Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Attorneys employed by the Franklin County Public Defender sought membership and service credit in the Ohio Public Employees Retirement System for their years of service prior to January 1999, and challenged a decision the Ohio Public Employees Retirement Board’s denial of service credit. Persons hired by the Franklin County Public Defender on or before December 31, 1984, are public employees entitled to PERS benefits; effective January 1, 1999, the Franklin County Public Defender’s employees have been enrolled in and considered to be members of PERS. During the intervening years, pursuant to the Ohio Public Defender Act (R.C. Chapter 120), the Franklin County Public Defender Commission and its employees paid Social Security taxes on wages and did not consider the office to be a county agency. The Court of Appeals denied relief. The Supreme Court of Ohio granted a writ of mandamus to compel the board to award service credit, rejecting an argument that “there was no person holding the office of Franklin County Public Defender between 1985 and 1999 because a person was appointed as the ‘Director’ of the corporation. The plain language in R.C. 120.14(A)(1) indicates that the attorneys were employed by a public official, and hence, were public employees. View "Altman-Bates v. Pub. Emps. Retirement Bd." on Justia Law

Petitioners, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, Council 18, AFL-CIO, Locals 1461, 2260 and 2499 (AFSCME), brought a declaratory-judgment action challenging the grandfather status of Respondent’s Board of County Commissioners of Bernalillo County (County Commission), local labor relations board. Both the trial and appellate courts rejected AFSCME’s claims. In its review, the New Mexico Supreme Court focused on the statutory jurisdictional prerequisites of New Mexico’s Declaratory Judgment Act, NMSA 1978, §§ 44-6-1 to -15 (1975), and held that AFSCME’s claims were not ripe, and AFSCME failed to assert an injury-in-fact. Accordingly, the district court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate AFSCME’s declaratory-judgment action. The case was remanded to the district court to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals also lacked jurisdiction, and its opinion was vacated. View "AFSCME v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs of Bernalillo Cty." on Justia Law

Appellant Mary Leib sought benefits from the Wyoming Workers’ Compensation Division after she developed abscesses in her breasts. Leib was employed as a maintenance worker for Laramie County Community College in Cheyenne. She began working on the grounds of the College in April 2012. As part of her duties as a groundskeeper, Leib was required to work with dirt that was mixed with untreated manure from livestock kept on campus and from traveling circus animals. In June 2012, approximately two weeks after she began planting flowers using the dirt and manure mixture, Leib experienced pain and swelling in both of her breasts. She sought treatment at the emergency room, where she was diagnosed with mastitis. Upon returning to work, the swelling developed again. The second time she sought treatment, her surgical incisions split open. Subsequent cultures indicated that several different types of peptostreptococcus bacteria were present. The Division denied the claim. The Medical Commission upheld the Division’s determination after finding that she had not met her burden of proving that her condition was related to her employment. Leib appealed to the district court, which affirmed the Medical Commission’s order. She challenged the district court’s decision in this appeal. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In the Matter of the Worker's Compensation Claim of: Leib v. Wyoming, ex rel., Department of Workforce Services, Workers' Compensation Division" on Justia Law

Lyons Enterprises Inc. was a regional franchisor of an international janitorial franchise operating in western Washington. The Department of Labor and Industries (L&I) determined that some of Lyons' franchisees, those that did not actually employ subordinates, met the Industrial Insurance Act (IIA, Title 51 RCW) definition of "worker" and assessed workers' compensation premiums against Lyons for those franchisees. The parties appealed the initial agency audit through four different administrative and judicial bodies that reached varying results as to whether Lyons' franchisees were covered workers. As part of these determinations, each adjudicative body that ruled that Lyons' franchisees were workers had also considered whether the franchisees were exempt from coverage under the Washington Supreme Court's decision in "White v. Department of Labor & Industries," (294 P.2d 650 (1956)) or under RCW 51.08.195. "[T]he answer to the exemption question has changed at nearly every level of review." Whether the franchisor-franchisee relationship was subject to the IIA was a question of first impression for the Supreme Court. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals and remanded to the Board to determine which of Lyons' franchisees actually employed subordinates. View "Dep't of Labor & Indus. v. Lyons Enters., Inc." on Justia Law

CRST trucking company requires its drivers to graduate from its training program before becoming certified drivers. In 2005, new driver Starke filed an EEOC charge, alleging that she was sexually harassed by male trainers during her training (42 U.S.C. 2000e–5(b)).The Commission ultimately informed CRST that it had found reasonable cause to believe that CRST subjected Starke and “a class of employees and prospective employees to sexual harassment.” In 2007, having determined that conciliation had failed, the Commission filed suit. During discovery, the Commission identified over 250 allegedly aggrieved women. The district court dismissed, held that CRST was a prevailing party, and awarded the company over $4 million in fees. The Eighth Circuit reversed the dismissal of two claims and vacated the award. On remand, the Commission settled Starke’s claim and withdrew the other. The district court again awarded more than $4 million, finding that CRST had prevailed on more than 150 claims because of the Commission’s failure to satisfy pre-suit requirements. The Eighth Circuit reversed, stating that dismissal was not a ruling on the merits. A unanimous Supreme Court vacated. A favorable ruling on the merits is not a necessary predicate to find that a defendant is a prevailing party. A plaintiff seeks a material alteration in the legal relationship between the parties; a defendant seeks to prevent that alteration, and that objective is fulfilled whenever the plaintiff ’s challenge is rebuffed, irrespective of the precise reason for the decision. Title VII’s fee-shifting statute allows prevailing defendants to recover whenever the plaintiff ’s “claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless.” Congress must have intended that a defendant could recover fees expended in such litigation when the case is resolved in the defendant’s favor, whether on the merits or not. View "CRST Van Expedited, Inc. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a State of Hawaii employee, was injured in an accident on the premises of the University of Hawaii Leward Community College one hour after he ended work for the day. The State denied Plaintiff’s claim for compensation on the basis that his injury was not work related. The Labor and Industrial Relations Appeals Board (LIRAB) determined that the State had presented sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption that Plaintiff’s knee injury was a covered work-related injury. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment and the LIRAB’s decision and order, holding that the LIRAB erred in concluding that the State rebutted the presumption that Plaintiff’s knee injury was a compensable work injury. View "Yoshii v. State, Univ. of Hawaii" on Justia Law

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) brought a civil enforcement action against three Papa John’s entities for violating the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) by denying a reasonable workplace accommodation to the appellant. Scott Bonn, and firing him for requesting this accommodation. Bonn moved to intervene, but the district court determined that Bonn’s claim was subject to arbitration under an agreement that Bonn’s mother had executed. Based on this determination, the district court denied the motion to intervene and ordered Bonn to arbitrate his claim. Bonn appealed the denial of his motion to intervene and the order compelling arbitration. After review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the arbitration agreement did not curtail Bonn’s unconditional statutory right to intervene. Accordingly, the Court reversed the denial of the motion to intervene. Furthermore, the Court concluded that it lacked appellate jurisdiction over the order compelling arbitration. "Although the district court ordered Mr. Bonn to arbitrate his claim, that order did not affect the EEOC’s claim against Papa John’s, which remains pending. Because that claim remains, the order compelling arbitration did not constitute a 'final decision,' which is necessary for appellate jurisdiction over an order compelling arbitration. Therefore, we dismiss this part of Mr. Bonn’s appeal." View "EEOC v. PJ Utah, LLC" on Justia Law

Defendant city of Lansing enacted an ordinance requiring contractors working on city construction contracts to pay employees a prevailing wage. Plaintiff Associated Builders and Contractors, a trade association, filed suit against Lansing, arguing that the ordinance was unconstitutional because municipalities did not have the authority to adopt laws regulating the wages paid by third parties, even where the relevant work is done on municipal contracts paid for with municipal funds. The Court of Appeals majority disagreed, and ruled that subsequent changes to state law had caused the controlling caselaw precedent, Attorney General ex rel Lennane v Detroit, to be “superseded.” The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the Court of Appeals erred by exceeding its powers for refusing to follow a decision from the Michigan Supreme Court that both applied and had not been overruled. Even so, the Supreme Court took the opportunity to overrule Lennane because subsequent constitutional changes "undercut its viability." The Court therefore vacated the Court of Appeals’ decision but affirmed the result. View "Associated Builders & Contractors v. City of Lansing" on Justia Law

Marcus Pryor applied to the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services (ODJFS) for unemployment compensation. The director of ODJFS concluded that Pryor was ineligible for benefits. A hearing officer with the Unemployment Compensation Review Commission affirmed. The Commission denied Pryor’s request to review the hearing officer’s findings. Pryor filed an appeal in the common pleas court naming the director of ODJFS as the appellee but failing to name the Army, Pryor’s former employer, as a party to his appeal. The common pleas court dismissed the appeal, finding that because Pryor failed to name the Army was an interested party, his notice of appeal did not comply with Ohio Rev. Code 4141.282(D), thus depriving the court of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court of appeals reversed the common pleas court’s dismissal of Pryor’s appeal and reinstated Pryor’s administrative appeal in the common pleas court, ruling that Pryor’s failure to name the Army was not a jurisdictional defect. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the naming of interested parties is not a jurisdictional requirement under section 4141.282; but (2) the Commission failed to comply with the procedural requirements in section 4141.282(D), and therefore, Pryor’s time to appeal the Commission’s decision never started to run. Remanded. View "Pryor v. Dir., Ohio Dep’t of Job & Family Servs." on Justia Law

In 1996, New York State Racing and Wagering Board (the Racing Board) reduced per diem wages for its seasonal employees by twenty-five percent. The Public Employees Federation (PEF) filed an improper practice charge with the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB), alleging that the reduction in wages violated the Racing Board’s duty to negotiate in good faith under N.Y. Civ. Serv. 209-a(1)(d). PERB dismissed the improper practice charge. Petitioner, then president of PEF, subsequently brought this N.Y. C.P.L.R. 78 proceeding, asserting that PERB’s determination was arbitrary, capricious and contrary to law. Supreme Court dismissed the petition. The Appellate Division reversed, concluding that PERB’s determination was arbitrary and capricious. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that PERB’s decision dismissing the improper practice charge was not affected by an error of law and was not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. View "Kent v. Lefkowitz" on Justia Law