Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Dean Hildebrant was working as an HVAC technician at Central Wyoming College in Riverton when he fell from a ladder. The Wyoming Workers’ Safety and Compensation Division found that Hildebrant had suffered a compensable injury as a result of the fall. As part of Hildebrant’s treatment, his doctor recommended the implantation of a spinal cord stimulator in his back. The Division denied preauthorization for the implant. The Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) upheld the Division’s denial, determining that the implant was premature. The district court affirmed the OAH. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was substantial evidence in the record supporting the OAH’s determination that (1) the proposed treatment was causally related to Hildebrant’s compensable injury, and (2) implantation of a spinal cord stimulator was not medically necessary. View "Hildebrant v. State ex rel., Dep’t of Workforce Servs." on Justia Law

Defendant, a car dealership, employed or employs Plaintiffs as “service advisors.” Plaintiffs filed this action alleging, inter alia, that Defendant violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) by failing to pay overtime wages. The district court dismissed the overtime claim, concluding that Plaintiffs fell within a statutory exemption from the the FLSA’s overtime pay requirements for “any salesman, parts man, or mechanic primarily engaged in selling or servicing automobiles.” Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the courts must defer to the United States Department of Labor’s regulatory definitions. The Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the FLSA overtime claim and supplemental state-law claims, holding that, where there are two reasonable ways to interpret the exemption, and the Department has chosen one interpretation, the Court must defer to that choice pursuant to Chevron; and (2) because Plaintiffs did not meet the regulatory definitions, they are not exempt from the FLSA’s overtime wage provisions. Remanded. View "Navarro v. Encino Motorcars, LLC" on Justia Law

To establish entitlement to an award for violation of a specific safety requirement (VSSR), a claimant must show that there was a specific safety rule (SSR) applicable to the employer, that the employer violated that SSR, and that the violation proximately caused the claimant’s injury. Cathy Penwell was injured when her left had was crushed in a hydraulic press. Her workers’ compensation was allowed for various serious injuries. Penwell also applied for a VSSR award, alleging that her injuries were caused by her employer’s failure to provide adequate safety restraints under the applicable safety rule. The Industrial Commission, through its staff hearing officer (SHO), concluded that there was no evidence of a VSSR. Penwell subsequently filed a complaint in mandamus in the court of appeals. The court of appeals agreed with the SHO’s determinations and denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission did not abuse its discretion in denying a VSSR award, and the court of appeals did not reweigh the evidence or otherwise improperly review the case. View "State ex rel. Penwell v. Indus. Comm’n" on Justia Law

Appellee injured both thumbs in an industrial accident. Following a period of temporary total disability, Appellee returned to light-duty work and, later, to his former position of employment with no medical restrictions. Later that year, Appellee was terminated for violating work rules. Appellee’s physician subsequently placed Appellee on restricted duty, and Appellee applied for an additional period of temporary-total-disability (TTD) compensation. The Industrial Commission awarded Appellee TTD compensation, concluding that Appellee had not voluntarily abandoned his employment and that he remained temporarily and totally disabled. Appellee’s former employer filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus alleging that the Commission abused its discretion in ordering payment of TTD compensation. The Court of Appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was evidence in the record that supported the Commission’s finding that Appellee was entitled to TTD compensation. View "State ex rel. Viking Forge Corp. v. Perry" on Justia Law

Appellee, the former chief of the Westlake Fire Department, was suspended for thirty days without pay and demoted from the position of fire chief for violating Ohio Rev. Code 124.34(A). The trial court modified the penalty imposed by the Westlake Civil Service Commission by reversing Appellee’s demotion to the position of firefighter and ordering that Appellee be reinstated to the rank of captain. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a trial court, as part of its de novo review of a civil service commission’s decision pursuant to section 124.34(C), has the authority to modify the disciplinary measures imposed by the commission; and (2) the trial court in this case did not abuse its discretion by reducing the punishment imposed by the commission. View "Westlake Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Pietrick" on Justia Law

Attorney Daniel Faber filed a federal lawsuit on behalf of three assistant attorneys who alleged alleging gender discrimination in connection with their salaries. The Attorney General filed a motion to stay litigation pending resolution of his motion to dismiss the complaint based on an immunity defense. The federal district court entered a memorandum opinion and order granting the Attorney General’s motion to stay all proceedings, including discovery; the stay was lifted a few months later. Prior to lifting of the stay, Faber filed an Inspection of Public Records Act (IPRA) request in his own name seeking employment data for every attorney who had been employed by the Attorney General’s Office since January 1987. The records custodian of the Attorney General’s Office denied the IPRA request, stating that “[t]his request is being denied as these records involve a current lawsuit and appear to circumvent the discovery process and the current Order Staying Discovery (attached).” Faber filed a complaint for damages and a petition for writ of mandamus in the state district court against the Attorney General alleging that his IPRA request had been wrongfully denied. The state district court found that the stay of discovery entered by the federal court did not preempt the statutory rights granted to New Mexico citizens by IPRA, and that the Attorney General violated IPRA by denying Faber’s request. The court also issued a writ of mandamus ordering the Attorney General to comply and ruled that damages would be considered at a later date. Faber subsequently moved for an award of damages. The state district court awarded damages of $10 per day from the date of the wrongful denial to the date the stay was lifted and thereafter “damages of $100 per day until the records are provided,” and $257.19 in costs to Faber. The Attorney General appealed the state district court’s award of damages. The determination of the IPRA violation was not at issue on appeal. The issue in this case focused on what type of damages were authorized by the Legislature in Section 14-2-13 12(D). The Supreme Court held that Section 14-2-12(D) permitted compensatory or actual damages because the plain language, purpose, and history of IPRA indicated that neither punitive nor statutory damages were intended by the Legislature. The Court also held that Faber was not eligible for nominal damages. View "Farber v. King" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were employees of Employers when they each suffered compensable injuries. Plaintiffs were treated at two different hospitals. In each case, the hospital submitted a bill for its services to Employer. Employer paid each hospital in accordance with the cost assessment of a third-party bill reviewer, which in each case was significantly less than what had been billed by the hospital. The hospitals subsequently sought to have the workers’ compensation commissioner determine Employer’s liability for the hospital costs. At issue was whether Employer’s liability for the hospital services should be assessed on the basis of the commissioner’s determination of what it “actually cost” the hospitals to render the services, as provided under Conn. Gen. Stat. 31-294d(d), or on the basis of the hospitals’ published rates that they are required to charge “any payer” under Conn. Gen. Stat. 19a-646. The commissioner concluded that the two cases were controlled by Burge v. Stonington, in which the Supreme Court concluded that the “actually costs” language in the predecessor to section 31-294d(d) had been repealed or preempted in 1973 when the legislature first regulated hospital rates. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the public health scheme governing hospital rates for payers generally controlled the cases here. View "Caraballo v. Elec. Boat Corp." on Justia Law

The California State Personnel Board upheld Telish’s dismissal from his position with the California Department of Justice based on findings that he intimidated, threatened to release sexually explicit photographs of, and physically assaulted a subordinate employee with whom he had a consensual relationship. The essential issue was the admissibility of recorded telephone conversations between Telish and his former girlfriend and subordinate employee, L.D., which was received at the administrative hearing. The court of appeal affirmed denial of relief. A participant may properly record a telephone conversation at the direction of a law enforcement officer, acting within the course of his or her authority, in the course of a criminal investigation (Pen. Code 633). Section 633 does not limit the use of duly recorded communications to criminal proceedings. Although Telish contends the criminal investigation was a “sham,” the Board determined L.D. duly recorded the telephone conversations pursuant to the direction of DOJ in connection with a criminal investigation, and the Board’s finding was supported by substantial evidence. View "Telish v. Cal. State Personnel Bd." on Justia Law

Frank Corrente was employed by the City of Providence during two separate time periods. Following a federal investigation, Corrente was convicted of six felony counts stemming from his employment during the second time period. After a hearing conducted pursuant to the “Honorable Service Ordinance” (HSO) of the City of Providence Code of Ordinances, the Retirement Board of the Employees’ Retirement System of the City of Providence voted to reduce Corrente’s pension benefits. The Board then filed a civil action in the superior court requesting a confirmation of its decision. The mayor and the City of Providence were allowed to intervene. The superior court subsequently entered an order confirming the Board’s decision to reduce Corrente’s pension. The intervenors appealed. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that because this case was brought pursuant to the HSO and was adjudicated in the superior court prior to the enactment of R.I. Gen Laws 36-10.1-5, which vests the superior court with jurisdiction to review pending proceedings under a municipal ordinance, the superior court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and, therefore, the final judgment was void. Remanded. View "Ret. Bd. of Employees’ Ret. Sys. of City of Providence v. Corrente" on Justia Law

Employee filed a charge with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission contending that her employment by Employer had been terminated because she became pregnant. The Commission found that Employer had participated in a discriminatory practice in violation of Ohio Rev. Code 4112. Employer filed a petition for judicial review pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 4112.06. The common pleas court granted the Commission’s motion to dismiss, concluding that the petition for review was not timely served on the parties because Employer failed to properly initiate service by the clerk within thirty days of the date the Commission’s order was filed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Employer had one year to obtain service of a petition to review an order of the Commission. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Rules of Civil Procedure apply to proceedings initiated pursuant to section 4112.06; and (2) therefore, a petition to review an order of the Commission must be served by a clerk of courts on all parties who appeared before the Commission and on the Commission itself within one year of the date the petition was filed as required by Ohio R. Civ. P. 3(A). View "Hambuechen v. 221 Market North, Inc." on Justia Law