Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Prairie State challenges the Commission’s decision to sustain the Secretary’s citations against it for operating without approved, mine-specific plans for roof support and ventilation at Prairie State’s underground coal mine at Lively Grove in southern Illinois. Principally at issue was which standard the Commission should use when it reviews the Secretary’s citation of an operator for failure to follow an approved, mine-specific plan. The court assumed, without deciding, that Chevron governs the court's consideration of that question, as Prairie State failed to contest the Secretary’s assertion that it does. The court held that the Secretary’s judgments regarding the suitability of mine-specific safety plans are entitled to deference under the Mine Act, 30 U.S.C. 801 et seq., and reject the further claims of error. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Prairie State Generating Com. v. Secretary of Labor" on Justia Law

Certain provisions of the Texas Occupations Code and Texas Commission of Licensing and Regulation rules promulgated pursuant to that Code require eyebrow threaders to undergo 750 hours of training in order to obtain a license before practicing commercial threading. Plaintiffs, several individuals practicing commercial eyebrow threading and the salon owners employing them, filed this declaratory judgment action asserting that, as applied to them, Texas’s licensing statutes and regulations violate the state Constitution’s due course of law provision. Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged that the number of hours required for a license to practice commercial eyebrow threading are not related to health or safety or to what threaders actually do. The trial court granted summary judgment for the State. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the large number of required hours that are not arguably related to the actual practice of threading, the associated costs of those hours, and the delayed employment opportunities while taking the hours make the licensing requirements as a whole reach the level of being so burdensome that they are oppressive in light of the governmental interest. View "Patel v. Dep’t of Licensing & Regulation" on Justia Law

This appeal centered on the second of two qui tam actions filed by former New Mexico Education Retirement Board ("ERB") Chief Investment Officer Frank Foy and his wife Suzanne ("Foys"), attacking the management of the investment portfolios of the ERB and of the New Mexico State Investment Council ("SIC"). The Foys "allege that Defendants, who include Wall Street firms and investment advisors, as well as high-ranking state officials, executed fraudulent schemes that led to the loss of hundreds of millions of dollars at the expense of the [SIC] and the [ERB]. Specifically, the issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether the retroactive application of the Fraud Against Taxpayers Act, NMSA 1978, Sections 44-9-1 to -14 (2007) ("FATA") violated the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States and New Mexico Constitutions. The New Mexico Supreme Court held that FATA was constitutional. The treble damages under FATA were predominantly compensatory and could be applied retroactively to conduct that occurred prior to its effective date. The Court declined to resolve the issue of whether the civil penalties awarded under FATA were punitive and violated ex post facto principles until there was a definitive amount awarded. View "New Mexico ex rel. Foy v. Austin Capital Mgmt., Ltd." on Justia Law

Petitioners Jonathan Duchesne, Matthew Jajuga, and Michael Buckley, appealed a superior court decision denying their request for a declaratory judgment and an injunction to remove their names from the so-called "Laurie List." The petitioners were officers of the Manchester Police Department. In 2010, while off duty, petitioners were involved in an incident at a bar in Manchester. The incident was widely reported in the media, and the Manchester chief of police ordered a criminal and internal affairs investigation. Following the investigation, the chief found that the petitioners had violated several departmental policies, including a prohibition against the unnecessary use of force, and each officer was suspended for a period of time. Pursuant to protocol, the chief sent letters to the Hillsborough County Attorney's Office stating that petitioners had "engaged in conduct (excessive use of force) that may be subject to disclosure under [New Hampshire] v. Laurie." Consequently, the county attorney placed the petitioners' names on the "Laurie List," which the trial court described as "an informal list of police officers who have been identified as having potentially exculpatory evidence in their personnel files or otherwise." Pursuant to the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the petitioners' union and the City of Manchester, the petitioners filed grievances regarding the discipline imposed by the chief. After a hearing, an arbitrator found that "the City of Manchester did not have just cause to take disciplinary action against [the petitioners] for actions taken or not taken" during the incident. As a result of this decision, petitioners were compensated for lost earnings and information regarding the incident was removed from their personnel files. While this process was occurring, the New Hampshire Attorney General's Office conducted an independent criminal investigation into the incident. Its final report concluded that the petitioners' conduct "was justified under New Hampshire law and no criminal charges are warranted." The chief again wrote to the then Hillsborough County Attorney, this time requesting that, pursuant to the arbitrator's award, petitioners be removed from the "Laurie List." The county attorney declined. Petitioners also asked the attorney general to direct the county attorney to remove the petitioners from the "Laurie List" which the attorney general also declined. After a hearing, the trial court denied petitioners relief. Although the "Laurie List" is not available to members of the public generally, placement on the list all but guarantees that information about the officers will be disclosed to trial courts and/or defendants or their counsel any time the officers testify in a criminal case, thus potentially affecting their reputations and professional standing with those with whom they work and interact on a regular basis. Here, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court unsustainably exercised its discretion and that petitioners were entitled to be removed from the "Laurie List." Therefore, to the extent that the petitioners' names appear on the "Laurie List" maintained by the Hillsborough County Attorney's Office, we hold that the trial court unsustainably exercised its discretion in failing to order that their names be removed from said list. In light of this ruling, the Court did not address the other relief requested. View "Duchesne v. Hillsborough County Attorney" on Justia Law

In 2003, Appellee was injured while working for Appellant. In 2011, Appellee applied for permanent-total-disability compensation and submitted a report from his treating physician, Dr. Oscar DePaz. A hearing officer relied in part on the report of Dr. DePaz as support for the decision to award Appellee permanent-total-disability compensation. Appellant filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus alleging that the Industrial Commission had abused its discretion when it ordered compensation to begin on the date of Dr. DePaz’s report and claiming that Dr. DePaz’s report did not find that Appellee’s disability was solely the result of his medical impairment. The court of appeals denied Appellant’s request for a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission did not abuse its discretion by (1) relying on the date of the DePaz report as the date on which to begin paying the award; and (2) determining that, based on the entire report, the DePaz opinion was evidence of permanent total disability based on the medical factors alone, thereby eliminating the need for further consideration of the nonmedical disability factors. View "State ex rel. Tradesmen Int’l v. Indus. Comm’n" on Justia Law

Defendant was an employee of the North Bergen Board of Education who filed an action asserting statutory and common law employment discrimination claims against the Board. In discovery, defendant's counsel produced several hundred documents that allegedly had been removed or copied from Board files. According to the Board, the documents included highly confidential student educational and medical records that were protected by federal and state privacy laws. The Board reported the alleged theft of its documents to the county prosecutor. The State presented the matter to a grand jury, which ultimately indicted defendant for official misconduct and theft by unlawful taking of public documents. Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the State failed to present evidence sufficient to support the indictment and withheld exculpatory evidence about her motive. She also contended that her removal of documents for use in her employment discrimination claim was sanctioned by the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in "Quinlan v. Curtiss-Wright Corp.," (204 N.J. 239 (2010)). The trial court denied the motion, and the Appellate Division affirmed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial and appellate court's decisions. View "New Jersey v. Saavedra" on Justia Law

In 2011, Appellant suffered a work-related injury. The Department of Workforce Services, Workers’ Compensation Division approved benefits for the jury to Appellant’s left groin, abdomen, upper leg, and knee. After Appellant returned to work, he began experiencing back pain. Appellant filed a claim for the evaluation and treatment of his back pain. The Division denied the claim, concluding that the lumbar spine evaluation and treatment Appellant had received were not related to his originally work injury. The Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) denied Appellant’s worker’s compensation claim on the grounds that he failed to prove a causal relationship between his lower back problems and his work-related accident. The district court upheld the OAH’s decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the hearing examiner’s conclusion that Appellant’s back problem was not caused by the work-related accident was supported by substantial evidence; and (2) the hearing examiner correctly ruled that Appellant was not entitled to worker’s compensation benefits under the second compensable injury rule. View "In re Worker's Comp. Claim of Guerrero" on Justia Law

Gwendolyn Hallsmith was the planning and community development director for the City of Montpelier. Her employment was protected by a "justifiable cause" provision in the City's personnel plan. In November 2013, City Manager William Fraser placed Hallsmith on paid administrative leave, and sent a letter to her indicating that he was contemplating firing her under the City's personnel plan. In the letter, the city manager described various acts of unprofessional behavior and insubordination, damage to relationships with key individuals and governing bodies within city government, and inappropriate use of City resources. He asserted that these acts were grounds for disciplinary action under the City's personnel plan, and offered to meet with Hallsmith to consider any response she wanted to make. Hallsmith, accompanied by counsel, met with the city manager and argued her case. Following that meeting, the city manager dismissed Hallsmith from employment with the City. Hallsmith timely filed a grievance pursuant to the personnel plan, which provides for review of disciplinary action. At the grievance hearing, the city questioned Hallsmith and her witnesses extensively. Hallsmith was not permitted to cross-examine the city manager, the City's only witness. The assistant city manager, serving as the hearing officer, upheld the City's termination decision. Hallsmith subsequently filed a Rule 75 petition at the trial court, seeking reinstatement, reimbursement for lost compensation, and other remedies. In her petition, Hallsmith contested the merits of her termination, arguing that the City's decision to terminate her employment was not supported by sufficient evidence of justifiable cause, and that the hearing officer's decision to uphold the termination was not supported by the evidence and applied the wrong legal standard. She also raised a due-process challenge to the post-termination hearing procedures. In response, the City moved to dismiss the due-process claim, arguing that Hallsmith got all the process that was due. The City did not argue that the post-termination grievance hearing was constitutionally adequate. Instead, its sole argument was that the pre-termination "Loudermill" meeting, combined with the availability of a post-termination judicial remedy "Rule 75" petition challenging governmental action or a common-law action for breach of contract satisfied due process. On the merits, the City argued that there was credible evidence establishing justifiable cause for the assistant city manager's decision to sustain the City's firing of Hallsmith. The trial court rejected the City's argument that the availability of a post-termination judicial remedy in the form of a Rule 75 petition or a breach-of-contract action satisfied due process. The City appealed that decision, but after careful review of the trial court and Board records, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision. View "Hallsmith v. City of Montpelier" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's consideration was whether defendant lifeguard's failure to intervene in the deceased's drowning was "the proximate cause" of his death. While governmental agencies and their employees are generally immune from tort liability under the governmental tort liability act (GTLA), MCL 691.1407(2)(c) provided an exception to this general rule when a governmental employee's conduct is both (1) grossly negligent and (2) "the proximate cause" of an injury, which the Michigan Supreme Court interpreted to mean the "most immediate, efficient, and direct cause". Plaintiff sued defendant, a governmental employee, arguing that governmental immunity did not apply because defendant's grossly negligent behavior while lifeguarding and resulting failure to rescue plaintiff's drowning son was the proximate cause of his death. Subsequently, defendant moved for summary judgment on immunity grounds, but the trial court denied defendant's motion. The Court of Appeals, in a split opinion, affirmed, concluding that a jury could reasonably find that defendant's failure to intervene constituted the proximate cause of the deceased's death. The Court of Appeals dissent instead concluded that defendant was immune from liability. After review, the Supreme Court held that the trial court erred by denying summary judgment to defendant, because the exception to governmental immunity articulated in MCL 691.1407(2) was inapplicable in this case. View "Beals v. Michigan" on Justia Law

In an interlocutory appeal, defendant-appellant Kansas Department of Labor (KDOL) argued the district court should have dismissed plaintiff-appellee Kathleen Arbogast's suit because: (1) KDOL lacks the capacity to sue and to be sued under Kansas law; and (2) even if KDOL was a proper defendant, it was immune from suit by operation of the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Arbogast was employed in the Workers Compensation Division of KDOL. She suffered from asthma and, in April 2008, complained that perfumes and other strong fragrances in the workplace were impairing her ability to work. In September 2010, Arbogast was moved to a workspace in the basement of her office building in an attempt to alleviate the problem. But Arbogast continued to suffer asthma attacks when coworkers wearing fragrances would come speak with her, prompting Arbogast to make additional complaints to her supervisor. In 2011, Karin Brownlee, then-Secretary of Labor, terminated Arbogast's employment at KDOL. The Tenth Circuit held that it lacked appellate jurisdiction to consider KDOL's capacity argument, but the Court exercised jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine and affirmed the district court's determination that KDOL was not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from Arbogast's claims. View "Arbogast v. Kansas Department of Labor" on Justia Law