Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the circuit court upholding the finding of just cause for Petitioner’s discharge made by the Mason County Civil Service Commission for Deputy Sheriffs.Petitioner was discharged from employment with the Mason County Sheriff’s Department based on two separate incidents. The Commission concluded that just cause existed for Petitioner’s discharge. The Circuit court affirmed the Commission’s decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Petitioner was not denied procedural due process; (2) the Commission’s practices and procedures were not flawed; and (3) The Commission’s finding of just cause not not clearly wrong or a misapplication of the law, was not arbitrary or capricious, and was not contrary to the evidence. View "Fruth v. Powers" on Justia Law

In an appeal by allowance, the issue presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s review was whether, in the context of a grievance arbitration award, an arbitrator has subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate a dispute between a union and a municipality arising out of a surviving spouse’s pension benefit, where the benefit was afforded to the surviving spouse statutorily and incorporated into the parties’ collective bargaining agreement (CBA). Pamela Cimino’s husband, Thomas J. Cimino, was a police officer for the City of Arnold, Pennsylvania (City) from July 1, 1990 until April 4, 2002. On April 4, 2002, Officer Cimino died off-duty of natural causes. At the time of his death, Officer Cimino had completed 11.77 years of service. The City issued Mrs. Cimino 142 consecutive monthly death benefit payments, from May 1, 2002 to February 1, 2014. However, in a 2014 compliance audit, the Commonwealth Auditor General’s Office determined that the City was incorrectly administering the death benefit. According to the Auditor General’s compliance audit, the City had been paying Mrs. Cimino twice as much as it should have under its interpretation of the applicable statute. The Wage Policy Committee of the City of Arnold Police Department (Union) initiated a grievance on behalf of Mrs. Cimino to dispute the 50% reduction in her death benefit pension payments. The Union followed the grievance procedure contained in the CBA between the City and the Union. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded a dispute as here was arbitrable under the Policemen and Firemen Collective Bargaining Act (“Act 111”), 43 P.S. secs. 217.1-217.10, because the surviving spouse’s pension benefit was incorporated into the CBA. Accordingly, the Court reversed the order of the Commonwealth Court which held to the contrary. View "City of Arnold v. Wage Policy Committee" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision affirming the decision by the Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board denying Joyce Crouse’s claim for unemployment benefits. The district court affirmed the Board’s conclusion that Crouse did not qualify for unemployment benefits because her voluntary termination did not constitute “good cause” pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 39-51-2302. The Supreme Court agreed with the lower court, holding (1) the findings of the Board were supported by substantial evidence; and (2) the district court correctly affirmed the Board’s decision to deny Crouse’s claim for benefits because she voluntarily resigned her position. View "Crouse v. State, Department of Labor" on Justia Law

North Dakota Workforce Safety and Insurance ("WSI") appealed a judgment affirming a decision of an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") that had reversed WSI's administrative reclassification of Questar Energy Services, Inc.'s ("Questar") employees. n July 2012, Questar applied for and received insurance coverage from WSI. Following an audit in 2014, WSI determined Questar's employees had been improperly classified and reclassified Questar's employees. The classification of employees directly impacts the insurance rate used to calculate Questar's premiums for the insurance received from WSI. WSI contends the ALJ applied the wrong standard of review, improperly excluded from evidence the changes to the Rate Classification Manual, and erred in determining classification of Questar's employees was not supported by the record. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded after review, the ALJ's underlying factual conclusions were supported by a preponderance of the evidence, and affirmed. View "WSI v. Questar Energy Services, Inc." on Justia Law

North Dakota, by the North Dakota Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation's Youth Correctional Center, petitioned for a supervisory writ directing a district court to vacate its July 18, 2017 order denying the State's motion for summary judgment on Delmar Markel's negligence claim. Markel cross-petitioned for a supervisory writ directing the district court to vacate its January 21, 2016 order dismissing Markel's claim for constructive and retaliatory discharge. Markel worked at the North Dakota Youth Correctional Center on December 9, 2012, when several inmates broke out of their locked rooms. The inmates injured Markel during their escape. In 2015, Markel brought a complaint against the State alleging one count of negligence for failure to fix faulty locks permitting the inmates to escape and one count of constructive and retaliatory discharge. The State argued that the Workforce Safety and Insurance ("WSI") Act in N.D.C.C. Title 65 barred Markel's negligence claim and that Markel failed to exhaust administrative remedies regarding his discharge claim. On January 21, 2016, the district court dismissed the discharge claim for failure to pursue available administrative remedies. The district court also denied the State's motion to dismiss Markel's negligence claim. The North Dakota Supreme Court exercised its original jurisdiction by granting the State's petition and denying Markel's cross-petition. The district court erred as a matter of law in denying the State's motion to dismiss Markel's negligence claim. Markel failed to allege and support at least an "intentional act done with the conscious purpose of inflicting the injury" to overcome the State's immunity. The State had no adequate remedy to avoid defending a suit from which it has immunity. View "North Dakota v. Haskell" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Greggory Owings sustained an on-the-job injury, for which he received long-term disability benefits by defendant United of Omaha Life Insurance Company (United), under the terms of a group insurance policy issued by United to Owings’ employer. Owings disagreed with, and attempted without success to administratively challenge, the amount of his disability benefits. He then filed suit against United in Kansas state court, but United removed the action to federal district court, asserting that the federal courts had original jurisdiction over the action because the policy was governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). The district court ultimately granted summary judgment in favor of United. Owings appealed. The Tenth Circuit concluded after review of this matter that United was arbitrary and capricious in determining the date that Owings became disabled and, in turn, in calculating the amount of his disability benefits. Consequently, the Court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of United and remanded with directions to enter summary judgment in favor of Owings. View "Owings v. United of Omaha Life" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied Hospital San Cristobal’s petition for review of an order of the National Labor Relations Board (Board) declaring that the Hospital had committed several unfair labor practices in violation of section 8 of the National Labor Relations Act and granted the Board’s cross-petition for enforcement of that order. The court held (1) this court lacked jurisdiction to consider the Hospital’s challenge to the validity of the underlying unfair labor practice complaints; (2) substantial evidence in the record supported the Board’s determination that the Hospital violated sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) of the Act; and (3) the Hospital’s challenge to the Board’s remedy was not properly before the court. View "Quality Health Services of P.R., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

The issue before the Georgia Supreme Court in this case was whether an employer has to show the availability of suitable employment to justify suspension of workers’ compensation benefits after already establishing that an employee’s work-related aggravation to a preexisting condition has ceased to be the cause of the employee’s disability. The Court of Appeals held the answer was yes; the Supreme Court disagreed, finding the Court of Appeals erred in remanding this case for the ALJ court to determine if the employer demonstrated suitable employment for the injured employee. View "Ocmulgee EMC v. McDuffie" on Justia Law

In this case raising two questions concerning Hawaii law of workers’ compensation as it relates to permanent partial disability (PPD) awards, the Supreme Court held (1) a PPD award for an unscheduled injury that is not comparable to a scheduled injury must be supported by some factual finding of a determinate percentage of impairment of a physical or mental function of the whole person; and (2) a PPD determination may be based on a claimant’s post-injury inability to perform the usual and customary work activities in the position the claimant occupied prior to the injury.In the instant case, the Labor and Industrial Relations Appeals Board (LIRAB) awarded Employee $250 in PPD benefits. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) vacated LIRAB’s ruling and remanded for a determination of whether Employee had suffered a permanent impairment and, if so, the percentage of the impairment and the award of PPD benefits based on that percentage. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated the Board’s $250 lump sum award and remanded to LIRAB for it to determine the relevant percentage of Employee’s impairment, as well as an award of PPD benefits based on that percentage. View "Ihara v. State" on Justia Law

Mainstay Business Solutions (Mainstay), a division of the Blue Lake Rancheria Economic Development Corporation, was a tribal government-sponsored entity of Blue Lake Rancheria, a federally recognized Indian tribe. Mainstay operated a temporary staffing business, assigning temporary workers to its clients. It also operated an employee leasing business in which employees of Mainstay’s clients were placed on Mainstay’s payroll and leased back to the clients. The California Self-Insurers’ Security Fund (SISF) assumed the workers’ compensation obligations when Mainstay defaulted on its obligations to self-insure. SISF then sued Mainstay, Mainstay’s clients and others to recover its costs and liabilities. Among other things, the trial court granted SISF’s motion for judgment on the pleadings against Mainstay’s clients. Mainstay’s clients filed a petition for writ of mandate and/or prohibition to challenge the trial court’s order. SISF argued on appeal: (1) writ review was not appropriate because the main issue presented was rendered moot by the enactment of Labor Code section 3701.9. On the merits, Mainstay’s clients argued: (2) SISF’s claim was subject to the exclusive remedy provisions of the Workers Compensation Act and should have been brought before the Workers Compensation Appeals Board; and (3) their agreements with Mainstay in compliance with Labor Code section 3602(d) serve to bar SISF’s civil action. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "American Cargo Express v. Super Ct." on Justia Law