Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Grand River Dam Authority (GRDA) terminated the employment of petitioner Chester Rouse after several years of evaluations of inefficiency, incompetence, and misconduct, and after three significant events which occurred at its coal fired plant. Rouse appealed the termination to the Oklahoma Merit Protection Commission (OMPC) and then to the district court. The administrative appeal and the district court appeal each resulted in the affirmation of the termination. Rouse appealed to the Supreme Court, raising 16 issues of alleged error, some of which were found by the Court to be redundant, repetitive, related, or were not briefed on appeal. The Court consolidated the issues into four broader issues: (1) the trial court erred in its statutory interpretation of 74 O.S. 2011 section 840-6.5; (2) the trial court erred in determining that the reasons for termination were not pretextual or post hoc rationalizations; (3) the trial court erred in determining that plaintiff was estopped from challenging the level of discipline imposed (termination); and (4) its review of OMPC's ruling and the admission of certain evidence. After consideration of these issues, the Supreme Court found no reversible error, and affirmed the trial court. View "Rouse v. Oklahoma Merit Protection Comm'n" on Justia Law

Kruse, a Norfok train conductor, was injured on the job in March, reported his injury, and took leave until August. Shortly after he returned to work, Kruse was suspended for 30 days without pay for exceeding speed limits. Kruse’s union appealed under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. 153. Both the on-property investigation and the arbitration board concluded that Norfolk “was justified,” but reduced the suspension. While his grievance-related appeal was pending before the arbitration board, Kruse filed a Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA) complaint with the Department of Labor, claiming that his suspension was in retaliation for reporting his prior work-related injury. The ALJ ruled in favor of Kruse, denying Norfolk’s motion to dismiss based on FRSA, which prohibits a railroad carrier from retaliating against employees who report work-related injuries and potential safety violations, and provides that “[a]n employee may not seek protection under both this section and another provision of law for the same allegedly unlawful act of the railroad carrier,” 49 U.S.C. 20109(f). The Department of Labor’s Administrative Review Board affirmed and the Sixth Circuit denied review, reasoning that prior arbitration of a grievance under the RLA did not trigger the FRSA’s election-of-remedies provision. View "Norfolk Southern Ry. Co. v. Perez" on Justia Law

In March 2010, Herring was removed from her position as a cytotechnologist with the Department of the Navy. The Office of Personnel Management denied her application for disability retirement benefits. Herring received the relevant OPM denial letter on July 14, 2012. The deadline to file an appeal of the denial was August 13, 2012. However, because her attorney’s law office negligently failed to transmit to her attorney the documents submitted by Herring (while confirming to Herring that the necessary documents and payment had been received), Herring did not file the appeal until August 23. An administrative judge dismissed the appeal as untimely filed without good cause, and the Merit Systems Protection Board affirmed. The Federal Circuit reversed. The Board’s failure to consider a factor it has previously treated as significant to “good cause” indicates that the MSPB abused its discretion in its disposition of Herring’s petition. View "Herring v. Merit Sys. Protection Bd." on Justia Law

The City of Florence, the Civil Service Board of the City of Florence ("the CSB") and Keith McDaniel appealed separately a circuit court judgment after a jury rendered its verdict in favor of William T. Ezell. In mid 2011, two positions for promotion to the job of battalion chief became available within the Florence Fire and Rescue Department. Benjamin Cochran, Melvin Brown, Tim Clanton, John T. Muse, McDaniel, and Ezell applied for the positions. The CSB conducted interviews with the candidates on September 1, 2011. Afterward, it promoted Cochran and McDaniel to the two battalion-chief positions. On September 12, 2011, Ezell filed a two-count complaint against the City and the CSB in the Lauderdale Circuit Court. A month later, the City and the CSB filed an answer in which they denied Ezell's allegations. They also asserted that Ezell had failed to join certain indispensable parties. The City and CSB simultaneously filed a motion to dismiss count 1 of the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(7), Ala. R. Civ. P., arguing that all six applicants were indispensable parties. They then asked that count 1 of the complaint be dismissed or that Ezell be required to add Cochran, Brown, Clanton, Muse, and McDaniel as defendants. The trial court ordered Ezell to amend his complaint to make Cochran, Brown, Clanton, Muse, and McDaniel parties to the suit. Ezell amended count 1 of his complaint and also added the other applicants as defendants. The City and the CSB filed an answer to the amended complaint in which they denied Ezell's allegations and argued that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The jury returned the following verdict: "We are not reasonably satisfied that the decision of the [CSB] was correct and we find that the following 2 individuals should be promoted to Battalion Chief (pick two) ... Benjamin Cochran ... William Ezell." The trial court entered a judgment on the verdict and ordered that the status quo be maintained during the pendency of any appellate proceedings. The City, the CSB, and McDaniel filed posttrial motions, which the trial court denied. McDaniel appealed to the Supreme Court (docketed as case no. 1130372). The City and the CSB also appealed to the Supreme Court (docketed as case no. 1130373). Because Ezell failed to demonstrate that he had a right to appeal the CSB's decision, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to entertain his appeal. Accordingly, the Supreme Court dismissed these appeals with instructions to the trial court to vacate its judgment. View "City of Florence v. Ezell" on Justia Law

Three health care workers sued their hospital employer in this putative class and private attorney general enforcement action for alleged Labor Code violations and related claims. In this appeal, the workers argued that a hospital policy illegally let health care employees waive their second meal periods on shifts longer than 12 hours. A statute requires two meal periods for shifts longer than 12 hours. But an order of the Industrial Welfare Commission (IWC) authorized employees in the health care industry to waive one of those two required meal periods on shifts longer than 8. The principal issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review centered on the validity of the IWC order. After review, the Court concluded the IWC order was partially invalid to the extent it authorized second meal break waivers on shifts longer than 12 hours. However, with one exception, the retroactive application of the Court's conclusion had to be litigated on remand. The Court also determined the court incorrectly granted summary judgment and denied class certification. View "Gerard v. Orange Coast Mem. Medical Center" on Justia Law

Vernon Bailey injured his neck and back while working as a custodial supervisor. The Wyoming Workers’ Compensation Division awarded benefits to Bailey. When Bailey’s symptoms did not improve, a neurosurgeon requested preauthorization for a recommended discectomy and fusion because of neck pain. The Division denied the request. After a hearing, the Medical Commission upheld the Division’s denial of benefits for Bailey’s surgical spine issues. The district court affirmed the Medical Commission. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that substantial evidence existed to support the Medical Commission’s decision to deny Bailey further benefits for his cervical spine injury. View "Bailey v. State ex rel., Dep’t of Workforce Servs." on Justia Law

Carnice Hodge brought an action to appeal the Unemployment Insurance Agency’s determination that she was disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits under a section under the Michigan Employment Security Act (MESA) that disallows benefits for individuals discharged for work-related misconduct, after respondent U.S. Security Associates, Inc., terminated her employment as a security guard at Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport. Hodge was fired for accessing publicly available flight departure information on a computer near her post at the request of a traveler in violation of respondent’s policy regarding the unauthorized use of client equipment. An administrative law judge affirmed the denial of benefits, as did the Michigan Compensation Appellate Commission (MCAC), but the Wayne Circuit Court reversed. The Court of Appeals granted the employer's application for leave to appeal and affirmed, holding that the circuit court had not erred by concluding as a matter of law that claimant’s behavior was a good-faith error in judgment rather than misconduct. After review, the Supreme Court reversed, finding that the circuit and appellate courts applied an incorrect standard of review by substituting their own assessment of the seriousness of Hodge's conduct for the assessment of the MCAC. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the MCAC's judgment. View "Hodge v. U.S. Security Associates, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, who worked for United Parcel Service, Inc. (UPS) for thirty-two years, was diagnosed with diabetes in 1987 and with diabetic neuropathy in 1998. The diabetic neuropathy caused impairment to his arms and hands. In 2003, Plaintiff suffered injuries to his upper arms and hands in a work-related accident. After Plaintiff retired in 2008 he filed a claim for benefits. The Workers’ Compensation Commissioner apportioned the payment so that Defendants, UPS and its insurer, paid only for the proportion of disability attributed to Plaintiff’s occupational injuries rather than pay the entirety of Plaintiff’s permanent partial disability to his upper extremities and hands. The Workers’ Compensation Board affirmed. The Appellate Court reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a disability arising from a progressive nonoccupational condition - such as Plaintiff’s diabetes and diabetic neuropathy - that manifests prior to an occupational injury and that further disables the same body part is a compensable preexisting injury rather than a noncompensable concurrently developing disease under the apportionment rule established in Deschenes v. Transco, Inc. View "Sullins v. United Parcel Serv., Inc." on Justia Law

Duane Serrano was injured in a car accident while driving a truck within the scope of his employment with Provo City. More than four years later, Serrano quit his job. Serrano subsequently applied for permanent total disability compensation under the Workers’ Compensation Act. On remand, an administrative law judge (ALJ) found that the preponderance of the evidence showed that Serrano was permanently and totally disabled as a result of his accident and awarded him permanent disability payments. The Utah Labor Commission affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Serrano proved the elements of a permanent total disability claim; (2) the ALJ did not abuse her discretion by initially denying Serrano’s claim but then awarding benefits after the Labor Commission instructed her to reconsider the evidence; and (3) award of benefits should not commence on the date that Serrano was deemed to be permanently and totally disabled because of the extraordinary delay in resolving Serrano’s claim. View "Provo City v. Utah Labor Comm’n" on Justia Law

Amy Sawyer was a special education teacher for the Jordan School District. When Sawyer received a failing score for her second Jordan Performance Appraisal System (JPAS) evaluation, Sawyer was informed that she would be required to pass a third JPAS evaluation to keep her job or that she could resign in order to avoid the third evaluation. Concerned that if she were terminated that she would not find future employment as a teacher, Sawyer elected to resign rather than submit to a third JPAS evaluation. The Department of Workforce Services (DWS) denied Sawyer’s application for unemployment benefits based upon its finding that Sawyer quit her job without good cause. An administrative law judge (ALJ) upheld DWS’s decision, and the Workforce Appeals Board affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) good cause to quit is a fact-like mixed question of law and fact reviewed deferentially; but (2) the ALJ and Appeals Board applied an incorrect legal standard to this mixed question. Remanded. View "Sawyer v. Dep’t of Workforce Servs." on Justia Law