Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Claimant was injured when he fell while trying to cut a tree branch. Claimant filed an application for workers’ compensation benefits alleging that the injury had occurred while he was an employee of Appellee. The Bureau of Workers’ Compensation allowed the claim. Appellee purportedly appealed from the order of the Bureau, claiming that Claimant was not his employee at the time of the accident. The Commission concluded that Appellee’s appeal substantially complied with the statutory requirements for an administrative notice of appeal, accepted the appeal as valid, and referred the matter to a district hearing officer. A hearing officer disallowed the claim on the merits, concluding that Claimant was not an employee of Appellee. The Commission affirmed. Claimant filed a complaint for writ of mandamus alleging that the Commission abused its discretion in determining that Appellee’s administrative appeal was valid. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Claimant had an adequate remedy at law by way of an appeal under Ohio Rev. Code 4123.512 regarding the issues he raised in this case, he was not entitled to relief in mandamus. View "State ex rel. Alhamarshah v. Indus. Comm’n" on Justia Law

Claimant was injured at work and later applied for permanent-total-disability benefits. The Industrial Commission denied the application. Claimant later filed a second application supported a letter from his treating physician, Dr. Karl Metz. The Commission also submitted a report from Dr. Steven Van Auken. A staff hearing officer denied permanent total disability based on the two reports. Claimant filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus alleging that the Commission abused its discretion because it failed to consider additional restrictions placed on him in the two reports. A magistrate concluded that the Commission did not abuse its discretion by relying on the reports of Drs. Metz and Van Auken. The court of appeals adopted the magistrate’s conclusions of law regarding Van Auken’s opinion but issued a limited writ of mandamus ordering the Commission to clarify Dr. Metz’s opinion or to obtain additional medical evidence. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals abused its discretion in granting the limited writ because its decision was based on speculation that there was a possible conflict in Dr. Metz’s report that could be construed to bar sedentary employment, which did not, by itself, justify the issuance of a limited writ. View "State ex rel. Metz v. GTC, Inc." on Justia Law

Sophia Stevens slipped and fell at work in 1979. Thirty years later, Stevens filed a motion for permanent-total-disability compensation. Through a staff hearing officer, the Industrial Commission initially granted benefits, but the full Commission later reconsidered the staff hearing officer’s order and denied Stevens’s request. Stevens filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus alleging that the Commission abused its discretion when it exercised continuing jurisdiction and denied compensation. The court of appeals (1) concluded that Stevens had not met her burden of proof for mandamus relief on the question of continuing jurisdiction, but (2) determined that Stevens was deprived of due process when one of the three voting commissioners did not attend the hearing. Thus the court issued a writ of mandamus ordering the commission to conduct another hearing with all three commissioners present. The Supreme Court reversed and denied the writ, holding (1) Stevens I properly focused on Stevens’s burden of proof for mandamus relief; (2) this Court’s decision in State ex rel. Sigler v. Lubrizol Corp. requires reversal of the judgment in Stevens II; and (3) the Commission’s order denying permanent-total-disability benefits is supported by the evidence. View "State ex rel. Stevens v. Indus. Comm’n" on Justia Law

Elmore County’s decided to terminate employee, plaintiff-appellant Cherri Nix, without providing her a pre-termination hearing pursuant to the Elmore County Personnel Policy (ECPP). Nix filed suit alleging, among other claims, that Elmore County violated the ECPP and breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing when it terminated her employment without giving her a pre-termination hearing. The district court granted Elmore County’s summary judgment motion on the basis that Nix was an at-will employee subject to termination at any time and for any reason, and that Nix failed to show a contractual relationship with Elmore County that would entitle her to a pre-termination hearing. Nix appealed, but finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Nix v. Elmore County" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether the Superior Court abused its discretion by declining to exercise its mandamus jurisdiction to remedy various alleged violations of the Law Enforcement Officers’ Bill of Rights (LEOBOR). Petitioners-appellants Shawn Brittingham and Christopher Story sought mandamus relief for several alleged violations of LEOBOR while they were police officers with the Georgetown Police Department (GPD). Respondents-appellees Town of Georgetown, Georgetown Chief of Police William Topping, and Captain Ralph Holm moved for summary judgment. The Superior Court granted the motion, thereby denying Brittingham and Story’s petition. In 2007, Chief Topping issued an oral order prohibiting GPD officers from meeting or speaking with the mayor or members of the Town Council to discuss internal police business without first obtaining his permission and going through the chain of command. In spite of this order, seven off-duty officers met with a Town Council member at her home to discuss police department issues. Captain Holm learned of the meeting, and informed appellants and the other officers involved that they were being investigated for violating GPD Rules and Regulations. A written reprimand was offered to each officer. Rather than accept the reprimand, appellants elected to request a hearing as to the allegations made against them (namely, for insubordination) with the Criminal Justice Council (CJC). The panel found substantial evidence to support the insubordination charge. Chief Topping imposed discipline against appellants: Brittingham received a four-week suspension without pay and a fourteen-day reduction in rank, and placed on disciplinary probation for a year; Story received a two-week suspension without pay, a seven-day reduction in rank, and disciplinary probation of a year. The officers appealed to the Town's Disciplinary Action Appeals Board, which upheld the CJC panel. Appellants filed a civil complaint against appellees, claiming (amongst other things) a violation of their First Amendment rights. On appeal, appellants argued that the process afforded them did not comply with LEOBOR, and that their only remedy was a mandamus writ ordering vacatur of the resulting disciplinary decisions. Appellees responded that they did not violate LEOBOR, that Appellants’ claims are now moot, and that the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the requested relief. After review, the Supreme Court found that Brittingham and Story were correct that a technical violation of LEOBOR occurred, but the Court rejected their claims as to all other alleged violations. However, as to the one meritorious claim, the matter was moot because neither Brittingham nor Story were then-employed by the GPD, and because the relief they sought was not relief that was available to them in a mandamus proceeding. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Superior Court’s decision as to all claims but one, and as to that claim, the Court held that the claim was moot. View "Brittingham v. Town of Georgetown" on Justia Law

In 1998, Glenn Johnson suffered serious work-related injuries. In separate administrative proceedings, the parties contested the details and amounts of the lifetime workers’ compensation benefits Johnson was entitled to. Johnson and his wife filed the instant suit against his employer’s workers’ compensation insurance provider and related individuals and entities (collectively, Crawford), alleging that Crawford engaged in a plan to delay and deny benefits that the Johnsons were entitled to receive. Crawford filed a plea to the jurisdiction and motion for summary judgment, arguing that the Texas Department of Insurance Division of Workers’ Compensation had exclusive jurisdiction over all of the Johnsons’ claims because they arose out of the workers’ compensation claims-handling process. The trial court dismissed the Johnsons’ claims for breach of the common law duty of good faith and fair dealing and for violations of the Texas Insurance Code but refused to dismiss any of the other claims. The Supreme Court conditionally granted mandamus relief, holding that all of the Johnsons’ claims arose out of Crawford’s investigation, handling, and settling of claims for workers’ compensation benefits, and therefore, the Division had exclusive jurisdiction over the Johnsons’ claims. View "In re Crawford & Co." on Justia Law

The Union represents employees at the Anniston Army Depot. Clark is a bargaining-unit employee, but not a dues-paying union member. The Union learned that the Depot was assigning employees duties beyond their pay grade without additional compensation and filed a grievance on behalf of all bargaining-unit employees. The parties entered a settlement agreement that provided backpay. The Union was to notify Depot employees and gather information needed for claims. Though Clark had completed work above his pay grade, the Union failed to contact him. When Clark inquired about the settlement, a Union representative asked whether he was a member and told Clark he needed to join. Clark refused. The representative told Clark how to submit a claim. Clark complied. The Depot and the Union agreed to distribute $303,825 among 218 employees the Union had listed. The Union left Clark off the list and put only one non-member on the list. Clark filed an unfair labor practice charge with the FLRA, which alleged that the Union had violated 5 U.S.C. 7114(a)(1) and 7116(b)(8) by giving preferential treatment to union member. Before a hearing, the parties agreed that the Union would pay Clark $1,970, but 55 other nonunion employees would receive $200. Clark objected. The Regional Director approved the settlement; the FLRA General Counsel affirmed. The D.C. Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Such a decision is not a “final order of the Authority” subject to review under 5 U.S.C. 7123(a). View "Clark v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth." on Justia Law

The Festus City Council terminated Draper from his position as City Administrator six months into a three-year employment contract, after the election of a council member who was critical of Draper’s performance. The city had refused to reschedule or continue the hearing regarding Draper’s job performance. Neither Draper nor his attorney was present. Several witnesses testified. The council concluded that Draper had manipulated the evaluation process to choose an engineering firm to complete a road project; that Draper had authorized heating system repairs and the purchase of new windows without competitive bidding, in violation of Festus policy; that Draper had sent a memorandum stating that the sick-leave-bonus program had been abolished when it had not been; and that Draper had requested reimbursement for a hotel room he had paid for with his Festus credit card. The district court entered summary judgment, rejecting claims of violations of procedural and substantive-due-process rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983, a section 1983 conspiracy claim, breach of contract, and violation of the Missouri Administrative Procedure Act, Mo. Rev. Stat. 536.010-536.160. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The evidence supported the city’s decision to terminate Draper, so and that its decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. View "Draper v. City of Festus" on Justia Law

Petitioners, former employees of the City of Houston, filed suit against the Houston Municipal Employees Pension System (HMEPS) board members, asserting that the board members violated HMEPS’s enabling statute by requiring Petitioners’ continued participation in the City’s defined-benefit pension plan. The trial court found jurisdiction to be lacking, and the court of appeals affirmed. As provided by statute, the pension board has exclusive authority to interpret and supplement omissions in the statute and to determine all questions of law and fact pertaining to eligibility for membership, services and benefits. The board’s actions with respect to these matters are final and binding and therefore not amenable to judicial review. To defeat this jurisdictional bar, Petitioners asserted that subject-matter jurisdiction exists when the pension board fundamentally alters the terms of the statute without the City’s consent. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the claims because (1) the pension board acted within the scope of its authority in construing the term “employee”; and (2) Petitioners failed to assert viable constitutional claims. View "Klumb v. Houston Municipal Employees Pension Sys." on Justia Law

Grady Billick sought workers’ compensation benefits for a series of work-related injuries. Roberts Dairy, Billick’s current employer, contended that its liability for Billick’s industrial disability should be apportioned because Billick was previously compensated for his losses of earning capacity arising from previous injuries through settlements with previous employers. The Workers’ Compensation Commissioner concluded that Roberts’s liability for permanent partial disability benefits could not be apportioned under the circumstances of this case. The district court reversed, concluding that the Commissioner misapprehended the relevant statutes. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was no error in the Commissioner’s interpretation of the relevant statutes. View "Roberts Dairy v. Billick" on Justia Law