Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Manuel Perez was injured while working in the construction industry and was awarded temporary-total-disability compensation. Prior to his injury, Perez owned and was operating an auto-repair business. Years later, the Industrial Commission of Ohio determined that Perez was overpaid temporary-total-disability compensation for more than four years and that he committed fraud in applying for it. The court of appeals affirmed the Commission’s finding of an overpayment and dismissed the fraud finding for insufficient evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the Commission did not abuse its discretion (1) in finding that Perez had been overpaid compensation while operating his auto-repair business; and (2) when it concluded that the evidence supported a finding of fraud. View "State ex rel. Perez v. Indus. Comm'n" on Justia Law

Pursuant to 2011 amendments to statutes addressing collective bargaining for teachers and their employees, when parties failed to reach a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) regarding salaries and wages, the Indiana Education Employment Relations Board (IEERB) appoints a mediator. If the mediation fails, the parties must exchange their last best offers (LBOs). A factfinder appointed by the IEERB then selects which side’s LBO to adopt as the CBA. In this case, a teachers association appealed a factfinder’s decision to adopt a school’s LBO. The IEERB affirmed the factfinder’s decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the adopted LBO was collectively bargained and lawful. View "Jay Classroom Teachers Ass’n v. Jay School Corp." on Justia Law

After Robert Rossignol was notified that his teaching contract would not be renewed, Rossignol applied to the Maine Public Employees Retirement System (MPERS) for disability retirement benefits. Rossignol alleged that he suffered from depression, anxiety, and panic attacks, which made it impossible for him to perform the duties of his position. The Executive Director’s designee denied Rossignol’s application. The MPERS Board of Trustees affirmed the denial of disability retirement benefits. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Rossignol failed to demonstrate that, under the governing statutory standard, he was entitled to disability retirement benefits. View "Rossignol v. Maine Pub. Employees Ret. Sys." on Justia Law

As the result of an audit, the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation reclassified some of Aaron’s Inc.’s employees for purposes of workers’ compensation premiums, applied the reclassifications retroactively, and billed Aaron’s for more than $2 million in back premiums. Aaron’s filed a complaint in mandamus alleging that the Bureau abused its discretion by failing adequately to explain why it decided to apply the reclassifications retroactively and not solely prospectively as Aaron’s had advocated. The administrator’s designee concluded that the Bureau properly exercised its discretion to apply the reclassification retroactively. Aaron’s subsequently filed the instant complaint seeking a writ of mandamus regarding the order of the administrator’s designee. A magistrate concluded that the administrator’s designee appropriately exercised his discretion in ordering the reclassifications to be applied retroactively. The court of appeals adopted the magistrate’s decision and denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Bureau did not abuse its discretion when it applied the audit adjustment to the twenty-four months prior to the current payroll period. View "State ex rel. Aaron's, Inc. v. Ohio Bureau of Workers' Comp." on Justia Law

In 2010 and 2012, the Commission issued charges against William Boyd, a charter school employee, for alleged violations of Haw. Rev. Stat. 84-14 that occurred in 2006 and 2007. Boyd filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the Commission lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate proceedings against him because he was not an employee of the State subject to the code of ethics contained in Haw. Rev. Stat. Chapter 84. The Commission denied Boyd’s motion and concluded that Boyd was an “employee” as defined in Haw. Rev. Stat. 84-3. The Commission then concluded that Boyd committed several violations of Chapter 84 and imposed a total administrative fine of $10,000. The circuit court affirmed the Commission’s determination that Boyd as an “employee” under section 84-3 and was thus subject to the code of ethics in Chapter 84. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed the determination. The Supreme Court vacated the lower courts’ judgments and the Commission’s decision and order, holding (1) in accordance with Haw. Rev. Stat. 302B-9(a), charter school employees were exempt from Haw. Rev. Stat. 84-14 at the relevant time period in this case; and (2) therefore, the Commission did not have the authority to adjudicate the proceedings against Boyd. View "Boyd v. Haw. State Ethics Comm’n" on Justia Law

Brenda Puryear filed a complaint with the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities on behalf of her minor daughter, Sarah, alleging that Echo Hose Ambulance and the city of Shelton had discriminated and retaliated against Sarah on the basis of her race and color in violation of the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (CFEPA) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The Commission’s human rights referee struck the complaint on the ground that Sarah was not an employee under the “remuneration test” used to resolve similar federal causes of action. The trial court dismissed the Commission’s appeal, concluding that the referee properly applied the remuneration test. The Appellate Court affirmed. The Commission appealed, arguing that the Appellate Court erred in applying the federal remuneration test rather than Connecticut’s common-law “right to control” test to determine whether an unpaid volunteer is an “employee” under the CFEPA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Appellate Court did not err in concluding that the remuneration test is the appropriate test for determining whether a volunteer is an employee under CFEPA. View "Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Echo Hose Ambulance" on Justia Law

Grover worked for many years for the Customs and Border Protection service and participated in the Civil Service Retirement System, 5 U.S.C. 8331–8351. He retired in 2008 and applied for a retirement annuity. By statute, the annuity must reflect the highest average annual pay based on three consecutive years of specified service, and for a customs officer like Grover in the years in question, the calculation must include overtime pay up to $17,500. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM), in calculating Grover’s pay, did not include anything close to $17,500 in overtime pay, although Grover asserted that he received more than $17,500 in overtime pay in those years. The Merit Systems Protection Board upheld OPM’s calculation, which relied on a particular official record. The Federal Circuit vacated. Neither OPM nor the Board recognized that the record is internally contradictory about what overtime pay Grover received, so neither sought further information, such as pay stubs, that might definitively resolve the uncertainty. The regulation does not permit the Board to affirm OPM’s calculation without resolving the amount-of-overtime-pay factual issue. View "Grover v. Office of Pers. Mgmt." on Justia Law

John Kovacs injured his back while working for Pro Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc. on September 29, 2010. Kovacs filed an application for benefits on September 29, 2011. The Department of Labor and Industries initially found that Kovacs qualified for benefits, which he began to receive. Kovacs's employer challenged the award, arguing that Kovacs's application was not timely. In response, the department reversed its decision, rejected the claim, and ordered Kovacs to pay back the benefits already paid to him. Kovacs appealed to the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals, which affirmed the department's decision that the application was untimely. Kovacs appealed again to the superior court, which reversed the board's decision, held that Kovacs's claim was "timely within the meaning of RCW 51.28.050," entered judgment for Kovacs, and granted Kovacs's motion for attorney fees. By divided opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed the superior court. The Supreme Court found that applications for workers' compensation benefits had to be filed "within one year after the day upon which the injury occurred." Generally, the day of injury is excluded from time calculations. The Court determined that the legislature did not intend to include the day of injury in calculating the time to file a worker's compensation claim, and held that the one-year statute of limitations here began to run the day after the injury and reversed. View "Kovacs v. Dep't of Labor & Indus." on Justia Law

Respondent suffered a work-related back injury. Respondent and her employer entered into a “full, final, and complete” settlement of Respondent’s claims for workers’ compensation benefits related to that injury. Respondent later filed a claim petition seeking additional benefits for the back injury, alleging a lumbar spine injury with consequential depression and anxiety. The employer moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that Respondent was first required to bring a motion to vacate the existing settlement agreement before bringing a new claim. The workers’ compensation judge denied the motion, concluding that the settlement agreement did not foreclose a later claim for consequential psychological injury. The Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the settlement agreement did not foreclose claims from the same incident that were not mentioned in the agreement without evidence that those claims were contemplated by the parties at the time they entered into the agreement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the language of the settlement agreement was sufficient settle conditions and complications that arise out of, and are a consequence of, Respondent’s workers’ compensation injury. View "Ryan v. Potlatch Corp." on Justia Law

Petitioner, after more than fifteen years of service in the City of Providence Police Department, was injured while on duty. The Department concluded that Petitioner’s injury interfered with her ability to handle a firearm. Later that month, Petitioner applied to the City of Providence Retirement Board for accidental-disability retirement. The Board voted to deny Petitioner’s application, finding that Petitioner’s condition was correctable with surgery and that Petitioner failed to mitigate her injury by undergoing surgery. The Supreme Court quashed the Board’s decision, holding that the Providence Code of Ordinances does not require an otherwise eligible employee to mitigate her injury by undergoing a surgical procedure in order to qualify for an accidental-disability pension. Remanded. View "Prew v. Employee Ret. Sys. of City of Providence" on Justia Law