Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Department of Industrial Relations determined that plaintiff Vector Resources, Inc. failed to pay the appropriate prevailing wages to its workers on a public works project for the San Diego Unified School District. The Department's director's decision was based on regulatory language in a document entitled "Important Notice To Awarding Bodies And Other Interested Parties Regarding Shift Differential Pay In The Director's General Prevailing Wage Determinations," which was posted on the Department's Web site. The Important Notice addresses shift differential pay for various crafts used on public works projects, and was augmented by additional regulatory language in a "Note" that the Department placed on the cover page of prevailing wage shift provisions ("the Stamp"). Vector filed a declaratory relief action against the Department, seeking a declaration that the Important Notice and Stamp were invalid and unenforceable as "underground regulations" because they were not promulgated in compliance with the notice and hearing requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Vector and the Department filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted the Department's motion on the ground that under Government Code section 11340.9, subdivision (g), the Important Notice and the Stamp were exempt from the notice and hearing requirements of the APA because they were part of an overall prevailing wage determination process that constituted "rate setting." Vector argued on appeal that the grant of summary judgment to the Department was made in error because: (1) the Department admitted that the shift premium rule is a regulation; (2) the Department admitted that that regulation was not adopted in compliance with the APA; (3) the Department failed to prove that the shift premium regulation establishes or fixes rates within the meaning of Government Code section 11340.9, subdivision (g); (4) the court erred in failing to specifically cite the evidence it relied on to grant summary judgment; (5) the court's written order ignored the law and the admissible evidence; and (6) the Department's motion relied upon inadmissible evidence. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Vector Resources, Inc. v. Baker" on Justia Law

Petitioner New Hampshire Retirement System (NHRS) appealed a decision of the New Hampshire Public Employee Labor Relations Board (PELRB) denying the NHRS’s petition to modify the composition of respondent Local 1984 (a bargaining unit represented by the State Employees’ Association (SEA)) to exclude from the unit certain supervisory positions. The NHRS filed its modification petition looking to exclude from the bargaining unit the Team Lead, Public Information Officer, and Controller positions on the grounds that circumstances had changed and that the positions were now supervisory within the meaning of RSA 273-A:8, II (Supp. 2014). The SEA objected to the petition to modify, arguing that the circumstances regarding those positions had not changed to a degree warranting modification of the bargaining unit and that the positions were not otherwise improperly included within the unit. Following an evidentiary hearing, a PELRB hearing officer denied the petition to modify the bargaining unit. Specifically NHRS argued that modification of the bargaining unit under the changed circumstances was mandated by RSA 273-A:8, II, which prohibited supervisors and the employees they supervise from belonging to the same bargaining unit. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed that the change in the contested positions to “supervisors-in-fact” constituted a material change in circumstances warranting modification of the unit. The Court reversed the PELRB and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Appeal of New Hampshire Retirement System" on Justia Law

Two individuals (Claimants) who sustained work-related injuries received workers’ compensation benefits. Claimants sought additional benefits as a result of further symptoms related to their original workplace injuries and timely requested that the new diagnoses be added to their original claims. In both cases, however, denials of compensability and/or medical treatment required extensive litigation through the workers’ compensation system. The Supreme Court ultimately found Claimants to be entitled to the compensability ruling/medical treatment they had requested, but as a result of the litigation delays, Claimants’ requests for permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits associated with the newly added diagnoses were denied by the workers’ compensation system as untimely filed. The Supreme Court reversed the rulings of the Board of Review denying Claimants’ PPD evaluation requests as untimely and remanded, holding (1) Claimants’ requests for a PPD evaluation were timely pursuant to W. Va. Code 23-4-16(a)(2); and (2) to hold otherwise would effectively deny Claimants their statutory rights to receive a permanent disability evaluation and to be compensated for their workplace injuries. Remanded. View "Hammons v. W. Va. Office of Ins. Comm’r" on Justia Law

At the time that Claimant suffered a compensable work-related injury to his left knee, Liberty Mutual Insurance Group (Liberty Mutual) was the workers’ compensation insurance carrier for Claimant’s employer (Employer). Claimant subsequently suffered a compensable work-related injury to his right knee. At the time, Chubb & Son (Chubb) was the workers’ compensation insurance carrier for Employer. Claimant was scheduled to have bilateral knee replacement surgery, but the two insurance carriers disagreed about who would pay for Claimant’s temporary total disability benefits. After a hearing, the Workers’ Compensation Commissioner required Liberty Mutual to reimburse Chubb for one half of Claimant’s temporary total disability benefits. The Workers’ Compensation Review Board and the Appellate Court affirmed. Liberty Mutual appealed, claiming that the Commissioner lacked the statutory authority to order the reimbursement to Chubb. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, given the unique factual circumstances of this case, the Commissioner had the authority to order the reimbursement pursuant to the relapse statute, Conn. Gen. Stat. 31-307b. View "Gill v. Brescome Barton, Inc." on Justia Law

The State Commission for Human Rights brought an action on behalf of an employee who alleged that her employer’s racist and insensitive remarks created a hostile work environment. The Commission ultimately found that the employee did not suffer a hostile work environment, but it denied the employer’s request for attorney’s fees. The employer appealed on the issue the fees, arguing that it was entitled to fees as the prevailing party and because it raised affirmative defenses under the Alaska and United States Constitutions. After review of the specific facts entered on the Commission's record, the Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed the Commission’s denial of fees. View "Ace Delivery & Moving, Inc. v. Alaska State Commission for Human Rights" on Justia Law

Appellant, a deputy sheriff at the Cass County sheriff’s office, was suspended for ten days. Appellant filed a grievance on his suspension. The Cass County Merit Commission affirmed the actions of the sheriff’s office. Forty-two days from the date the Commission orally announced its decision, Appellant filed a petition in error with the Cass County District Court. The notice of appeal was filed seventeen days after the date the Commission’s decision was faxed and mailed to Appellant’s counsel. The district court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that the appeal was not filed within the thirty-day time period. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) although decisions rendered by an inferior tribunal, board or commission are typically final when they are announced on the record, Neb. Rev. Stat. 23-1734 - which requires that the order must be in writing, certified to the sheriff, and delivered - overrides that general rule; and (2) pursuant to section 23-1734, the appeal was timely. Remanded. View "Schaffer v. Cass County" on Justia Law

Nurses employed by the Department of Veterans Affairs claimed entitlement to overtime pay under 38 U.S.C. 7453(e)(1), which requires the agency to compensate “officially ordered or approved” overtime work. The Claims Court dismissed because the nurses did not allege that the agency “expressly directed” their overtime. The Federal Circuit reversed and remanded. The statute does not require the official order or approval to be in any particular form, and the agency has not enacted any regulation interpreting the statute as mandating any particular procedure that must be followed to qualify for overtime pay. The words “officially ordered or approved” in section 453(e)(1) should have the same meaning as the same words which appear in the Federal Employee Pay Act, 5 U.S.C. 5542(a), which authorizes overtime pay generally for federal employees not covered by other specific statutes, The nurses allege the agency has “knowledge” that they work overtime “on a recurring and involuntary basis,” and that the agency ordered or approved such work through “expectation, requirement, and inducement.” Those allegations state a claim upon which relief may be granted under previous interpretation of the phrase “officially ordered or approved.” View "Mercier v. United States" on Justia Law

Randy Ellington owned and operated R&J Cabinets as a sole proprietorship. When Ellington received a work-related injury, R&J had no employees. Kentucky Employers’ Mutual Insurance (KEMI) had previously issued a workers’ compensation policy to Ellington and R&J as “insureds.” At the same time, the policy included a specific exclusion from coverage of Ellington as the sole proprietor. KEMI denied Ellington’s claim for benefits, arguing that it was not covered because of the sole-proprietor exclusion endorsement. An administrative law judge concluded that Ellington was not covered by the policy. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding the policy was ambiguous and construing it in Ellington’s favor to provide coverage for his injuries. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the policy, as issued, is not a personal policy but rather a business policy purchased by a sole proprietor, and Ellington, as the sole proprietor, was not entitled to benefits under the policy. View "Ky. Employers Mut. Ins. v. Ellington" on Justia Law

Appellee was injured when a horse she was exercising at Gardens Glen Farm (Appellant) rolled over on her. Appellee negotiated a lump sum settlement with Appellant, which reflected a twenty-nine percent impairment rating and a return to work factor of 1.5509453. Appellee later moved to reopen, alleging that her occupations disability was worsening. The motion was sustained. An administrative law judge (ALJ) determined that Appellee showed a worsening of her condition and calculated credit for money paid to Appellee pursuant to the settlement. Appellant appealed, arguing that the ALJ erred by refusing to give it a dollar for dollar credit based on the lump sum settlement. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the ALJ did not err in calculating the credit owed to Appellant. View "Gardens Glen Farm v. Balderas" on Justia Law

Taylor Stumbo received an injury during the course of his employment with the City of Ashland. An administrative law judge (ALJ) determined that Stumbo was permanently and totally disabled. The City appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Board. The Board vacated the ALJ’s opinion and remanded for additional findings of fact regarding the extent and duration of Stumbo’s disability. The court of appeals affirmed the Board. Both parties appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence to support the ALJ’s finding of permanent total disability; and (2) this matter must be remanded to the ALJ to make appropriate factual findings. View "City of Ashland v. Stumbo" on Justia Law