Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission that one-half of Oscar Gerard’s attorney’s fees must be paid by the Arkansas Game & Fish Commission (AG&F).Gerard sustained a compensable injury, and AG&F accepted the injury as compensable and paid medical and indemnity benefits. After three surgeries related to his injury, Gerard sought additional benefits. The administrative law judge (ALJ) awarded Gerard additional benefits. Gerard then requested that the ALJ find AG&F responsible for his one-half of attorney’s fees. The ALJ ordered AG&F to deduct Gerard’s one-half of attorney’s fees from the additional benefits awarded and to pay that amount to his attorneys. The full Workers’ Compensation Commission affirmed and adopted the ALJ’s findings. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission correctly found that one-half of Gerard’s attorney’s fees must be paid by the AG&F. View "Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v. Gerard" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission that one-half of Oscar Gerard’s attorney’s fees must be paid by the Arkansas Game & Fish Commission (AG&F).Gerard sustained a compensable injury, and AG&F accepted the injury as compensable and paid medical and indemnity benefits. After three surgeries related to his injury, Gerard sought additional benefits. The administrative law judge (ALJ) awarded Gerard additional benefits. Gerard then requested that the ALJ find AG&F responsible for his one-half of attorney’s fees. The ALJ ordered AG&F to deduct Gerard’s one-half of attorney’s fees from the additional benefits awarded and to pay that amount to his attorneys. The full Workers’ Compensation Commission affirmed and adopted the ALJ’s findings. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission correctly found that one-half of Gerard’s attorney’s fees must be paid by the AG&F. View "Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v. Gerard" on Justia Law

Under the circumstances of this case, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 30, 46D did not provide Luis Spencer, who resigned under pressure as Commissioner of Correction, a right to revert to a tenured civil service correction officer position in last held in 1992.Spencer brought a complaint against the Civil Service Commission and the Department of Correction, seeking judicial review of the Commission’s decision concluding that the right to revert to a civil service position applies only to involuntary terminations, not voluntary resignations, and because Spencer voluntarily resigned, no “termination of his service” had occurred within the meaning of section 46D. The superior court affirmed the Commission’s decision. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the Commission’s interpretation of this ambiguous statutory language was reasonable; and (2) the Commission correctly concluded that Spencer’s resignation was voluntary. View "Spencer v. Civil Service Commission" on Justia Law

The Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission (PTC) appealed directly to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court a decision by the Commonwealth Court entering a $3.2 million verdict in favor of plaintiff-appellee Ralph Bailets after a bench trial of his claims arising under the Pennsylvania Whistleblower Law. PTC presented a question of first impression in Pennsylvania: whether non-economic damages for items such as embarrassment, humiliation, loss of reputation and mental anguish were available to plaintiffs in actions brought under the Law. Additionally, if non-economic damages are authorized under the Law, PTC asked the Supreme Court to determine whether the verdict amount was excessive in this case. After review, the Court concluded non-economic damages were available to successful plaintiffs under the Law and the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in entering a verdict amount of $1.6 million for non-economic damages. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed. View "Bailets v. Pa. Turnpike Commission" on Justia Law

Karen Hayes appealed a judgment denying her writ of mandate petition seeking an order directing the Temecula Valley School District (District) to reinstate her as a middle school principal. The District removed Hayes as principal and reassigned her to a teaching position for the 2015-2016 school year under its statutory authority to reassign a school principal without cause. Hayes contended the court erred in denying her writ petition because: (1) the District's notice of the no-cause reassignment was untimely as the governing school board (Board) did not approve the notice until two days after the statutory deadline; (2) her removal was in fact "for cause" and therefore she was entitled to a hearing and due process before the removal and reassignment; and (3) her placement on paid administrative leave violated statutes and internal District policies. On the first issue, the Court of Appeal determined the notice was timely because the statutes did not require school board preapproval for an Education Code section 44951 notice to be valid. The remaining contentions were without merit on the factual record reviewed by the Court. View "Hayes v. Temecula Valley Unified Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Karen Hayes appealed a judgment denying her writ of mandate petition seeking an order directing the Temecula Valley School District (District) to reinstate her as a middle school principal. The District removed Hayes as principal and reassigned her to a teaching position for the 2015-2016 school year under its statutory authority to reassign a school principal without cause. Hayes contended the court erred in denying her writ petition because: (1) the District's notice of the no-cause reassignment was untimely as the governing school board (Board) did not approve the notice until two days after the statutory deadline; (2) her removal was in fact "for cause" and therefore she was entitled to a hearing and due process before the removal and reassignment; and (3) her placement on paid administrative leave violated statutes and internal District policies. On the first issue, the Court of Appeal determined the notice was timely because the statutes did not require school board preapproval for an Education Code section 44951 notice to be valid. The remaining contentions were without merit on the factual record reviewed by the Court. View "Hayes v. Temecula Valley Unified Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Claimant Louis LaFountain appealed pro se the Employment Security Board’s denial of his claim for unemployment benefits. Claimant was employed as a store manager at the Eden General Store for three-and-a-half years. Claimant sought unemployment compensation benefits, and a claims adjudicator denied his request. The claims adjudicator found that claimant left his employment due to a certified health condition, which precluded the discharge of duties inherent in such employment. She further found that claimant was currently unable to work and that he therefore was ineligible for unemployment compensation. Claimant appealed this decision to an administrative law judge (ALJ). Following a hearing, the ALJ found claimant had Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (COPD), which worsened during his last year of employment to the point that he had to reduce his hours to part-time and eventually stop working. Claimant needed a well-ventilated or purified-air environment to prevent exacerbation of his COPD. Claimant has been working with Vocational Rehabilitation (VocRehab) to explore part-time employment. Several months earlier, in late February 2017, claimant had applied for Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefits. The ALJ concluded that claimant was not able to work, and thus, he was ineligible for unemployment benefits. The Vermont Supreme Court found the purpose of the unemployment compensation law was not “to provide sick benefits nor to compensate those who cease working because of illness.” Instead, the law was designed “to assist members of the working force who are made jobless by operations of the economy over which they have no individual control.” The Court determined the Board’s findings did not adequately support its conclusion: Claimant testified that he wanted to work and that he could work part-time. Claimant stated that he had not been applying for any work but that he had been going to VocRehab every week and that his counselor was trying to match him up with a job that fit his needs. Claimant believed that he could continue to do retail work as long as he was sitting down. He also stated that he could perform computer work, preferably from home. Claimant testified that he had experience working on his computer from home and that he was exploring this type of work with his VocRehab counselor. Claimant’s VocRehab counselor did not testify at the hearing. View "LaFountain v. Department of Labor" on Justia Law

Claimant Louis LaFountain appealed pro se the Employment Security Board’s denial of his claim for unemployment benefits. Claimant was employed as a store manager at the Eden General Store for three-and-a-half years. Claimant sought unemployment compensation benefits, and a claims adjudicator denied his request. The claims adjudicator found that claimant left his employment due to a certified health condition, which precluded the discharge of duties inherent in such employment. She further found that claimant was currently unable to work and that he therefore was ineligible for unemployment compensation. Claimant appealed this decision to an administrative law judge (ALJ). Following a hearing, the ALJ found claimant had Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (COPD), which worsened during his last year of employment to the point that he had to reduce his hours to part-time and eventually stop working. Claimant needed a well-ventilated or purified-air environment to prevent exacerbation of his COPD. Claimant has been working with Vocational Rehabilitation (VocRehab) to explore part-time employment. Several months earlier, in late February 2017, claimant had applied for Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefits. The ALJ concluded that claimant was not able to work, and thus, he was ineligible for unemployment benefits. The Vermont Supreme Court found the purpose of the unemployment compensation law was not “to provide sick benefits nor to compensate those who cease working because of illness.” Instead, the law was designed “to assist members of the working force who are made jobless by operations of the economy over which they have no individual control.” The Court determined the Board’s findings did not adequately support its conclusion: Claimant testified that he wanted to work and that he could work part-time. Claimant stated that he had not been applying for any work but that he had been going to VocRehab every week and that his counselor was trying to match him up with a job that fit his needs. Claimant believed that he could continue to do retail work as long as he was sitting down. He also stated that he could perform computer work, preferably from home. Claimant testified that he had experience working on his computer from home and that he was exploring this type of work with his VocRehab counselor. Claimant’s VocRehab counselor did not testify at the hearing. View "LaFountain v. Department of Labor" on Justia Law

Claimant Catherine Lyons appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the Department of Labor Commissioner (the Commissioner), which found she did not qualify for workers’ compensation benefits for an injury sustained while student teaching at a school in the defendant supervisory union. Because the Vermont Supreme Court held claimant fell within the statutory definition of an employee for purposes of workers’ compensation, the Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings in accord with this opinion. View "Lyons v. Chittenden Central Supervisory Union" on Justia Law

Claimant Catherine Lyons appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the Department of Labor Commissioner (the Commissioner), which found she did not qualify for workers’ compensation benefits for an injury sustained while student teaching at a school in the defendant supervisory union. Because the Vermont Supreme Court held claimant fell within the statutory definition of an employee for purposes of workers’ compensation, the Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings in accord with this opinion. View "Lyons v. Chittenden Central Supervisory Union" on Justia Law