Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Mark Byers, who worked as a grinder at Acme Foundry, was injured in a workplace accident. After Byers was released from the hospital he agreed to do a drug test. Byers’ urine sample was thrown into the trash, however, when Acme’s in-house nurse determined that there was not enough urine in the collection cup. An administrative law judge concluded that Byers forfeited his benefits under the Workers Compensation Act by providing an inadequate urine sample for testing. The Workers Compensation Board upheld that ruling. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Byers’ actions did not amount to a refusal. Remanded. View "Byers v. Acme Foundry" on Justia Law

The Bartonville police department’s union contract includes a grievance procedure. The Union may refer the grievance to arbitration if it is not settled within the three-step procedure. In 2014, Chief Fengel signed a complaint for termination, alleging that Lopez violated department procedures during a traffic stop. After scheduling a hearing by the board of fire and police commissioners, Lopez sought a declaratory judgment, arguing that the board was divested of jurisdiction because it had failed to commence the hearing within the 30-day time limit under Municipal Code 10-2.1-17. The board responded that it did so at Lopez’s request. The appellate court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the board. The hearing had proceeded, with counsel stating that Lopez did not waive the issue of jurisdiction and that the Union’s presence did not waive its contractual right to grieve the termination. The board ordered termination. Lopez never sought judicial review under the Administrative Review Law, but filed a grievance. When the grievance was not resolved by the three-step process, the Union referred it to arbitration. The Department sought a stay, arguing that in relying on the Municipal Code, Lopez essentially admitted that the board had jurisdiction. Because the board issued a final merits decision, review was subject to the Administrative Review Law. The Department also argued that the grievance and arbitration provisions in the labor contract did not apply to termination proceedings because the parties did not negotiate an alternative form of due process in the labor contract. The trial court granted the Department summary judgment, finding no contract provision, “even inferring, that the grievance procedure should, or could, be used to determine disciplinary matters.” The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the trial court decision, finding the grievance barred by waiver and res judicata. View "The Village of Bartonville v. Lopez" on Justia Law

The issue in this workers’ compensation appeal was ultimately whether a notice of compensation payable closely circumscribes the range of health-related conditions to be considered in impairment rating evaluations. The Supreme Court held that physician-examiners must exercise independent professional judgment to make a whole-body assessment of “the degree of impairment due to the compensable injury,” which discernment cannot be withheld on the basis that the physician-examiner believes the undertaking is a more limited one. The order of the Commonwealth Court with respect to this issue was reversed, and the matter remanded for reinstatement of the finding of invalidity rendered by the Worker's Compensation Appeal Board. View "Duffey v. WCAB" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Leticia Bareno appealed a judgment entered in favor of defendants San Diego Miramar College (the College), San Diego Community College District, and San Diego Community College District Administrative Facilities Corporation. In early 2013, Bareno was disciplined by her employer, the College, in relation to her employment as an administrative assistant. Thereafter, Bareno required medical treatment and accompanying leave from work, and she requested medical leave from her supervisor. Bareno provided medical certification for this request for leave. After the time frame specified in Bareno's initial request for leave had ended, Bareno continued to be absent from work. Bareno had attempted to e-mail her supervisor a recertification of her need for additional medical leave, but the College claimed that Bareno's supervisor did not receive any such request from Bareno for additional leave. As a result, after Bareno continued to be absent from work for an additional five consecutive days, the College took the position that she had "voluntarily resigned." After Bareno learned that the College considered her to have voluntarily resigned, she attempted to provide the College with information regarding the medical necessity of the leave that she had taken. The College refused to reconsider its position. Bareno filed suit against all three defendants, alleging that in effectively terminating her employment, defendants retaliated against her for taking medical leave, in violation of the California Family Rights Act (CFRA). Defendants moved for summary judgment on Bareno's sole claim for retaliation under CFRA, and the trial court granted the motion. On appeal, Bareno argued that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because there remain triable issues of material fact in dispute. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed, reversed the judgment and remanded the matter for further proceedings. View "Bareno v. San Diego Community College Dist." on Justia Law

Rogelynn Emory, a full-time tenured teacher in the Memphis City School System, was terminated after the Memphis City Schools Board of Education concluded after a hearing that there was ample evidence of Emory’s unsatisfactory job performance. Emory subsequently filed a petition for judicial review. The trial court affirmed the Board’s decision. The Court of Appeals declined to reinstate Emory based on the untimeliness of the school board hearing but awarded her partial back pay. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision to upheld the termination of Emory’s employment and clarified the standard of judicial review for the termination of a tenured teacher under the Tenure Act, holding (1) the Court of Appeals’ award of partial back pay was without basis in the Teachers’ Tenure Act; and (2) because Emory failed to raise before the school board any objection as to the timeliness of her hearing, that issue was not properly before the Supreme Court. View "Emory v. Memphis City Schools Board of Education" on Justia Law

The Budget Control Act of 2011 established spending limits for federal agencies and required automatic spending cuts (sequestration) if certain deficit reduction legislation was not enacted. The American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 required the President to issue a sequestration order near the middle of fiscal year 2013. Under President Obama’s sequestration the Department of Defense (DOD) 2013 budget was cut by approximately 37 billion dollars, to be absorbed over six months. The DOD reprogrammed funds, reduced facility maintenance, eliminated some military training exercises, and furloughed civilian workers. Calhoun is a non-excepted civilian Doctrine Defense Specialist for the Army Cyber Command (ACC). ACC Commander Lt. Gen. Hernandez, the deciding official, delegated that authority to his Chief of Staff, Col. Sanborn. Calhoun received a Notice of Proposed Furlough. Calhoun replied, including budget proposals she asserted would prevent furloughs. In responses to Calhoun, Col. Sanborn stated that he had read her submissions and that “[t]he furlough guidance … is clear.” Calhoun was furloughed for six nonconsecutive days. An administrative judge found that delegation to Col. Sanborn did not violate DOD policy; that Col. Sanborn appropriately considered Calhoun’s reply; and that evaluation of the merits of her proposals was beyond the scope of his review. The Merit Systems Protection Board and the Federal Circuit affirmed, finding no due process violation because Col. Sanborn considered Calhoun’s written reply and because a summary of her oral reply would not have altered the furlough decision. View "Calhoun v. Department of the Army" on Justia Law

Joseph Maravilla and J.R. Simplot Company both appealed the Industrial Commission’s (Commission) Order on Petition for Declaratory Ruling. Maravilla was injured in an industrial accident while working for Simplot, and Simplot paid Maravilla’s worker’s compensation benefits for that injury. In a separate action, Maravilla brought suit against Idaho Industrial Contractors, Inc. (IIC), the contractor performing repairs on the area where Maravilla was injured. Maravilla and IIC settled the claim for $75,000 and Simplot claimed subrogation against Maravilla. In its order, the Commission ruled that Maravilla could have argued that Simplot was partly at fault for Maravilla’s industrial accident and that Simplot’s negligence, if proved, was not a bar to Simplot being reimbursed for worker’s compensation payments it had paid Maravilla. Simplot appealed the Commission’s decision that Maravilla’s settlement with IIC does not preclude Maravilla from attempting to prove Simplot’s negligence. Maravilla appealed the Commission’s ruling that Simplot was entitled to reimbursement even if Simplot’s negligence contributed to Maravilla’s injury. The Supreme Court, after its review, affirmed in part and reversed in part, finding that the Commission erred in its interpretation of the controlling case law in this matter: “The adoption of comparative negligence and the abrogation of joint and several liability do not affect the rationale behind the Liberty Mutual rule, let alone require its abandonment.” The Court affirmed in all other respects. View "Maravilla v. J. R. Simplot Co." on Justia Law

California firefighters and their union sought to compel the California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) to continue to enforce Government Code 20909, and allow eligible public employees to purchase at cost up to five years of nonqualifying service credit (airtime) to increase pension benefits paid in retirement, by increasing their service credit. The option was eliminated as of January 1, 2013 under the Public Employees’ Pension Reform Act (PEPRA), a reform measure designed to strengthen the state’s public pension system and ensure its ongoing solvency. (Government Code 7522.46, 20909(g)). Plaintiffs argued that elimination of the option violated the California Constitution contracts clause (Art. I, section 9), so that CalPERS lacked authority to refuse to consider applications for the credit. The trial court and court of appeal rejected the argument. Modification of the statute governing airtime service credit was wholly reasonable and carried “some material relation to the theory of a pension system and its successful operation.” Plaintiffs are entitled only to a “reasonable” pension, not one providing fixed or definite benefits immune from modification or elimination by the governing body, and did not establish that elimination of their right to purchase airtime credit cost them their right to a reasonable pension. View "Cal Fire Local 2881 v. California Public Employees' Retirement System" on Justia Law

Rosalva Ochoa was terminated from her employment with JBS Swift & Company for absenteeism. Ochoa filed two workers’ compensation petitions against Swift and its workers’ compensation carrier, alleging a cumulative left groin injury and a cumulative injury to the neck and right shoulder during the course and scope of her employment. A workers’ compensation deputy commissioner ordered Swift to pay Ochoa permanent partial disability benefits and permanent total disability benefits, but the award eliminated what would otherwise amount to overlapping partial disability benefits and total disability benefits. The workers’ compensation commissioner concluded that Ochoa’s permanent partial disability payments should not have terminated as of the date when her permanent total disability payments commenced, which resulted in Ochoa receiving more than six years of overlapping weekly benefits. The district court and court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Iowa workers’ compensation law does not prohibit an employee from collecting both permanent partial disability benefits and permanent total disability benefits at the same time when the employee suffers successive injuries at the same workplace. View "JBS Swift & Co. v. Ochoa" on Justia Law

Delek petitions for review of OSHA citations for violations of its process safety management rules, which govern an employer’s responsibility to inspect, and to develop inspection and recording regimes for, machinery that handles large volumes of hazardous chemicals. Item 4 alleges a failure to resolve open findings and recommendations identified during process hazard analyses that occurred in 1994, 1998, 1999, 2004, and 2005—prior to Delek purchasing and taking possession of the refinery. Item 8 alleges an inadequate monitoring and inspection regime for certain equipment involved in process safety management. Item 12 alleges that Delek failed to determine and document a response to the findings of a 2005 compliance audit in a timely manner. Item 12 was also conducted before Delek took possession of the refinery. The court concluded that citations for Items 4 and 12 are barred by the six-month statute of limitations in 29 U.S.C. 658(c). Accordingly, the court vacated those items. The court also concluded that the regulations relevant to the citation for Item 8 are ambiguous and the Secretary's interpretation is reasonable. The court affirmed the citation for Item 8. View "Delek Refining, Ltd. v. OSHC" on Justia Law