Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Tonya Denson, a member of the Employees' Retirement System of Alabama ("the ERSA"), and Venius Turner, a member of the Teachers' Retirement System of Alabama ("the TRSA"), brought this action on behalf of themselves, individually, as well as similarly situated members of the Retirement Systems of Alabama ("the RSA") against:(1) David Bronner, in his official capacities as chief executive officer and secretary-treasurer of the ERSA, the TRSA, and the RSA and (2) the officers and members of the respective boards of control of the TRSA and the ERSA, in their official capacities (referred to collectively as "the RSA defendants"). Plaintiffs argued the RSA defendants violated their fiduciary duties with respect to their management of their respective retirement systems, and investments of the plans' assets. The RSA defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, which the trial court denied. The RSA defendants then filed a petition for a writ of mandamus with the Supreme Court, asking it direct the trial court to vacate its order denying their motion to dismiss and to grant the motion. Upon review of the trial court record and arguments by the parties, the Supreme Court granted the RSA defendants' petition. The Court directed the trial court to vacate its order refusing to dismiss the complaint and to grant the RSA defendants' motion to dismiss: "The doctrines of sovereign immunity and separation of powers require that the judicial branch honor that delegation and not take upon itself the task of reviewing the investment strategies and decisions of the boards of control, at least not under the circumstances presented here." View "Ex parte David Bronner, et al." on Justia Law

The Lewis County Board of Education (Board) terminated Michael Holden’s employment as a school bus driver due to his physical inability to safely perform his job duties. Holden filed a grievance with the West Virginia Public Employees Grievance Board, alleging, among other things, that the Board’s denial of his request for a leave of absence was improper. The grievance board upheld the Board’s decision on all issues, determining that Holden was properly terminated and that his grievance on the leave of absence issue was not timely filed. The circuit court reversed, concluding that the Board improperly terminated Holden and that Holden timely filed his grievance of the Board’s denial of his request for a leave of absence. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s order and reinstated the grievance board’s decision, holding that the circuit court erred in (1) setting aside the grievance board’s decision, as the Board did not err in terminating Holden based on physical incompetency; and (2) finding that Holden did not timely file his grievance as to the leave of absence issue. View "Lewis County Bd. of Educ. v. Holden" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed a claim for workers’ compensation for her peripheral neuropathy that she developed due to toxic exposure to heavy metals at the workplace. The claim was ruled compensable. Petitioner subsequently began intravenous chelation therapy at her physician’s office, a treatment that was medically necessary to treat Petitioner’s compensable condition. Petitioner sought reimbursement for those medical expenses. An administrative law judge with the Workers’ Compensation Office of Judges concluded that reimbursement was appropriate. The Workers' Compensation Board of Review reversed, concluding that reimbursement for these medical expenses was precluded pursuant to West Virginia Code of State Rules 85-20-62.2, under which a claimant will be denied reimbursement for intravenous chelation therapy performed in an office. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 85-20-62.2 unreasonably denies reimbursement when such treatment is medically necessary, in contravention of W. Va. Code 23-4-3, and it is therefore invalid. Remanded for entry of an order directing that Petitioner’s reasonable expenses for medically necessary chelation therapy be reimbursed. View "Moore v. K-Mart Corp." on Justia Law

Linda Bell was injured at her job and underwent surgery for her injury seventeen months later. Bell requested temporary partial disability (TPD) compensation to reimburse her for the sick leave and vacation time she had used following her injury and before her surgery. The Industrial Commission of Arizona (ICA) denied the request on the ground that Bell did not had not taken time off work during the time period for which benefits were requested and that she did not miss any period of time over one week. The court of appeals affirmed on the ground that Bell failed to prove she had satisfied the waiting period created by Ariz. Rev. Stat. 23-1062(B). The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals’ opinion and set aside the ICA award, holding (1) the waiting period for compensation set forth in section 23-1062(B) applies to claims for all types of disability including both TPD benefits and temporary total disability (TTD) benefits; and (2) section 23-1062(B) does not require proof of an initial period of TTD but does require proof of seven consecutive calendar days of some type of work-related disability before an injured employee becomes entitled to compensation for any type of disability. View "Bell v. Indus. Comm’n of Ariz." on Justia Law

Yvonne Lovett was employed as a security guard for Delta Regional Medical Center. While on duty, Lovett slipped and fell. As a result of her fall, Lovett experienced injuries to her back and to her right knee. Months after returning to work at Delta, Lovett experienced dizziness and weakness and sought treatment. Subsequently, Lovett was diagnosed as having suffered a mini-stroke. Delta covered the costs of Lovett's related medical treatments and paid her disability benefits during the time in which she could not work. Lovett filed two workers' compensation claims based on the two events, which were consolidated. The administrative judge found certain subsequent medical expenses were not related to her employment and would not be covered. Both parties sought review by the Mississippi Workers' Compensation Commission. After review, the Supreme Court found that substantial evidence supported the Commission's finding that Lovett did not receive a thirty percent loss of wage-earning capacity. However, when the Commission reversed the administrative judge's finding, it failed to then consider Lovett's functional loss. The case was remanded for the Commission to conduct findings on Lovett's functional loss; the Supreme Court affirmed the Commission in all other respects. View "Lovett v. Delta Regional Medical Center" on Justia Law

While working as the municipal court judge for the town of Diamondville, Wyoming, Appellant slipped and fell on the icy outdoor steps of the town hall. Due to pain in her lower back, Appellant underwent back surgery in 2009. The Wyoming Workers’ Safety and Compensation Division paid for this surgery, along with temporary disability benefits. In 2011, Appellant experienced acute onset of pain in her lower back and left leg. Appellant underwent surgery for a herniated disk. The Division denied coverage for the second surgery, as well as temporary total disability benefits, on the basis that the recent back surgery was not directly related to the work injury. The Office of Administrative Hearings upheld the decision. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the hearing officer’s decision to deny benefits was supported by substantial evidence and that Appellant failed to show that the decision was arbitrary, capricious, or not in accordance with law. View "Newman v. State ex rel., Dep’t of Workforce Servs." on Justia Law

Claimant-appellant Terri Boyd-Davis filed for unemployment compensation on January 27, 2013, and began receiving benefits. IDOL claims to have mailed an "online review letter" to Boyd-Davis' listed address on March 6, 2013. The Online Review Letter indicated that Boyd-Davis had been selected to provide additional information concerning her unemployment insurance claim for the week of March 2, 2013. The Online Review Letter instructed Boyd-Davis that she would need to complete work search documentation online. The letter also indicated that failure to complete the online eligibility review by 5:00 p.m. on March 15, 2013, would result in the denial of her benefits. Boyd-Davis claimed she did not receive the Online Review Letter. When Boyd-Davis had not provided the requested information by the deadline, IDOL issued an Eligibility Determination on March 19, 2013, indicating that Boyd-Davis had failed to complete the online eligibility review and as a result was ineligible for benefits effective March 10, 2013. Boyd-Davis filed a protest. A telephonic hearing was scheduled for April 18, 2013. On April 1, 2013, Boyd-Davis provided the information IDOL had requested in the Online Review Letter. As soon as the requested information was provided, Boyd-Davis' benefits were reinstated for the week beginning March 31, 2013. However, benefits were not reinstated for the period of March 10 through March 30, 2013. Boyd-Davis proceeded with the April 18, 2013, hearing seeking restoration of her benefits for the period of March 10 through March 30, 2013. Following the hearing, an IDOL Appeals Examiner affirmed the original eligibility determination and concluded that Boyd-Davis' benefits had been properly denied. After review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings, finding that Boyd-Davis presented evidence that "would permit reasonable minds to conclude that the Online Review Letter was not received." The Court concluded that the Commission erred in its application of the presumption of delivery articulated in Idaho Code section 72-1368(5) of the online letter. Furthermore, the Commission abused its discretion in determining that Boyd-Davis was ineligible for unemployment benefits for the period from March 10, 2013, through March 30, 2013. View "Boyd-Davis v. Macomber Law, PLLC" on Justia Law

Joan Thrall appealed an Idaho Industrial Commission decision denying her unemployment benefits. The Commission concluded that Thrall was not entitled to benefits because she voluntarily resigned from St. Luke's Regional Medical Center without good cause. Thrall timely appealed, arguing that she was discharged and that St. Luke's failed to show the discharge was for misconduct. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded this case for further proceedings. Because the Commission's factual findings demonstrate that Thrall satisfied her burden to show that she was discharged, Thrall was entitled to benefits unless the discharge was for misconduct in connection with her employment, with St. Luke's carrying the burden to show the discharge was for misconduct. When the Commission mistakenly concluded that Thrall voluntarily resigned, it improperly placed the burden on Thrall to show that she was not discharged for misconduct. "Though the Commission's order includes a variety of statements regarding misconduct and Thrall's errors in the performance of her job duties, it is unclear to what extent those statements were a consequence of its misallocation of the burden of proof." View "Thrall v. St. Luke's Regional Med Cntr" on Justia Law

The Association of Administrative Law Judges, a union, represents the Social Security Administration’s administrative law judges in collective bargaining pursuant to the Federal Labor-Management Relations Act, 5 U.S.C. 7101. The Association and ALJs employed by the SSA sued, claiming that, by setting a goal that its ALJs decide 500-700 social security disability cases a year, the Administration has interfered with their decisional independence, in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 554(d)(2), 3105. The district court dismissed the complaint for want of subject-matter jurisdiction, holding that the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 precluded resort to the APA by creating remedies for “prohibited personnel practices” taken against federal employees, including “significant change in duties, responsibilities, or working conditions,” 5 U.S.C. 2302(a)(1), (2)(A)(xii), (b). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the remedy under the Administrative Procedure Act for interference with decisional independence does not extend to the incidental consequences of a bona fide production quota. View "Ass'n of Admin. Law Judges v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Appellant injured his back while working as a mechanic for Employer. Six days after the injury, Appellant returned to work with a note from his doctor restricting him to modified duty. Appellant quit his job that same day. Thereafter, Appellant applied for temporary-total-disability compensation. The Bureau of Workers’ Compensation denied Appellant’s request on the ground that he had voluntarily quit his job and had not reentered the workforce. The Industrial Commission refused Appellant’s appeal. Appellant filed a complaint in the court of appeals seeking a writ of mandamus. The court of appeals denied the writ, concluded that Appellant was not fired but had voluntarily quit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Appellant voluntarily abandoned his position for reasons unrelated to his industrial injury and in denying Appellant’s request for temporary-total-disability compensation. View "State ex rel. Hildebrand v. Wingate Transport, Inc." on Justia Law