Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

All Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) plant officers are required to maintain medical clearance as a condition of employment. Since his employment began in 2009, Hale maintained the clearance necessary for his position. In 2013, the TVA began requiring a pulmonary function test for that clearance; Hale failed the testing and was terminated because of his chronic obstructive pulmonary disorder. Hale sued, alleging disability discrimination and failure to accommodate under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act. In an unsuccessful motion to dismiss, the TVA argued that Title VII’s national-security exemption applies to the Rehabilitation Act and precludes the court from reviewing the physical-fitness requirements imposed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the interests of national security and that the Egan doctrine precludes the judiciary from reviewing the TVA’s determination that Hale lacked the physical capacity to fulfill his job duties because this decision was one of national security. The Sixth Circuit denied an interlocutory appeal; the national security exemption does not apply to Hale’s Rehabilitation Act claim. The court declined to extend Egan to preclude judicial review of an agency’s determination regarding an employee’s physical capability to perform the duties of his position. View "Hale v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court’s review centered on whether, pursuant to section 8327(b)(2) of the Public School Employees’ Retirement Code, 24 Pa.C.S.A. 8327(b)(2), the school district that originally approved the creation of a charter school was financially responsible, after the revocation of the charter, for the charter school’s prior failure to make payments to its employees’ retirement fund. The Court surmised the question hinged upon whether unpaid retirement contributions constituted an outstanding obligation of the closed charter school. The Court concluded that the deficiency resulting from the failure to make the payments was indeed an outstanding financial obligation of a closed charter school and therefore, pursuant to section 17-1729-A(i) of the Charter School Law, 24 P.S. section 17-1729-A(i), the school district could not be held liable for the amounts owed. View "Pocono Mtn. Sch. Dist. v. Dept. of Educ." on Justia Law

Gallegos worked for the FDA, 1980-2000. He was removed for refusal to accept a reassignment that required relocation. Gallegos appealed to the Merit System Protection Board. In 2001, the parties entered into a settlement, providing that the Agency would expunge from Gallegos’s file and Standard Form 50 any indication that he was removed. A revised SF50 would indicate “voluntary resignation.” Gallegos was to “be provided with a copy of the revised SF50 … notify the Agency of any concerns within 15-days.” The Board approved the settlement, noting that any petition for enforcement must be filed within a reasonable period after discovery of noncompliance, consistent with 5 C.F.R. 1201.182(a). Almost 14 years later, Gallegos alleged that he discovered that his revised SF-50 indicated resignation “in lieu of involuntary action.” Gallegos alleged that he had misplaced the agreement and was only able to confirm the breach by obtaining a copy in response to a FOIA request. In 2015, Gallegos filed a petition for enforcement with the Board. An administrative judge concluded that Gallegos had received the revised SF-50 14 years earlier, and that Gallegos did not establish good cause for the delay. The Board and Federal Circuit affirmed, noting Gallegos’s failure to maintain a copy of the agreement and his apparent failure to compare the SF-50 with the settlement agreement. Gallegos did not establish good cause for untimely filing. View "Gallegos v. Merit System Protection Board" on Justia Law

Rebecca Gage was a deputy sheriff in Sacramento County who sustained a job-related injury and applied for industrial disability retirement. She also requested advance disability pension payments while her retirement application was processed. Although she eventually received such advance pension payments, Gage also sought penalties under section 5814 for an unreasonable delay. The workers’ compensation judge (WCJ) ruled section 5814 penalties were available for the unreasonable delay in payment of advance disability pension payments, but deferred the decision on whether the delay in this case was unreasonable. At issue in this case was whether the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) had jurisdiction to impose penalties under Labor Code section 5814 for the unreasonable delay or denial of advance disability pension payments, available under section 4850.4 to local peace officers who were disabled on the job. Because: (1) such payments qualified as compensation under section 3207; (2) section 5814 penalties were available for unreasonable delay or denial of the payment of compensation; and (3) no other provision of the Labor Code evinced a legislative intent to exclude such payments from the penalty provisions of section 5814, the Court of Appeals concluded the answer was yes. View "Gage v. WCAB" on Justia Law

In 2008, plaintiff Sharon Hammer began working as the City Administrator for the City of Sun Valley (City) pursuant to a written employment agreement. In 2011, DeWayne Briscoe defeated the incumbent mayor, Wayne Willich, in the mayoral election. The City’s council conducted a special executive session to discuss allegations of improper use of public funds and equipment by plaintiff. The following day, her husband, an attorney, sent a letter to Mayor Willich threatening litigation. The City placed the Plaintiff on paid administrative leave, and three days later her husband filed a lawsuit on her behalf against the City and members of city government. Following an investigation, Plaintiff resumed her duties, and no disciplinary action was taken. In early 2012, Briscoe was sworn in as the mayor. The next day, he placed Plaintiff on paid administrative leave and notified her of another investigation. Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed her pending lawsuit against the City and members of city government. A few days after dismissing her case, Plaintiff was terminated from employment based upon the unanimous vote of the Mayor and city council. Plaintiff brought another lawsuit seeking to recover under the Idaho Protection of Public Employees Act. The district court ruled that the Plaintiff had waived her claim against the City of Sun Valley pursuant to a release she had signed, and that the Act did not provide a cause of action against City officials. Finding no reversible error in that judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Hammer v. City of Sun Valley" on Justia Law

The union was charged with violating its duty of fair representation in processing the grievance of a union member, Powell, who was terminated from her position as an automotive plant janitor. The charge alleged that Faircloth, Powell’s union steward, had submitted a false statement that she had witnessed an incident in which Powell threatened a fellow employee, and that Faircloth was subsequently involved in Powell’s grievance process. An Administrative Law Judge dismissed the charge. The National Labor Relations Board reversed, finding that the union had violated its duty of fair representation by acting arbitrarily or in bad faith. The Board emphasized that: Faircloth had submitted a statement against Powell that was partly false; Faircloth had represented Powell in the first stage of the grievance process without disclosing the fact that she had submitted a statement; and Powell was unaware of Faircloth’s statement throughout the grievance process. The Sixth Circuit vacated, holding that the Board’s finding regarding the falsity of Faircloth’s statement was not supported by substantial evidence, and that there was an insufficient basis to find a breach of duty of fair representation. There was nothing to contradict Faircloth’s assertion that she witnessed the threat. View "International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

Plaintiff San Joaquin County Correctional Officers Association (CCOA) appealed a judgment in favor of the County of San Joaquin (County) in this dispute over pensions payments, specifically, cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs), for CCOA members. Under the County Employees Retirement Law of 1937 (CERL), the County had the right to reduce any contributions it chose to make toward what would otherwise have been the employee’s half-share of COLA payments. Under the California Public Employees’ Pension Reform Act of 2013 (PEPRA), limits on any such government contributions take effect after 2018. After the County reduced the COLA contributions it had been making, CCOA contended, in effect, that PEPRA shielded its members from any such reductions until 2018. The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court that this was an incorrect interpretation of the law. "PEPRA was intended to rein in what was perceived by the Legislature to be overly generous retirement packages for public employees, but delayed the effective date of some provisions to ease the transition and allow some changes to be negotiated gradually. It was not designed to shield compensation packages that were already subject to reduction under prior laws, specifically, CERL." Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court. View "San Joaquin County Correctional etc. v. County of San Joaquin" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was employed as a police officer by Defendant when he was injured. The Workers’ Compensation Commissioner dismissed Plaintiff’s claim for Workers’ Compensation benefits, concluding that Plaintiff had not departed his “place of abode” for duty as a police officer at the time he sustained his injury, and therefore, the incident was not compensable. The Workers’ Compensation Board affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiff was acting “in the course of his employment” at the time he was injured, and therefore, the Board erred in affirming the Commissioner’s decision to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim. View "Balloli v. New Haven Police Department" on Justia Law

Mary Smith was discharged from her employment with the Estill County Fiscal Court after complaining about working conditions. The Kentucky Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission found that the Fiscal Court’s discharge of Smith was a violation of Ky. Rev. Stat. 338.121(3)(a) because her letter constituted an occupational health “complaint.” The circuit court affirmed. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the Commission exceeded its statutory authority by interpreting what action constitutes a “complaint” under the Kentucky Occupational Safety and Health Act (KOSHA) because only the Kentucky Occupational Safety and Health Board, the quasi-legislative body under KOSHA, could interpret the meaning of undefined terms. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the final order of the Commission, holding that the Commission reasonably interpreted the word “complaint,” and that interpretation was in accord with the purpose of KOSHA. View "Kentucky Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission v. Estill County Fiscal Court" on Justia Law

Eddie Ray Thomas, Jr. died from a heart attack while attempting to tow a truck from a roadside culvert. Eddie’s estate filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits. During the proceedings, the estate offered various testimony supporting the estate’s claim that Eddie’s heart attack was work-related, thus meeting its burden of proving that Eddie’s death was work-related without the presumption provided by Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.680. Eddie’s employer attempted to rebut the statutory presumption with testimony by Dr. Roseman. An administrative law judge (ALJ) determined that Eddie’s death was not work-related, finding that Eddie suffered from pre-existing and active ischemic heart disease and that any anxiety Eddie suffered at the time of his death was not work-related. The Workers’ Compensation Board affirmed. The court of appeals reversed and remanded the matter to the ALJ with instructions to award benefits. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Dr. Roseman’s opinion was not evidence of substance, and therefore, the presumption stood and the ALJ was required to award benefits. View "Eddie’s Service Center v. Thomas" on Justia Law