Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant injured her knee while working, and a worker’s compensation claim was allowed for a medial meniscus tear of her right knee. When arthroscopic surgery was later performed on Appellant’s knee and no evidence of a meniscus tear was found, the Industrial Commission exercised its continuing jurisdiction and disallowed Appellant’s claim. Appellant filed a petition alleging that she was entitled to participate in the workers’ compensation system for her workplace injuries and also filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus alleging that the Commissioner’s denial of her claim was an abuse of discretion. The court of appeals denied the writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant had an adequate remedy by way of appeal, and therefore, the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus. View "State ex rel. Carroll v. Galion Assisted Living, Ltd." on Justia Law

In 2006, Plaintiff’s decedent filed notices of claim with the Workers’ Compensation Commission. The Commission assigned the decedent’s claims to its asbestos docket for adjudication. After the decedent died, Plaintiff, his widow, filed a claim for dependent benefits that was joined with the original claims. The Connecticut Insurance Guaranty Association became a defendant in the proceedings. The Association was originally dismissed from the case for lack of exposure. The Commissioner later reinstated the Association as a party to the proceedings. The Workers’ Compensation Review Board affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed the Board’s decision, holding that the Commissioner properly reinstated the Association as a party to the proceedings because the Commissioner’s broad case management authority permitted him to render a dismissal that was provisional, rather than final, in nature. View "Graham v. Olson Wood Associates, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner Katherine Streeter appealed a New Hampshire Compensation Appeals Board (board) order denying her request for attorney’s fees under New Hampshire Administrative Rules, Lab 207.01(a)(4). In 2013, Streeter injured her left shoulder at work. She notified her employer and the employer filed a First Report of Injury with its insurance carrier the next day. Streeter would ultimately be diagnosed with tendonitis and referred for physical therapy. She received a steroid injection and was unable to work for two weeks, during which time the employer’s insurance carrier paid indemnity benefits. Streeter was awarded “payment of her medical treatment associated with this case, including, but not limited to, her surgery and physical therapy treatment . . . [and] indemnity benefits at the temporary total disability rate” from May through August 2014. Streeter’s attorney was awarded 20% of the retroactive indemnity award, pursuant to New Hampshire Administrative Rules, Lab 207.01(a)(1). Thereafter, her attorney requested additional fees. The hearing officer denied the request, finding that Streeter’s attorney was entitled only to 20% of the retroactive award and, thus, her “request for legal fees relative to the award of medical benefits [was] inappropriate under these circumstances.” On appeal, Streeter argued that “by paying benefits voluntarily after 21 days after notification of the claim,” the employer’s insurance carrier made a “de facto” determination pursuant to New Hampshire Administrative Rules, Lab 506.02 that her injury was compensable. After review, the Supreme Court determined that Streeter’s attorney was entitled only to “20% of the retroactive indemnity benefits payable out of the benefit received.” N.H. Admin. Rules, Lab 207.01(a)(1). View "Appeal of Katherine Streeter" on Justia Law

The Employment Security Board (ESB) affirmed a Department of Labor audit of appellant, Great Northern Construction (GNC). The Department's auditor concluded that GNC had improperly classified two of its workers as independent contractors rather than employees for the purposes of unemployment insurance taxes. In accordance with Vermont's Unemployment Compensation Law, the Department issued GNC an assessment for unpaid taxes from 2011 to 2014 plus interest and a penalty. GNC sought review of the assessment before an administrative law judge, who upheld the Department's tax assessment, and GNC appealed that decision to the ESB. The ESB concluded that the workers in question were not independent contractors but employees according to Vermont's statutory definition of the term. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the ESB concerning one worker, but reversed as to the other. View "Great Northern Construction, Inc. v. Department of Labor" on Justia Law

The State appealed a Labor Relations Board decision to reverse its dismissal of grievant John Lepore, instead suspending him for thirty days without pay. The Board agreed with the State that grievant committed serious offenses and demonstrated 'poor judgment and dishonesty related to his fitness for state employment' while serving as a juror in a capital murder trial. It concluded, however, the State could not dismiss grievant given its delay in imposing discipline and its failure to restrict grievant's job duties during the investigation into grievant's misconduct. The State argued that neither ground undermined its conclusion that grievant's serious misconduct warranted dismissal, particularly because grievant suffered no prejudice from the delay. After review, the Supreme Court agreed, and therefore reversed the Board's decision. View "In re Grievance of John Lepore" on Justia Law

Appellee was injured at work. The Industrial Commission awarded Appellee permanent total disability compensation benefits, concluding that Appellee was unable to perform any sustained remunerative employment due solely to the medical impairment caused by the allowed psychological condition in her workers’ compensation claim. Appellee subsequently applied for permanent partial disability compensation, arguing that she was entitled to this award based on the physical conditions allowed in her claim. The Industrial Commission determined that a claimant is not barred from concurrent compensation for permanent partial disability if it is based on conditions that were not the basis for the prior finding of permanent total disability in the same claim. Appellant, Appellee’s employer, filed a complaint seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the Commission to vacate its order. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court reversed and granted Appellant’s request for a writ of mandamus, holding that the Commission has no authority to award an injured worker permanent partial disability compensation when the worker has been previously found to be permanently disabled in the same claim, even when the new finding is based on conditions in the claim that formed no part of the basis for the prior finding of permanent total disability. View "State ex rel. Ohio Presbyterian Retirement Services, Inc. v. Industrial Commission" on Justia Law

Wilson was a civilian Resource Analyst at the Nuclear Propulsion Directorate at the Naval Sea Systems Command, which required a Department of Energy security clearance. The DOE revoked Wilson’s security clearance, stating that Wilson: knowingly brought a personal firearm onto a Navy facility in violation of regulations; armed himself with a personal weapon while acting as a Metropolitan Police Department reserve officer, contrary to regulations; and made false statements and false time and attendance entries to his civilian employer, the Naval Reserve Unit and the MPD. Wilson maintains that he brought his firearm to the facility in response to the 2013 Washington Navy Yard shooting, in perceived compliance with his duty as a Navy Reservist, and requested reinstatement under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act, 38 U.S.C. 4301. The Navy removed Wilson from federal service. A Merit Systems Protection Board administrative judge determined that the Board lacked authority to consider claims of discrimination or reprisal in the context of a removal based on security clearance revocation; that the Navy provided him the procedural protections of 5 U.S.C. 7513(b); and that the Navy did not have a policy to reassign employees to alternate positions that do not require a security clearance. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s finding that it lacked the authority to consider Wilson’s USERRA claim. View "Wilson v. Department of the Navy" on Justia Law

Marilynne Earles was injured in the course and scope of her employment with BF Goodrich Company, Specialty Chemicals Division (Goodrich). Earles returned to work with certain restrictions. Later, Earles find an application for wage-loss compensation based on a reduction in her earnings while working in a light-duty position. A district hearing officer denied the application. A union representative subsequently filed an appeal on behalf of Earles. The Industrial Commission accepted the appeal and awarded wage-loss compensation. Goodrich filed a complaint in mandamus alleging that the Commission had abused its discretion. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission did not abuse its discretion in (1) concluding that Earles’s wage loss was the direct result of her inability to return to her previous position due to the physical restrictions resulting from her claim; and (2) concluding that the appeal was timely filed. View "State ex rel. BF Goodrich Co., Specialty Chemicals Division v. Industrial Commission of Ohio" on Justia Law

Miller worked as the Superintendent of Industries at the Beaumont, Texas Federal Correctional Complex, overseeing a prison factory that produced ballistic helmets primarily for military use. Miller occasionally served associate warden and was described by Warden Upton as “a fantastic employee.” In 2009, Miller disclosed to the government-owned corporation that ran the prison and to Upton what he perceived to be mismanagement of factory funds. The Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducted an inspection. Upton asked Miller to not report to the factory that day. The next day, Miller reported that there had been “sabotage” at the factory, and urged that it be closed pending investigation. Hours later, Upton informed Miller that he was being reassigned. Upton later testified that OIG was concerned that Miller might compromise its investigation. Over the next four and a half years, Miller was assigned to low-level positions. Upton attributed his reassignments to unidentified OIG staff. Eventually, Upton reassigned Miller to sit on a couch in the lobby for eight months. Miller appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board, alleging violation of the Whistleblower Protection Act, 5 U.S.C. 2302(b)(8). The Administrative Judge found that the government had rebutted his case. The Federal Circuit reversed. The government did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that it would have reassigned Miller absent his protected disclosures. View "Miller v. Department of Justice" on Justia Law

The Washington Township Education Association was the major union representative for employees of the Robbinsville Township Board of Education. Relevant to the events in this matter, the Board and the Association were bound by a collective negotiation agreement during the period of July 1, 2008 through June 30, 2011. According to Article 5.3 of the Agreement, the teachers salaries were based on the number of school-year work days, which contract negotiations established to be 188 days for new teachers and 185 days for all other teachers. On March 17, 2010, during a time of declared fiscal emergency, the State notified the Board that State education funding to the district would be reduced by fifty-eight percent for the upcoming 2010-2011 school year. Reeling from that significant funding reduction, the Board took action: it revised its budget for the next school year by cutting educational programs, freezing salaries, and laying off approximately thirteen teaching and staff positions. Because those attempts were insufficient to balance the school district's budget, on March 19, 2010, the Board asked the Association to re-open contract negotiations for the 2010-2011 school year. The Association, citing its members best interests, declined to re-open discussions mid-contract. The Association also did not respond to the Board s subsequent request on April 13 to reconsider re-opening negotiations. The Board announced a decision to impose involuntary furlough days on teachers, knowing that the furloughed days would impact the affected employees' wages. An unfair labor charge was filed with the Public Employment Relations Commission (PERC). The Appellate Division granted summary judgment in favor of the Board. But the Supreme Court reversed, finding that the Appellate Division's decision was based on an overly broad and mistaken reading of the controlling case-law for this matter. View "In the Matter of Robbinsville Twp. Bd. of Education v. Washington Township Education Assn." on Justia Law