Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Julie Camps worked as a full time paramedic for the Garrard County Fiscal court and was concurrently employed as a paramedic with Clark County EMS. Camps later quit her job with Clark County, intending to obtain another paramedic job closer to her home. While working for Garrard County, Appellant suffered an acute ankle sprain requiring reconstructive surgery. Camps filed for workers’ compensation based on an average weekly wage (AWW) calculation including her wages from both counties. An administrative law judge concluded that Camps’s AWW was limited to the wages she earned working for Garrard County. The Workers’ Compensation Board affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed based on its interpretation of Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.140(5), concluding that Camps’s Clark County wages should be included in her AWW calculation because she worked for Clark County during the relevant look-back period. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, because Camps was no longer under a contract for hire with Clark County at the time of her injury, she was not entitled to claim both her Garrard County and Clark County wages in her AWW calculation. View "Garrard County Fiscal Court v. Camps" on Justia Law

Appellant injured his left shoulder while working for Appellee. Appellant underwent three shoulder surgeries and returned to work on light duty between the surgeries. After Appellant returned to work without restrictions, Appellee terminated his employment for bumping into a pole while operating a forklift. An administrative law judge (ALJ) denied Appellant’s request for temporary total disability (TTD) benefits while Appellant was on light duty and declined to award the two multiplier under Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.730(1)(c)(2) and Chrysalis House, Inc. v. Tackett after finding that Appellant was not terminated due to his disabling shoulder injury. The Workers’ Compensation Board and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the denial of TTD benefits, as the evidence did not compel a contrary finding; and (2) reversed and remanded with respect to the two multiplier, as the circumstances in this case led the Court to reconsider its holding in Chrysalis House and its construction of section 342.730(1)(c)(2). View "Livingood v. Transfreight, LLC" on Justia Law

Sheri Eaton requested workers’ compensation benefits claiming that she received a workplace injury resulting from an injury at her workplace. After a contested case hearing, the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) determined that Eaton did not prove that her injury was related to the workplace event. The OAH also upheld the final determination by the Division ceasing payments for temporary total disability benefits and mental health treatment six months after reaching maximum medical improvement. The district court affirmed the OAH’s decision. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s order, holding that the OAH hearing examiner’s decision was supported by substantial evidence and that the OAH’s determination was not arbitrary or capricious. View "Eaton v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Workforce Servs." on Justia Law

Appellant received a back injury while working as a concrete truck driver. Appellant subsequently received two surgeries to his back and could not return to work. The Wyoming Workers’ Safety and Compensation Division assigned Appellant a nine percent permanent partial impairment (PPI) rating. The Medical Commission sustained the Division’s PPI rating. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Medical Commission’s decision that Appellant did not prove he was entitled to a higher impairment rating under the AMA Guides to the Evaluation of Physical Impairment was supported by substantial evidence and otherwise in accordance with the law. View "In re Worker's Compensation Claim of Michael D. Hurt" on Justia Law

The National Labor Relations Board entered an order requiring NSTAR Electric Company, an electric and gas company, to bargain with a Union that seventeen of the company’s dispatch-center workers voted to join. The Board filed an application in the First Circuit to enforce that order. NSTAR filed a cross-petition for review, contending that the electrical workers’ responsibilities made them either “supervisors” or “manager[s]” rather than “employees,” and therefore, the National Labor Relations Act, which requires a company to bargain with a union that represents “employees” of that company, did not protect the workers’ right to have the Union represent them. The First Circuit granted the Board’s petition to enforce the Board’s order and denied the company’s cross-petition for review, holding that substantial evidence supported the Board’s finding that the NSTAR failed to show that the workers were either supervisors or managers, even though the workers were highly skilled and charged with critical tasks. View "NLRB v. NSTAR Elec. & Gas Co." on Justia Law

The Defense Contract Management Agency within the Department of Defense (DOD) employed Vassallo as a computer engineer in 2012. That summer, it announced a vacancy for the position of Lead Interdisciplinary Engineer, stating that only certain individuals could apply: “[c]urrent [DCMA]” employees or “[c]urrent [DOD] [e]mployee[s] with the Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics . . . [w]orkforce who are outside of the Military Components.” Vassallo, a veteran, applied, but DCMA rejected his application. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) determined that DOD was not required to afford him veterans employment preferences under the Veterans Employment Opportunities Act of 1998 (VEOA), 112 Stat. 3182. OPM defines the word “agency” in 5 U.S.C. 3304(f)(1) to mean “Executive agency” as defined in 5 U.S.C. 105 and concluded that DCMA was not required to give Vassallo an opportunity to compete under 5 U.S.C. 3304(f)(1) because the DOD— the agency making the announcement—did not accept applications from outside its own workforce. Vassallo sought corrective action from the Merit Systems Protection Board, which concluded that OPM’s regulation permissibly fills a gap in the governing statute. The Federal Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the OPM regulation contradicts the plain terms of the statute and unreasonably undermines the purpose of the VEOA. View "Vassallo v. Dept. of Defense" on Justia Law

The Mississippi Highway Safety Patrol (MHP) discharged Officer Sammy Ray for falsifying official state documents. Ray appealed to the Employee Appeals Board (EAB). The EAB conducted a hearing and upheld Ray's termination. On appeal, the Circuit Court affirmed. But the Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court judgment, concluding that Ray's due process rights were violated because the EAB's decision was based on conduct other than that for which he officially was charged. The Court of Appeals awarded Ray reinstatement and back pay. The Department of Public Safety appealed, arguing that the Court of Appeals improperly reweighed the evidence and failed to give sufficient deference to the EAB's findings. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated and affirmed the trial court. View "Ray v. Mississippi Dept. of Pub. Safety" on Justia Law

Appellee Emily Kane ran for elective office while she was employed at the Albuquerque Fire Department (the AFD) as a captain. Article X, Section 3 of the Charter of the City of Albuquerque (1989), and the City of Albuquerque Personnel Rules and Regulations Section 311.3 (2001), prohibit city employees from holding elective office. Kane sought injunctive relief to allow her to hold elective office while retaining her employment with the AFD. She argued that the employment regulations of the City of Albuquerque (the City) violated: (1) the First and Fourth Amendments of the United States Constitution; (2) Article VII, Section 2 of the New Mexico Constitution; and (3) Section 10-7F-9 of the Hazardous Duty Officers' Employer-Employee Relations Act (the HDOA). The district court granted Kane the relief she sought, but the Supreme Court reversed. The Court found the City's employment regulations did not violate the First Amendment because they regulated conflicts of interest, and they were therefore rationally related to the legitimate government purpose of promoting administrative efficiency. In addition, the Court held these regulations did not violate Article VII, Section 2 because they constituted conditions of employment that did not add additional qualifications to elective public office. Finally, the City's employment regulations were not preempted by Section 10-7F-9 because personnel rules touched issues of local rather than general concern, and they were within the City's authority to promulgate. View "Kane v. City of Albuquerque" on Justia Law

During negotiations with Nichols to replace an expired collective bargaining agreement, the union called for a strike. Most employees participated; some crossed the picket line. Nichols hired replacement workers. Bandy, a 34-year employee, participated, but did not take a strategic or leadership role. The union ended the strike. Nichols began recalling strikers, including Bandy. Nichols requested, and, without objection, Bandy took a pledge that they would not “strike again over the same dispute,” subject to discipline. Nichols maintains the pledge merely confirmed returning employees would not engage in unlawful intermittent striking, which is not protected activity. Nichols also distributed its longstanding “zero tolerance” policy, which was incorporated into the CBA: “[h]arassing, disruptive, threatening, and/or violent situations or behavior by anyone, regardless of status, will not be tolerated and” offending employees would be “subject to discharge for the first offense.” Nichols posted notice. Two weeks after his return, Bandy drew his finger across his throat in a “cut throat” gesture toward Braafhart, who had crossed the picket line. Bandy was discharged. T An ALJ concluded Nichols did not violate National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1), (3), but the NLRB concluded that Bandy’s strike activity was a motivating factor and ordered Bandy reinstated with back-pay. The Eighth Circuit declined to enforce the order. View "Nichols Aluminum, LLC v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd." on Justia Law

Appellant, a self-employed delivery driver who contracted with FedEx Home Delivery for one of its delivery routes, fell and injured his shoulder while delivering packages. Under his FedEx service contract, Appellant was required to maintain workers’ compensation insurance, which he did through CorVel Corporation. Appellant received medical treatment, but with his physical restrictions, he could not complete his delivery route. Appellant hired a replacement driver until he canceled the service contract. Appellant sought temporary disability benefits, which CorVel denied. Appellant administratively appealed. The appeals officer denied both temporary total disability benefits and temporary partial disability benefits on the basis that Appellant could not establish a loss of any income without evidence of a salary. The district court denied Appellant’s petition for judicial review. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) for self-employed individuals, the lack of a salary associated with typical employment does not preclude an average monthly wage calculation for the purpose of determining lost income and rendering a workers’ compensation benefit decision; and (2) the appeals officer in this case should have determined the best method for calculating any loss to Appellant’s wages resulting from his industrial injury, taking into account both his business’s income and expenses. Remanded. View "Mensah v. CorVel Corp." on Justia Law