Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Federal Aviation Administration hired De Santis in 2013 and fired him less than one month later, while he was in his probationary period. He appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board under 5 C.F.R. 210.101, 315.805, and 315.806, which apply to employees in the competitive service. The Board dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because De Santis was in the excepted service, not the competitive service. The Federal Circuit affirmed, citing 49 U.S.C. 40122(g)(3), which authorizes FAA employees to appeal “any action that was appealable to the Board … as of March 31, 1996.” Under that section, Board jurisdiction over an FAA employee’s appeal depends on whether, given the employee’s status in the excepted service at the time of the challenged action, that employee comes within the grants of appeal rights that existed on March 31, 1996. The court rejected an alternative reading under which the Board would disregard the employee's actual current status and ask what status a person in that position, or a similar position, would have had on March 31, 1996. De Santis was an excepted-service employee, and the regulatory appeal rights at issue, unchanged since March 31, 1996, do not apply to excepted-service employees. View "De Santis v. Merit Sys.Protection Bd." on Justia Law

The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) requires employers to pay overtime compensation to covered employees who work more than 40 hours in a week; a 1966 exemption covers “any salesman, partsman, or mechanic primarily engaged in selling or servicing automobiles” at a covered dealership, 29 U.S.C. 213(b)(10)(A). In 1970, the Department of Labor defined “salesman” to mean “an employee who is employed for the purpose of and is primarily engaged in making sales or obtaining orders or contracts for sale of the vehicles . . . which the establishment is primarily engaged in selling.” The regulation excluded service advisors, who sell repair and maintenance services but not vehicles, from the exemption. Several courts rejected that exclusion. In 1978, the Department changed its position, stating that service advisors could be exempt. In 1987, the Department confirmed its new interpretation, amending its Field Operations Handbook. In 2011, the Department issued a final rule that followed the original 1970 regulation and interpreted the statutory term “salesman” to mean only an employee who sells vehicles. The Ninth Circuit reversed dismissal of a suit by service advisors, alleging violation of the FLSA by failing to pay overtime compensation. The Supreme Court vacated. Section 213(b)(10)(A) must be construed without placing controlling weight on the 2011 regulation. Chevron deference is not warranted where the regulation is “procedurally defective.” An agency must give adequate reasons for its decisions. An “[u]nexplained inconsistency” in agency policy is “a reason for holding an interpretation to be an arbitrary and capricious change from agency practice,” not entitled to deference. The 2011 regulation was issued without the reasoned explanation that was required in light of the Department’s change in position and the significant reliance interests. View "Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro" on Justia Law

The National Labor Relations Board (Board) issued an order ruling that a Massachusetts car dealership was liable for unfair labor practices. The dealership petitioned for review, arguing that the Board’s findings were not supported by substantial evidence and that the Board applied its precedents arbitrarily and capriciously. The Board, in turn, petitioned for enforcement of its order. The Supreme Court denied the dealership’s petition for review and granted the Board’s petition for enforcement, holding that the Board’s rulings were supported by substantial evidence and by reasoning that was not arbitrary and capricious. View "Boch Imports Inc. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd." on Justia Law

Jason Tudor claimed that he suffered work-related cumulative-trauma back injuries while employed by Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. Toyota’s third party administrator (the TPA) denied Tudor’s claim for workers’ compensation benefits based on the belief that Tudor’s condition was not work-related. Tudor then filed an application for adjustment of injury claim, alleging three cumulative-trauma injuries. An administrative law judge (ALJ) found that Tudor suffered a series of work-related injuries and awarded Tudor income benefits. The ALJ further found that Toyota had failed to meet its burden of proving that Tudor had not timely filed his claim. The Workers’ Compensation Board affirmed the ALJ. The court of appeals affirmed the ALJ’s award of benefits. The Supreme Court vacated the ALJ’s opinion and award and remanded, holding (1) the ALJ’s application of Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky, Inc. v. Czarnecki was based on a misunderstanding of the record; and (2) the ALJ’s finding that Tudor was entitled to temporary total disability benefits was made prior to the Supreme Court’s opinion in Trane Commercial Systems v. Tipton, and therefore, the case must be remanded for consideration of the factors set forth in Tipton. View "Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky, Inc. v. Tudor" on Justia Law

Appellant, a police officer, sustained a work-related injury and sought disability benefits. The Board of Trustees of the Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government Policemen’s and Firefighter’s Retirement Fund (Board) denied Appellant’s application. After exhausting his administrative remedies, Appellant filed a petition for judicial review of the Board’s decision but failed to sign or verify the petition. The Board moved to dismiss Appellant’s appeal, arguing that his petition failed to comply with the requirement of Ky. Rev. Stat. 67A.670(2) that a petition for review be “verified by the petitioner.” The circuit court denied the Board’s motion, finding that Appellant had cured the deficiency of his original pleading and therefore “substantially complied” with the statutory verification requirement. The Board filed a petition for a writ of prohibition to bar the circuit court from reviewing the Board’s decision, concluding that the deficiency in Appellant’s initial pleading deprived the circuit court of subject matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reversed and vacated the writ, holding that a first class, second class, or special writ was not available because the circuit court was not proceeding outside its jurisdiction, there was no showing that “great injustice and irreparable injury” would ensue, and the orderly administration of justice was not imperiled by the circuit court’s ruling. View "Spears v. Hon. Pamela Goodwine" on Justia Law

The question in this case was whether an injured worker had to provide actual notice of secondary employment in connection with a workers' compensation claims process or whether the employer’s preexisting knowledge of that employment could be imputed to the insurer to satisfy the notice requirement of ORS 656.210(2)(b)(A). The Oregon Supreme Court held that the correct interpretation of ORS 656.210(2)(b)(A) required a claimant to prove that the insurer received actual notice of the claimant’s secondary employment within 30 days of the insurer’s receipt of the initial claim. View "DCBS v. Muliro" on Justia Law

In 2004, Edward Birch received a workplace injury. In 2011, a claims administrator granted Birch and eight percent permanent partial disability (PPD) award. The Workers’ Compensation Office of Judges (OOJ) granted an additional five percent PPD award for a total of thirteen percent PPD. The West Virginia Workers’ Compensation Board of Review (BOR) affirmed. At issue on appeal was the correct methodology for apportioning the level of impairment in workers’ compensation cases involving preexisting conditions. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the BOR and reinstated the claims administrator’s order granting Birch an eight percent PPD award, holding that the BOR’s affirmation of the OOJ’s decision was clearly the result of an erroneous conclusion of law. View "SWVA, Inc. v. Birch" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed an application for disability retirement benefits alleging that she was unable to perform her job with the Maine Department of Transportation because of her numerous disabilities. The Maine Public Employees Retirement System Board of Trustees denied benefits after considering Plaintiff’s medical records. Plaintiff appealed, challenging only the denial of benefits as to her fibromyalgia. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the medical board’s reports were a proper part of the evidentiary record; and (2) the record did not compel a finding that Plaintiff met her burden of proving that her fibromyalgia caused functional limitations that made it impossible for her to do her job. View "Behr v. Maine Pub. Employees Ret. Sys." on Justia Law

This appeal centered on two petitions filed on behalf of sixty-nine sworn law enforcement officers of the Vermont Department of Fish & Wildlife, Vermont Department of Liquor Control, and Vermont Department of Motor Vehicles. Here, the New England Police Benevolent Association (NEPBA) filed a petition seeking an election of collective bargaining representatives among the sworn officers, currently represented by the Vermont State Employees’ Association (VSEA) as part of the Non-Management Bargaining Unit. VSEA moved to dismiss the petition. The State agreed, and notified the Board by letter that the proposed bargaining unit would not be an appropriate unit. NEPBA appealed an order of the Vermont Labor Relations Board dismissing the petition. Finding no reversible error in the Board's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Petition of New England Police Benevolent Association" on Justia Law

The issue before the New Jersey Supreme Court in this case was whether the 2011 suspension of State pension cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs) contravened a term of the contract right granted under the earlier enacted non-forfeitable right statute, L.1997, c.113 (codified as N.J.S.A.43:3C-9.5). Qualifying members of the State's public pension systems or funds were granted a non-forfeitable right to receive benefits as provided under the laws governing the retirement system or fund. By codifying that non-forfeitable right to receive benefits, the Legislature provided that the benefits program, for any employee for whom the right has attached, could not be reduced. Whether COLAs were part of the benefits program protected by N.J.S.A. 43:3C-9.5 depended on whether the Legislature, in enacting N.J.S.A. 43:3C-9.5(a) and (b), intended to create a contractual right to COLAs. The Supreme Court found in this instance, proof of unequivocal intent to create a non-forfeitable right to yet-unreceived COLAs was lacking. Although both plaintiff retirees and the State advanced plausible arguments on that question, "the lack of such unmistakable legislative intent dooms plaintiffs' position." The Court concluded that the Legislature retained its inherent sovereign right to act in its best judgment of the public interest and to pass legislation suspending further COLAs. Having determined that there was no contract violation, and because the additional arguments advanced by plaintiffs were not meritorious, the Court reversed the Appellate Division's judgment holding to the contrary. View "Berg v. Christie" on Justia Law