Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves Carlos M. Rivera-Velázquez, an employee of the Caribbean Environmental Protection Division (CEPD), a component of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Rivera, a military veteran with a service-connected disability, was hired by the CEPD in 2001. Throughout his tenure, he expressed interest in being promoted to a GS-13 position. In 2006, the CEPD was reorganized, and Teresita Rodríguez became Rivera's supervisor. After Rivera returned from a tour of duty in Afghanistan in 2010, Rodríguez began checking on his well-being. In 2012, Rivera was diagnosed with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). In 2014, Nancy Rodríguez became the chief of the Multimedia Permits and Compliance Branch and Rivera's supervisor. Rivera filed several formal and informal complaints about his treatment by his supervisors, alleging discrimination and harassment.In the lower courts, Rivera filed formal complaints with the EPA Office of Civil Rights (OCR) in 2011, 2017, and 2018, alleging discrimination and retaliation. He also filed claims of "harassment" under EPA Order 4711 in 2017 and 2018. The OCR and the EPA Order 4711 investigations found no merit to Rivera's complaints. Rivera then filed a complaint in the District Court in 2019, alleging employment discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The District Court granted summary judgment to the Administrator of the EPA on Rivera's claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision. The court found that Rivera failed to establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act or retaliation under Title VII. The court concluded that Rivera failed to show that his supervisors regarded him as having a disability, that he was subjected to an adverse action, or that there was a causal connection between his protected conduct and the alleged adverse actions. View "Rivera-Velazquez v. Regan" on Justia Law

The case involves a group of incarcerated individuals who were sent from a detention center to work at a recycling facility operated by Baltimore County, Maryland. The workers alleged that they were employees under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and Maryland state laws, and thus entitled to minimum wage and overtime pay. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the county, concluding that no reasonable adjudicator could view the incarcerated workers as "employees" under the FLSA.The district court's decision was based on the fact that the workers were part of a work detail program run by the Department of Corrections (DOC), which the court found had a rehabilitative, rather than pecuniary, interest in the workers' labor. The court also found that the workers did not deal at arms' length with their putative employer, as they were not free to negotiate the terms of their employment and were under the control of the DOC.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. The appellate court clarified that there is no categorical rule that incarcerated workers cannot be covered by the FLSA when they work outside their detention facility’s walls and for someone other than their immediate detainer. The court also held that the district court applied the wrong legal standards in granting summary judgment to the county. The court emphasized that the question under the FLSA is whether the principal or primary purpose for using incarcerated workers at the recycling center during the time frame at issue was for “rehabilitation and job training.” The case was remanded for a fresh look at the facts under these clarified standards. View "Scott v. Baltimore County, Maryland" on Justia Law

Dr. Jennifer Seed, a former employee of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), filed a lawsuit against the EPA and the United States, alleging age discrimination. Seed claimed that she was involuntarily demoted to a junior position as older managers were replaced with younger employees. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the EPA, concluding that Seed had not provided sufficient evidence to support her claim of age discrimination.The district court's decision was based on its finding that Seed had not provided direct evidence of discriminatory intent that would entitle her to a trial, nor had she provided indirect evidence that would give rise to an inference of discrimination. The court also found that Seed had not shown that she was treated less favorably than younger employees after her reassignment or that her treatment was based on her age.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit dismissed Seed's appeal, ruling that the court lacked jurisdiction to address the merits of her reassignment claims because she lacked standing under Article III of the United States Constitution. The court found that Seed had not demonstrated that a favorable court decision would likely redress her claimed injuries. The court therefore remanded the case to the district court with instructions to vacate the grant of summary judgment and to dismiss the reassignment claim for lack of standing. View "Seed v. EPA" on Justia Law

The case involves two plaintiffs, Michael Grim and Jim Maynard, who were employees of the Denton Municipal Electric (DME), a local electric utility owned by the City of Denton. The plaintiffs supported the construction of a controversial new power plant, the Denton Energy Center (DEC). Keely Briggs, a member of the Denton city council, opposed the new plant and leaked internal city documents about the project to a local newspaper. The plaintiffs reported Briggs's leak of confidential vendor information, alleging it violated the Public Information Act and the Open Meetings Act. They claimed that this report triggered the protections of the Whistleblower Act. The plaintiffs were later fired, which they alleged was retaliation for their report about Briggs.The case was initially heard in the district court, where the city argued that the Whistleblower Act did not apply because the plaintiffs did not report a violation of law "by the employing governmental entity or another public employee." The court was not convinced, and the case proceeded to a jury trial, which resulted in a $4 million judgment for the plaintiffs. The city appealed, raising several issues, including the legal question of whether the Whistleblower Act applied in this case. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's decision.The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the judgment of the court of appeals. The court held that the Whistleblower Act did not protect the plaintiffs because they reported a violation of law by a lone city council member, not by the employing governmental entity or another public employee. The court found that the lone city council member lacked any authority to act on behalf of the city, and her actions could not be imputed to the city. Therefore, her violation of law was not a "violation of law by the employing governmental entity." The court concluded that the plaintiffs did not allege a viable claim under the Whistleblower Act, and rendered judgment for the city. View "CITY OF DENTON v. GRIM" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute between Union Pacific Railroad Company and its employee, Randy G. Franklin. Franklin, a long-time employee of Union Pacific, brought a gun to work and stored it in his locked vehicle, which was parked in Union Pacific's parking lot. This action was in compliance with Arkansas law, but violated Union Pacific's company policy that bans employees from carrying firearms onto its property. As a result, Union Pacific terminated Franklin's employment, which was later reduced to a lengthy suspension by an arbitration panel.Union Pacific filed a declaratory-judgment action in federal court, seeking a declaration that Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-5-117, which allows employees to store firearms in their vehicles on their employer's property, is preempted by the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA) when applied to Union Pacific parking lots in Arkansas. Franklin counterclaimed, seeking a declaratory judgment that Union Pacific must allow him to bring his firearm onto railroad property, as long as the firearm is legally possessed for a lawful purpose and stored out of sight in his locked car.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas certified a question to the Supreme Court of Arkansas: whether the prohibitions in Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-5-117 are severable from the liability-immunity provisions in section 16-120-802(a) such that section 11-5-117 would still apply when the liability-immunity provisions of section 16-120-802(a) cannot apply.The Supreme Court of Arkansas answered the certified question in the affirmative. The court found that section 11-5-117, which protects the rights of employees to store firearms in their vehicles on their employer's property, is not dependent on the liability-immunity provisions of section 16-120-802. Therefore, even if the latter is preempted by FELA, section 11-5-117 is not likewise preempted. The court concluded that regardless of whether FELA preempts section 16-120-802(a), section 11-5-117 still applies. View "UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY V. FRANKLIN" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a workers' compensation claim filed by Billy J. Ottinger, who suffered a severe injury while working for B&B Wrecking & Excavating, Inc. Ottinger fell from a roof and landed on his legs, resulting in significant weakness and immobility. The Bureau of Workers’ Compensation awarded Ottinger compensation for the loss of use of both legs. However, the Industrial Commission of Ohio later vacated this decision, denying Ottinger's request for loss-of-use compensation.The Bureau's decision was initially challenged by the Industrial Commission, which argued that there was a lack of medical evidence to support the award for loss-of-use compensation. The Commission exercised its continuing jurisdiction and vacated the Bureau's decision, citing a clear mistake of fact and law. The Commission found that the Bureau's decision was based on an incorrect diagnosis of paraplegia, leading to the incorrect conclusion that Ottinger was completely paralyzed.Ottinger appealed to the Tenth District Court of Appeals, seeking a writ of mandamus to reinstate the Bureau's decision. However, the court of appeals denied the request, concluding that the Commission's decision was supported by some evidence and that awarding Ottinger loss-of-use compensation based on that evidence was a clear mistake of law.The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the Tenth District's judgment. The court found that the Commission did not abuse its discretion by exercising its continuing jurisdiction to vacate the Bureau's order awarding Ottinger loss-of-use compensation based on a clear mistake of fact. The court also concluded that the Commission did not abuse its discretion by denying Ottinger's motion for loss-of-use compensation, as the decision was supported by some evidence. View "State ex rel. Ottinger v. B&B Wrecking & Excavating, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves Duke Bradford, Arkansas Valley Adventure (AVA), and the Colorado River Outfitters Association (CROA) who appealed against the District of Colorado’s order denying their motion to preliminarily enjoin a Department of Labor (DOL) rule. The rule required federal contractors to pay their employees a $15.00 minimum hourly wage. The DOL promulgated the rule pursuant to a directive in Executive Order (EO) 14,026, issued by President Biden. The EO imposed the minimum wage requirement on most federal contractors and rescinded an exemption for recreational services outfitters operating on federal lands.The appellants argued that the district court erred in concluding that the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act (FPASA) authorizes the minimum wage rule as applied to recreational services permittees because the government does not procure any services from them or supply anything to them. They also argued that the DOL acted arbitrarily and capriciously in promulgating the minimum wage rule without exempting recreational service permittees.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court concluded that the appellants have not shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits that the DOL’s rule was issued without statutory authority. The court held that FPASA likely authorizes the minimum wage rule because the DOL’s rule permissibly regulates the supply of nonpersonal services and advances the statutory objectives of economy and efficiency. The court also held that the appellants have not shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits that the DOL’s rule is arbitrary and capricious. View "Bradford v. U.S. Department of Labor" on Justia Law

In February 2022, Workers United sought to represent 90 employees at a Starbucks Reserve Roastery in Seattle. Due to rising COVID-19 cases, the Regional Director ordered a mail-ballot election, which took place in April 2022. Starbucks refused to recognize and bargain with the union, arguing that the Regional Director should have ordered an in-person election. The Regional Director overruled Starbucks' objection and certified the election results. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) found that Starbucks' refusal to recognize and bargain with the union constituted unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act.The NLRB's decision was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Starbucks argued that the court lacked jurisdiction over the enforcement application because the NLRB had severed the question of whether to adopt a compensatory remedy. The court rejected this argument, holding that the NLRB's order was final and reviewable under 29 U.S.C. § 160(e).Starbucks also claimed that the Regional Director abused his discretion by ordering a mail-ballot election instead of an in-person one. The court rejected this argument as well, holding that the Regional Director had correctly applied the NLRB's own law in deciding to hold a mail-ballot election. The court affirmed the NLRB's finding that Starbucks had violated Section 8(a)(5) by refusing to bargain. The court granted the NLRB's application for enforcement of its order directing Starbucks to recognize and bargain with the union. View "NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD V. SIREN RETAIL CORPORATION DBA STARBUCKS" on Justia Law

The case involves Daniel L. Renner, a groundskeeper for Saginaw County, Michigan, who was part of a bargaining unit represented by the Technical, Professional, and Officeworkers Association of Michigan (the Union). Renner opted out of dues-paying membership with the Union in 2017. In 2018, Renner filed a complaint with his employer, alleging that a coworker smoked around him, which was injurious to his health. When Renner attempted to commence a formal grievance procedure, he was informed that only the Union could pursue the grievance procedure. The Union, however, required Renner to pay a fee for its assistance with the grievance under its pay-for-service policy for nonmembers. Renner refused to pay the fee, the Union did not provide assistance, and the deadline for pursuing the grievance expired.Renner filed an unfair labor practice charge with the Michigan Employment Relations Commission (MERC) against the Union, alleging that the Union violated its duty of fair representation by refusing to represent him in a grievance with his employer unless Renner paid a fee for direct representation services. An administrative law judge (ALJ) ruled in favor of Renner, concluding that the direct service fee was not permitted under the public employment relations act (PERA) or the collective bargaining agreement and that it constituted an unfair labor practice. MERC adopted the decision of the ALJ, and the Union appealed in the Court of Appeals, which affirmed MERC’s decision.The Union sought leave to appeal in the Michigan Supreme Court, which granted the Union’s application in part. The Supreme Court held that under the 2014 version of PERA, a public sector union that is the exclusive bargaining representative of a bargaining unit violates the union’s duty of fair representation by requiring an employee in that bargaining unit who is not a member of the union to pay a fee for the union’s representative services when the union’s pay-for-service policy denies the nonmember employee access to the grievance administration process under the collective bargaining agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals and the decision of MERC. View "Technical, Professional, and Officeworkers Assn v. Renner" on Justia Law

The case involves David Duff II, a Kanawha County Deputy Sheriff, who injured his back while on duty. He applied for workers' compensation benefits and was awarded a 13% Permanent Partial Disability (PPD) award. The award was based on a medical report that found Duff had a 25% whole person impairment, but 12% of this was attributed to a preexisting condition. Duff protested this award to the West Virginia Workers’ Compensation Board of Review (BOR), arguing that no apportionment was indicated. However, the BOR affirmed the 13% PPD award. Duff then appealed to the Intermediate Court of Appeals of West Virginia (ICA), which also affirmed the BOR's decision.The case was then brought before the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia. The court found that the ICA erred in affirming the BOR's decision. The court held that under West Virginia Code § 23-4-9b (2003), the employer has the burden of proving apportionment is warranted in a workers' compensation case. This requires the employer to prove the claimant "has a definitely ascertainable impairment resulting from" a preexisting condition(s). The court found that the respondent failed to carry its burden of proving the degree of impairment to be attributed to any preexisting condition for purposes of apportionment. The court reversed the ICA's decision and remanded the case to the BOR with directions to grant Duff an additional 12% PPD award for a total PPD award of 25%. View "Duff v. Kanawha County Commission" on Justia Law