Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Mark Hranicka filed a workers’ compensation claim as a result of an injury he sustained during a motor vehicle accident. The workers’ compensation claim was withdrawn. Thereafter, Hranicka submitted to the Workers’ Compensation Commission a second claim. The claim was electronically submitted to the Commission before expiration of the two-year statute of limitations but not filed on paper until after the expiration of the two-year period. Respondents contested the claim, arguing that it was time-barred under Md. Code Ann. Lab. & Empl. 9-709(b)(3). The Commissioner determined that the claim was not time-barred. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that electronic submission of a claim does not constitute “filing” pursuant to Code of Maryland Regulations, and therefore, the Commission erred in ruling that the filing date of a claim could be the date of the claim’s electronic submission for purposes of the statute of limitations. View "Hranicka v. Chesapeake Surgical, Ltd." on Justia Law

The State Teachers Retirement Board (STRB) denied the application of Jason Menz, an elementary school principal, for disability-retirement benefits on the grounds that Menz did not meet the criteria for permanent disability. Menz subsequently filed an action in mandamus in the court of appeals. The court of appeals granted a writ, concluding that STRB had abused its discretion in denying Menz disability benefits because both the treating physician and the independent physician had acknowledged that Menz had a condition that would prevent his return to work for at least one year. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Menz met the statutory criterion for an award of disability-retirement benefits under the relevant statute. View "State ex rel. Menz v. State Teachers Ret. Bd." on Justia Law

Appellant was injured in 2003 while working for Appellee. In 2010, Appellant applied for permanent total disability compensation. Kiva Shtull, M.D. examined Appellant on behalf of the employer and concluded that Appellant was capable of full-time employment. Craig Johnson, Ph.D., performed a vocational assessment and concluded that Appellant was capable of sedentary physical activity. A staff hearing officer denied Appellant’s application, determining that Appellant was vocationally capable of returning to work or going into a rehabilitation program. Appellant filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus, arguing that the staff hearing officer abused his discretion by relying on the reports of Shtull and Johnson. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was evidence in the record to support the Commission’s denial of permanent-total-disability compensation. View "State ex rel. Lacroix v. Indus. Comm’n" on Justia Law

The Bureau of Workers’ Compensation conducted an adult of WFAL Construction and determined that WFAL owned back premiums as an “employer” subject to the Workers’ Compensation Act because those working for WFAL in 2009 were employees, not independent contractors as WFAL claimed. WFAL protested the audit findings. An adjudicating committee of the Bureau denied the protest, and the administrator’s designee affirmed. WFAL then filed this action for mandamus relief. The court of appeals concluded that the Bureau appropriately found that WFAL met the statutory criteria to support its decision that WFAL’s workers were employees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that WFAL failed to demonstrate that the Bureau’s decision was an abuse of discretion. View "State ex rel. WFAL Constr. v. Buehrer" on Justia Law

The Workers’ Compensation Core Group of the Iowa Association for Justice filed a petition for declaratory order with the Workers’ Compensation Commissioner seeking a determination whether Iowa Code 85.25(2) mandates that employers or insurance carriers defending workers’ compensation claims must immediately provide copies of surveillance videos, photographs, and reports concerning a claimant’s physical or mental condition relative to the claim. The Commissioner concluded that section 85.27(2) overrides the work product immunity, thus requiring the disclosure of surveillance materials upon request from a claimant before the claimant is deposed. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 85.27(2) does not affect privileges and protections related to the litigation process such as the work product doctrine because the statute is limited to health-care-related privileges such as the physician-patient privilege. Remanded. View "Iowa Ins. Inst. v. Core Group of the Iowa Ass’n for Justice" on Justia Law

The Retirement Systems of Alabama ("RSA"), the Teachers' Retirement System of Alabama ("TRS"), the Public Education Employees' Health Insurance Plan ("PEEHIP"), the Public Education Employees' Health Insurance Fund ("PEEHIF"), the Board of Control of TRS ("the TRS Board"), the Board of Control of PEEHIP ("the PEEHIP Board"), David Bronner, as chief executive officer of RSA and as secretary-treasurer of TRS and PEEHIP, and various members of the TRS Board and of the PEEHIP Board in their official capacities ("the PEEHIP defendants") sought mandamus review of the Circuit Court's denial of their motion to dismiss the claims filed against them by James Burks II, Eugenia Burks, Martin Hester, Jacqueline Hester, Thomas Highfield, Carol Ann Highfield, Jake Jackson, and Melinda Jackson, individually and on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals ("the public-education plaintiffs"). PEEHIP, which is managed by the PEEHIP Board, provided group health-insurance benefits to public-education employees in Alabama. The public-education plaintiffs alleged that a policy adopted by the PEEHIP Board in 2009 changed the amounts participants and their eligible dependents, and this change violated Article V, section 138.03, Alabama Constitution of 1901, as well as the public-education plaintiffs' rights to equal protection, due process, and freedom of association under the Alabama Constitution, the United States Constitution, and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The public-education plaintiffs also alleged that the 2009 policy violated Alabama public policy and their right to family integrity as protected by the Alabama Constitution. The public-education plaintiffs sought relief in the form of: (1) a judgment declaring "[the PEEHIP defendants'] practice of denying an allotment for insurance benefits to educators who are married to another educator and who have dependent children to be unconstitutional, discriminatory and unlawful under both State and Federal law"; (2) an injunction preventing the PEEHIP defendants from "denying an allotment for insurance benefits to educators whose spouse is also an educator in the public school system and who have dependent children"; (3) restitution of "amounts ... unlawfully withheld and/or ... amounts [the public-education plaintiffs] have paid for insurance that they would not have paid absent [the PEEHIP defendants'] unlawful conduct" or other equitable relief; and (4) costs and attorney fees. After review of the specific facts of this case, the Alabama Supreme Court granted the petition in part, denied in part, and issue a writ to direct the circuit court to dismiss all the public-education plaintiffs' claims against RSA, PEEHIP, the PEEHIP Board, PEEHIF, TRS, the TRS Board, the members of the TRS Board, and Bronner, in his capacity as chief executive officer of RSA and as secretary-treasurer of TRS; to dismiss all the public-education plaintiffs' state-law claims against the members of the PEEHIP Board and Bronner, in his capacity as secretary-treasurer of PEEHIP; and to dismiss the public-education plaintiffs' claims against the members of the PEEHIP Board and Bronner, in his capacity as secretary-treasurer of PEEHIP, for monetary relief, pursuant to § 1983. The petition was denied with regard to the public-education plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief, pursuant to section 1983, against the members of the PEEHIP Board and Bronner, in his capacity as secretary-treasurer of PEEHIP. The PEEHIP Board and Bronner were entitled to immunity from the state law claims, but not to immunity from the Eleventh Amendment claims for prospective injunctive relief under section 1983. View "Ex parte The Retirement Systems of Alabama et al." on Justia Law

Candelario Lopez, who was hired by Interstate Treating to work on the installation of a gas processing plant, was transporting two other Interstate Treating employees to the job site when he died in an automobile accident. Lopez’s wife, Maximina Lopez, sought death benefits from Interstate Treating’s workers’ compensation insurance carrier, SeaBright Insurance Co. SeaBright denied coverage, concluding that Lopez was not acting in the course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident. A hearing officer, however, determined that Lopez was acting in the course and scope of his employment and ordered SeaBright to pay death benefits. The trial court affirmed the administrative decision. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Lopez was acting in the course and scope of his employment when he died, and Maximina was entitled to benefits. View "Seabright Ins. Co. v. Lopez" on Justia Law

The Forest Service removed Bernard, a firefighter, from his position as supervisor. Bernard appealed. The agency and Bernard settled: the agency reinstated him in a non-supervisory role and provided back pay, promising that Bernard would not be restricted from applying for supervisory positions and would be given future fire assignments “the same as any other employee.” To receive assignments, an employee must have an Incident Qualification Card (red card), listing specific firefighting positions the employee is qualified to fill. A renewal card requires completion of annual training. Five months after his reinstatement, Bernard successfully completed the course. Other participants received renewal cards, but the agency did not issue a card to Bernard, indicating that an audit of his records found too few hard-copy documents supporting the entries. Bernard provided a copy of his 2010 card, signed by a certifying official, listing Bernard as qualified, until 2014, for 11 firefighting positions. After the agency requested additional documentation, Bernard notified it of a potential breach of the settlement, and received a card certifying him for seven positions. Bernard petitioned the Merit Systems Protection Board. An administrative judge found that Bernard had not established a breach, and— without acknowledging repeated requests for discovery—that Bernard “did not support his bare allegations with any evidence illustrating bad faith” and retaliation. The Federal Circuit vacated. The Board improperly denied discovery of potentially relevant evidence. View "Bernard v. Dep't of Agric." on Justia Law

Appellant suffered a work-related injury and filed a claim for benefits. An administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded that Appellant was entitled to benefits. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the ALJ properly excluded unemployment compensation benefits when calculating Appellant’s average weekly wage (AWW). The Workers’ Compensation Board affirmed the ALJ’s finding that unemployment benefits should not be included in the AWW calculation. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Board’s finding regarding unemployment benefits. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that unemployment benefits are not wages under Ky. Rev. Stat. 341.140(6). View "Jewell v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s position of employment with the Emergency Services Division of the State of Montana Department of Military Affairs was eliminated during implementation of the Division’s reduction-in-force policy. After her position was eliminated, Plaintiff filed a grievance with the Department of Labor and Industry Hearings Bureau alleging that the Division terminated her in retaliation for her complaint that sexual favoritism had occurred within the Division. The Bureau dismissed the complaint, and Plaintiff chose not to appeal. Instead, Plaintiff filed a discrimination complaint with the Montana Human Rights Bureau of the Department of Labor and Industry, restating her claims. The Department dismissed the complaint. Plaintiff later filed the present complaint in the district court. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding that Plaintiff’s claims were time-barred under the Montana Human Rights Act (MHRA). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by holding that Plaintiff’s claims were subject to the procedures set forth in the MHRA, and as a result were time-barred. View "Lay v. Dep’t of Military Affairs" on Justia Law