Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant suffered a workplace injury to his back and applied for permanent partial disability. The Workers’ Compensation Division denied benefits. Appellant requested a contested case hearing. During discovery, the Division served interrogatories and requests for production requesting information regarding Appellant’s work history since the time of his injury. Appellant objected to a number of the interrogatories and requests, asserting his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The hearing examiner compelled Appellant to answer the discovery, but Appellant continued to invoke his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The hearing examiner dismissed the contested case as a discovery sanction. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Appellant was justified in asserting his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination because he reasonably believed his answers to the discovery requests could be used in a criminal prosecution against him; and (2) the hearing examiner abused his discretion by acting arbitrarily and capriciously in dismissing the case as a discovery sanction without engaging in the proper balancing of Appellant’s and the Division’s conflicting interests. View "Debyah v. State, ex rel., Dep’t of Workforce Servs." on Justia Law

Appellee suffered an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. The Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Court awarded temporary benefits to Appellee. Nearly three years later, Employer petitioned to modify the award, alleging that Appellee had reached maximum medical improvement and had experienced a decrease in incapacity. The compensation court found that Appellee had reached maximum medical improvement. After a trial held on Employer’s petition to modify, the compensation court then filed a “Further Award,” determining that Appellee was permanently and totally disabled. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the compensation err did not err when it (1) admitted and relied upon reports of a psychiatrist and a neurologist when it considered Appellee’s preexisting mental and cognitive deficits in determining the extent of his disability; and (2) applied the odd-lot doctrine and found that Appellee was permanently and totally disabled. View "Gardner v. Int’l Paper Destruction & Recycling" on Justia Law

Wharf Resources, Inc., a mining company, terminated Lisa Davis for “disruptive behavior in the workplace.” Several months later, Davis filed a gender discrimination claim and a retaliatory discharge claim with the South Dakota Department of Labor, Division of Human Rights (Department). The Department concluded that there was no probable cause for Davis’s claims. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err by (1) affirming the Department’s finding of no probable cause; (2) determining that Davis was terminated for permissible factors; and (3) affirming the findings of fact and conclusions of law submitted by the Department. View "Davis v. Wharf Res. (USA), Inc." on Justia Law

The unions in each of three municipalities brought scope-of-negotiations challenges to the municipal actions. The Public Employment Relations Commission (PERC), in separate decisions, held that the municipalities violated the New Jersey Employer-Employee Relations Act (EERA), and required each municipality to negotiate the changes in terms and conditions of employment. PERC applied the three-part test set forth in "Local 195, IFPTE v. New Jersey," (88 N.J.393 (1982)), for resolving questions about the scope of public sector employment negotiations. In "Local 195," the Court established that a subject is negotiable when: (1) the item intimately and directly affects the work and welfare of public employees; (2) the subject has not been fully or partially preempted by statute or regulation; and (3) a negotiated agreement would not significantly interfere with the determination of governmental policy.The three municipalities appealed their PERC administrative determinations. The Appellate Division observed that the Commission had approved all three layoff plans during the time when the Commission's emergency regulation permitting temporary layoffs, was in effect. PERC determined that the layoffs in each municipality directly affected employee work and welfare, that the subject of negotiation was not preempted by statute or regulation, and that the municipalities did not have the managerial prerogative to unilaterally implement the layoffs because negotiations would not significantly interfere with governmental policy. The Supreme Court affirmed, finding that at the time that they occurred, the layoff actions at issue were non-negotiable under the third prong of the Local 195 test. View "IMO Borough of Keyport v. Local 68" on Justia Law

While in the course and scope of his employment with Employer, Plaintiff suffered serious injuries. Plaintiff recovered workers’ compensation insurance benefits in the amount of $207,147. Plaintiff subsequently brought this action against Employer, alleging that Employer was an uninsured employer under the Workers’ Compensation Act at the time of the accident. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Employer, concluding that Employer was an insured employer under the Act and was therefore entitled to tort immunity pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 39-71-411. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in concluding that Employer was an insured employer under the Act and therefore was entitled to tort immunity. View "Stokes v. Golden Triangle, Inc." on Justia Law

Ryan was employed by FEMA (Department of Homeland Security). Her position required top secret security clearance. The agency suspended Ryan’s access to classified information after learning she had been indicted on federal charges of conflict of interest, soliciting a gratuity, and making a false statement. FEMA indefinitely suspended her without pay pending final determination by FEMA's Chief Security Officer concernng future eligibility for access to classified information. Ryan appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). Although Ryan was acquitted, the MSPB found she was not entitled to immediate termination of the suspension because it “was based upon the suspension of her clearance and not the underlying reasons … (the indictment)” and MRPB cannot order reinstatement to a position requiring access to classified information while Ryan is without the required clearance. Ryan filed another appeal asserting unreasonable delay in adjudication of her security clearance. The MSPB affirmed dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In a third decision, the MSPB found the basis for her suspension was not constructively amended. The Federal Circuit affirmed, noting that “denial of a security clearance . . . is not subject to [MSPB] review.” It was Ryan’s inability to access classified information, not the underlying reasons for the inability, that caused her suspension. View "Ryan v. Dep't of Homeland Sec." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured when he fell off a truck following a customer appreciation supper held by his employer (Defendant). The Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Court concluded that Plaintiff was injured in the course and scope of his employment, thus making Defendant liable for the injury. Defendant appealed, arguing that the compensation court applied the wrong legal standard in its finding that Defendant received a “substantial benefit” from Plaintiff’s attendance at the supper, when the correct legal standard for the test is a “substantial direct benefit.” The Supreme Court agreed and reversed, holding that the compensation court applied the wrong legal standard. Remanded for an application of the correct standard. View "Jacobitz v. Aurora Coop." on Justia Law

Yer Sumner was injured when she fell while working for Jim Lupient Infiniti. Sumner filed a claim petition for workers’ compensation benefits. Lupient denied primary liability. After Sumner filed her claim petition, eleven entities (collectively, Intervenors), including two health-care providers that provided treatment to Sumner (collectively, Relators), moved to intervene as of right. Lupient objected to the compensability of the services for which several Intervenors, including Relators, sought reimbursement. Intervenors had their claims for reimbursement denied when they failed to attend a hearing before a compensation judge. Relators and Sumner appealed. The Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of Relators’ reimbursement claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, because Relators were absent from the hearing, and none of the exceptions to the attendance requirement was met, the compensation judge did not err when he denied Relators’ claims for reimbursement. View "Sumner v. Jim Lupient Infiniti" on Justia Law

Respondent was the widow of an employee of Battelle Memorial Institute (BMI). The decedent was stationed in Tbilisi, Georgia when he died in an automobile accident while traveling by taxi to shop for groceries. Respondent filed a claim for death benefits under the Defense Base Act (DBA). An administrative law judge (ALJ) held in favor of the widow. The Benefits Review Board affirmed. BMI petitioned for review. At issue before the First Circuit was whether the Board correctly found that the zone of special danger doctrine applied in this case and that the decedent’s death was compensable under the Act. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s findings and ensuing conclusions that the zone of special danger doctrine applied and that the decedent’s death was compensable under the Act. View "Battelle Mem’l Inst. v. Dicecca" on Justia Law

Dakota Trailer Manufacturing, which makes radiator components for an unrelated company, performs its component work in one of Dakota Trailer’s locations that was originally classified as a “machine shop” for workers compensation insurance rating purposes. After an inspection, the National Council on Compensation Insurance changed the location’s classification to “welding or cutting.” Both the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board and the South Dakota Department of Labor affirmed the new classification. The circuit court reversed and reinstated the machine shop code. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court properly found that Dakota Trailer’s activities fit within the machine shop code. View "Dakota Trailer Mfg. v. United Fire & Cas. Co." on Justia Law