Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Utah Code 34A-2-417(2)(a)(ii), a provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA) that limits the time an injured worker has to prove a claim, is a statute of repose but is nevertheless constitutional under the Open Courts Clause of the Utah Constitution.Section 34A-2-417(2)(a)(ii) provides that an employee claiming compensation for a workplace injury must prove that he or she is due the compensation claimed within twelve years from the date of the accident. Petitioners filed claims to receive permanent total disability benefits more than twelve years after the original workplace accident that led to their injuries. Petitioners’ claims were dismissed as untimely under the statute. In petitioning for review, Petitioners argued that the statute acts as a statute of repose and is unconstitutional under the Open Courts Clause. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 34A-2-417(2)(a)(ii) is a statute of repose but withstands Open Courts Clause scrutiny. View "Waite v. Utah Labor Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the district court concluding that the Nebraska Department of Labor’s action intercepting Appellee’s tax refund from the state to partially pay a judgment determining that Appellee had been overpaid for unemployment benefits was barred by the relevant statute of limitations.An appeal tribunal, citing Neb. Rev. Stat. 25-218, concluded that the Department’s action was barred by a four-year statute of limitations. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court held that there was no time limitation barring the Department’s interception of Appellee’s state income tax refund to offset his unemployment benefit overpayment under Neb. Rev. Stat. 48-665(1)(c) and therefore reversed. View "McCoy v. Albin" on Justia Law

Marybeth Lauderdale served as acting superintendent and superintendent for the Illinois School for the Deaf (ISD), 2006-2010. During her last year as superintendent, she was paid a total of $88,048. Reggie Clinton was superintendent for the School for the Visually Impaired (ISVI), 1998-2003 and again, 2008-2010. When Clinton returned to ISVI in 2008, he received a 1.9% salary increase from his most recent salary at the Arcola School District. He was paid, at the end of his tenure at ISVI, $121,116 per year. After Clinton resigned, the Illinois Department of Human Services, which oversees ISD and ISVI, created one combined superintendent role to cover both schools and offered Lauderdale the role. Lauderdale wanted to be paid as much or more than Clinton had been paid but eventually accepted a salary of $106,500. Lauderdale sued, alleging sex discrimination under the Equal Pay Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court concluded no reasonable juror could find the pay discrepancy was a product of sex discrimination and that the discrepancy resulted from budget concerns and from the application of the Illinois Pay Plan. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, agreeing that the record indicated that the pay discrepancy was not based on sex. View "Lauderdale v. Illinois Department of Human Services" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the Board's holding that Frontier-Kemper was responsible for the payment of benefits to a coal miner under the Black Lung Benefits Act (BLBA), 30 U.S.C. 901 et seq. Frontier Constructors and Kemper Construction formed a partnership that worked on heavy construction projects. The Partnership later reorganized into a newly-formed corporation, Frontier-Kemper. The court agreed with the Board that Frontier-Kemper was a successor operator and that the miner's employment with both Frontier-Kemper and the Partnership could be combined in determining Frontier-Kemper's potential liability; there was no retroactive effect in applying the expanded definition of "operator" to the Partnership for the purpose of combining the miner's employment there with his later work at Frontier-Kemper; and the ALJ correctly found that the miner worked for Frontier-Kemper and the Partnership cumulatively for at least one year. View "Frontier-Kemper Constructors, Inc. v. DOWCP" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's second amended complaint (SAC) against the school district, holding that plaintiff's grievance, filed pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement, did not satisfy the claim filing requirements of the Government Claims Act. In this case, it was undisputed that plaintiff never filed a claim with the school district on a government claim form. The court held that the trial court properly sustained the school district's demurrer to the SAC on the basis that plaintiff failed to comply with the requirements of the Government Claims Act and plaintiff's noncompliance was not excused based on substantial compliance, the instant matter involving a "claim as presented," and futility. View "Olson v. Manhattan Beach Unified School District" on Justia Law

Morrison’s position as a New London Naval Submarine Base firefighter required a security clearance. The Navy revoked Morrison's clearance, citing concerns regarding his personal finances. Regional Fire Chief Cox signed a letter finalizing Morrison’s removal but it was not immediately formally issued. Instead, District Fire Chief Clapsadle, who was to deliver the letter, offered Morrison the option to retire preemptively. Morrison chose to retire, thinking his retirements benefits were at risk. In fact, Morrison would have received those benefits regardless of whether he retired or was terminated, 5 U.S.C. 8312-8315. After learning that his benefits were not at risk, Morrison appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board, claiming that his retirement was involuntary. Based on Morrison’s allegations that an agency manager had told him he would lose his benefits if he were terminated, the Board held that an agency is required to provide employees with adequate information to make an informed retirement decision but that, if the Navy would have removed Morrison, he was not entitled to reinstatement or back pay. The Federal Circuit dismissed Morrison’s petition for lack of jurisdiction. The Board’s ruling was not a “final decision,” but required the Navy to decide whether and when Morrison would have been terminated if he had not retired. . View "Morrison v. Department of the Navy" on Justia Law

For the reasons set forth in a companion case issued today, Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Board, the Supreme Court held that the court of appeal correctly rejected Employer’s defense that Union had abandoned its employees and thus forfeited its status as bargaining representative.In this case, Employer refused to bargain with the labor union that its employees had elected as their bargaining representative under the Agricultural Labor Relations Act (ALRA). The Agricultural Labor Relations Board (Board) rejected Employer’s abandonment defense and determined that Employer’s refusal constituted an unfair labor practice under the ALRA. The Board ordered Employer to pay make-whole relief under Cal. Labor Code 1160.3. The court of appeal affirmed the Board’s rejection of Employer’s abandonment defense but reversed the Board’s make-whole relief award. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the court of appeal (1) properly rejected Employer’s abandonment defense, but (2) did not accord the Board sufficient deference as to the issue of make-whole relief and improperly exercised the Board’s remedial authority. View "Tri-Fanucchi Farms v. Agricultural Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

For the reasons set forth in a companion case issued today, Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Board, the Supreme Court held that the court of appeal correctly rejected Employer’s defense that Union had abandoned its employees and thus forfeited its status as bargaining representative.In this case, Employer refused to bargain with the labor union that its employees had elected as their bargaining representative under the Agricultural Labor Relations Act (ALRA). The Agricultural Labor Relations Board (Board) rejected Employer’s abandonment defense and determined that Employer’s refusal constituted an unfair labor practice under the ALRA. The Board ordered Employer to pay make-whole relief under Cal. Labor Code 1160.3. The court of appeal affirmed the Board’s rejection of Employer’s abandonment defense but reversed the Board’s make-whole relief award. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the court of appeal (1) properly rejected Employer’s abandonment defense, but (2) did not accord the Board sufficient deference as to the issue of make-whole relief and improperly exercised the Board’s remedial authority. View "Tri-Fanucchi Farms v. Agricultural Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

The Agricultural Labor Relations Act’s (ARLA) “mandatory mediation and conciliation” (MMC) statute neither violates equal protection nor unconstitutionally delegates legislative power. Further, employers may not refuse to bargain with unions - whether during the ordinary bargaining process or during MMC - on the basis that the union has abandoned its representative status.In this case, the United Farm Workers’ of America (UFW) filed an MMC request with the Agricultural Labor Relations Board after failing to reach a collective bargaining agreement with Gerawan Farming, Inc. Mediation also failed to produce an agreement, and therefore, the mediator submitted a report fixing the contractual terms. The Board adopted the report in its final order. The court of appeal concluded (1) the MMC statute on its face violates equal protection principles and improperly delegates legislative authority, and (2) an employer may not defend against a union’s MMC request by challenging the union’s certification as bargaining representative on the basis of abandonment. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) the MMC statutes is not unconstitutional; and (2) an employer may not raise an abandonment defense to an MMC request. View "Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

The Agricultural Labor Relations Act’s (ARLA) “mandatory mediation and conciliation” (MMC) statute neither violates equal protection nor unconstitutionally delegates legislative power. Further, employers may not refuse to bargain with unions - whether during the ordinary bargaining process or during MMC - on the basis that the union has abandoned its representative status.In this case, the United Farm Workers’ of America (UFW) filed an MMC request with the Agricultural Labor Relations Board after failing to reach a collective bargaining agreement with Gerawan Farming, Inc. Mediation also failed to produce an agreement, and therefore, the mediator submitted a report fixing the contractual terms. The Board adopted the report in its final order. The court of appeal concluded (1) the MMC statute on its face violates equal protection principles and improperly delegates legislative authority, and (2) an employer may not defend against a union’s MMC request by challenging the union’s certification as bargaining representative on the basis of abandonment. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) the MMC statutes is not unconstitutional; and (2) an employer may not raise an abandonment defense to an MMC request. View "Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law