Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Magdalena Guardado, an undocumented worker, was employed as a machine manager for Roos Foods when she was involved in a work-related accident. She injured her left wrist and thereafter received total disability benefits. The employer petitioned the Industrial Accident Board (“the Board”) to terminate those benefits on the ground that the worker was no longer disabled and could return to work. The Board found: (1) the employer met its initial burden of showing that the worker was no longer totally disabled; (2) that the worker was a prima facie displaced worker based solely on her status as an undocumented worker; and (3) the employer had failed to meet its burden of showing regular employment opportunities within the worker’s capabilities. Accordingly, it denied the employer’s petition. The questions this case presented for the Delaware Supreme Court's review were: (1) whether an injured worker’s immigration status alone rendered her a prima facie displaced worker; and (2) whether the Board properly found that the employer failed to meet its burden of showing regular employment opportunities within the worker’s capabilities because its evidence failed to take into account the worker’s undocumented status. The Court concluded that an undocumented worker’s immigration status was not relevant to determining whether she was a prima facie displaced worker, but it was a relevant factor to be considered in determining whether she is an actually displaced worker. The Court also concluded that the Board correctly rejected the employer’s evidence of regular employment opportunities for the worker because that evidence failed to consider her undocumented status. View "Roos Foods v. Guardado" on Justia Law

Providence Alaska Medical Center terminated Dr. Michael Brandner’s hospital privileges without notice and an opportunity to be heard after determining he had violated hospital policy by failing to report an Alaska State Medical Board order requiring him to undergo an evaluation of his fitness to practice medicine. Brandner unsuccessfully challenged this action through Providence’s internal post-termination hearing and appeal procedures. Brandner then sued in superior court, seeking reinstatement and damages for, in relevant part, alleged due process violations both in the procedures used and in the substantive standard applied in his termination. The superior court ruled that Brandner’s due process rights were not violated, that he was not entitled to reinstatement, and that under federal law Providence was entitled to immunity from his damages claims. After review, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s decision concerning the substantive standard applied to terminate Brander; he therefore was not entitled to reinstatement or post-termination-hearing damages. But Brandner’s due process rights were violated by the procedures Providence employed because was not given required notice and a hearing prior to the termination of his hospital privileges; the Court therefore reversed the superior court’s decision on the pre-termination notice and hearing claim and its decision that Providence had damages immunity from this claim. View "Brandner v. Providence Health & Services - Washington" on Justia Law

Horsley Company, LLC was a Florida contractor hired to install equipment at the Jackson, Wyoming airport. Cody Beazer, Horsley’s employee, was injured while he was working on the airport project. The Workers’ Safety and Compensation Division notified Horsley that it was liable to the State for all payments made to Beazer because Horsley had not filed an “employee report” for the period in which Beazer’s injury occurred. Horsley objected to the Division’s determination that it was required to reimburse the Division for payments made to Beazer. The Office of Administrative Hearings granted summary judgment for Horsley, determining that Horsley had complied with the Worker’s Compensation Act in all respects and was not liable for payments made to Beazer by the Division. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Division’s challenge to the finding that the Division was estopped from seeking reimbursement for payments made to the claimant did not provide a sufficient basis to overturn the award of summary judgment; and (2) the Supreme Court was deprived of jurisdiction to consider the Division’s challenge to the award of attorney’s fees to Horsley. View "State ex rel. Wyoming Department of Workforce Services, Workers' Compensation Division v. Beazer" on Justia Law

Mark Black was hired as an agent of the South Dakota Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI) in 2005. Approximately one decade later, DCI terminated Black’s employment after a series of incidents and disciplinary actions. The Civil Service Commission (CSC) found that DCI had just cause to terminate Black’s employment. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) CSC did not err in finding that DCI had just cause to terminate Black’s employment; and (2) DCI complied with the applicable rules and regulations and afforded Black due process of law. View "Black v. Division of Criminal Investigation" on Justia Law

The Palo Alto charter provided that impasses in negotiations regarding wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment for the city’s police and firefighters would be submitted to binding interest arbitration. In 2011, the City Council voted to place on the ballot for the upcoming election a measure to repeal the binding interest arbitration provision. The firefighters’ union filed an unfair practice charge with the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB), alleging the city placed the measure before voters without consulting in good faith, as required by the Meyers-Milias Brown Act (Gov. Code 3500). A PERB administrative law judge (ALJ) found in the city’s favor. The decision was later reversed by PERB, which ordered the city to rescind its resolution. By that time, the measure repealing the binding interest arbitration provision had already been passed by the voters. The court of appeal found PERB’s conclusion that the union sufficiently requested to meet and consult with the city supported by substantial evidence. Constitutional issues raised by the city were meritless, but PERB’s order directing the city to rescind its resolution violated the doctrine of separation of powers by ordering a legislative body to take legislative action. View "City of Palo Alto v. Public Employment Relations Board" on Justia Law

Service Employees International Union, Local 509 (Union) brought a declaratory judgment action against the Department of Mental Health (DMH) maintaining that certain contracts DMH made with private vendors were “privatization contracts” subject to the requirements of the Pacheco Law. The Union sought a declaration invalidating the contracts because DMH did not comply with the statutory prerequisites of the Pacheco Law. The case was dismissed. The Supreme Judicial Court remanded the case. On remand, DMH again successfully moved to dismiss the Union’s declaratory judgment action on the basis that it was moot because the initial contracts had expired and the remaining extant renewal contracts were immune from challenge by virtue of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 7, 53. The Union appealed, asserting that because the non-compliant initial contracts were invalid under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 7, 54, so too were any renewal contracts made pursuant to them. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of dismissal, holding that the protection afforded renewal contracts by section 53 is not extended to those renewal contracts made pursuant to timely challenged and subsequently invalidated privatization contracts under section 54. View "Service Employees International Union, Local 509 v. Department of Mental Health" on Justia Law

In 2014, Brooks Keel, president of Georgia Southern University, terminated the employment contract of tenured professor Lorne Wolfe for violation of University policies, and the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia denied Wolfe’s application for review of his termination. Wolfe then filed a complaint for breach of contract and mandamus against the Board and Keel seeking reinstatement and other relief. The superior court granted the Board’s motion for summary judgment, and Wolfe again appealed. The Supreme Court found that this appeal fell within the scope of OCGA 5-6-35 (a) (1), and an application to appeal was therefore required. Because Wolfe did not file a discretionary application, the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits of his case. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the appeal. View "Wolfe v. Regents of the University Sys. of Georgia" on Justia Law

RB&F seeks relief from the Benefits Review Board's holding that RB&F is responsible for the payment of benefits to Turl Mullins, a coal miner, and survivor's benefits to his widow under the Black Lung Benefits Act (BLBA), 30 U.S.C. 901 et seq. At issue is whether RB&F or another operator is liable for the claim. The court concluded that Wilder is not a “responsible operator” for the purposes of the BLBA. The court explained that a mine operator cannot be the responsible operator if it is financially incapable of assuming liability. In this case, it is undisputed that Wilder is bankrupt and is itself incapable of assuming liability. It is also undisputed that Wilder’s insurance company, Rockwood, is insolvent and is incapable of assuming liability. The court need not reach the preemption issue because the VPCIGA is not an insurer for this claim and is not covered by the BLBA. Under DOL regulations, the liability for Mullins’s claim falls to the “potentially liable operator” that most recently employed the miner. Since Wilder cannot be found to be a “potentially liable operator” under 20 C.F.R. 725.494, the liability properly falls to the miner’s next most recent employer, RB&F. The court need not address RB&F's claim regarding the regulatory burden-shifting analysis because the burden of proof was irrelevant to the outcome of this case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the Board's decision. View "RB&F Coal, Inc. v. Mullins" on Justia Law

In 2015, the legislative body for Hardin County, Kentucky passed an ordinance, providing that no employee could be required to join or pay dues to a union. Labor organizations claimed that the National Labor Relations Act preempts right-to-work laws not specifically authorized in section 14(b) of the Act; regulation of “hiring-hall” agreements, which require prospective employees to be recommended, approved, referred, or cleared by or through a labor organization; and regulation of “dues-checkoff” provisions, which require employers to automatically deduct union dues, fees, or other charges from employees’ paychecks and transfer them to the union. The county argued that the ordinance constitutes state law within the meaning of section 14(b) and is not preempted by 29 U.S.C. 164(b). The district court rejected the “state law argument and found the ordinance preempted and unenforceable. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part. The ordinance’s right-to-work protection, prohibiting employers from requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment, is expressly excepted from preemption in section 14(b), but the other challenged sections are unenforceable. The court reasoned that sections 14(b)’s explicit exception of state right-to-work laws from preemption trumps operation of implicit field preemption. View "United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America v. Hardin County" on Justia Law

Graviss has worked in education since 1978. In 2008, she became a pre-school special needs teacher at Kingsolver Elementary, part of Fort Knox Schools. Kingsolver’s principal, McClain, issued Graviss a reprimand based on an “inappropriate interaction with a student” and “failure to follow directives,” asserting that Graviss and her aide had physically carried a misbehaving pre-school student and Graviss had emailed concerns to the director of special education, although McClain had directed Graviss to “bring all issues directly to [her].” The union filed a grievance. Subsequently, one of Graviss’s students had an episode, repeatedly flailing his arms, kicking, and screaming. While the other students were out at recess, Graviss employed physical restraint to subdue the child. After an investigation, McClain submitted a Family Advocacy Program Department of Defense Education Activity Serious Incident Report and Alleged Child Abuse Report to the Family Advocacy Program (child protective services for the military). McClain forwarded the Report to her direct supervisor, who was later the decision-maker in Graviss’s termination. An arbitrator concluded that that Graviss's termination promoted the efficiency of the service and was reasonable. The Federal Circuit reversed, concluding that Graviss’s due process rights were violated by improper ex parte communication between a supervisor and the deciding official. That communication contained new information that the supervisor wanted Graviss terminated for insubordination. View "Federal Education Association v. Department of Defense" on Justia Law