Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Patricia Jones (Patricia) and Danny Akers (Danny) divorced. Thereafter, Judy Vannoy Akers (Judy) and Danny married. After Danny died, the West Virginia Public Employees Retirement Board (Board) awarded Judy disability retirements. Patricia argued that she was entitled to Danny’s West Virginia Public Employees Retirement System (PERS) retirement benefits based on the provision for those benefits in her divorce decree. The Board denied benefits on the grounds that there was not an enforceable qualified domestic relations order (QDRO) in effect at the time when the survivor benefits were issued to Judy. Both Patricia and Judy challenged the Board’s rulings. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the Board. The Supreme Court reversed after invoking its equitable powers to permit the posthumous entry of a QDRO that provided for distribution of Patricia’s equitable interest in the portion of Danny’s retirement assets recognized as marital property, holding (1) the Board erred in granting posthumous disability benefits to Judy rather than preretirement benefits; and (2) Patricia was entitled to seek Danny’s PERS benefits. View "Jones v. W. Va. Pub. Employees Ret. Sys." on Justia Law

Appellant was denied a promotion after based on the results of a civil service test conducted by the Richfield Police and Fire Civil Service Commission. Appellant filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Court of Appeals, arguing that the Commission’s promotional process failed to meet the requirements of Minn. Stat. 419.06(9). The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Court of Appeals erred by determining that the term “records” under section 419.06(9) includes a candidate’s interview responses at the time the candidate is applying for a promotion; and (2) the Commission violated section 419.06(9) when it failed to consider records “kept in the regular course of the administration of civil service” as required by statute. View "Peterson v. Richfield Civil Serv. Comm’n" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought this action because Fiscal Year (FY) 2014 and FY 2015 Appropriations Acts did not provide sufficient funding to meet the amounts called for with the Legislature's enactment of Chapter 78, L.2011, c.78 (amending N.J.S.A. 43:3C-9.5(c)). Plaintiffs argued that Chapter 78 created an enforceable contract that was entitled to constitutional protection against impairment. The Supreme Court granted the State's motion for direct certification to resolve important questions raised by this "apparent clash of constitutional provisions." After review, the Supreme Court held that the Legislature and Governor were without authority to enact an enforceable and legally binding long-term financial agreement through this statute. "Chapter 78's contractual language creates, at best, the equivalent of appropriations-backed debt that is accompanied by a strong legislative expression of intent to provide future funding. The legislative use of contractual terms in Chapter 78, when referring to the required schedule of recurring payments of the State's annual required contribution to the State public pension systems, does not create an enforceable long-term financial contract that can co-exist with the limitations of the Debt Limitation Clause and the related Appropriations Clause of the State Constitution. So long as Chapter 78 exists in its present statutory form, each year's appropriations act will reflect the present legislative and executive judgment as to the budgetary priority of this pressing need for which those branches will be answerable to the public and to the financial marketplace. It is not the place of this Court to dictate that judgment, for the Constitution has left such budgetary and political questions to the other two branches." View "Burgos v. New Jersey" on Justia Law

Employee was injured while working for Employer. Employee filed a workers’ compensation claim and submitted a report from a physician from whom she received an examination that was not authorized by Employer. The deputy workers’ compensation commissioner concluded that Employee suffered a permanent partial disability to her back and taxed as a cost against Employer the expense of the examination and report under the administrative rule governing the assessment of costs in a hearing. The district court affirmed, holding that the reimbursement was proper. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the reimbursement would be inconsistent with Iowa Code 85.39. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the commissioner may not tax the fees of a physician arising from the evaluation of an employee done outside the process set forth in section 85.39 as “costs incurred in the hearing” when the employee submits a written report of the evaluation at the hearing. View "Des Moines Area Reg’l Transit Auth. v. Young" on Justia Law

Employee was injured when he ran from a co-worker on the job site after tricking that co-worker. Employee sought workers’ compensation benefits. Employer and Insurer denied workers’ compensation benefits, asserting that Employee’s injury did not “arise out of” or “in the course of” his employment because Employer specifically prohibited horseplay by its employees. Employee petitioned for a hearing. The Department of Labor concluded that Employee’s injury arose “out of” his employment because, but for his work with Employer” he would not have been at the job site where he was injured, but that the injury did not occur “in the course of” the employment. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for an award of benefits, holding that the Department (1) correctly concluded that Employee’s injury arose “out of” the employment; and (2) erred when it did not consider the effect of the mandatory lull in Employee’s work when it determined that the injury did not occur “in the course of” his employment. Because Employee’s act of horseplay was not a substantial deviation from his employment, it occurred “in the course of the employment.” View "Petrik v. JJ Concrete, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a class action suit stemming from the workers' compensation benefits owed to class members under the Defense Base Act, 42 U.S.C. 1651 et seq., for injuries suffered while working for United States government contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan. Members of the class suffered lost limbs in massive explosions, suffered traumatic brain injuries from “concussive blasts, mortars, rockets, and bombs,” and developed post-traumatic stress disorder after witnessing “gruesome scenes of carnage.” The court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiffs’ class-wide tort claims in light of Hall v. C&P Telephone Company as well their Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961-68, claims because plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action under the statute and the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. 901-950, claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies; however, this dismissal does not preclude any individual plaintiff from bringing independent claims outside of the Base Act’s statutory scheme; with respect to the American with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., claims brought by three individual plaintiffs, the court remanded to the district court to reconsider and explain its denial of leave to amend the complaint. View "Brink v. Continental Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In 2006, Appellant was injured while working at Wal-Mart. In 2009, Appellant was injured while working at Warren Properties. Appellant filed a complaint against Warren Properties to recover compensation for her 2009 injury. The deputy workers’ compensation commissioner awarded benefits based on a finding of two successive injuries to the back and a shoulder injury and applied the full-responsibility rule with no apportionment for the preexisting disability. The workers’ compensation commissioner affirmed. The district court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the commissioner erred in failing to apportion Appellant’s preexisting disability that arose from the 2006 injury when calculating the benefits owed by Warren Properties for the 2009 injury. The court remanded to the case for a determination as to whether the 2009 injury resulted in any new back disability. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding that an employer who is liable to compensate an employee for a successive unscheduled work injury is not liable to pay for the preexisting disability that arose from employment with a different employer or from causes unrelated to employment if the employee’s earning capacity was not evaluated both before and after the successive injury. Remanded. View "Warren Props. v. Stewart" on Justia Law

In 2005, Merwin Carlson was injured in a traffic accident while hauling freight as a trucker under a contract with GMR. In 2006, Carlson filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits with Workforce Safety and Insurance ("WSI"), stating GMR was his employer. In response, GMR submitted a WSI form with employer information claiming Carlson was not its employee, but was an independent contractor. WSI issued a notice of decision finding Carlson was an employee of GMR at the time of the accident and awarded him benefits. GMR, through out-of-state attorneys who were neither licensed to practice law in North Dakota nor admitted pro hac vice at the time, requested reconsideration of WSI's decision, and argued Carlson was an independent contractor. Based on the additional information submitted, WSI issued a notice of decision reversing its earlier decision and denying Carlson benefits because it concluded he was an independent contractor rather than an employee of GMR. After Carlson requested reconsideration, WSI issued an order finding Carlson was an independent contractor and requiring him to repay disability and medical benefits previously awarded. Carlson requested a rehearing before an administrative law judge ("ALJ"). The ALJ recommended finding Carlson was an independent contractor and was not entitled to benefits. WSI adopted the ALJ's recommendation and the district court affirmed WSI's decision. Carlson appealed to the Supreme Court. In the meantime, Merwin commenced a federal court action against GMR, its owners, and its out-of-state attorneys alleging numerous claims for relief, including that GMR unlawfully failed to secure WSI coverage for him, and therefore GMR was liable for his work-related injuries under N.D.C.C. 65-09-02. The federal district court granted summary judgment dismissing the action, concluding Carlson had failed to plead or prove sufficient facts to maintain a civil action under N.D.C.C. 65-09-02. Merwin and his wife Denise then appealed the state court's grant of summary judgment dismissing their personal injury and loss of consortium action against GMR Transportation, Inc. Because the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the state district court did not err in ruling as a matter of law that GMR had not lost its employer immunity under the workers' compensation laws, it affirmed. View "Carlson v. GMR Transportation, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2008, Brandon Clark fell ten feet while working as a carpenter for Employer. Clark’s workers’ compensation doctor prescribed various drugs to treat Clark’s injuries, and Clark’s personal doctor prescribed additional drugs. In 2009, Clark died from the “combined toxic effects of the four sedating drugs detected in his blood with associated early pneumonia.” Clark’s family sought workers’ compensation death benefits, arguing that the medications Clark was prescribed for his work-related injuries caused his death. The workers’ compensation judge awarded death benefits to the family. The Court of appeal reversed, concluding that there was insufficient evidence that the drugs Clark was prescribed for his work injuries contributed to his death. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Court of Appeal wrongly applied a higher proximate cause standard to this wrongful death case than the Legislature intended; and (2) substantial evidence supported the WCJ’s finding that two drugs, prescribed by the workers’ compensation doctor for Clark’s industrial injury, contributed to his death. View "South Coast Framing v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Benedict Cosentino appealed an order that dismissed his claims against defendants-respondents Stella Fuller, John R. Magee, Jason P. Maldonado, William R. Ramos, and Robert B. Vargas based on the sovereign immunity afforded to Indian tribes and their officials. Cosentino was a table games dealer at an Indian tribal casino and Defendants were the five members of the tribe’s gaming commission responsible for licensing individuals involved in the tribe’s gaming activities and overseeing those activities. Shortly after he began working at the casino, Cosentino observed ongoing criminal activity on the casino floor. Based on his observations, Cosentino became a informant for the California Department of Justice and the information he provided lead to several criminal convictions. Defendants later sought to learn what information Cosentino provided the Department of Justice, but he followed the Department’s instructions and declined to divulge the information. Defendants thereafter revoked his gaming license and the casino terminated his employment because he could not work at the casino without a valid license. Cosentino filed suit claiming Defendants revoked his gaming license without cause and in retaliation for acting as an informant. Defendants specially appeared to make a motion to quash and dismiss, arguing sovereign immunity deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction because Cosentino based all of his claims on Defendants’ official actions as members of the tribe’s gaming commission. The trial court agreed and granted the motion. The Court of Appeal reversed: "[a]n official’s actions that exceed the scope of his or her authority are not protected. [. . .]Cosentino, however, presented evidence supporting his claim Defendants exceeded the scope of their authority by revoking his license without cause in retaliation against him. Sovereign immunity prevents us from inquiring into the reliability of information Defendants may have relied upon in revoking Cosentino’s license or any other errors they may have made, but it does not prevent inquiry into whether Defendants exceeded their authority by using their official position to intentionally harm Cosentino." View "Cosentino v. Fuller" on Justia Law