Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Larry Myers, a sales associate, worked at Outdoor Express, Inc., a recreational vehicle dealership. Myers received no pay if no sales were finalized during the preceding two-week period. Myers filed claims for, and received, unemployment compensation benefits for periods when he did not receive commission checks for sales of recreational vehicles. A deputy commissioner with Workforce West Virginia subsequently determined that the benefits were to be repaid by Myers, finding that Myers was neither totally nor partially unemployed during various periods between November 29, 2008 and March 17, 2012, and was, therefore, ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits. The circuit court affirmed the administrative decision and directed that Myers pay back $39,713 in benefits he received for the periods in question. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding (1) the circuit court correctly found that Myers was ineligible to receive unemployment compensation benefits because he was neither totally nor partially unemployed during the periods in question; but (2) the $39,713 was improperly calculated based on the statute of limitations pertaining to the overpayments in this case. View "Myers v. Outdoor Express, Inc." on Justia Law

Geteway Taxi Management, d/b/a Laclede Cab Company (Laclede), operated a taxi service in the St. Louis metropolitan area. The Division of Employment Security determined that Laclede was liable for unemployment tax because its taxi drivers performed services for “wages” in the “employment” of Laclede. under Mo. Rev. Stat. 288.034.5. The appeals tribunal reversed. The Labor and Industrial Relations Commission (LIRC) reversed, finding that the taxi drivers were “employees” of Laclede under Mo. Rev. Stat. 288.034.5. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was competent and substantial evidence on the record to support LIRC’s decision that Laclede’s drivers were employees of Laclede. View "Gateway Taxi Mgmt. v. Div. of Employment Sec." on Justia Law

Jonathan Piper, who was convicted and imprisoned for burglary, was transferred to Casa Grande Traditional Housing, which was operated by Nevada Department of Corrections (NDOC) for offenders participating in NDOC’s work release program, to serve out the remainder of his sentence. Washworks Rainbow, LLC hired Piper to work at its car wash. Piper was severely injured during the course of his employment. York Claims Services, Inc., Washworks’ workers’ compensation insurance provider, denied coverage, asserting that NDOC was financially responsible for Piper’s workers’ compensation coverage under its own insurance program. An appeals officer found York liable for Piper’s workers’ compensation coverage. The district court set aside the decision of the appeals officer, concluding that NDOC was responsible for Piper’s workers’ compensation coverage pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 616B.028(1). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 616B.082(1) does not apply to offenders like Piper, who are participating in the work release program. View "Nev. Dep't of Corr. v. York Claims Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

Patricia Wheeler was employed by Cinna Bakers, Westside Casino, and Get ’N’ Go and held the three separate jobs concurrently. Wheeler was injured in the course of her employment with Cinna Bakers, which rendered her unable to work at any of her jobs. Cinna Bakers and its insurance company (together, Cinna Bakers) accepted Wheeler’s injuries as compensable but disputed whether all three of Wheeler’s concurrent employments should not be aggregated to calculate her Average Weekly Wage (AWW). An administrative law judge determined that only Wheeler’s wage from Cinna Bakers could be utilized to calculate her AWW. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) South Dakota law allows for the aggregation of wages when an injury at one employment renders the worker incapable of performing that employee’s other concurrently held employments; and (2) the Court is persuaded to adopt the “growing minority rule,” which allows for aggregation of wages from all concurrently held employments, not just similar or related employments. View "Wheeler v. Cinna Bakers LLC" on Justia Law

The Back Pay Act, 5 U.S.C. 5596(b)(1), authorizes back pay awards to employees "affected by an unjustified or unwarranted personnel action." At issue was whether Customs and Border Protection must provide a border guard, whom an arbitrator found was wrongfully denied an overtime opportunity in violation of the agency's assignment policy, with monetary compensation under the Act or whether Customs must provide the next available overtime opportunity under the agency's assignment policy. Customs argues that the Act limits the guard's remedy to the terms of the assignment policy but the Authority rejected the agency's reading of subsection (b)(4) and ruled that even if the Act limits awards to the terms of the agency's assignment policy, that policy was inapplicable in this case because it applies only in situations involving administrative error and the arbitrator had concluded that the denial of overtime was "more than a mere mistake." Customs petitioned for review. The court agreed with the Authority that it lacks jurisdiction to review the Authority's final orders. Section 7123 of the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute, 5 U.S.C. 7123(a)(1), vests the court with jurisdiction to review the Authority's final orders "other than an order...involving an award by an arbitrator." Because no exception applies, the court dismissed the petition. View "DHS v. FLRA" on Justia Law

Robles worked collecting food grease from restaurants until his 2010 termination. Robles’s supervisor cited Robles’s attempt to buy shoes at the Red Wing store, where employees can use an annual $150 shoe allowance. Robles asked the clerk to measure his friend’s foot because he “intended to give it to my friend.” Robles reasoned that he had shoes and his friend needed them. The clerk told Robles “that was not possible.” Robles believes there was a misunderstanding of policy but no misconduct. Robles sought unemployment benefits. The Employment Development Department’s record contained no employer information about the incident. The EDD’notice stated that Robles’s claim was denied because he “broke a reasonable employer rule.” Robles appealed, stating his employer did not cite any specific rule, that he was not aware of any such rule, and that he did not obtain an improper benefit or cause his employer any harm. Despite being twice ordered to do by the trial court, EED continued to refuse to award benefits. The court of appeal affirmed the court’s most recent response to Robles’s motion to enforce writ of administrative mandate,ordering EDD “to pay withheld federal extension benefits, costs and interest in the amount of $45,560.39, within 30 days.” View "Robles v. Emp't Dev. Dept." on Justia Law

Ortiz, working for a concrete products manufacturer, was in a sand storage bin trying to scrape its wall, when he sank and was engulfed by sand up to his neck. Workers tried to dig him out. Plant manager MacKenzie was notified within 10 minutes. He decided there was no emergency and left the scene. Rescue efforts were not progressing; Ortiz asked the workers to call 911. No one did. Eventually, MacKenzie called 911. The Fire Department’s Technical Rescue Team arrived within minutes. Ortiz had been trapped for 90 minutes. Using a vacuum truck to remove the sand, the team extricated Ortiz in about four hours. He sustained serious injuries to his lower body. The bin is a “permit-required confined space.” OSHA requires “procedures for summoning rescue and emergency services, for rescuing entrants … and for preventing unauthorized personnel from attempting a rescue.” The plan must specify that emergency services are to be summoned immediately and forbid others to attempt rescue. Other regulations require danger signs and a protective barrier. An OSHA inspector cited the employer for three “serious” and one “willful” violation, 29 U.S.C. 666. An ALJ imposed a penalty of $70,000. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review that challenged the finding of the willful violation and the finding of violation of the requirement of a barrier. View "Dukane Precast, Inc. v. Perez" on Justia Law

Petitioners were active and retired members of the Public Employee Retirement System (PERS) who challenged two legislative amendments aimed at reducing the cost of retirement benefits: Senate Bill (SB) 822 (2013), and SB 861 (2013). Petitioners raised numerous challenges to the amendments but primarily argued that the amendments impaired their contractual rights and therefore violated the state Contract Clause, Article I, section 21, of the Oregon Constitution, and the federal Contract Clause, Article I, section 10, clause 1, of the United States Constitution. "Although there is no doubt that the legislature passed SB 822 and SB 861 to address legitimate public policy concerns and with an appropriate sensitivity to the impact that the amendments would have on retirees, those concerns do not establish a defense to the contractual impairment that the amendments effect. The public purpose defense that respondents ask [the Oregon Supreme Court] to recognize imposes a high bar to justify the state’s impairment of a state contract, like PERS, and the record in this case does not meet that standard. We therefore hold that respondents constitutionally may cease the income tax offset payments to nonresidents as set out in SB 822 and that respondents also constitutionally may apply the COLA amendments as set out in SB 822 and SB 861 prospectively to benefits earned on or after the effective dates of those laws, but not retrospectively to benefits earned before those effective dates." View "Moro v. Oregon" on Justia Law

Before suing for employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) must “endeavor to eliminate [the] alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion,” 42 U. S. C. 2000e–5(b). Nothing said or done during conciliation may be “used as evidence in a subsequent proceeding without written consent of the persons concerned.” After investigating a sex discrimination charge against Mach Mining, EEOC determined that reasonable cause existed to believe that the company had engaged in unlawful hiring practices and invited the parties to participate in informal conciliation. A year later, EEOC sent Mach another letter stating that conciliation efforts had been unsuccessful, then filed suit. Mach alleged that EEOC had not attempted to conciliate in good faith. The Seventh Circuit held that EEOC’s statutory conciliation obligation was unreviewable. The Supreme Court vacated, noting a “strong presumption” that Congress means to allow judicial review of administrative action. EEOC’s argument that review is limited to checking the facial validity of its two letters falls short of Title VII’s demands; the aim of judicial review is to verify that the EEOC actually tried to conciliate. The Court rejected Mach’s proposal for specific requirements or a code of conduct as conflicting with the wide latitude Congress gave EEOC and with Title VII’s confidentiality protections. A sworn affidavit from EEOC that it informed the employer about the specific discrimination allegation and tried to engage the employer in a discussion to give the employer a chance to remedy the allegedly discriminatory practice should suffice. Should the employer present concrete evidence that the EEOC did not provide the requisite information or attempt to engage in conciliation, a court must conduct the fact-finding necessary to resolve that limited dispute. View "Mach Mining, LLC v. Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n" on Justia Law

Claimant Gina Poledna was employed by Thorne Research, Inc. (Employer). Her work required repetitive tasks, and over time she began experiencing pain in her wrists. She saw a physician who diagnosed her as having ganglion cysts in both wrists. Her physician stated that Claimant could return to work and recommended that she wear a brace. The physician saw Claimant again and noted that her pain “fairly well quieted down” and that she has “slight discomfort with excessive twisting . . . otherwise she can do what she wants.” Claimant’s wrist pain worsened, and she returned to her physician a few years later, who informed her that she had bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome and that her work caused the pain to get worse. After receiving that diagnosis, Claimant met with Employer and requested other work duties that did not require the repetitive motion of her current job. Employer told her that no other type of work was available. Claimant decided that she would quit her employment. She went on vacation on Thursday, December 19, 2013, and on December 30, 2013, she gave Employer a clinic note from her physician. Employer told Claimant that there were no light duty positions available. Claimant decided not to return to work with Employer, so her last day of employment was December 18, 2013. Claimant filed a claim for unemployment benefits, which was denied. She appealed to an appeals examiner. In a report prepared by Claimant's physician, the physician stated that he did not advise Claimant to “[t]ake time off from work,” to “[c]hange occupations,” to “[m]ove to another area,” or to “[d]iscontinue working.” He further stated that the only limitation of which he advised her regarding the kind, amount, conditions, or place of her work was that she was to wear a brace at work. Finally, he stated that Claimant could work full time. During the hearing, Claimant admitted that her physician never told her that she needed to quit her job. The appeals examiner issued a decision denying Claimant unemployment benefits because “there is no evidence in the record to suggest her medical condition made work impossible,” which Claimant was required to prove in order to establish that she quit work with good cause connected to her employment. Claimant the appealed to the Industrial Commission, which later upheld the appeals examiner’s decision not to reopen the hearing, and it concluded that Claimant voluntarily quit her job without good cause because she failed to prove that her job was unsuitable due to her medical condition. The Commission found that the medical records from Claimant’s treating physician were more credible than Claimant’s assertions. Claimant then appealed to the Supreme Court. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Commission. View "Poledna v. Dept of Labor" on Justia Law