Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Workers’ Compensation Board imposed a $30,000 penalty on Nale Holyoke and his construction company (collectively, Holyoke) for violating the insurance coverage requirements of the Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA). The Workers’ Compensation Board Appellate Division vacated the Board’s imposition of penalties on Holyoke. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, albeit for a different reason than that expressed by the Appellate Division, holding that Holyoke complied with Me. Rev. Stat. 39-A, 401 and 403 by maintaining workers’ compensation policies that would have provided compensation to any worker entitled to benefits, and therefore, Holyoke complied with the coverage requirements of the WCA. View "Workers Comp. Bd. Abuse Investigation Unit v. Nate Holyoke Builders, Inc." on Justia Law

American Coal appealed the MSHA's citation and fine for a "fire" on one of its coal stockpiles when safety inspectors observed patches of smoldering, smoking coal without visible flames. American Coal argued that the citation and fine should be vacated because a "fire," for purposes of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act, 30 U.S.C. 801 et seq., exists only when there are visible flames and that, even if a fire could exist without visible flames, there was insufficient proof to show a fire of any kind. The court rejected these arguments and denied American Coal's petition for review, concluding that the statutory term “fire” is ambiguous, the Secretary of Labor reasonably determined that the term does not require the presence of flames, and substantial evidence supports the conclusion that the smoldering patches on American Coal’s stockpile satisfied the Secretary’s interpretation of a “fire.” View "The American Coal Co. v. MSHR" on Justia Law

The Michigan Coalition of State Employee Unions and others brought an action in the Court of Claims against the State and various state agencies and officers, alleging that portions of 2011 PA 264, which amended the State Employees’ Retirement Act (SERA, MCL 38.1 et seq.), were unconstitutional because the resulting changes to retirement benefits altered rates of compensation or conditions of employment, which were within the exclusive authority of the Civil Service Commission to regulate. The Court of Claims granted plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding that SERA retirement benefits were properly classified as both “rates of compensation” and “conditions of employment,” neither of which was subject to legislative alteration. The Supreme Court reversed. "While the [Civil Service Commission] has considerable constitutional powers to manage the civil service system and to preserve its sphere of constitutional authority, the commission has no legislative powers. It may neither enact legislation nor revise an enactment, nor may it dictate that the Legislature repeal or modify an enactment. Therefore, we hold that because the commission has acquiesced in the application of SERA to the employees of the civil service system, plaintiff’s objections fail to establish a basis for relief." View "Michigan Coalition of State Employee Unions v. Michigan" on Justia Law

The International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace, and Agricultural Implement Workers of America and others brought an action in the Court of Appeals against Nino Green and other members of the Michigan Employment Relations Commission, the Governor, and the Attorney General, seeking a declaratory judgment that portions of 2012 PA 349 (which amended the public employment relations act (PERA, MCL 423.201 et seq.), to prohibit public employers from requiring their employees to join a union or pay union-related expenses) were unconstitutional with respect to employees in the classified state civil service. The Court of Appeals held that the challenged portions of 2012 PA 349 were constitutional. Although the Supreme Court concluded that public collective bargaining was a method by which the Civil Service Commission (could choose to exercise its constitutional duties, the Court held that the commission could not effectively require civil servants to fund the commission’s own administrative operations. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals on different grounds. View "UAW v. Green" on Justia Law

Hamilton County EMS Association, IAFF Local 4956 (Union) filed a petition with Nebraska’s Commission of Industrial Relations (CIR) seeking to become the exclusive bargaining agent for employees of the Hamilton Coutny Ambulance Service. Hamilton County objected to the inclusion of two shift captains of the Union in the bargaining unit. The CIR concluded that the captains were not statutory supervisors under Nebraska’s Industrial Relations Act and could be included with the nonsupervisors’ bargaining unit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the CIR did not err in classifying the two shift captains as nonsupervisors and allowing them to take part in the workers’ bargaining unit. View "Hamilton County EMS Ass’n v. Hamilton County" on Justia Law

Respondent sustained injuries while employed by Employer. In 2010, Respondent sought workers’ compensation benefits, claiming that as a result of his injury he developed complex regional pain syndrome (CRPS) and that he was entitled to compensation for certain medical expenses, including expenses incurred for the implantation of a spinal cord neurostimulator. The compensation judge concluded that Respondent had failed to show that the effects of his work-related injury included CRPS and therefore necessitated a neurostimulator. The Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) affirmed. In 2013, Respondent filed a second request for medical benefits seeking compensation for the expenses related to the replacement of his neurostimulator. The compensation judge dismissed the claim, concluding that Respondent’s 2013 claim was barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel. The WCCA reversed. The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the WCCA, holding (1) res judicata did not preclude Respondent’s 2013 claim; but (2) in resolving the 2013 claim, the compensation judge did not determine whether Respondent’s medical condition had changed or new material facts had emerged, a determination that was necessary in order to resolve whether collateral estoppel precluded the 2013 claim. Remanded. View "Mach v. Wells Concrete Prods. Co." on Justia Law

Employee filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits arising out of a work-related pulmonary condition. Employer and Employee entered into a settlement that expressly left “future related pulmonary med[ical] care open.” An administrative law judge approved the settlement. The dispute in this case centered on Employer’s refusal to pay for certain inhaler medicines prescribed to Employee. Employee filed a request for a hearing before the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission to determine whether Employer was required to pay for the inhalers. The Commission concluded that it retained jurisdiction to determine Employer’s liability for Employee’s future medical care and ordered the parties to present their evidence in a hearing before the Division of Workers’ Compensation. Thereafter, Employer filed a petition for a writ of prohibition and, alternatively, mandamus, asserting that the parties’ settlement divested the Commission of jurisdiction over the issue of Employer’s liability for Employee’s future medical care. The Supreme Court quashed the preliminary writ, holding that the Commission was not divested of jurisdiction to determine the extent of a claimant’s entitlement to workers’ compensation benefits pursuant to a settlement that expressly leaves the issue of future medical care “open” and indeterminate. View "State ex rel. ISP Minerals, Inc. v. Labor & Indus. Relations Comm’n" on Justia Law

Charles Stenz suffered a workplace injury. His employer’s insurance carrier, Pinnacle Risk Management, accepted Stenz’s claim and paid the benefits. Stenz subsequently died, and his widow, Elizabeth Stenz, filed a claim for death benefits. An administrative law judge (ALJ) upheld the denial. The court of appeals set aside the award. The ALJ eventually awarded death benefits and, almost four years after Elizabeth filed her claim, entered a final order affirming the award. Pinnacle paid the benefits dating back to Stenz’s death but did not pay interest on the unpaid benefits. The ALJ concluded that no interest was owed on the death benefit before the award became final. The court of appeals set this ruling aside, concluding that the claim was liquidated as of the date Pinnacle received notice of it. The Supreme Court vacated the opinion of the court of appeals and set aside the ALJ’s award, holding that a claim for death benefits filed pursuant to Ariz. Rev. Stat. 23-1046 is a liquidated claim, and interest is owed on the claim from the date on which the carrier receives notice that a survivor has filed a claim with the Industrial Commission. View "Stenz v. Indus. Comm’n of Ariz." on Justia Law

Appellants The International Association of Firefighters, Local 22, AFL-CIO, and its named officers (collectively, the Union) was the collective bargaining unit representing the City of Philadelphia’s firefighters and paramedics. It appealed a Commonwealth Court order reversing the trial court’s grant of peremptory judgment in mandamus for the Union and against the City of Philadelphia, Mayor Michael Nutter, Richard Negrin, and Lloyd Ayers (collectively, the City), and required the City to fill vacancies immediately in the positions of Fire Captain and Fire Lieutenant. The Commonwealth Court held that neither the Home Rule Charter nor the Civil Service Regulations required vacancies to be filled immediately. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the Union did not establish a clear legal right to relief or a corresponding duty in the City, and that it was therefore not entitled to mandamus relief. View "Phila Firefighters' Union. v. City of Phila" on Justia Law

Dibble and Akemann were arbitrators for the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission. At the time of their appointments, the Workers’ Compensation Act, 820 ILCS 305/14, provided that each arbitrator would be appointed for a term of six years, with the possibility of reappointment. The legislature passed Public Act 97–18, which was signed on June 28, 2011 and took effect three days later, ending the terms of all incumbent arbitrators effective July 1, 2011 and providing that the Governor would make new appointments. The law allowed incumbent arbitrators to serve as holdovers until the Governor made new appointments. By July 1, 2012, both Dibble and Akemann had lost their positions. They alleged that by shortening their six‐year terms as arbitrators under the prior law, Public Act 97–18 deprived them of a property interest without due process of law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed judgments for defendants. Plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive relief were moot, and the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiffs’ claims for damages. Even if plaintiffs plausibly allege a constitutional violation, the applicable law was not clearly established under the circumstances of these cases, where a statutory amendment eliminated the property interest that a statute had previously conferred. View "Dibble v. Quinn" on Justia Law