Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Ricky Rhame filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits. The single commissioner found the claim compensable. Respondent Charleston County School District sought review, and the matter was heard by an Appellate Panel of the Commission. The Appellate Panel reversed, denying the claim. Petitioner filed a motion for rehearing before the Appellate Panel. He did not file his notice of appeal until after the Appellate Panel denied his motion for rehearing. The notice of appeal was filed more than thirty days after the Appellate Panel's initial denial of the claim. The court of appeals dismissed Petitioner's appeal because the notice of appeal was not filed within thirty days from the date the Appellate Panel denied his claim. The court of appeals held that motions for rehearing are not permitted before the Commission on review of a single commissioner's decision. After its review, the South Carolina Supreme Court held Rhame's motion for rehearing to the Appellate Panel was proper and stayed the time for serving the notice of appeal for thirty days from receipt of the decision denying the motion. The case was remanded to the court of appeals for consideration of Rhame's appeal. View "Rhame v. Charleston County School District" on Justia Law

Law Firm represented an employee in a workers’ compensation claim. Under a settlement agreement, the employee received a disability payment, part of which was earmarked as attorney fees. Defendant also agreed to pay the employee’s medical bills, which included bills from the University of Utah Health Care (Hospital). Law Firm sought to secure additional attorney fees from Hospital and filed an action alleging that it was entitled under a “common fund” theory to recover a percentage of the payments Hospital had received as a result of Law Firm’s efforts in pursuing the employee’s claim. The district court dismissed the action, concluding that the issue was a matter for the Labor Commission. The court of appeals affirmed. Law Firm subsequently asserted a claim before the Labor Commission against Hospital, again arguing for a right to recover fees on a common fund theory. An administrative law judge (ALJ) dismissed the claim, concluding that Law Firm had received all the fees it was statutorily due. Thereafter, Law Firm filed a further attempt at a common fund claim in the district court. The district court dismissed the claim, concluding that further litigation of the matter was barred by the doctrine of issue preclusion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the elements of the doctrine of issue preclusion were amply satisfied in this case. View "Davis & Sanchez, PLLC v. Univ. of Utah Health Care" on Justia Law

The Maryland Workers’ Compensation Act creates a presumption that certain disabling medical conditions are occupational diseases suffered in the line of duty and are therefore compensable. The statute caps those benefits, however. The retirement benefits at issue in this case derived in part from an optional retirement program offered by Baltimore County. The program provided that senior employees who opted to remain on the job be compensated with enhanced retirement benefits that could be taken in a lump sum upon retirement or in higher recurring retirement payments. The two retired firefighters in these cases participated in the program and also qualified for workers’ compensation benefits as a result of the special presumption for public safety employees. At issue in these cases was how the lump sum retirement payment was to be included in the formula for capping the retirees’ workers’ compensation benefits. The Court of Appeals rejected the methods proposed both by the retirees and by the County and adopted the approach by the Workers’ Compensation Commission in the Thiergartner case for converting the lump sum portion of the retirement benefits to a weekly figure. View "Baltimore Co. v. Thiergartner" on Justia Law

Under the “fifteen-year presumption” of the Black Lung Benefits Act, if a claimant has at least fifteen years of underground coal mine employment and a qualifying respiratory or pulmonary disability, a rebuttable presumption arises that he is entitled to benefits. After working for more than twenty-one years in underground coal mines, most recently for Petitioner, Respondent suffered a totally disabling respiratory impairment for purposes of the Act. Respondent filed this claim for benefits under the Act. The administrative law judge (ALJ) reviewing his claim applied the fifteen-year presumption, concluded that Petitioner failed to rebut that presumption, and awarded black lung benefits. The Fourth Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review and affirmed the ALJ’s finding that Petitioner had failed to rebut the fifteen-year presumption, holding that the ALJ’s determinations were supported by substantial evidence. View "Hobet Mining, LLC v. Epling" on Justia Law

A police officer’s employment was terminated for abuse of alcohol, sexually offensive remarks made to two female officers, and alleged dishonesty during the subsequent police investigation. An arbitrator concluded that terminating the officer’s employment was an excessive penalty and ordered the officer’s reinstatement. The superior court affirmed the arbitration decision and the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the superior court based on the deference that must be given to an arbitration decision. However, the Alaska Police Standards Council revoked the officer’s police certificate after concluding that the officer was not of good moral character and was dishonest. The superior court reversed the decision to revoke, substituting its judgment for the Council’s. The Supreme Court reversed the superior court, holding that the Council’s decision, like that of the arbitrator, was entitled to deference. The Court therefore affirmed the Council’s decision to revoke the officer’s police certificate. View "Alaska Police Standards Council v. Parcell" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs worked in the State Department as Diplomatic Security Special Agents and volunteered to serve one-year in Iraq. They arrived in Iraq in February 2004. Initially, their permanent duty station was in Washington, D.C., so they received “locality pay” in addition to base salary intended to equalize federal employees’ compensation with that of non-federal workers in the same geographic area, 5 U.S.C. 5301, 5304. Months later, their permanent duty station changed to the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad and they no longer received locality pay. Plaintiffs also received compensation for a significant number of overtime hours. In 2005, they returned to the U.S. After the Office of Personnel Management’s new regulations took effect, the plaintiffs received notices of a review of premium pay earnings involving Iraq, that “the rate of the annual premium pay cap that applies to you is $128,200,” that earnings to date “have already or will shortly put you above the cap for the current pay year,” and that the Department would seek collection of any overpayments. Each later received a letter requiring repayment of from $435.94 to $10,514.98. The D.C. Circuit held that the Department permissibly construed the statute and did not act arbitrarily in denying a discretionary waiver of the obligation to repay. View "Lubow v. Dep't of State" on Justia Law

Retired officers of D.C.’s Metropolitan Police Department were subsequently re-hired by the D.C. Protective Services Division, which protects government buildings and D.C.-owned property. They received pension benefits from their service with the Police Department and salaries for their jobs with Protective Services, but Section 5- 723(e) of the D.C. Code requires reduction of plaintiffs’ salaries by the amount of their pensions to prevent so-called double-dipping. Pursuant to that provision, D.C. reduced plaintiffs’ salaries by the amount of their pensions. Following a remand for consideration under the Fair Labor Standards Act, plaintiffs raised a claim under the Public Salary Tax Act of 1939, 4 U.S.C. 111(a)), which was rejected. The D.C. Circuit affirmed. The Public Salary Tax Act allows states and D.C. to impose “taxation” on compensation paid to employees of the federal government, only if the taxation does not discriminate against federal employees. The D.C. salary reduction provision at issue is not “taxation.” It does not raise revenue, but operates on the opposite side of D.C.’s financial ledger. It reduces D.C.’s total expenditures on salaries. View "Cannon v. Dist. of Columbia" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Frederick Morton and Walter Powers, Jr., individually and in his capacity as President of the Fraternal Order of Police, and cross-claimant the New Orleans Civil Service Commission (“CSC”) appealed the district court’s judgment upholding certain ordinances passed by the City of New Orleans related to paid detail for officers of the New Orleans Police Department (“NOPD”). The Fifth Circuit approved a Consent Decree entered into by agreement between the United States and the City of New Orleans; the Consent Decree was the product of a nearly year-long United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) investigation into the NOPD which “revealed longstanding patterns of unconstitutional conduct and bad practices and policies within the department.” As relevant here, the DOJ found that the structure of NOPD’s system of paid detail undermined the quality of NOPD policing and facilitated abuse and corruption by officers. To fix the problems associated with paid details, the Consent Decree required the City to “completely restructure” the existing system in which NOPD officers negotiated details and received payment directly from private employers. Morton and Powers alleged in their petition that the paid detail ordinances violated the federal and state Constitutions, and sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The district court held a hearing on plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, in which the CSC participated. The court denied plaintiffs’ motion, finding that the CSC lacked jurisdiction over NOPD officers’ paid detail work; the ordinances did not violate the state or federal Contract Clauses because, even if contracts between the officers and private employers existed, they were subject to approval by the Superintendent and the ordinances were a legitimate exercise of the City’s police power; and the ordinances did not violate Louisiana’s Anti-Expropriation Clause because NOPD officers working paid details were not a “business enterprise,” and, in any case, the OPSE, a non-profit entity, did not compete with any paid detail business. All parties proceeded to a three-day bench trial. Following the trial, the district court issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law and dismissed plaintiffs’ claims and the CSC’s cross-claim. Plaintiffs and the CSC appealed the district court’s rulings on all claims and further alleged that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the case. Finding no reversible error in the district court's decision, the Fifth Circuit affirmed. View "Powers v. City of New Orleans" on Justia Law

In 1996, the Mason County Board of Education and Michael Whalen, the then-superintendent of schools, entered into a settlement agreement in which Whalen agreed to forego the final year of his superintendent contract in exchange for a lump sum payment of $60,000. Whalen retired in 1997. In 1998, the West Virginia Consolidated Public Retirement Board, as administrator of the West Virginia Public Employees Retirement System, ruled that a $60,000 payment received by Whalen did not constitute “salary” and therefore would not be included when calculating his retirement annuity benefit. In 2001, Whalen filed a complaint in the circuit court that was, in essence, an appeal of the Retirement Board’s 1998 final order. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Whalen. The Retirement Board then filed this complaint seeking a writ of prohibition. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding that Whalen’s appeal was not filed within the thirty-day period specified in W. Va. Code 29A-5-4(bb), and therefore, the circuit court exceeded its jurisdiction in ruling that Whalen’s appeal was timely. View "State ex rel. W. Va. Consol. Pub. Ret. Bd. v. Hon. David W. Nibert" on Justia Law

Russell H., a twenty-four-year-old coal miner, died in his sleep from a seizure, leaving behind his mother (Petitioner) and his six-year-old daughter, L.H. Petitioner, on L.H.’s behalf, applied for dependent’s death benefits exactly six months after she received an autopsy report indicating that Russell’s cause of death stemmed from a work-related injury. The Workers’ Compensation Board of Review denied death benefits on the basis that Petitioner failed to file her application within six months after Russell’s death. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Board erred in finding that Petitioner’s application was time-barred because the first known medical evidence that Russell’s cause of death was work-related was not made available to the family until eight months after the death; and (2) Petitioner was a proper party to file for defendant’s death benefits on L.H.’s behalf. Remanded. View "Sheena H. v. W. Va. Office of Ins. Comm’r" on Justia Law