Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Michael Beagan was terminated from his employment with Albert Kemperle, Inc. after his manager discovered a disparaging post Beagan had made about him on Facebook. The Rhode Island Department of Labor and Training (DLT) denied Beagan’s application for unemployment benefits, finding that he had been discharged for “disqualifying reasons” under R.I. Gen. Laws 28-44-18. The district court affirmed the DLT’s decision. The Supreme Court quashed the decision of the district court and remanded with directions to award Beagan unemployment benefits, holding that no legally competent evidence existed that Beagan’s Facebook post was connected to his work in the manner contemplated by section 28-44-18, and therefore, there was no legally competent evidence to support a finding that Beagan was ineligible for unemployment benefits. View "Beagan v. Rhode Island Department of Labor & Training, Board of Review" on Justia Law

Petitioner Beverly Desmarais appealed the decision of the New Hampshire Compensation Appeals Board (CAB) denying her request for attorney’s fees and costs that she incurred in litigating a fee dispute with the respondents, Utica National Insurance Group (Utica) and AMI Graphics. The CAB determined that, although the Workers’ Compensation Law entitled the petitioner to attorney’s fees and costs associated with litigating the merits of her workers’ compensation claim, it did not further entitle her to fees and costs incurred in successfully litigating the fee dispute. The New Hampshire Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding that the evident purpose of paragraph VI of RSA 281-A:44 was to encourage claimants to obtain, and attorneys to provide, representation in a certain class of disputes regarding workers’ compensation benefits. The Court remanded to the CAB for a determination as to the reasonableness of the additional fees and costs that the petitioner incurred in litigating the fees and costs issue at the administrative level. Any party aggrieved by the CAB’s order on fees and costs may appeal to the Supreme Court pursuant to RSA chapter 541. View "Appeal of Beverly Desmarais" on Justia Law

An administrative law judge (ALJ) awarded Brandon Fleming partial disability benefits based on a finding that Fleming had a combined permanent impairment rating of seventeen percent. In 2010, Fleming moved to reopen his claim, alleging that his condition had worsened. A different ALJ found that Fleming had a combined permanent impairment rating of thirty-two percent. The Workers’ Compensation Board and court of appeals affirmed. LKLP CAC Inc. appealed, arguing that the ALJ’s opinion was not supported by substantial evidence because the ALJ relied on a physician who stated that Fleming’s permanent impairment rating had not changed following the 2010 opinion and award. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no abuse of discretion in the ALJ’s finding that Fleming had an increase in his permanent impairment rating, in his impairment, and in his disability. View "LKLP CAC Inc. v. Fleming" on Justia Law

Collateral estoppel is not given effect to an uncontested Wyoming Workers’ Compensation Division (Division) determination denying workers’ compensation benefits even when the denial is based on a finding that the employee did not suffer a compensable injury.Lea Porter, through her employer, submitted a report of injury to the Division, by which Porter reporter an injury to her left knee. The Division issued to Porter final determination informing her that it would not approve payments of benefits upon its determination that the injury was not a work-related injury. Porter did not object to the final determination or request a hearing but did object to a later final determination of the Division that denied payment of costs related to an MRI of her left knee. The Office of Administrative Hearings granted summary judgment for the Division, concluding that Porter could not challenge the denial of benefits for the MRI because she did not object to the Division’s earlier determination that her injury was not work related. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Porter’s failure to object to the Division’s compensability determination did not preclude her objection to the Division’s final determination denying benefits to cover her MRI costs. View "Porter v. State ex rel. Department of Workforce Services" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured while working for Defendant. The North Carolina Industrial Commission accepted Plaintiff’s claim as compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Act, and Defendant began paying Plaintiff compensation for temporary total disability. Plaintiff later filed a Form 33 requesting a medical motion hearing regarding his symptoms. The Commission concluded that Plaintiff failed to meet his burden of establishing that his anxiety and depression were a result of his work-related accident and that Plaintiff was not entitled to disability payments made after January 2011. The court of appeals (1) vacated and remanded in part, ruling that, on remand, the Commission should give Plaintiff the benefit of a presumption that his anxiety and depression were related to his injuries; and (2) reversed in part, ruling that Plaintiff had met his burden of establishing disability. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified and remanded for further proceedings, holding (1) Plaintiff was entitled a presumption of compensability in regard to his continued medical treatment; and (2) the Commission failed to address the effects of Plaintiff’s tinnitus in determining whether Plaintiff lost wage-earning capacity. View "Wilkes v. City of Greenville" on Justia Law

An inmate injured while working at a work release center is not entitled to workers' compensation benefits.William Crawford sought workers’ compensation benefits for a severe injury he sustained during his period of confinement at the Charleston Work Release Center. The claims administrator rejected Crawford’s application for benefits based upon its determination that he did not suffer an injury in the course of and resulting from his employment because Crawford was an inmate and not an employee as defined under W. Va. Code 23-4-1(a). The office of judges and Workers’ Compensation Board of Review affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Board did not err in ruling that Crawford was not entitled to workers’ compensation benefits pursuant to W. Va. Code 23-4-1e(b); and (2) there was no violation of Crawford’s equal protection rights. View "Crawford v. West Virginia Department of Corrections - Work Release" on Justia Law

Tartaglia served as Chief of Police at the Veterans Administration Hampton Virginia Medical Center. The VA proposed Tartaglia’s removal based on Abuse of Authority” (six specifications); “Lack of Candor” (two specifications); and “Misuse of Government Property” (one specification). The VA’s deciding official rejected Charge 3 as unsubstantiated, sustained Charge 1 based on five specifications and Charge 2 based on both specifications, and removed Tartaglia from service. An administrative judge affirmed Tartaglia’s removal, finding that the VA failed to prove either specification of Charge 2 and that it proved only three specifications of Charge 1. As to Charge 1, Tartaglia admitted to Specification 5: instructing a subordinate to drive him in a government-owned vehicle for a personal errand while on duty. The Merit Systems Protection Board sustained Tartaglia’s removal based solely on Specification 5, stating that removal fell within the Table of Penalties for that misconduct; Tartaglia’s “misconduct was particularly serious because it went beyond merely misappropriating a Government vehicle, but also included instructing a subordinate to help him”; mitigating factors such as Tartaglia’s “outstanding work record and lack of prior discipline” were “temper[ed]” because Tartaglia had served with the VA for “only approximately [four] years” and Tartaglia expressed remorse “only after initially denying the misconduct..” The Federal Circuit vacated, based on the Board’s miscalculation of Tartaglia’s length of service. View "Tartaglia v. Department of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law

The Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) abused its discretion when it granted Eddie Hudson’s petition to vacate an award of workers’ compensation benefits. Hudson was injured while working for Trillium Staffing and filed a workers’ compensation claim. The parties eventually settled. About one year later, Hudson filed a petition to vacate the award. The Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) granted the petition, finding that Hudson’s medical condition had substantially changed in a way that clearly was not, and could not reasonably have been, anticipated at the time of the award. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the WCCA abused its discretion when it granted Hudson’s petition because the medical opinion underlying the WCCA’s decision lacked foundation and therefore did not establish a substantial change in Hudson’s medical condition. View "Hudson v. Trillium Staffing" on Justia Law

Monterey County entered into an agreement with the Monterey County Deputy Sheriffs Association, including a longevity performance stipend that provided that a member of the Association who achieved 20 years of service with the county and a satisfactory or outstanding performance evaluation could receive an additional stipend of up to eight percent. Plaintiffs sued the county, the Sheriff’s Office, and the California Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS), seeking to compel the county to report the longevity performance stipend to CalPERS as an item of special compensation and to compel CalPERS to include the longevity performance stipend in calculating their retirement benefits. The trial court ruled as a matter of law that the longevity performance stipend was not reportable to CalPERS as an item of special compensation under California Code of Regulations, title 2, section 571(a), and granted judgment on the pleadings. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the longevity performance stipend does not qualify as an item of special compensation that must be reported to CalPERS and included in the calculation of plaintiffs’ retirement benefits. View "DiCarlo v. County of Monterey" on Justia Law

In 1992, Appellant was injured in an accident while in the course and scope of his employment. In 2014, Appellant applied for permanent total disability benefits. A hearing officer found that Appellant was not permanently and totally disabled. Appellant filed a complaint in mandamus alleging that the Industrial Commission abused its discretion by entering an order that was not supported by the evidence. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission did not abuse its discretion in relying on an expert’s report to find that Appellant was capable of up to four hours of sedentary work a day, and therefore, the court of appeals properly denied Appellant’s request for a writ of mandamus. View "State ex rel. Bonnlander v. Harmon" on Justia Law