Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

DiMasi, a former Speaker of the Massachusetts House of Representatives, resigned from his position in 2009 and began receiving retirement benefits from the State Board of Retirement (board). A federal grand jury subsequently indicted DiMasi for violating several federal laws while in office. Consequently, the board voted to suspend DiMasi’s retirement allowance. DiMasi sought judicial review, and the municipal court entered summary judgment in favor of DiMasi. The board appealed. Thereafter, a federal jury found DiMasi guilty of seven counts of the superseding indictment. On September 9, 2011, DiMasi was sentenced to a term of imprisonment. The board again voted to suspend payment of DiMasi’s retirement allowance. A hearing officer concluded that DiMasi’s convictions became “final” for purposes of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 32, 15(4) when he was sentenced, and therefore, DiMasi forfeited his retirement allowance as of September 9, 2011. On January 14, 2014, all of DiMasi’s direct appeals were exhausted. The municipal court agreed with the board that the term “final” meant the date when DiMasi was sentenced and not the date when all of his direct appeals were exhausted. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that in the context of pension forfeiture, a “final conviction” occurs when an individual is sentenced and not at the conclusion of the appellate process. View "DiMasi v. State Bd. of Retirement" on Justia Law

Teamsters Local 384 filed a representation petition with National Labor Relations Board Regional Director Walsh, seeking to represent workers at Advanced’s facilities. The proposed unit consisted of approximately 120 full-time and regular part-time drivers, helpers, and mechanics. The Union and Advanced entered into a Stipulated Election Agreement. Secret ballot elections were held at Advanced’s facilities, with 60 voters supporting unionization and 58 opposing it. Advanced challenged the outcome. A hearing officer and a three-member NLRB panel overruled all of Advanced’s objections. To preserve its right to appeal, Advanced refused to bargain with the certified bargaining unit. Director Walsh filed a Complaint and a three-member NLRB panel issued a Decision and Order, concluding that Advanced had violated 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(5) by refusing “to bargain collectively with the representatives of [its] employees.” The Third Circuit affirmed and ordered enforcement, rejecting a claim that, because Walsh was appointed at a time when the Board lacked a valid quorum, his actions were ultra vires. Advanced did not lose the ability to challenge Walsh’s authority by failing to raise this issue during the representation proceeding, nor did the Stipulated Election Agreement constitute an implied accession to his authority. Walsh and the Board properly ratified their previously unauthorized actions. View "Advanced Disposal Servs. E., Inc. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd." on Justia Law

Claimant Nancy Bruce worked as a Certified Nurse's Assistant, or "residential life staff aide," for the Oklahoma Department of Human Services for twenty-six years. Her duties consisted primarily of lifting clients, cleaning them up, feeding them, and daily care. In 2012, Claimant was injured while lifting one such client. Although her Employer admitted the injury, the trial court denied compensability finding Claimant's employment was not the major cause of her injury. Claimant appealed, and a three-judge panel reversed and found that Claimant's employment was the major cause of the injury to her neck. Employer appealed, and the Court of Civil Appeals reversed the order of the three-judge panel. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the three-judge panel's decision finding Claimant's work-related injury was the major cause of Claimant's neck injury was not against the clear weight of the evidence. The Court therefore vacated the Court of appeals' judgment and reinstated the order of the three-judge panel. View "Dept. of Human Svcs v. Bruce" on Justia Law

Petitioner Cynthia Robinson worked as a Nurse's Aide for Employer Fairview Fellowship Home for Senior Citizens, and was injured in early 2014. Petitioner requested a finding of injury to her neck, left shoulder, and left knee, as well as temporary total disability. Employer admitted that she was an employee on the date of the accident but denied that her injury arose out of and in the course of her employment. Petitioner argued that if her injury was not compensable, then 85A O.S. Supp. 2013 section 2(13) was an unconstitutional special law and unconstitutionally denied her a remedy for her injury. The ALJ found Petitioner's injury was not in the course and scope of employment, and thus, not compensable. The ALJ declined to address Petitioner's constitutional arguments. Petitioner appealed to the Workers' Compensation Commission, and the Commission affirmed the decision of the ALJ. After Petitioner filed her Petition for Certiorari in this Court, the Attorney General filed notice of his intent to provide his views concerning the authority of the Workers' Compensation Commission to address constitutional issues and the ability of the courts to review those decisions. The Supreme Court concluded that the Workers' Compensation Commission had the power to determine whether a provision of Title 85A was being unconstitutionally applied to a particular party in a proceeding before the Commission. The Court of Civil Appeals' opinion in this case was vacated, the Commission's decision in this case was vacated and the judgment was reversed and remanded for a new hearing before the assigned ALJ. View "Robinson v. Fairview Fellowship Home for Senior Citizens, Inc." on Justia Law

"This appeal is heavy, very heavy, on procedure." Plaintiff-appellee Peggy Walton worked in the New Mexico State Land Office. She was a political appointee of the elected Republican Land Commissioner, Patrick Lyons. Lyons’s decision not to seek reelection for a third term put plaintiff's job at risk: as a political appointee, a new administration could easily dismiss her. To see that she remained employed with the state, Lyons appointed plaintiff to a senior civil service job where she’d be protected by state law against removal for political reasons. A local television reporter ran a report titled “[c]ronies move up as officials move out” - a report highly critical of Lyons and plaintiff. Another reporter introducing the story aired his view that plaintiff was “distinctly unqualified” for her new job and claimed the hiring was “rigged.” Ray Powell, the newly elected Democratic candidate, dismissed plaintiff. Eight days after making the decision to dismiss her but before announcing it publicly, Powell held a meeting with the land office’s advisory board; "glared across the conference table" at plaintiff, spoke of the television news report denouncing her appointment; and, referring to her in all but name, said he “was concerned about . . . ‘protected employees’” who “for some reason didn’t have to meet the leadership criteria” for their appointments. Plaintiff sued when she was dismissed, arguing that she was a protected civil service employee, and under New Mexico Law, Powell had unlawfully retaliated against her for exercising her right to free political association in violation of the First Amendment and 42 U.S.C. 1983. In reply and at summary judgment. Powell claimed qualified immunity. But the district court denied the motion and set the case for trial. Powell appealed, and finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed denial of summary judgment. View "Walton v. NM State Land Office" on Justia Law

Employee injured her back during the course of her employment. Employer paid for the cost of care Employee received to treat her injury through September 2009. Employee later brought a workers’ compensation claim seeking workers’ compensation benefits and medical expenses she incurred for additional back treatment between May 2010 and April 2011. The Workers’ Compensation Commissioner concluded that the treatment Employee received between May 2010 and April 2011 was not causally related to her workplace injury but nonetheless awarded Employee medical expenses because Employer failed to notify Employee it was no longer authorizing treatment as required by Iowa Code 85.27(4). The district court reversed in part, concluding that the agency misinterpreted section 85.27(4) and that Employer was not liable for the expenses Employee incurred after September 2009. The court of appeals reversed the portion of the district court judgment reversing the agency’s determination that Employer was liable to Employee for the expenses she incurred from May 2010 through April 2011, concluding that the district court erroneously interpreted section 85.27(4). The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the decision of the court of appeals, holding that the Commissioner erroneously interpreted Iowa Code 85.27(4). Remanded. View "Ramirez-Trujillo v. Quality Egg, LLC" on Justia Law

Phillip Ramirez, a member of the New Mexico Army National Guard, was employed by the New Mexico Children, Youth and Families Department (CYFD). In July 2005, Ramirez was ordered to federal active duty and deployed to Iraq. After Ramirez returned to work in New Mexico, CYFD terminated his employment. Ramirez sued CYFD, asserting a Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA) claim. A jury found in his favor and awarded Ramirez monetary damages. The Court of Appeals reversed the damages award, concluding that CYFD as an arm of the State was immune to Ramirez’s USERRA claim. After review of that decision, the New Mexico Supreme Court disagreed: by enacting NMSA 1978, Section 20-4-7.1(B) (2004), the Legislature specifically extended “[t]he rights, benefits and protections” of USERRA to members of the New Mexico National Guard who were ordered to federal or state active duty for a period of thirty or more consecutive days. In so doing, the Legislature consented to suits brought against state employers who violate the protections guaranteed by USERRA. View "Ramirez v. CYFD" on Justia Law

Robert Boyd retired from Scotts Miracle-Gro Company in 1983. Boyd received workers’ compensation benefits in 2005 for asbestosis in both lungs. In 2013, Boyd applied for permanent-total-disability benefits. A staff hearing officer at the Industrial Commission denied Boyd’s application. Boyd then filed a complaint seeking a writ of mandamus that would require the Commission to vacate its decision. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Boyd’s complaint in mandamus failed where Boyd failed to demonstrate that the Commission abused its discretion by entering an order not supported by any evidence in the record. View "State ex rel. Boyd v. Scotts Miracle-Gro Co." on Justia Law

Petitioner Richard Hartzell appealed the court of appeals' decision to reverse the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Commission's determination that he was entitled to medical benefits for a work-related back injury. Petitioner argued the record contained substantial evidence to support the Commission's finding that he reported his work-related injury to Employer within the requisite time, and therefore, the court of appeals erred in reversing the Commission's order based on this issue. The Supreme Court agreed, reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Hartzell v. Palmetto Collision" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs worked within the Child Support Enforcement Division of the Department of Public Health and Human Services and constituted the majority of Compliance Specialists, Pay Band 6, employed by the State. Plaintiffs, who belonged to a Union, filed a grievance with the Board of Personnel Appeals (BOPA) alleging that their pay was not “internally equitable” in comparison with Pay Band 6 Compliance Specialists in other state agencies. A Hearing Officer issued a recommended order holding that Plaintiffs were aggrieved and awarded damages. BOPA, however, rejected the recommended order and dismissed the grievance, concluding that Plaintiffs had no independent right to internally equitable pay with other Pay Band 6 Compliance Specialists, but, instead, internal equity was a factor to be considered during the collective bargaining process. The district court vacated and reversed BOPA’s final order, agreeing with the Hearing Officer that Plaintiffs had a right to pay that was internally equitable with other Pay Band 6 Compliance Specialists. The Supreme Court vacated the district court’s order and reinstated BOPA’s final order, holding that the statutory factor of “internal equity” is not a stand-alone right that may be pursued independently and in preemption of the work of the collective bargaining process. View "Mashek v. Dep’t of Pub. Health & Human Servs." on Justia Law