Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The circuit court affirmed a determination by the Labor and Industry Review Commission (LIRC) that Appellant was ineligible for unemployment benefits because she was terminated for substantial fault. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant was entitled to unemployment compensation because her actions did not fit within the definition of substantial fault as set forth in Wis. Stat. 103.04(5g)(a) where she was terminated for committing “one or more inadvertent errors” during the course of her employment. Remanded to LIRC to determine the amount of unemployment benefits Appellant was owed. View "Operton v. Labor & Industry Review Commission" on Justia Law

This case presented a question of whether the then-current collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the State of Washington and Services Employees International Union Healthcare 775NW (SEIU) included a union security provision statutorily authorized under chapter 41.56 RCW. The trial court held that the CBA contained an authorized union security provision and dismissed the lawsuit. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Thorpe v. Inslee" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit asked the Louisiana Supreme Court: “What is the meaning of ‘good faith’ as that term is used in the Louisiana Environmental Quality Act, Louisiana Revised Statutes 30:2027?” Eric Borcik was employed by Crosby Tugs, L.L.C. (Crosby) as a deckhand. In July 2010, he was transferred to the M/V NELDA FAYE. Borcik claims that the lead captain of the NELDA FAYE ordered him to dump waste oil into navigable waters and otherwise violate environmental laws over a period of three years. He further claims that he followed these orders. In May 2013, Borcik emailed Crosby’s Chief Administrative Officer (CAO). His email communicated that he had “concerns” that he stated “have all fallen on deaf ears” and expressed “fear [of] some form of retaliation.” He later met with the CAO in person. Borcik was transferred to another boat and later fired. Borcik contends he was fired in retaliation for his complaints; Crosby contends that Borcik was fired for insubordination. Borcik sued Crosby in October 2013, alleging retaliatory termination in violation of Louisiana Environmental Quality Act (“LEQA”), specifically claiming that Crosby violated the Louisiana Environmental Whistleblower Act. The Supreme Court answered the certified question: the term “good faith,” as used in R.S. 30:2027, means an employee is acting with an honest belief that a violation of an environmental law, rule, or regulation occurred. View "Borcik v. Crosby Tugs, LLC" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit upheld Milwaukee's residency requirement for law enforcement and emergency personnel. Milwaukee’s corporate charter previously required all city employees to live within city limits. In 2013, the Wisconsin legislature prohibited local governments from imposing a residency requirement as a condition of employment, exempting requirements that law enforcement, fire, or emergency personnel reside within 15 miles of jurisdictional boundaries. Milwaukee announced its intent to enforce its original residency requirement, citing the Wisconsin Constitution’s home‐rule provision. The Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected that argument. The city amended its charter to require all law enforcement, fire, and emergency personnel to reside within 15 miles of city limits, giving affected employees six months to comply, with extensions available for hardship. In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Seventh Circuit affirmed judgment on the pleadings for the city. Municipal employees do not have a fundamental right to be free from residency requirements, for purposes of substantive due process. Rejecting a procedural due process argument, the court stated that no vested right was impaired. The amended charter does not apply retroactively. View "Milwaukee Police Association v. City of Milwaukee" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Todd Huval and Chad Boyer were former Louisiana State Troopers employed by the State of Louisiana, Department of Public Safety and Corrections, Office of State Police. In 2007, they were terminated based on an investigation which exposed alleged violations of employment policy and state law. Both were accused of providing confidential information to a third party. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to determine whether the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over tort claims stemming from the disciplinary action over which the State Police Commission presided. The lower courts concluded that subject matter jurisdiction was proper in district court. The Supreme Court agreed. View "Huval v. Louisiana" on Justia Law

In 2013, Karen Hardy was injured during the course of her employment. In 2015, Hardy sought treatment for low back pain. The Department of Workforce Services, Workers’ Compensation Division denied payment for Hardy’s medical bills. The Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) concluded that Hardy’s injury was not compensable because Hardy had failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence a causal connection between her 2013 work-related injury and her 2015 back injury. The district court affirmed. Hardy appealed, arguing that she was entitled to benefits under the second compensable injury rule. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that substantial evidence supported the OAH’s conclusion that Hardy failed to demonstrate that it was more probable than not that her 2013 injury was causally related to her 2015 injury. View "Hardy v. State ex rel. Department of Workforce Services, Workers’ Compensation Division" on Justia Law

Marshall Parker sought an award of benefits for a back injury he received during the course of his employment with Webster County Coal. An administrative law judge (ALJ) awarded benefits for the back injury. However, the ALJ found that, pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.730(4), Webster County Coal did not have liability for payment of income benefits in addition to the two years of temporary total disability income benefits Parker had already received. The Workers’ Compensation Board and Court of Appeals affirmed. Parker appealed, arguing that section 342.730(4) is unconstitutional because, under the statute, injured older workers who qualify for normal old-age Social Security retirement benefits are treated differently from injured older workers who do not qualify. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that section 342.730(4) is constitutionally infirm on equal protection grounds because there is no rational basis or substantial and justifiable reason for the disparate treatment of two groups of workers. View "Parker v. Webster County Coal, LLC" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal granted the writ application of the employer, City of Jackson (City), after the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (Board) disregarded the apportionment determination of the qualified medical evaluator (QME) on the ground the determination was not substantial medical evidence and directed the workers’ compensation administrative law judge (ALJ) to make an award of unapportioned disability. The QME concluded that the employee’s disability - neck, shoulder, arm, and hand pain - was caused by cervical degenerative disc disease, and that the disease, in turn, was caused in large part by heredity or genetics. The QME thus assigned causation 49 percent to the employee’s personal history, which included, but was not limited to, the genetic cause of the degenerative disease. The ALJ agreed with the QME’s apportionment, but the Board did not. The Board concluded the QME could not assign causation to genetics because that is an “impermissible immutable factor[].” The Board also concluded that by relying on the employee’s genetic makeup, the QME apportioned the causation of the injury rather than the extent of his disability. Finally, the Board concluded the QME’s determination was not substantial medical evidence. After review, the Court of Appeal disagreed with each of the Board’s conclusions, annulled its order, and remanded with directions to deny reconsideration. View "City of Jackson v. WCAB" on Justia Law

The 2013 Department of Defense (DOD) budget was cut by $37 billion halfway through Fiscal Year 2013. The Secretary of Defense directed DOD managers to prepare to furlough most civilian employees for up to 11 workdays, with exceptions for employees deployed to a combat zone, those whose jobs are necessary to protect safety of life and property, Navy Shipyard employees, National Intelligence Program employees, Foreign Military Sales employees, political appointees, non-appropriated fund instrumentality employees, foreign national employees, and various employees not paid directly by DOD Military accounts. Snyder, a civilian engineer at the Naval Surface Warfare Center (Dahlgren) received a Notice of Proposed Furlough. Snyder worked on an Advanced Shipboard Weapons Control project, governed by a Cooperative Research and Development Agreement (CRADA) between Dahlgren and Lockheed. Lockheed was solely responsible for funding and paid $2.6 million in 2012 to the U.S. Treasurer. Unused funds were to be remitted to Lockheed. Lockheed and Snyder requested that Dahlgren employees supporting the CRADA be exempt from furlough. The Navy denied the request. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Merit System Protection Board in upholding Snyder’s furlough. An agency may furlough an employee for lack of work or funds or other non-disciplinary reasons, 5 U.S.C. 7511(a)(5), 7512(5) if the furlough “will promote the efficiency of the service.” The court found the furlough decision to “be a reasonable management solution to the financial restrictions placed on the agency.” View "Snyder v. Department of the Navy" on Justia Law

Defendant Carus Corp. (Carus) was an international company that developed and sold chemical products for municipal and industrial applications. Defendant's products included a chemical called Totalox, which essentially, was designed as a deodorizer for sewer systems. The Town of Lexington (Town) used Totalox in its sewer treatment plants. In 2010, Plaintiff John Machin, a Town employee, was exposed to Totalox when a storage container valve broke during the delivery of Totalox to one of the Town's wastewater stations. Plaintiff suffered reactive airways syndrome, which was also known as chemically induced asthma or obstructive lung disease. As a result of his injuries, Plaintiff filed a workers' compensation claim and was awarded workers' compensation benefits. The South Carolina Supreme Court accepted four certified questions from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina: (1) Under South Carolina law, when a Plaintiff seeks recovery from a person, other than his employer, for an injury sustained on the job, may the jury hear an explanation of why the employer is not part of the instant action?; (2) when a Plaintiff seeks recovery from a person, other than his employer, for an injury sustained on the job, may a defendant argue the empty chair defense and suggest that Plaintiff's employer is the wrongdoer?; (3) In connection with Question 2, if a defendant retains the right to argue the empty chair defense against Plaintiff's employer, may a court instruct the jury that an employer's legal responsibility has been determined by another forum, specifically, the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Commission?; and (4) when a Plaintiff seeks recovery from a person, other than his employer, for an injury sustained on the job, may the Court allow the jury to apportion fault against the nonparty employer by placing the name of the employer on the verdict form? The South Carolina Supreme Court answered these questions in the abstract, without any suggestion as to the resolution of the post-trial motion before the federal court: Questions 1, 2, and 3 "yes," provided a defense seeks to assign fault to the plaintiff's employer. The Court answered Question 4, "no." View "Machin v. Carus Corporation" on Justia Law