Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Los Angeles County fired Merritt, a supervisor in the Department of Children and Family Services, for failing to adequately supervise a social worker, Clement, and approving Clement’s closure of a case of suspected child abuse without first consulting the Department’s records, as required by Department policy. Those records indicated the child (eight-year-old Gabriel) was at risk of further abuse and that the file should not have been closed. Less than two months later Gabriel’s mother and her boyfriend beat Gabriel to death. A Civil Service Commission hearing officer found Merritt negligent, but set aside the discharge and imposed a 10-day suspension. Without reading the record or receiving further evidence, the Commission adopted the findings, substituting a 30-day suspension. The Superior Court concluded the Commission set forth insufficient findings to support its decision and remanded. Merritt’s counsel acknowledged that the interlocutory order would not be subject to appellate review. Nevertheless, Merritt appealed. The court of appeal dismissed. While an otherwise nonfinal order remanding a matter to an administrative agency may be appealable if it affects substantial rights and may, as a practical matter, be unreviewable after resolution of the merits, the order from which Merritt purported to appeal left key issues for future resolution. The propriety of that order can be resolved in any future appeal from a final judgment. View "County of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles County Civil Service Commission" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs John Davis and Shad Denson filed a complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the City of Jackson, Mississippi (“City”). The plaintiffs, both taxicab drivers, sought: (1) a declaratory judgment that the City’s taxicab ordinances violate the Mississippi Constitution; and (2) an injunction to prevent the City from denying the plaintiffs a Certificate of Public Necessity for their failure to comply with the City’s ordinances. The City filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, citing Mississippi Code Section 11-51-75 (Rev. 2012), which required a bill of exceptions to be filed and transferred to circuit court when the complaining party was aggrieved by a discretionary action of a municipal governing authority. The chancery court granted the City’s motion to dismiss, finding it lacked jurisdiction to consider the case. The plaintiffs appealed. The Mississippi Supreme Court found the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction was proper, but for a different reason: plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of the City’s taxi ordinances because they failed to file or complete the required application to start a taxicab company in Jackson. View "Davis v. City of Jackson" on Justia Law

Under the plain language of W. Va. Code 23-4-8, the claims administrator did not have discretion to deny Claimant reimbursement for his meal expense he incurred while attending a required medical examination on the ground that his travel did not require overnight lodging.Claimant, who applied for workers’ compensation benefits, was ordered by his claims administrator to attend a medical examination 100 miles away from from his home. Claimant ate one meal while attending the medical examination. The claims administrator denied Claimant’s request for reimbursement for the meal expense he incurred on the ground that his travel did not require overnight lodging. The Workers’ Compensation Board of Review affirmed the denial of Claimant’s request for meal reimbursement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the claims administrator violated the clear mandate in section 23-4-8 that Claimant be reimbursed for his reasonable travel expenses. View "Silveti v. Ohio Valley Nursing Home, Inc." on Justia Law

Under the plain language of W. Va. Code 23-4-8, the claims administrator did not have discretion to deny Claimant reimbursement for his meal expense he incurred while attending a required medical examination on the ground that his travel did not require overnight lodging.Claimant, who applied for workers’ compensation benefits, was ordered by his claims administrator to attend a medical examination 100 miles away from from his home. Claimant ate one meal while attending the medical examination. The claims administrator denied Claimant’s request for reimbursement for the meal expense he incurred on the ground that his travel did not require overnight lodging. The Workers’ Compensation Board of Review affirmed the denial of Claimant’s request for meal reimbursement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the claims administrator violated the clear mandate in section 23-4-8 that Claimant be reimbursed for his reasonable travel expenses. View "Silveti v. Ohio Valley Nursing Home, Inc." on Justia Law

The question before the Ninth Circuit was "simple:" could an employer justify a wage differential between male and female employees by relying on prior salary? Based on the text, history, and purpose of the Equal Pay Act, the Court determined the answer was clearly "no." Prior to the Court's decision here, the law was unclear whether an employer could consider prior salary, either alone or in combination with other factors, when setting its employees’ salaries. The Ninth Circuit took this case en banc in order to clarify the law, and held prior salary alone or in combination with other factors could not justify a wage differential. "To hold otherwise - to allow employers to capitalize on the persistence of the wage gap and perpetuate that gap ad infinitum - would be contrary to the text and history of the Equal Pay Act, and would vitiate the very purpose for which the Act stands." The Fresno County Office of Education (“the County”) did not dispute that it paid Aileen Rizo (“Rizo”) less than comparable male employees for the same work. However, it argued this wage differential was lawful under the Equal Pay Act. The County contended that the wage differential was based on a fourth, "catchall exception: a 'factor other than sex.'” The Ninth Circuit surmised this would allow the County to defend a sex-based salary differential on the basis of the very sex-based salary differentials the Equal Pay Act was designed to cure. Because the Court concluded that prior salary did not constitute a “factor other than sex,” the County failed as a matter of law to set forth an affirmative defense. The Court affirmed the district court’s denial of summary judgment to the County and remanded for further proceedings. View "Rizo v. Yovino" on Justia Law

The Village of Waterbury terminated Adam Hubacz as one of its police officers. The Village appealed when the trial court granted Hubacz's Rule of Civil Procedure 75 petition overturning its employment action. On interlocutory appeal, the superior court certified a question of law to the Supreme Court: whether a State’s Attorney’s unilateral decision to refuse to prosecute any cases investigated by a particular municipal police officer, alone, a sufficient basis for termination of the officer pursuant to 24 V.S.A. 1931? The Supreme Court answered this question generally in the affirmative, but with the limitations. "[C]onsideration requires a finding that the officer in question cannot fulfill the duties associated with his employment and cannot be reassigned in such a way as to accommodate the nonprosecution decision." View "Hubacz v. Village of Waterbury" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and affirmed as modified in part the decision of the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission awarding benefits to Employee for injuries that arose out of and in the course and scope of Employee’s employment with Employer.As pertinent to this appeal, the Commission found (1) Employee was entitled to a permanent anatomical-impairment rating of twenty-nine percent for his brain injury and twenty-four percent for his left-eye injury, both to the body as a whole; and (2) Employee was not entitled to benefits based on a permanent anatomical-impairment rating based on pain. Employer appealed, and Employee cross-appealed. The Supreme Court held (1) the Commission’s decision that Employee was entitled to a permanent anatomical-impairment rating of twenty-nine percent for his brain injury to the body as a whole for his brain injury was supported by substantial evidence; (2) the Commission’s finding of 100 percent impairment to Employee’s left eye was proper, but the award is modified to reflect that it is a scheduled injury; (3) the Commission’s decision denying twenty-four percent whole-body impairment rating for cranial nerve V and trigeminal nerve damage was supported by substantial evidence. View "Multi-Craft Contractors, Inc. v. Yousey" on Justia Law

Respondent Otis Nero filed a workers' compensation claim alleging he sustained injuries to his back and shoulder while on the job. The single commissioner found respondent suffered an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of respondent's employment, and awarded benefits. The appellate panel reversed the decision of the single commissioner, finding respondent failed to provide timely notice of the injury. On appeal from the commission's decision, the court of appeals employed the de novo standard of review applicable to jurisdictional questions, and reversed the commission. In finding the question of timely notice was a jurisdictional question subject to de novo review, the court of appeals relied on Shatto v. McLeod Regional Medical Center, 753 S.E.2d 416 (2013) and Mintz v. Fiske-Carter Construction Co., 63 S.E.2d 50 (1951). The South Carolina Supreme Court found neither Shatto nor Mintz supported the court of appeals' use of the de novo standard. Until this case, the court of appeals consistently applied the substantial evidence standard when reviewing decisions of the commission on the question of timely notice. The Supreme Court found that under well-settled law, the commission's determination of whether a claimant gave timely notice under section 42-15-20 was not a jurisdictional determination, and had to be reviewed on appeal under the substantial evidence standard. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and remanded for a decision under the proper standard of review. View "Nero v. SCDOT" on Justia Law

In 2014, Bruce Millar brought an action against the Construction Code Authority (CCA), Elba Township, and Imlay City, alleging violation of the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (WPA); wrongful termination in violation of public policy; and conspiracy to effectuate wrongful termination and violate the WPA. Millar had performed mechanical and plumbing inspection services for the CCA, which had contracts with Imlay City and Elba Township to provide licensed inspections. Imlay City and Elba Township each wrote letters to the CCA directing it to terminate Millar’s inspection services within their communities. In response, the CCA drafted a letter to Millar stating that he would no longer perform inspections in those communities, but it was not until Millar arrived at work on March 31 that he was given a copy of the CCA. That same day, he was prevented from working in Imlay City. The circuit court granted summary judgment on all counts to defendants, ruling that the WPA claim was time-barred because the WPA violation occurred, at the latest, on March 27, when the CCA drafted its letter, and therefore Millar had filed his claim one day after the 90-day limitations period in MCL 15.363(1) had run. The court also concluded that the WPA preempted Millar’s public-policy claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished per curiam opinion. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed, finding the limitations period on plaintiff's WPA claim did not begin to run until the CCA letter was given to him, or March 31. Because plaintiff's complaint was filed 87 days later, it was timely filed under MCL 15.36.(1). View "Millar v. Construction Code Authority" on Justia Law

Wyo. Stat. Ann. 27-14-605 does not bar a claimant from receiving temporary total disability benefits for a second compensable injury when he has not filed a claim for benefits on his original injury within four years.Six years after receiving workers’ compensation benefits for a workplace injury to his right knee, James Hall underwent another knee surgery that was approved by the Workers’ Compensation Division. The Division denied Hall’s application for temporary total disability (TTD) benefits, concluding that, under section 27-14-605(b), Hall was not entitled to TTD benefits related to the surgery after not seeking benefits on his original injury for over four years. The Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), however, concluded that section 27-14-605 did not govern Hall’s claim because Hall suffered a second compensable injury that section 27-14-605 did not control and that Hall was entitled to TTD benefits as a matter of law. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Hall suffered a second compensable injury and was therefore entitled to TTD benefits pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. 27-14-404(a). View "In re Worker's Compensation Claim of James A. Hall" on Justia Law