appealed to the Tenth District Court of Appeals, seeking a writ of mandamus to reinstate the Bureau's decision. However, the court of appeals denied the request, concluding that the Commission's decision was supported by some evidence and that awarding Ottinger loss-of-use compensation based on that evidence was a clear mistake of law.The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the Tenth District's judgment. The court found that the Commission did not abuse its discretion by exercising its continuing jurisdiction to vacate the Bureau's order awarding Ottinger loss-of-use compensation based on a clear mistake of fact. The court also concluded that the Commission did not abuse its discretion by denying Ottinger's motion for loss-of-use compensation, as the decision was supported by some evidence. View "State ex rel. Ottinger v. B&B Wrecking & Excavating, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves Duke Bradford, Arkansas Valley Adventure (AVA), and the Colorado River Outfitters Association (CROA) who appealed against the District of Colorado’s order denying their motion to preliminarily enjoin a Department of Labor (DOL) rule. The rule required federal contractors to pay their employees a $15.00 minimum hourly wage. The DOL promulgated the rule pursuant to a directive in Executive Order (EO) 14,026, issued by President Biden. The EO imposed the minimum wage requirement on most federal contractors and rescinded an exemption for recreational services outfitters operating on federal lands.The appellants argued that the district court erred in concluding that the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act (FPASA) authorizes the minimum wage rule as applied to recreational services permittees because the government does not procure any services from them or supply anything to them. They also argued that the DOL acted arbitrarily and capriciously in promulgating the minimum wage rule without exempting recreational service permittees.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court concluded that the appellants have not shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits that the DOL’s rule was issued without statutory authority. The court held that FPASA likely authorizes the minimum wage rule because the DOL’s rule permissibly regulates the supply of nonpersonal services and advances the statutory objectives of economy and efficiency. The court also held that the appellants have not shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits that the DOL’s rule is arbitrary and capricious. View "Bradford v. U.S. Department of Labor" on Justia Law

In February 2022, Workers United sought to represent 90 employees at a Starbucks Reserve Roastery in Seattle. Due to rising COVID-19 cases, the Regional Director ordered a mail-ballot election, which took place in April 2022. Starbucks refused to recognize and bargain with the union, arguing that the Regional Director should have ordered an in-person election. The Regional Director overruled Starbucks' objection and certified the election results. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) found that Starbucks' refusal to recognize and bargain with the union constituted unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act.The NLRB's decision was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Starbucks argued that the court lacked jurisdiction over the enforcement application because the NLRB had severed the question of whether to adopt a compensatory remedy. The court rejected this argument, holding that the NLRB's order was final and reviewable under 29 U.S.C. § 160(e).Starbucks also claimed that the Regional Director abused his discretion by ordering a mail-ballot election instead of an in-person one. The court rejected this argument as well, holding that the Regional Director had correctly applied the NLRB's own law in deciding to hold a mail-ballot election. The court affirmed the NLRB's finding that Starbucks had violated Section 8(a)(5) by refusing to bargain. The court granted the NLRB's application for enforcement of its order directing Starbucks to recognize and bargain with the union. View "NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD V. SIREN RETAIL CORPORATION DBA STARBUCKS" on Justia Law

The case involves Daniel L. Renner, a groundskeeper for Saginaw County, Michigan, who was part of a bargaining unit represented by the Technical, Professional, and Officeworkers Association of Michigan (the Union). Renner opted out of dues-paying membership with the Union in 2017. In 2018, Renner filed a complaint with his employer, alleging that a coworker smoked around him, which was injurious to his health. When Renner attempted to commence a formal grievance procedure, he was informed that only the Union could pursue the grievance procedure. The Union, however, required Renner to pay a fee for its assistance with the grievance under its pay-for-service policy for nonmembers. Renner refused to pay the fee, the Union did not provide assistance, and the deadline for pursuing the grievance expired.Renner filed an unfair labor practice charge with the Michigan Employment Relations Commission (MERC) against the Union, alleging that the Union violated its duty of fair representation by refusing to represent him in a grievance with his employer unless Renner paid a fee for direct representation services. An administrative law judge (ALJ) ruled in favor of Renner, concluding that the direct service fee was not permitted under the public employment relations act (PERA) or the collective bargaining agreement and that it constituted an unfair labor practice. MERC adopted the decision of the ALJ, and the Union appealed in the Court of Appeals, which affirmed MERC’s decision.The Union sought leave to appeal in the Michigan Supreme Court, which granted the Union’s application in part. The Supreme Court held that under the 2014 version of PERA, a public sector union that is the exclusive bargaining representative of a bargaining unit violates the union’s duty of fair representation by requiring an employee in that bargaining unit who is not a member of the union to pay a fee for the union’s representative services when the union’s pay-for-service policy denies the nonmember employee access to the grievance administration process under the collective bargaining agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals and the decision of MERC. View "Technical, Professional, and Officeworkers Assn v. Renner" on Justia Law

The case involves David Duff II, a Kanawha County Deputy Sheriff, who injured his back while on duty. He applied for workers' compensation benefits and was awarded a 13% Permanent Partial Disability (PPD) award. The award was based on a medical report that found Duff had a 25% whole person impairment, but 12% of this was attributed to a preexisting condition. Duff protested this award to the West Virginia Workers’ Compensation Board of Review (BOR), arguing that no apportionment was indicated. However, the BOR affirmed the 13% PPD award. Duff then appealed to the Intermediate Court of Appeals of West Virginia (ICA), which also affirmed the BOR's decision.The case was then brought before the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia. The court found that the ICA erred in affirming the BOR's decision. The court held that under West Virginia Code § 23-4-9b (2003), the employer has the burden of proving apportionment is warranted in a workers' compensation case. This requires the employer to prove the claimant "has a definitely ascertainable impairment resulting from" a preexisting condition(s). The court found that the respondent failed to carry its burden of proving the degree of impairment to be attributed to any preexisting condition for purposes of apportionment. The court reversed the ICA's decision and remanded the case to the BOR with directions to grant Duff an additional 12% PPD award for a total PPD award of 25%. View "Duff v. Kanawha County Commission" on Justia Law

A group of non-convicted individuals detained at the Santa Rita Jail in Alameda County, California, filed a lawsuit against the county and a private contractor, Aramark Correctional Services, LLC. The detainees were working in the jail's kitchen, preparing meals for the jail population and staff under an agreement between the county and Aramark. They were not paid for their labor. The detainees sued for failure to pay minimum wage and overtime.The case was initially heard in a federal district court, which granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motions to dismiss. The court reasoned that while the Penal Code addresses employment and wages of state prisoners, it does not address such matters for pretrial detainees confined in county jails. The court also agreed with the County that government entities are exempt from state overtime laws and therefore granted the County's motion to dismiss the claim for overtime wages. The district court certified for interlocutory appeal the legal question of pretrial detainees’ entitlement to minimum and overtime wages.The Supreme Court of California was asked by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to decide whether non-convicted incarcerated individuals working in a county jail for a private company have a claim for minimum wage and overtime under California law. The Supreme Court of California concluded that non-convicted incarcerated individuals performing services in county jails for a for-profit company do not have a claim for minimum wages and overtime under Section 1194 of the California Labor Code, even in the absence of a local ordinance prescribing or prohibiting the payment of wages for these individuals. View "Ruelas v. County of Alameda" on Justia Law

A scientist with physical disabilities, Dr. Andrew Mattioda, sued his employer, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. He alleged that he suffered a hostile work environment after informing his supervisors of his disabilities and requesting upgraded airline tickets for work travel. He also claimed he was discriminated against due to his disability by being passed over for a promotion.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed Dr. Mattioda’s hostile-work-environment claim and granted summary judgment in favor of NASA on his disability-discrimination claim. The court concluded that Dr. Mattioda failed to allege a plausible causal nexus between the claimed harassment and his disabilities. It also held that NASA provided a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for not selecting Dr. Mattioda for an available senior scientist position.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of Dr. Mattioda’s hostile-work-environment claim, affirming that a disability-based harassment claim is available under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and the Rehabilitation Act. The court held that Dr. Mattioda plausibly alleged a hostile-work-environment claim based on his disability. However, the court affirmed the district court’s order granting summary judgment for NASA on the disability-discrimination claim, agreeing that NASA had provided a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for not selecting Dr. Mattioda for the senior scientist position. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "MATTIODA V. NELSON" on Justia Law

Kevin D. Jones, an attorney, held a term position with the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) before transferring to the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF). At the USDA, Jones primarily provided advice and counsel regarding discrimination complaints filed against the agency and litigated ensuing discrimination claims before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). At the ATF, Jones served as an advisor to the Professional Review Board (PRB) as part of a team of attorneys in the Management Division of the ATF Office of General Counsel (OGC). After three months at the ATF, Jones was asked to resign due to his lack of contract law experience. Jones filed a complaint alleging discrimination and lack of due process in his termination.The Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) dismissed Jones's administrative appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The Administrative Judge (AJ) of the MSPB found that Jones was not an "employee" as defined by 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(B) because his positions at the USDA and ATF were not the same or similar. The AJ noted several distinctions between the tasks Jones performed at each agency. Jones did not appeal the Initial Decision to the full Board, so the AJ’s Initial Decision became the Final Decision of the Board.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board's decision. The court found that the AJ did not err in her determination that Jones's positions at the USDA and ATF were not similar. The court also found that the AJ's decision was supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, the court affirmed the Board's determination that it lacked jurisdiction to hear Jones's appeal. View "Jones v. Merit Systems Protection Board" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Arno Kuigoua, a registered nurse who was employed by the California Department of Veterans Affairs (the Department) at the Knight Veterans Home. Kuigoua was terminated in October 2018 after the Department found him guilty of sexually harassing women and providing substandard care that harmed patients. Kuigoua appealed his termination to the State Personnel Board, but his appeal was rejected. He then filed an administrative charge of employment discrimination with the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing and the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, alleging discrimination based on sex and retaliation.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reviewed Kuigoua's case after he sued the Department in state court on state statutory claims. His complaint included allegations of unlawful gender, sex, and/or sexual orientation discrimination and harassment, unlawful race, color, and/or national origin discrimination and/or harassment, failure to prevent unlawful discrimination and/or harassment based on gender, sex, sexual orientation, race, color, and/or national origin, and retaliation based on gender, sex, sexual orientation, race, color, and/or national origin.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Eight reviewed the case after Kuigoua appealed the judgment of the Superior Court. The court found that Kuigoua's claims in court were not like, and were not reasonably related to, those in his administrative complaint. The court also found that an administrative investigation would not have uncovered the conduct that was the focus of Kuigoua's operative complaint. As a result, the court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court, ruling that Kuigoua failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. View "Kuigoua v. Dept. of Veteran Affairs" on Justia Law