Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The case was an appeal by the Continental Cement Company (Continental) against a decision by the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission. The Commission had determined that Continental had acted discriminatorily towards one of its employees, Tara Otten, by paying her less than she would have earned had she been working, instead of accompanying mine inspectors during an inspection, an activity known as her "walkaround right".Otten was a miner and designated miners' representative who had been trained to operate mobile equipment. Normally, she would receive a higher wage when operating this equipment. However, when she was performing her walkaround duty, Continental had stopped paying her the higher wage. This action was directed by a human resources specialist at Continental, who based the decision on the collective bargaining agreement.Otten subsequently filed a complaint against Continental with the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA), and the Secretary of Labor filed a discrimination claim on Otten's behalf with the Commission. The Commission sided with the Secretary, agreeing that Continental had discriminated against Otten by causing her to suffer a loss of pay because she exercised her walkaround right. The Commission further held that Continental's decision was motivated by Otten's protected activity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, however, disagreed with the Commission's decision. The Court held that while Otten did suffer a loss of pay, which was a violation of the law, it did not automatically mean that Continental had discriminated against Otten. The Court clarified that discrimination occurs when an employer intentionally treats a person worse because of a protected characteristic. In this case, the Court found no evidence that Continental paid Otten less for the reason that she exercised her walkaround right. The Court, therefore, reversed the Commission's determination that Continental violated the discrimination law. View "Continental Cement Company v. Secretary of Labor" on Justia Law

In a dispute between Valley Hospital Medical Center and the National Labor Relations Board, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied the Hospital's petition for review, granted the Board's cross-application for enforcement, and enforced the Board's order. The court previously remanded the case to the Board to better explain its decision that an employer may unilaterally cease union dues checkoff after the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement. Upon remand, the Board reversed its prior decision, readopting its rule prohibiting employers from unilaterally ceasing dues checkoff after expiration of a collective bargaining agreement, and found that Valley Hospital engaged in an unfair labor practice. Valley Hospital contended that the Board exceeded its mandate from the court, which only authorized supplementing its reasoning, not changing its interpretation of the National Labor Relations Act. However, the Ninth Circuit held that its earlier mandate did not explicitly prohibit the Board from reconsidering its rule, so the Board was not bound by its prior decision. The court also found that the Board's new decision was rational and consistent with the Act. Thus, the Board's order was enforced. View "NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD V. VALLEY HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER, INC." on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that employers cannot unilaterally stop deducting union dues from employee paychecks after the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement. The case involved Valley Hospital Medical Center and Desert Springs Hospital Medical Center (collectively known as the "Hospitals") and the Service Employees International Union, Local 1107 ("the Union”). The Union and the Hospitals had entered into collective bargaining agreements that included checkoff provisions requiring the Hospitals to deduct union dues from participating employees’ paychecks and to remit those dues to the Union. After the agreements expired, the Hospitals ceased dues checkoff, arguing that the written assignments authorizing this did not include express language concerning revocability upon expiration of the collective bargaining agreement. They believed this omission violated the Labor Management Relations Act, also known as the Taft-Hartley Act. The Union filed unfair labor practice charges, and the National Labor Relations Board determined that the Hospitals had committed an unfair labor practice by unilaterally ceasing dues checkoff. The court held that the Taft-Hartley Act did not require specific language in the written assignments, so the Hospitals could not rely on that statute to justify their unilateral action. Consequently, the court granted the Board’s application for enforcement, denied the Hospitals' petition for review, and enforced the Board’s order in full. View "NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD V. VALLEY HEALTH SYSTEM, LLC DBA DESERT SPRINGS HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENT" on Justia Law

The case involves American Medical Response of Connecticut (AMR), a company that operates ambulances and employs emergency medical technicians and paramedics, and the International Association of EMTs and Paramedics (Union). The Union and AMR had a collective bargaining agreement that was in effect from 2019 through 2021. During the COVID-19 pandemic, AMR invoked an emergency provision in the agreement and cut shifts due to reduced demand. The Union raised concerns about AMR's actions and requested specific information from AMR to investigate potential grievances. AMR refused to provide some of the requested information, arguing that the emergency provision in the agreement excused it from providing the information during the pandemic. The Union filed a charge with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), alleging that AMR's refusal to provide the information violated the duty to bargain under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). The NLRB sided with the Union, and AMR sought review of this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit disagreed with the NLRB's decision. The court held that the NLRB was required to determine whether the collective bargaining agreement relieved AMR of the duty to provide the requested information. The court explained that the NLRA requires the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements, including those provisions that limit a union's information rights. The court expressed that the NLRB had put the cart before the horse by concluding that AMR failed to provide information before determining whether AMR had a contractual duty to provide such information. As a result, the court granted AMR’s petition for review, denied the NLRB's cross-application for enforcement, vacated the NLRB's order, and remanded the case back to the NLRB for it to consider whether the collective bargaining agreement excused AMR from providing the requested information. View "American Medical Response of Connecticut, Inc. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, the plaintiff, Taquila Monroe, was a former employee of Fort Valley State University's Head Start and Early Head Start department. She sued the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia (the "Board") under the False Claims Act's (FCA) anti-retaliation provision, alleging that she was terminated for reporting mismanagement and misuse of federal and state funds meant for the Head Start programs. The district court granted the Board's motion to dismiss, citing the Board's sovereign immunity. The central issue on appeal was whether the FCA's anti-retaliation provision abrogates sovereign immunity for lawsuits against states, and whether the Board is an arm of the state entitled to the same immunity.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court concluded that Congress did not unequivocally express its intent to subject states to suits under the FCA's anti-retaliation provision, and therefore did not abrogate sovereign immunity. The court also held that the Board is an arm of the state and thus entitled to sovereign immunity. In reaching these conclusions, the court considered how Georgia law defines the Board, the degree of control the state exercises over the Board, the Board's source of funding, and who would be responsible for a judgment against the Board. The court found that all of these factors pointed to the Board being an arm of the state that is entitled to sovereign immunity. View "Monroe v. Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the decision of the lower court, granting a writ of mandamus to Cassens Corp., a self-insuring employer, against the Industrial Commission of Ohio. The case involved an employee, Luis Ybarra, who was injured on the job when he was struck by a vehicle driven by a coworker who had failed to clear the snow and ice from the windshield. The Commission had found that Cassens Corp. violated a specific safety requirement (VSSR) and granted an application for an additional workers' compensation award. Cassens Corp. sought a writ of mandamus to compel the Commission to vacate its order. The Supreme Court of Ohio held that the Commission erred in finding that the outdoor yard where Ybarra was injured constituted a "workshop" under the applicable administrative code. Therefore, the company could not have committed a VSSR under the code. As a result, Cassens Corp. was entitled to a writ of mandamus ordering the Commission to vacate its decision and refund all additional compensation paid by Cassens Corp. in accordance with the Commission's order. View "State ex rel. Cassens Corp. v. Indus. Comm." on Justia Law

In the case before the Nebraska Supreme Court, Kathryn Wright was employed as a customer service agent for Southwest Airlines Co. (Southwest). In her volunteer role on a workplace social committee, she was found to have not kept adequate records of expenditures and to have spent committee funds for personal purposes. Consequently, Southwest terminated her employment. Wright then applied for unemployment insurance benefits, which were initially granted by the Nebraska Department of Labor (DOL) adjudicator. However, this decision was overturned by the DOL appeal tribunal, disqualifying her from receiving unemployment benefits for the week of the discharge and the 14 weeks thereafter. The district court affirmed this decision and Wright appealed.The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that Wright had committed misconduct connected with her work under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-628.10 (Reissue 2021). The court found that Wright's failure to keep a ledger and maintain supporting documentation for all committee expenses was misconduct connected with her work, regardless of the fact that her work on the committee was volunteer and separate from her paid job duties. The court also disagreed with Wright's argument that the committee funds were not Southwest's but her coworkers'. The court reasoned that the funds were contributed to the committee organized, promoted, supported, and regulated by Southwest, which had an interest in ensuring that the funds were spent appropriately. Therefore, Wright's failure to follow the rules harmed Southwest and was misconduct connected with her work. View "Wright v. Southwest Airlines Co." on Justia Law

The case involves Nathan Jackson, a detention officer with the Los Angeles Police Department, who was suspended for 10 days due to several misconduct charges. These charges included reporting late for duty, reporting unfit for duty, leaving his post without authorization, and refusing to provide a doctor's note as directed. Jackson appealed his suspension to the Board of Civil Service Commissioners, which upheld the suspension. He then filed a petition for writ of administrative mandate in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, asking the court to set aside his suspension and award him back pay.The superior court granted the petition in part, setting aside the suspension but upholding the findings on three of the four counts. The court also ordered the Board to reconsider whether the City's amendment of one of the counts after initial notice of proposed discipline prejudiced Jackson's defense and entitled him to back pay. The court also ordered the Board to reconsider the appropriate penalty.Jackson appealed the judgment, arguing that substantial evidence did not support the findings on any of the counts and that he was entitled to back pay as a matter of law. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, however, dismissed the appeal on the grounds that the superior court's judgment was not a final appealable judgment because it vacated the suspension and remanded the matter back to the Board for reconsideration, allowing Jackson an opportunity to challenge any ultimate adverse disciplinary action. View "Jackson v. Board of Civil Service Commissioners" on Justia Law

In the State of North Dakota, Dale Kringlie suffered a work-related injury to his right shoulder and wrist while using a concrete drill in April 2019. Workforce Safety and Insurance (WSI) accepted the claim and paid the associated medical expenses and disability benefits. WSI later issued a vocational rehabilitation plan for Kringlie, which he contested, asserting his inability to perform any of the jobs due to a neuropsychological condition. Kringlie sought the opinion of Dr. Swenson, who supported his claim. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) reversed WSI’s decision, basing his judgment heavily on Dr. Swenson's opinion. WSI appealed this decision to the district court, arguing that the ALJ erred by considering Kringlie’s functional limitations at the time of the vocational rehabilitation report issuance. The district court reversed the ALJ's decision, stating that WSI was only required to consider Kringlie's functional limitations at the time of his work-related injury. The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district court's decision, agreeing that the ALJ misapplied the law. The court held that the ALJ erred in considering Kringlie’s functional limitations at the time WSI issued the vocational rehabilitation report, rather than at the time of the work-related injury. Furthermore, the court ruled that the ALJ wrongfully relied on Dr. Swenson's opinion, which was not permitted under N.D.C.C. § 65-05-08.1. View "Workforce Safety and Insurance v. Kringlie" on Justia Law

In this case, the appellant, Bjay Nagel, who was employed as a caretaker by Sand Creek Country Club, broke his ankle while working. He had been drinking alcohol prior to the accident. The Wyoming Department of Workforce Services, Workers' Compensation Division initially awarded benefits but later denied further benefits after discovering that Nagel was intoxicated at the time of his injury. The Wyoming Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) upheld the Division's denial of benefits, finding that Nagel's intoxication was a substantial factor causing his injury. Nagel appealed the decision, claiming that the OAH's decision was contrary to substantial evidence, arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.The Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the decision of the lower court. The Court found that there was substantial evidence supporting the OAH's decision that Nagel's intoxication was a substantial factor causing his injury. The Court also found that the decision was not arbitrary or capricious because there was a rational basis for it, and the decision was in accordance with the law. Nagel's intoxication at the time of his injury was established by a blood alcohol content test which showed a level of .183%. Furthermore, an expert opinion was provided which stated that it was more likely than not that Nagel's intoxication was a substantial factor causing his injury. View "Nagel v. State of Wyoming, Ex Rel. Department of Workforce Services" on Justia Law