Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

After taking maternity leave, Plaintiff returned to work. She quit, however, after disputes between her and Employer arose over a change to her schedule that made her childcare situation more difficult, and over an appropriate place for her to pump breast milk at work. The Bureau of Unemployment Compensation denied Plaintiff’s claim for unemployment benefits. The Department of Labor’s Division of Administrative Hearings affirmed. The Unemployment Insurance Commission affirmed, concluding that Plaintiff “was not able and available for full-time work” within the meaning of Me. Rev. Stat. 26, 1192(3). The superior court affirmed. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the Commission did not err in its construction of the statute and that its decision was not contrary to public policy. View "Cheney v. Unemployment Ins. Comm’n" on Justia Law

Under Md. Code Ann. Lab. & Empl. (LE) 9-632, an award of benefits by the Workers’ Compensation Commission survives the death of an injured employee. Under Md. Code Ann. Lab. & Empl. (LE) 9-640, an award of benefits survives the death of an injured employee only up to $45,000. Appellant, an injured worker’s daughter, sought to collect benefits under the Maryland Workers’ Compensation Act that would have been due to her father had he not died of causes unrelated to his accidental work injury. At dispute between Appellant and Appellees, the worker’s former employer and employer’s insurer, was whether LE 9-632 or 9-640 applied. The Commission determined that Appellees were not obligated to make further payments under an award of compensation to Appellant because LE 9-640 capped the survival of benefits at $45,000, and Appellees had already paid more than this amount to the decedent at the time of his death. The circuit court affirmed the Commission’s ruling. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that LE 9-640, rather than LE 9-632, applied in this case. View "Hollingsworth v. Severstal Sparrows Point, LLC" on Justia Law

Steven Seapker was administratively appealing a decision by the City of Carlsbad (City) to discharge him from his position as a police officer. His defense was that the City was penalizing him more harshly than it has penalized other similarly situated police officers. This case presented the question of whether a judgment denying a petition for writ of mandate challenging an evidentiary ruling of a hearing officer was an appealable final judgment or a nonappealable interlocutory judgment. The Court of Appeal published this order to clarify that a judgment denying a petition for writ of mandate challenging an evidentiary ruling of a hearing officer was a nonappealable interlocutory judgment where, as here, the superior court did not deny the petition on the merits, the administrative proceedings before the hearing officer were not concluded, the hearing officer was not the final administrative decision maker, and the hearing officer's decision did not a create a substantial risk confidential information would be publicly disclosed. The Court, therefore, dismissed the appeal and denied a related motion for stay as moot. View "City of Carlsbad v. Scholtz" on Justia Law

Employer Entergy Corporation challenged the denial of its request for a credit against future workers’ compensation benefits owed to claimant Sharon Conant. Employer argued on appeal that, given the payments it made to claimant under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement, as well as the retroactive temporary total disability (TTD) payments it was ordered to make, claimant received more money as wage replacement than she was owed. After review, the Supreme Court agreed, and reversed the Commissioner of the Department of Labor’s decision on this point. View "Conant v. Entergy Corporation" on Justia Law

In the underlying action, inmate Alejandro Franco filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 after Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Deputies David Chang, Anthony Pimentel, and Kris Cordova assaulted Franco. The deputies signed agreements with the County of Los Angeles setting forth the terms and conditions under which the County would defend them. The jury found that the deputies violated Franco's federal civil rights and awarded damages. The deputies’ request for indemnification from the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors was denied. The deputies then filed suit against the County and others, seeking to compel payment of the Franco judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the deputies. The court held, however, that Government Code section 825.2 applies when a public entity employer provides a defense under a reservation of rights that includes reservation of the right not to indemnify for acts committed with actual fraud, corruption or actual malice. An employer’s reservation of the right to indemnity from the employee for acts committed with actual fraud, corruption or actual malice is necessarily a reservation of the right not to indemnify the employee for such acts. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment with directions. View "Chang v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Appellant, who was employed by the Missouri Department of Corrections as a corrections officer, was involved in a workplace accident. Appellant filed a claim for workers’ compensation seeking reimbursement from the Department for medical expenses. The Labor and Industrial Relations Commission denied Appellant’s claim for workers’ compensation benefits, finding that Appellant was involved in a workplace accident but that Appellant did not prove that the accident was the “prevailing factor” causing his medical condition. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Appellant proved by substantial and competent evidence that his workplace accident was the prevailing factor causing his medical condition. View "Malam v. State, Dep’t of Corr." on Justia Law

Petitioner Thomas Phillips appealed a Compensation Appeals Board (CAB) decision denying his request for attorney’s fees in the amount of one-third of the value of workers’ compensation benefits awarded to him, as provided in a contingent fee agreement that he entered into with counsel. Petitioner argued that the CAB erred when it failed to award: (1) the contingent fee in accordance with the fee agreement; or (2) at least a “generous fee” under the circumstances of this case. The CAB ruled that, although contingent fee agreements in workers’ compensation cases were not per se unreasonable, the contingent fee requested in this case, which included one-third of all future benefits, was unreasonable. It stated that it was “not inclined to award fees based upon the hypotheticals counsel posed as to the gross amounts of indemnity or medical benefits the claimant may or may not receive over his lifetime.” The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. "[I]t appears that the CAB did not consider the merits of the petitioner’s proposed future cost estimate, but, rather, rejected the notion that any claimant could ever provide a reasonable estimate of the amount of future benefits. However, a blanket rule that future medical benefits are always speculative and, therefore, cannot be demonstrated, is contrary to our case law." Because the Court remanded to the CAB to make a new determination regarding counsel fees, the Court reserved ruling on the amount of fees to which petitioner was entitled in connection with the prior appeal and the appeal to the Supreme Court. View "Appeal of Thomas Phillips" on Justia Law

Petitioner Carlos Marti appealed a Compensation Appeals Board (CAB) decision to dismiss his claim for reinstatement to his job with respondent Nashua Foundries, Inc. Petitioner injured his elbow at work. He informed respondent’s president of his injury, was given an over-the-counter medication, and returned to work. Petitioner’s pain grew worse and, after approximately thirty minutes, he asked the president for permission to go to the local emergency room. The president refused the request, referring petitioner to an occupational health clinic pursuant to company policy and the collective bargaining agreement governing petitioner’s employment. Against the president’s directive, petitioner clocked out of work and went to the emergency room. He returned later with a doctor’s note for a four-day work absence, but was instead terminated for insubordination. Petitioner did not grieve his termination under the collective bargaining agreement. Respondent’s workers’ compensation insurer accepted the claim and paid petitioner’s medical bills. Petitioner requested a hearing on his claims for reinstatement and back pay; respondent moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The CAB found that petitioner failed to challenge his termination by grieving it pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement. Respondent contended that because petitioner failed to grieve his termination, he could not challenge its legitimacy. The Supreme Court, after review, disagreed with respondent's contention: "[i]f this were correct, the petitioner would be considered to have been legitimately terminated for cause, and, under our interpretation of the statute herein, would not be an “employee” eligible for reinstatement under RSA 281-A:25-a, I. We cannot determine, however, whether the petitioner’s failure to grieve forecloses a challenge to his termination because the collective bargaining agreement is not contained in the record before us." Accordingly, the Court vacated and remanded for a determination on that issue and for further proceedings. View "Appeal of Carlos Marti" on Justia Law

Bonnie Jones was injured during the course of her employment. Her employer’s comp carrier, American Home Assurance Company, paid her various benefits but did not pay her supplemental income benefits (SIBs) for the fourteenth quarter of 2011. Jones sued, and the parties settled. Under the Texas workers’ compensation regime, where SIBs are concerned, settlements cannot bypass a statutory formula or facilitate benefits were none were due as a matter of law. In this case, the settlement was noncompliant. The trial court approved the proposed settlement, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a court cannot condone a noncompliant settlement regarding an SIBs award. View "Tex. Dep’t of Ins., Div. of Workers’ Comp. v. Jones" on Justia Law

Under the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act), the amount of compensation due to a “covered employee” - which may include a sole proprietor - who has a “permanent total disability resulting from an accidental personal injury” is based on the employee’s “average weekly wage” (AWW). At issue in this case was how to calculate the AWW of a sole proprietor who elects coverage for an accident personal injury under the Act. Petitioner, a self-employed sole proprietor who elected to obtain workers’ compensation coverage as a covered employee, was injured while working as a subcontractor. The Workers’ Compensation Commission issued an award of compensation, but the parties disputed the amount of compensation due. The Commission ultimately calculated Petitioner’s AWW based on his net profit rather than his gross receipts. The circuit court and Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the AWW of a sole proprietor who elects coverage under the Act is calculated based on the sole proprietorship’s net profit, not on the sole proprietorship’s gross receipts or gross income. View "Long v. Injured Workers' Ins. Fund" on Justia Law