Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Janet Owen, a former University of Kentucky (UK) employee, filed a claim for discriminatory employment practices based on a physical disability with the Kentucky Commission on Human Rights (KCHR). The KCHR dually filed Owen’s claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The KCHR later dismissed Owen’s claim. The EEOC likewise issued a dismissal and notice of rights, adopting the KCHR’s findings and informing Owen that she had the right to sue under federal law. Rather than seeking judicial review of the KCHR final order or pursuing the EEOC’s federal claim, Owen filed an original action in circuit court under the Kentucky Civil Rights Act (KCRA). The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of UK, concluding that because Owen elected to pursue her claim through the administrative process, the trial court had no jurisdiction over the claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that Ky. Rev. Stat. 344.270 acts as an election of remedies. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that due to a 1996 amendment to the KCRA, there is nothing remaining in the statute to bar claims filed in circuit court despite final and appealable order dismissing the exact same claim filed in the administrative agency. View "Owen v. University of Kentucky" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review was whether a city of Seattle (City) employee who recovered wages from a Seattle Civil Service Commission (Commission) hearing was entitled to attorney fees under RCW 49.48.030 when the city code provided she could be represented in those proceedings only at her own expense. Georgiana Arnold recovered wages from the civil service proceeding, after which she initiated an action in superior court to request attorney fees. The trial court denied attorney fees, but the Court of Appeals reversed and granted her attorney fees. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed and held that the commission proceedings at issue here constituted an "action" for which RCW 49.48.030 provided attorney fees when requested in a separate court action. View "Arnold v. City of Seattle" on Justia Law

While receiving benefits based on his impairment rating, Keith Mayer died of a heart attack unrelated to his work accident. Mayer’s impairment rating was paid out in full following his death. However, Mayer died before a determination was made as to what permanent disability benefits he may have been entitled to in excess of his impairment rating. The parties submitted the issue on stipulated facts and the Industrial Commission concluded that permanent partial disability less than total survived the death of an injured worker when the death was unrelated to the work accident. The Industrial Commission also determined that the disability of the deceased worker should be evaluated as of the time immediately preceding the worker’s death. TPC Holdings, Inc. (TPC) appealed that determination, arguing that Mayer’s claim for permanent partial disability did not survive death. Finding no reversible error in the Commission's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Mayer v. TPC Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law

The Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to determine whether the Alexandria Municipal Fire and Police Civil Service Board properly excluded a firefighter’s alleged failed breath alcohol test results, resulting in the firefighter’s reinstatement to employment after the City of Alexandria had terminated him. The trial court reversed the Board’s decision, finding the Board should have considered the breath alcohol test results. The court of appeal overturned the trial court, reinstating the firefighter’s employment. After its review, the Supreme Court found the Board’s exclusion of the breath test results was incorrect and further, the court of appeal was in error in reversing the trial court’s ruling that the breath alcohol test results were admissible. Therefore, the trial court’s judgment reversing the Board’s decision was reinstated, and the case was remanded back to the Board for proper consideration of the breath alcohol test results. View "City of Alexandria v. Dixon" on Justia Law

The Colorado Supreme Court accepted this case from the court of appeals because it had granted certiorari in two other cases involving similar issues ("City of Littleton v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office," 2016 CO 25, ___ P.3d ___, and "Industrial Claim Appeals Office v. Town of Castle Rock," 2016 CO 26, ___ P.3d ___). In these cases, the Court interpreted section 8-41-209, C.R.S. (2015), of the Workers’ Compensation Act of Colorado, which provided workers’ compensation overage, under certain conditions, for occupational diseases affecting firefighters. An employer can show, by a preponderance of the medical evidence, either: (1) that a firefighter’s known or typical occupational exposures are not capable of causing the type of cancer at issue, or (2) that the firefighter’s employment did not cause the firefighter’s particular cancer where, for example, the claimant firefighter was not exposed to the cancer-causing agent, or where the medical evidence renders it more probable that the cause of the claimant’s cancer was not job-related. Englewood firefighter Delvin Harrell was diagnosed with melanoma, underwent surgery to remove it, and sought workers' compensation benefits. Englewood sought to overcome the statutory presumption. Because the ALJ and the Panel in this case did not have the benefit of the Supreme Court's analysis in City of Littleton and Town of Castle Rock, it set aside the Panel’s order affirming the ALJ and remanded this case to the Panel with directions to return the matter to the ALJ for reconsideration in light of the "Littleton" and "Castle Rock" decisions. View "City of Englewood v. Harrell" on Justia Law

Littleton firefighter Jeffrey Christ was diagnosed with glioblastoma multiforme (“GBM,” a type of brain cancer). After undergoing surgery, chemotherapy, and radiation, he returned to work, but ultimately died as a result of the disease. He (and later his widow and child) sought workers’ compensation benefits to cover his cancer treatment, asserting that his brain cancer qualified as a compensable occupational disease under the “firefighter statute” of the Workers’ Compensation Act of Colorado. .At issue here was whether Christ’s employer, the City of Littleton, and Littleton’s insurer, Cannon Cochran Management Services, Inc. (collectively “Littleton”), successfully overcame a statutory presumption that Christ’s condition resulted from his employment as a firefighter. After review, the Supreme Court held that the employer, through a preponderance of the evidence, could meet its burden to show the firefighter's cancer "did not occur on the job" by establishing the absence of specific causation. Here, the ALJ applied the statutory presumption and found that Littleton established by a preponderance that Christ's GBM condition was not caused by his occupational exposures. A panel of the Industrial Claim Appeals Office (“Panel”) reversed, concluding that Littleton’s medical evidence was insufficient to overcome the presumption. In a split decision, a division of the court of appeals affirmed the Panel. Because the Supreme Court disagreed with the court of appeals’ interpretation of the breadth of the statutory presumption and of the employer’s burden to overcome the presumption, the Court concluded that the court of appeals erroneously evaluated the medical evidence presented by Littleton and erroneously failed to defer to the ALJ’s findings of fact, which are supported by substantial evidence. The court of appeals' judgment was therefore reversed and the case remanded back to the Panel for reinstatement of the ALJ’s original findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order. View "City of Littleton v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office" on Justia Law

The Industrial Special Indemnity Fund (ISIF) appeals a decision of the Industrial Commission in which the Commission concluded that ISIF must pay a portion of Roy Green’s disability benefits because Green had a pre-existing condition. In 2006, Green was logging alone when a 1700-pound tree fell on him, striking him on his hardhat. The accident occurred after another tree that he had just felled knocked the culpable tree loose. Green avoided being crushed only because of the presence of a nearby stump. When Green came to, he found that his legs were tingling, he had little sensation and difficulty walking. Green managed to drive to St. Maries to seek medical treatment. After receiving treatment from various physicians and completing an Independent Medical Evaluation (IME), Green was referred to neurosurgeon Dr. Bret Dirks. Dr. Dirks diagnosed Green with a lower back injury that was directly related to the 2006 Accident. Dr. Dirks recommended surgery, and in early 2007, Green underwent a bi-level lumbar fusion with decompression surgery from L3 to L5. Following the surgery, Green expressed concern about “right-sided neck pain that goes into the right arm and makes it feel like jelly.” MRI images of Green’s cervical spine taken on July 11, 2006, and May 23, 2007, showed, among other things, a bulging disk at C5–6. Dr. Dirks recommended an anterior cervical discectomy and fusion at C5–6 with plating and cadaver bone. Dr. Dirks attributed the need for this surgery to the 2006 Accident. On October 30, 2006, Green filed a complaint against St. Joes Salvage Logging (Employer) and Travelers Indemnity Company (Surety). Two years later, on November 6, 2008, Employer/Surety filed a complaint against ISIF. The Industrial Commission considered whether Green had pre-existing injuries that subjected ISIF to liability. The ISIF appealed when the Commission held that it was responsible for a portion of Green's disability benefits. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Commission. View "Green v. Industrial Special Indemnity Fund" on Justia Law

Claimant James Loyd was awarded permanent partial disability benefits after being injured on the job. Loyd did not appeal, and the order became final. Less than a month after such order was issued, Loyd filed a "Form 9" requesting continuing medical maintenance and requesting a portion of his permanent partial disability award be commuted to a lump sum payment. When this request was denied and the denial upheld by the Workers' Compensation Court and Court of Appeals, he appealed. Upon consideration, the Supreme Court hold that a claimant may seek to commute his or her permanent partial disability award after the hearing on permanent partial disability under 85 O.S. 2001 sec. 41(A). Additionally, the Court concluded that because Loyd did not request reservation of continuing medical maintenance and the trial court's order awarding permanent partial disability did not address or reserve the issue of continuing medical maintenance, Loyd's only recourse was to seek continuing medical maintenance through a reopening proceeding under 85 O.S. 2001 sec. 28. View "Loyd v. Michelin North America, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Alfred Fuciarelli was a tenured faculty member at Valdosta State University (“VSU”). Fuciarelli was at one time also assistant vice president for research and a dean of the graduate school. After he complained about VSU’s “noncompliance with laws, rules and regulations,” VSU terminated Fuciarelli’s contract to serve as an assistant vice president and dean. Although Fuciarelli remained as a member of the faculty, his salary and benefits were reduced. Fuciarelli appealed his termination to the Board of Regents which affirmed VSU’s decision. Thereafter, Fuciarelli filed suit against the Board of Regents, William McKinney, individually and in his official capacity as president of VSU, and Karla Hull, individually and in her official capacity as a former acting vice president of VSU, seeking damages under both the Public Employee Whistleblower Retaliation Act, and the Taxpayer Protection Against False Claims Act (“TPAFCA”). The trial court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss the public employee whistleblower retaliation claim, but granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the taxpayer retaliation claim on the ground that Fuciarelli failed to obtain the approval of the Attorney General before filing suit. The Georgia Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals to determine whether it correctly held that the TPAFCA did not require the Attorney General to approve taxpayer retaliation claims brought under subsection (l) of the Act. Because the plain language of the statute required the Attorney General to approve a taxpayer retaliation claim prior to filing suit, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals' holding to the contrary. View "McKinney v. Fuciarelli" on Justia Law

In two cases before the Workers’ Compensation Commission, the Commission concluded that under Md. Code Ann. Lab. & Empl. 9-806, the amount owed to the Subsequent Injury Fund (SIF) by the employers in these cases - the Maryland Transit Administration (MTA) and Baltimore County - is 6.5 percent of the Commission’s award of compensation prior to the deduction of any statutory offset. The circuit courts affirmed the decisions of the Commission. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The MTA and the County each filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals granted certiorari in both cases and consolidated them in this opinion to address the question of whether the SIF assessment under section 9-806 should be calculated based on the amount of an award prior to the statutory offsets granted by Md. Code Ann. Lab. & Empl. 9-610 and 9-503(e). The Court answered the question in the affirmative and affirmed the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. View "Injured Workers' Ins. Fund v. Subsequent Injury Fund" on Justia Law