Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In 1996, Plaintiff was hired by Defendant, the New Haven Police Department, as a police officer. In 2011, Plaintiff suffered a myocardial infarction. Plaintiff later filed a claim for benefits under Conn. Gen. Stat. 7-433c(a) for hypertension and heart disease. The Workers’ Compensation Commissioner dismissed Plaintiff’s claim for benefits related to his hypertension as untimely but granted his claim for benefits related to his heart disease and myocardial infarction. The Workers’ Compensation Review Board affirmed. Defendant appealed, arguing that the Board improperly affirmed the Commissioner’s decision that Plaintiff’s hypertension and heart disease were separate diseases, each with its own limitation period for filing a claim for benefits. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the medical evidence supported the Board’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s hypertension and heart disease were separate medical conditions; and (2) the Board properly affirmed the Commissioner’s decision granting Plaintiff benefits pursuant to section 7-433c related to heart disease. View "Holston v. New Haven Police Department" on Justia Law

The Commission determined that a fatal accident in a coal mine operated by Consol resulted from Consol's "unwarrantable failure" to ensure that certain equipment in the mine was maintained in a safe, working condition. Consol petitions for review and challenges the Commission's final order. The court concluded that Consol had fair notice that the failure to replace defective shutoff valves raised the possibility of sanctions, and MSHA is therefore not barred from seeking civil penalties in connection with this violation; the ALJ’s conclusion that Addington acted as Consol’s agent in responding to the damaged valves is amply supported by the evidence; the ALJ properly imputed his knowledge and negligence in connection with the accident to Consol; and the court affirmed the ALJ's findings that the challenged violations stemmed from Consol’s unwarrantable failure to comply with applicable MSHA health and safety regulations. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Consol Buchanan Mining Co. v. Secretary of Labor" on Justia Law

After she was demoted from her position with the Montana Department of Transportation, Sheila Cozzie filed a grievance. Following a contested case proceeding, the hearing examiner recommended that Cozzie’s grievance be denied. Cozzie appealed to the full Board of Personnel Appeals (BOPA). The BOPA voted to grant Cozzie’s grievance and issued a final decision reinstating Cozzie. On appeal, the district court ruled that BOPA acted outside the scope of review, concluding that the BOPA improperly struck findings of fact and incorrectly modified conclusions of law. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err by affirming the evidentiary ruling made by the hearing examiner; and (2) did not err by reversing the BOPA’s just cause decision. View "Department of Transportation v. Department of Labor" on Justia Law

Appellant was discharged from his position as a firefighter with the City of Laramie after random breathalyzer tests performed while he was on duty detected alcohol in his system. The Civil Service Commission reduced Appellant’s discipline from discharge to a suspension. The district court reversed and remanded for further agency proceedings, concluding that the Commission had applied the wrong legal standard. On remand, the Commission found that the breathalyzer tests were invalid and ruled in favor of Appellant. The district court again reversed on remanded, concluding that the law and the record did not support the Commission’s conclusion. On remand, the Commission consented to Appellant’s discharge. The district court dismissed Appellant’s petition for review. The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant’s appeal, holding (1) the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to consider the City’s petition for review of the Commission’s second decision because the legislature did not grant cities the right to judicial review of commission decisions refusing to consent to employee discharges; and (2) because the district court lacked jurisdiction to review the Commission’s second decision, it was final, and all of the proceedings that followed the Commission’s second decision were improper. View "Vance v. City of Laramie" on Justia Law

Peter Metcalfe was employed briefly by the State in the early 1970s and contributed to the Public Employees’ Retirement System (PERS). In 1981, Metcalfe took a refund of his PERS contributions. Under a statute in effect at the time, if Metcalfe later secured State employment and returned his refund to PERS with interest, he was entitled to reinstate at his prior PERS service tier and credit. But in 2005 the legislature repealed that statute, leaving a five-year grace period for regaining State employment and reinstating to a prior PERS status. The State then sent notice to former PERS members that “[d]efined benefit members who do not return to covered employment before July 1, 2010 will forfeit their defined benefit tier and all service associated with the refund.” In 2012 Metcalfe inquired about his PERS status. He was informed that even if he were to regain State employment, he could not reinstate to his prior PERS service tier and credit because under the new statute, his grace period for reinstatement ended in 2010. In June 2013 Metcalfe brought a putative class action lawsuit against the State, alleging that the 2005 legislation: (1) violated article XII, section 7 of the Alaska Constitution; (2) deprived a class of former employees of their vested interest in the contractual “benefit to be reinstated to state employment at the tier level they previously held”; and (3) effectively breached the class members’ employment contracts. Metcalfe sought damages, but he also asked for a seemingly mutually exclusive declaratory judgment that the State must comply with former AS 39.35.350. The class was never certified. The State moved to dismiss Metcalfe’s lawsuit for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The superior court tentatively rejected the argument that Metcalfe failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, rejected the argument that Metcalfe’s claim was not ripe and that he lacked standing, but dismissed Metcalfe’s claim as time barred. Metcalfe appealed, and the State cross-appealed the superior court’s ruling that Metcalfe’s claim was ripe and argued that the superior court’s decision could be upheld on the ground that Metcalfe lacked standing to sue. The Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of the contract damages claim on the alternative ground that no such claim existed; the Court reversed and remanded the declaratory and injunctive relief claim for further proceedings. View "Metcalfe v. Alaska" on Justia Law

Jessica Barr appealed an Idaho Industrial Commission (Commission) decision finding her ineligible for unemployment benefits and affirming the decision of an Appeals Examiner for the Idaho Department of Labor’s (IDOL) Appeals Bureau. The Commission found that Barr was discharged by her employer, Citicorp Credit Services, Inc. USA (Citicorp), for misconduct in connection with employment and determined that Barr was not eligible for benefits pursuant to Idaho Code section 72-1366(5). Barr argued that Citicorp representatives provided false information to the Appeals Examiner and her unemployment benefits should have been restored. Finding that the Commission's decision was supported by substantial and competent evidence, the Supreme Court affirmed the IDOL Appeals Examiner's decision. View "Barr v. CitiCorp Credit Svc" on Justia Law

Claimant-appellant Thomas Millard appealed the Idaho Industrial Commission’s (Commission) ruling that certain medical payments made by the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah on behalf of Millard were payable at the statutorily scheduled fee amounts rather than the full invoiced amounts. Millard argued that the Commission incorrectly applied the Idaho Supreme Court’s holding in "Neel v. Western Construction, Inc.," (206 P.3d 852 (2009)), by ruling that a surety may deny a claim then still be allowed to pay the medical fee schedule rate so long as the surety makes payment before the Commission issues a decision on compensability. Finding no reversible error in the Commission's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Millard v. ABCO Construction" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Paul Cameron submitted his application for disability retirement on May 22, 2009, after the second of two injuries he sustained during his tenure as a Sacramento County employee. The SCERS staff referred this matter to the Office of Administrative Hearings where it was heard by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). In 2013, the ALJ found that the application was untimely and denied the application for service-related retirement. Based on the ALJ’s findings, SCERS denied plaintiff’s application for service-connected retirement. Cameron appealed. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeals concluded that plaintiff failed to show he was continuously disabled within the meaning of Government Code sections 31722 and 31641, subdivision (a), between the discontinuance of his service and the time he filed his application for service-connected disability retirement. Consequently, his application was not timely under section 31722. In the unpublished portion of its opinion, the Court concluded that plaintiff did not show that SCERS failed to inform him of his rights regarding disability retirement, misled him concerning those rights, otherwise breached its fiduciary duty to him, or caused plaintiff’s delay in making his application. View "Cameron v. Sacramento Co. Employees' Retirement System" on Justia Law

Appellee Daniel Massey, Chatham County Superior Court Clerk, filed a writ of mandamus against Chatham County and its Board of Commissioners, seeking, among other things, an order declaring him to be entitled to cost-of-living adjustments (“COLAs”) to his salary as provided by general statute (“State COLAs”) as well as by special local legislation (“County COLAs”), and to longevity increases as provided by statute. Massey argued the County deprived him of some of the compensation increases to which he was entitled over his years of service by setting off the COLAs the County claimed it paid him by improperly decreasing, in a corresponding sum, the amount the County was paying to supplement his salary over the statutory minimum. In response, the County argued, among other things, that since it was paying Massey in excess of the statutory minimum, he was not entitled to County COLAs in addition to State COLAs and longevity increases. After reviewing the evidence and arguments presented, the trial court entered an order finding Massey was entitled not only to state-mandated longevity increases and State COLAs provided by general statute but also to County COLAs provided by local legislation. The County appealed that decision to the Supreme Court, but finding no reversible error, the Court affirmed. View "Chatham Cty. v. Massey" on Justia Law

In the underlying litigation to this appeal, claimants were petitioners or represented petitioners who challenged legislation passed in 2013 that changed the pension benefits paid to certain members of the Public Employee Retirement System (PERS) by limiting the statutory cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) and eliminating a PERS income-tax offset for out-of-state retirees. In "Moro v. Oregon," (351 P.3d 1 (2015) (Moro I)), the Oregon Supreme Court largely agreed with petitioners’ argument that modifications to the COLA formula impaired petitioners’ contractual rights, thus violating Article I, section 21, of the Oregon Constitution. But the Court rejected petitioners’ similar challenge to the elimination of the income-tax offset. Petitioners, who were active and retired members of PERS, were the prevailing parties. Following the decision in Moro I, claimants petitioned for attorney fees and costs. State respondents and county/school district respondents filed objections. The Supreme Court referred those petitions to a special master for recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law. The special master reported his recommendations, and the parties subsequently filed objections and responses to those recommendations. The issues raised in those filings included which legal doctrines justified an award of attorney fees in this case; whether self-represented attorneys were eligible to receive an award of attorney fees; whether the fees sought by claimants were reasonable; and how to pay for an award of fees and costs. After review, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that fees should be awarded based on the common-fund and substantial-benefit doctrines; that the self-represented attorneys were eligible to receive a fee award under those doctrines; that a reasonable fee award under the lodestar approach had to be based on reasonable hourly rates and reflect reductions to account for duplicative work and work on unsuccessful claims; and that an award in this case should be paid for as determined by the Public Employees Retirement Board (PERB) in a manner that was consistent with its statutory authority and fiduciary obligations. View "Moro v. Oregon" on Justia Law