Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court determining that Plaintiff need not comply with R.I. Gen. Laws 45-21-23 and 45-21-24 in order to continue receiving his accidental disability pension because those sections were not applicable to his situation. Plaintiff suffered a debilitating injury while performing his duties as a police officer and was granted an accidental disability pension. The Supreme Court held (1) Plaintiff was subject to sections 45-21-23 and 45-21-24; and (2) Plaintiff may be required to undergo an independent medical examination on occasion at the direction of the Retirement Board and to submit such financial information as may be requested in accordance with section 45-21-24. View "Grasso v. Raimondo" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court determining that Plaintiff need not comply with R.I. Gen. Laws 45-21-23 and 45-21-24 in order to continue receiving his accidental disability pension because those sections were not applicable to his situation. Plaintiff suffered a debilitating injury while performing his duties as a police officer and was granted an accidental disability pension. The Supreme Court held (1) Plaintiff was subject to sections 45-21-23 and 45-21-24; and (2) Plaintiff may be required to undergo an independent medical examination on occasion at the direction of the Retirement Board and to submit such financial information as may be requested in accordance with section 45-21-24. View "Grasso v. Raimondo" on Justia Law

On September 11, 2012, President Obama published notice “continuing for [one] year the national emergency . . . with respect to the terrorist attacks.” In April 2013, O’Farrell, an Army Reservist, received an order directing him to replace another Reservist, an attorney, who had been deployed. After reaching his maximum total years of active commissioned service (28 years), O’Farrell was transferred to the Army Reserve Retired List in October 2013. O’Farrell served his active duty as legal counsel until September 30, 2013. By August 26, 2013, O’Farrell had used his 15 days of military leave, most of his accrued annual leave, and advance annual leave. To avoid being placed on Military Leave Without Pay for the remainder of his active duty service, O’Farrell (unsuccessfully) requested an additional 22 days leave under 5 U.S.C. 6323(a)(1). O’Farrell did not cite any statutory provision that would qualify him as "called to full-time military service as a result of a call or order to active duty in support of a contingency operation." He argued that he was “serving . . . during a national emergency." O’Farrell sued under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act, 38 U.S.C. 4301– 4333. The Federal Circuit reversed. Section 6323(b) does not require that “a specific contingency operation" be identified in military orders when an employee is activated; “in support of” includes indirect assistance to a contingency operation, 5 U.S.C. 6323(b)(2)(B), which includes a military operation that results in service members being called to active duty under any law during a national emergency, 10 U.S.C. 101(a)(13). A service member’s leave request need not use particular language. View "O'Farrell v. Department of Defense" on Justia Law

Spring Creek Coal Company (Spring Creek) petitioned the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals for review of a decision by the Department of Labor (DOL) awarding survivors’ benefits to Susan McLean under the Black Lung Benefits Act (BLBA), 30 U.S.C. sections 901-944. The DOL concluded that Bradford McLean became disabled and died from his exposure to coal dust during the course of his employment at Spring Creek’s surface coal mine. The BLBA adopts several presumptions that apply for purposes of determining whether a miner is totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis and whether the death of a miner was due to pneumoconiosis. See 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(1)-(5). One of those presumptions, the fifteen-year presumption, is central to the outcome in this case. The ALJ, after concluding that Mr. McLean was entitled to the statutory/regulatory presumption of pneumoconiosis, in turn analyzed the medical evidence to determine whether Spring Creek had rebutted that presumption. The Tenth Circuit determined the ALJ’s findings and decision in this case were case-specific and confined to the specific flaws in the testimony of Spring Creek’s medical experts, thus concluding Spring Creek did not rebut the presumption. Thus, the Tenth Circuit concluded the ALJ did not err in his analysis of the proffered medical opinions, and that there was no need to remand this case for further proceedings. Spring Creek’s petition for review was denied. View "Spring Creek Coal Company v. McLean" on Justia Law

Spring Creek Coal Company (Spring Creek) petitioned the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals for review of a decision by the Department of Labor (DOL) awarding survivors’ benefits to Susan McLean under the Black Lung Benefits Act (BLBA), 30 U.S.C. sections 901-944. The DOL concluded that Bradford McLean became disabled and died from his exposure to coal dust during the course of his employment at Spring Creek’s surface coal mine. The BLBA adopts several presumptions that apply for purposes of determining whether a miner is totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis and whether the death of a miner was due to pneumoconiosis. See 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(1)-(5). One of those presumptions, the fifteen-year presumption, is central to the outcome in this case. The ALJ, after concluding that Mr. McLean was entitled to the statutory/regulatory presumption of pneumoconiosis, in turn analyzed the medical evidence to determine whether Spring Creek had rebutted that presumption. The Tenth Circuit determined the ALJ’s findings and decision in this case were case-specific and confined to the specific flaws in the testimony of Spring Creek’s medical experts, thus concluding Spring Creek did not rebut the presumption. Thus, the Tenth Circuit concluded the ALJ did not err in his analysis of the proffered medical opinions, and that there was no need to remand this case for further proceedings. Spring Creek’s petition for review was denied. View "Spring Creek Coal Company v. McLean" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court ruling that the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) erred in upholding the Wyoming Workers’ Compensation Division’s denial of benefits to Richard Williams.Williams suffered a head injury while working as a well operator. Williams argued that a flash fire started him and caused him to fall backward and strike his head. The Division denied benefits, determining that Williams’ injury did not arise out of an in the course of his employment. The OAH upheld the denial of benefits, finding that Williams and his version of events lacked credibility. The district court reversed, concluding that the OAH decision was contrary to overwhelming medical evidence that Williams injured his head while engaged in work-related activities. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Williams offered evidence sufficient to raise a presumption that he suffered a head injury that arose out of his employment and that the Division failed to rebut that presumption. View "State ex rel. Department of Workforce Services, Workers' Compensation Division v. Williams" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court ruling that the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) erred in upholding the Wyoming Workers’ Compensation Division’s denial of benefits to Richard Williams.Williams suffered a head injury while working as a well operator. Williams argued that a flash fire started him and caused him to fall backward and strike his head. The Division denied benefits, determining that Williams’ injury did not arise out of an in the course of his employment. The OAH upheld the denial of benefits, finding that Williams and his version of events lacked credibility. The district court reversed, concluding that the OAH decision was contrary to overwhelming medical evidence that Williams injured his head while engaged in work-related activities. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Williams offered evidence sufficient to raise a presumption that he suffered a head injury that arose out of his employment and that the Division failed to rebut that presumption. View "State ex rel. Department of Workforce Services, Workers' Compensation Division v. Williams" on Justia Law

At issue was whether individuals engaged in door-to-door sales of vacuums provided by Plaintiff should be classified as independent contractors or as Plaintiff’s employees for purposes of the Unemployment Compensation Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. 31-222.The Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of the trial court concluding that the individuals were Plaintiff’s employees on the ground that Plaintiff failed to establish that the individuals were “customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, profession or business of the same nature as that involved in the service performed” for Plaintiff within the meaning of part C of the ABC test, codified at Conn. Gen. Stat. 31-222(a)(1)(B)(ii)(I)(II) and (III). Therefore, the trial court properly dismissed Plaintiff’s appeals from administrative decisions that Defendants were properly designated as Plaintiff’s employees and that Plaintiff was liable for contributions based on their wages. View "Kirby of Norwich v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission’s denial of Appellant’s claim that she sustained a compensable brain injury while working in a Kroger store. The Commission found that Appellant’s injury was the result of a syncope, which was caused by an arrhythmic heart condition, rather than a slip and fall or an unexplained fall. On appeal, Appellant argued that substantial evidence did not support the Commission’s finding. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that substantial evidence supported the Commission’s stated reason for denying benefits that Appellant’s injury was caused by an idiopathic condition and not an unexplained, compensable fall. View "Asking v. Kroger Limited Partnership I" on Justia Law

Delgado, an ATF agent, alleges that his supervisors retaliated against him after he reported his suspicions that another agent improperly shot at a fleeing suspect, provided an inaccurate report, and testified falsely about the incident. Delgado filed a whistleblower complaint with the Office of Special Counsel (OSC), which is charged with investigating allegations under the Whistleblower Protection Act, 5 U.S.C. 1214(a)(1)(A), 2302(b)(8). The OSC declined to investigate, telling Delgado that he had not made a disclosure protected by the Act and had failed to provide sufficient evidence to support his allegations of retaliation. The Merit Systems Protection Board dismissed his appeal, finding that Delgado had not satisfied the requirement that he “seek corrective action before the Special Counsel before seeking corrective action from the Board.” The Seventh Circuit remanded, finding that the OSC and the Board applied unduly stringent and arbitrary requirements. Delgado’s disclosure of suspected wrongdoing either explicitly accused another federal employee of perjury or provided sufficient evidence to justify such a suspicion worthy of consideration by superiors. Either version would be a protected disclosure. The Act requires only that a complainant fairly present his claim with enough specificity to enable the agency to investigate and does not require a whistleblower to prove his allegations before the OSC. View "Delgado v. Merit Systems Protection Board" on Justia Law