Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

This labor dispute arose out of a negotiation between the State and other governmental entities (collectively, the State) and United Public Workers (UPW) regarding the renewal and modification of a collective bargaining agreement. The State and UPW failed to reach an agreement, and the case proceeded to arbitration. Because the parties were unable to select a neutral arbitrator, the Hawai’i Labor Relations Board (HLRB) ordered the American Arbitration Association to select the neutral arbitrator. Both parties challenged the actions of the HLRB. The circuit court affirmed the HLRB’s rulings. On appeal, UPW asserted that the circuit court had jurisdiction to resolve the dispute regarding the selection of the arbitrator. The Intermediate Court of Appeals disagreed, determining that HLRB had exclusive original jurisdiction under Haw. Rev. Stat. 89-14. UPW appealed, arguing that the circuit court had jurisdiction over the dispute regarding selection of the arbitrator under Haw. Rev. Stat. 658A. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the HLRB had jurisdiction to resolve the dispute over the selection of the arbitrator under chapter 89, as the arbitration was required by statute as part of the legislatively mandated process for resolving impasses in collective bargaining; and (2) chapter 658A was not applicable to this case. View "State v. Nakaneula" on Justia Law

In 2010, Gregory Sullwold died of a heart attack while exercising on a treadmill in his home. Sullwood was employed by the Salvation Army at the time of his death, and the Salvation Army permitted Sullwold to work remotely from home. In 2011, Sullwold’s widow filed a petition for award of compensation, alleging that Sullwold’s work resulted in his heart attack. The Workers’ Compensation Board granted the petition. A hearing officer reaffirmed the original order, finding that work stress was a major factor in Sullwold’s death. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the hearing officer (1) did not err in finding that the evidence triggered the presumption found in 39-A Me. Rev. Stat. 327, which provides that an employee covered by the Maine Workers’ Compensation Act must be paid compensation if he or she receives a personal injury arising out of and in the course of employment; and (2) did not erroneously shift the burden of persuasion to the Salvation Army in this case. View "Sullwold v. Salvation Army" on Justia Law

Martha Simpson, a doctor of osteopathic medicine, was employed in two state positions. In one position, Simpson and her employer contributed to the State Teachers Retirement System (STRS). In the other, Simpson and her employer contributed to the Public Employees Retirement System (PERS). Members of STRS who are also members in another state retirement system may combine their total contributions and service credits in determining eligibility for benefits. Under STRS statutes, a pension benefit is calculated by determining a final average salary, which is capped under certain conditions. Simpson filed an application for retirement benefits with STRS. STRS applied the cap to Simpson’s combined PERS and STRS salaries when calculating Simpson’s final average salary. As a result, Simpson’s pension benefit was decreased. After unsuccessfully pursuing an administrative appeal, Simpson filed this action in mandamus, requesting a writ ordering the State Teachers Retirement Board to recalculate her retirement benefit by not capping the PERS portion of her salary. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that because STRS administered the pension benefits for Simpson, STRS’s statutes must be applied to the entirety of Simpsons’s retirement contributions. View "State ex rel. Simpson v. State Teachers Ret. Bd." on Justia Law

The Bureau of Prisons terminated Kannikal on September 3, 1999. In 2001, Kannikal filed a formal complaint with the EEOC, but he did not receive an administrative hearing until 2006. Kannikal’s case was then held in abeyance because it was considered part of a pending class action complaint. In 2007, the Department of Justice informed Kannikal that his case would no longer be held in abeyance. Kannikal asked the EEOC about his case status in 2008 and 2009, but never received a response. He filed suit on March 28, 2012. The district court dismissed, citing 28 U.S.C. 2401(a), which provides that “every civil action commenced against the United States shall be barred unless the complaint is filed within six years after the right of action first accrues.” The court held that Kannikal’s cause of action accrued on October 17, 2001, 180 days after he filed his EEOC complaint, and expired six years later. The Third Circuit vacated, finding that section 2401’s six-year limitations period does not apply to suits brought under Title VII. View "Kannikal v. Att'y Gen. of the United States" on Justia Law

In 2007, the Industrial Commission allowed the claim of Donna Evert, the surviving spouse of Charles Evert (the Decedent), for death benefits. Evert then filed a motion requesting an award for the Decent’s use of his arms and legs prior to his death. A staff hearing officer denied the motion. More than one year later, Evert filed a motion asking the Commission to exercise continuing jurisdiction to rehear the issue. A staff hearing officer denied the motion. Evert asked the Commission to reconsider its decision. After a hearing with two of the three commissioners attending, the Commission denied reconsideration by a vote of two-to-one. In 2011, Evert filed a complaint in mandamus alleging that she had been denied due process of law when the absent commissioner voted on the motion for reconsideration despite not attending the hearing. The Tenth District Court of Appeals issued a limited writ of mandamus vacating the Commission’s order and ordering a new hearing, concluding that the Tenth Circuit’s then-recent decision in State ex rel. Sigler v. Lubrizol Corp. was depositive. Because the Supreme Court subsequently reversed State ex rel. Sigler v. Lubrizol Corp., the Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the court of appeals for additional consideration. View "State ex rel. Evert v. Indus. Comm’n" on Justia Law

In 2002, Ruth McCormick slipped and fell while working at a McDonald’s restaurant. McCormick received temporary total disability (TTD) compensation until 2010, when the Industrial Commission terminated McCormick’s benefits based on a doctor’s opinion that McCormick had reached maximum medical improvement. McCormick filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus, alleging that the Commission's decision to terminate benefits was not supported by the evidence, was contrary to law, and was an abuse of discretion because the doctor’s opinion that she had reached maximum medical improvement was factually inaccurate. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the doctor’s report that McCormick had reached maximum level improvement was valid evidence supporting the Commission’s decision to terminate TTD compensation. View "State ex rel. McCormick v. McDonald’s" on Justia Law

The State appealed a Superior Court’s ruling that legislative changes to the definition of "earnable compensation" applicable to members of the New Hampshire Retirement System violated the Contract Clauses of the New Hampshire and United States Constitutions. Plaintiffs and the intervenors cross-appealed the court’s rulings that members’ rights to retirement benefits do not vest until they accrue ten years of creditable service, and that members do not have vested rights to cost-of-living adjustments to their pensions. The New Hampshire Retirement System took no position on the legal issues raised in the appeal, but objected to the remedy sought by plaintiffs and the intervenors. After review of the parties' arguments, the New Hampshire Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s ruling on "earnable compensation," and affirmed its ruling on cost-of-living adjustments. View "American Federation of Teachers v. New Hampshire" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Ralph Nelson, the former town manager of St. Johnsbury, appealed a trial court decision granting partial summary judgment to defendants, the Town of St. Johnsbury and its individual selectboard members (collectively "the Town"), on his claims of wrongful termination; violation of procedural due process under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1983; violation of Chapter I, Article 4 of the Vermont Constitution; and promissory estoppel. In September 2010, the selectboard formally hired plaintiff as town manager after he served briefly on an interim basis. According to plaintiff, the Town's attorney advised him on three separate occasions that he could be removed only for serious misconduct, which the attorney assured was "an extremely high bar." As town manager, plaintiff undertook a major project to renovate and lease the Town's Pomerleau Building. He gained voter approval on a renovation budget and negotiated a lease with a potential tenant. The selectboard contended plaintiff made certain misrepresentations about the proposed lease, which plaintiff denied. Selectboard chair James Rust informed plaintiff that the board had concerns about his performance and gave him a letter stating that the board would be conducting an inquiry. Rust called plaintiff and notified him that the selectboard would be meeting but that plaintiff was not obligated to attend (plaintiff nonetheless attended). When the meeting convened that evening, the selectboard immediately recessed to executive session. After forty-five minutes, the board asked plaintiff to join them, at which time they discussed the lease. The selectboard asked plaintiff if he wanted to resign, and he declined. Consequently, the board returned to public session and passed a vote of "no confidence." According to plaintiff, he did not understand until that time that the selectboard was terminating his employment. Upon review of the parties' arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded on the trial court's dismissal of the wrongful termination, Civil Rights Act, and state constitutional claims. The Court affirmed the court's dismissal of the promissory estoppel claim and its grant of summary judgment on the qualified immunity defense. View "Nelson v. Town of St. Johnsbury" on Justia Law

The City of Horn Lake contracted with Phillips Construction Company and its owner Michael Phillips to work on a sewer project. Two employees of Phillips, Bertram Hill and David Mooneyhan, were working near the bottom of a trench that was seventeen feet deep when the walls of the trench suddenly collapsed. Mooneyhan was killed, and Hill was injured. Mooneyhan's beneficiaries and Hill (collectively "Plaintiffs") sued the City for Phillips' negligence under respondeat superior and also alleged that the City had negligently hired Phillips. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the City. Plaintiffs appealed. Finding that the City only acted in a supervisory role over the project, the Supreme Court concluded that was not enough to trigger a master-servant relationship for the elements of respondeat superior. The Court found that the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the City was proper, and therefore affirmed the judgment. View "Hill v. City of Horn Lake" on Justia Law

Flora worked as Luzerne County Public Defender from 1980- 2013. He became Chief Public Defender in 2010, maintaining a private practice. His predecessor had tried to secure additional funding by submitting weekly reports concerning excessive caseloads and staffing deficiencies. Flora obtained grant funding for representing juveniles, but was not able to obtain additional money for adult offenders. Flora reported that the existing level of resources did not allow the Office to provide constitutionally adequate representation. The County was unresponsive, so Flora refused representation to those not faced with incarceration. In 2012 Flora initiated a class action lawsuit on behalf of indigent defendants and sought an injunction to prevent his firing. The state court ordered the County to provide adequate funding and prohibited refusing representation to indigent defendants. While the parties were in mediation, the County approved new positions. The funding litigation followed the “Kids for Cash” scandal. From 2003-2008, about 50% of Luzerne County juvenile offenders appeared in court without counsel. Virtually all were adjudicated delinquent. Federal investigators uncovered that judges had accepted kickbacks from for-profit juvenile detention facilities to send unrepresented juveniles to those facilities. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court ordered vacatur and expungement of thousands of delinquency adjudications. Flora alleges that, in 2013, he learned that 3,000 adjudications had not been expunged and reported the matter. Flora was relieved of his duties. Flora sued, alleging retaliation for his funding lawsuit and for reporting noncompliance with the expungement order. The district court dismissed. The Third Circuit vacated, finding that, under the Supreme Court’s 2014 decision, Lane v. Franks, Flora pled facts sufficient to allege that he spoke as a citizen. View "Flora v. County of Luzerne" on Justia Law