Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals denying the writ of mandamus sought by Stephen Harris to order the Industrial Commission of Ohio to reverse its decision denying Harris's request for scheduled-loss compensation for the permanent partial loss of sight of both eyes, holding that there were no grounds for the writ.After the Commission denied Harris's request for scheduled-loss compensation a district hearing officer determined that the medical evidence failed to establish that Harris had sustained any loss of vision in either eye as a result of the industrial injury. Harris filed a mandamus action requesting an order directing the Commission to reverse its decision. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that some evidence existed to support the Commission's decision. View "State ex rel. Harris v. Industrial Comm'n" on Justia Law

Defendant Alex Herrgott, was driving a four-seat Polaris all-terrain vehicle at night down a gravel road when he “overcorrected” trying to avoid a pothole. The ATV overturned, and Joseph MacNabb, a passenger, was severely injured. Since MacNabb was a state employee in the course and scope of his employment, he received workers’ compensation benefits from the Mississippi State Agencies Self-Insured Workers’ Compensation Trust. The Trust later initiated this litigation in an attempt to recover more than $300,000 in benefits paid for MacNabb’s injury. The circuit court ultimately granted summary judgment to Herrgott because the Trust’s Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6) representative could not articulate a legal theory entitling it to recover. The Mississippi Supreme Court found there was sufficient evidence of Herrgott’s negligence for the case to go to trial, and the deposition testimony of a lay witness should not have bound the Trust as to which legal theories it could pursue. The Supreme Court therefore reversed the summary judgment and remanded the case for trial. View "Mississippi State Agencies Self-Insured Workers' Compensation Trust v. Herrgott" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that Jacob Bennett was not barred from serving on the Harford County Council because of his employment as a schoolteacher by the Harford County Board of Education, thus reversing the contrary order and declaratory judgment of the circuit court.After Bennett was elected to the Council in the November 2022 general election a dispute arose between Bennett and Harford County concerning whether he was precluded from serving simultaneously as a member of the Council and as an employee of the Board by either section 207 of the Harford County Charter or the common law doctrine of incompatible positions. The circuit court ruled in favor of the County on the basis that the Board should be treated as a County for purposes of Charter 207. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that neither Charter 207 nor the doctrine of incompatible positions barred Bennett from simultaneously serving as a member of the Council and an employee of the Board. View "Bennett v. Harford County" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court declined to issue a writ of prohibition sought by Youngstown Civil Service Commission, the City of Youngstown and Youngstown Mayor Jamael Tito Brown (collectively, Youngstown) to prevent Mahoning County Court of Common Pleas Judge Maureen Sweeney from exercising jurisdiction over an administrative appeal commenced by Michael Cox and to require her to vacate all orders issued in the appeal, holding that Youngstown was not entitled to the writ.Youngstown commenced this action seeking a writ of prohibition prohibiting Judge Sweeney from exercising any judicial authority over the underlying action and vacating all orders and journal entires issued in that case. As grounds for the writ, Youngstown argued that Judge Sweeney patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction over it because the pending underlying action was an untimely administrative appeal. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that Judge Sweeney did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction over the matter at issue. View "State ex rel. Youngstown Civil Service Commission v. Sweeney" on Justia Law

When the Covid pandemic struck, the California State University (CSU) directed that instruction be provided remotely. To provide such instruction, Plaintiff, a biology professor at CSU-Los Angeles, incurred expenses that CSU refused to reimburse for a computer and other equipment. Plaintiff sued CSU’s board of trustees on behalf of himself and similarly situated faculty, alleging Labor Code section 2802 obligated CSU to reimburse employees for necessary work-related expenses. CSU demurred, arguing that as a department of the state, it enjoys broad exemption from Labor Code provisions that infringe on its sovereign powers. Plaintiff appealed from a judgment of dismissal entered after the trial court sustained CSU’s demurrer without leave to amend.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that absent express words or positive indicia to the contrary, a governmental agency is not within the general words of a statute. The court further wrote that although this exemption is limited to cases where the application of the statute would impair the entity’s sovereignty, subjecting CSU to Labor Code section 2802, in this case, would do so because it would infringe on the broad discretion CSU enjoys under the Education Code to set its own equipment reimbursement policies. Further, the court noted that because CSU did not violate section 2802, Plaintiff is not an aggrieved employee for purposes of PAGA. His PAGA claim therefore fails with his section 2802 claim. View "Krug v. Board of Trustees of the Cal. State Univ." on Justia Law

The City and County of San Francisco (the City) owns and operates San Francisco International Airport (SFO or the Airport). Airlines for America (A4A) represents airlines that contract with the City to use SFO. In 2020, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the City enacted the Healthy Airport Ordinance (HAO), requiring the airlines that use SFO to provide employees with certain health insurance benefits. A4A filed this action in the Northern District of California, alleging that the City, in enacting the HAO, acted as a government regulator and not a market participant, and therefore the HAO is preempted by multiple federal statutes. The district court agreed to the parties’ suggestion to bifurcate the case to first address the City’s market participation defense. The district court held that the City was a market participant and granted its motion for summary judgment. A4A appealed.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment. The court concluded that two civil penalty provisions of the HAO carry the force of law and thus render the City a regulator rather than a market participant. The court wrote that because these civil penalty provisions result in the City acting as a regulator, it need not determine whether the City otherwise would be a regulator under the Cardinal Towing two-part test set forth in LAX, 873 F.3d at 1080 View "AIRLINES FOR AMERICA V. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Tenth District Court of Appeals granting Donna Kidd's request for a writ of mandamus ordering the Industrial Commission of Ohio to vacate its order denying Kidd's application for permanent-total-disability (PTD) compensation, holding that the Commission did not abuse its discretion in denying Kidd's application for PTD compensation.In denying Kidd's application for PTD compensation the commission concluded that Kidd was capable of sustained remunerative employment at a sedentary level. The Tenth District granted Kidd's request for a writ of mandamus, concluding that the Commission exceeded its discretion by relying on a medical report that outlined limitations on Kidd's capabilities that were "seemingly inconsistent" with the definition of "sedentary work" in Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-34(B)(2)(a). The Supreme Court reversed and denied the writ, holding that the commission did not abuse its discretion by considering "prevalent workplace accommodations to determine whether Kidd could return to 'sustained remunerative employment' with her medical restrictions." View "State ex rel. Kidd v. Industrial Commission" on Justia Law

Allstates, a full-service industrial general contractor, employs people throughout the country, subject to the Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) Act. Allstates must comply with Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) workplace safety standards. It has been the subject of enforcement actions, including a $10,000 fine for a 2019 catwalk injury. In a facial challenge to the OSH Act, Allstates argued that, because the only textual constraint on setting workplace-safety standards is that they be “reasonably necessary or appropriate,” 29 U.S.C. 652(8), OSHA does not have the constitutional authority to set those standards and employers do not have a duty to comply with OSHA’s standards. Allstates sought a permanent nationwide injunction. The district court granted the government summary judgment, reasoning that the “reasonably necessary or appropriate” standard provided an “intelligible principle” to satisfy the nondelegation doctrine because the Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld similar delegations.The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding OSHA’s delegation constitutional. The Act provides an overarching framework to guide OSHA’s discretion, and the Act’s standards comfortably fall within limits previously upheld by the Supreme Court. “To require more would be to insist on a degree of exactitude which not only lacks legal necessity but which does not comport with the requirements of the administrative process.” View "Allstates Refractory Contractors, LLC v. Su" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court judge granting summary judgment in favor of BSC Companies, Inc., BSC Group, Inc., and the companies' president (collectively, BSC) in this action brought by BSC's former employees alleging claims under the Prevailing Wage Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, 26-27H, holding that the contracts at issue were not governed by the Act, and BSC was not required to pay its employees a prevailing wage pursuant to the contracts.At issue were two professional engineering services contracts awarded by the Department of Transportation (MassDOT) to BSC. The contracts were not competitively bid and were not awarded to the lowest bidder, unlike contracts for public works construction projects governed by the Act. Further, the contracts did not specify that BSC's employees would be paid at least a prevailing wage determined by the Department of Labor Standards. The superior court judge granted summary judgment to BSC. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs were not entitled to a prevailing wage for their work under the professional services contracts. View "Metcalf v. BSC Group, Inc." on Justia Law

Three former deputies of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (department) were discharged from their employment for alleged misconduct. The former deputies filed administrative appeals with the Los Angeles County Civil Service Commission (commission). While their appeals were pending, the former deputies executed settlement agreements with department personnel that purported to reinstate the former deputies to employment. The County of Los Angeles (county) thereafter refused to comply with these settlement agreements. The former deputies and a labor union for department personnel (collectively, Appellants) filed suit against the county, the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors (board of supervisors or board), the department, the Los Angeles County Sheriff (sheriff), the Los Angeles County Counsel (county counsel), and the Director of Personnel for the County of Los Angeles (director of personnel) (collectively, Respondents). Appellants sought enforcement of the settlements through mandamus, breach of contract, and promissory estoppel claims. The trial court sustained Respondents’ demurrers to Appellants’ pleading without leave to amend.   The Second Appellate District reversed the trial court’s judgments of dismissal. The court conclude that with the exception of the portion of Appellants’ declaratory relief cause of action that is premised on an alleged procedural due process violation, the trial court erred in denying Appellants leave to amend. Given that the trial court was reviewing Appellants’ first pleading and that Appellants could potentially discover the legal basis (if any) for the department’s alleged long-standing apparent belief that its personnel have the authority to settle commission appeals on their own. The court concluded that allowing appellants to file an amended pleading would not be an exercise in futility. View "Assn. for L.A. Deputy Sheriffs v. County of L.A." on Justia Law