Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In the case between the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and Bannum Place of Saginaw, LLC and Bannum, Inc., the court ruled in favor of the NLRB.Bannum Place of Saginaw, a provider of reentry services for formerly incarcerated individuals, had been found to have engaged in unfair labor practices, including the termination of two union supporters. The NLRB sought enforcement of its decision to award specific backpay amounts to the two affected employees. Bannum contested this decision, arguing that Bannum, Inc. and Bannum Place of Saginaw were not a single employer and that the backpay calculation was erroneous.The court, however, upheld the NLRB's decision, noting that substantial evidence supported the finding that Bannum, Inc. and Bannum Place of Saginaw constituted a single employer. The court also rejected Bannum's argument that the backpay calculation was erroneous, stating that the burden was on the employer to establish facts that would mitigate that liability. The court also dismissed Bannum’s claims that its due process rights were violated, explaining that the relationship between Bannum, Inc. and Bannum Place of Saginaw was so interrelated that they actually constituted a single integrated enterprise.In conclusion, the court granted the NLRB's application for enforcement and denied Bannum's cross-petition. View "NLRB v. Bannum Inc." on Justia Law

The court case involves Ferrellgas, L.P., which was appealing against an order enforcing a subpoena issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The subpoena was part of an EEOC investigation into a discrimination charge filed by an employee, alleging that Ferrellgas had engaged in discriminatory hiring, pay, and termination practices.Ferrellgas contended that the subpoena was improperly served, was facially invalid due to procedural errors, was overly broad, and would impose an undue burden. Ferrellgas also argued that the subpoena sought information on hiring practices, which was irrelevant to the specific discrimination charge. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rejected all of Ferrellgas's arguments.The Court found that the subpoena was served properly, despite Ferrellgas's claims to the contrary. It also ruled that the procedural errors in the subpoena were harmless and did not preclude its enforcement. The Court concluded that the subpoena was not overly broad, as the information sought could shed light on the alleged discriminatory practices. The Court also held that Ferrellgas failed to demonstrate that complying with the subpoena would impose an undue burden.In conclusion, the Court affirmed the district court's order enforcing the EEOC's subpoena, deciding that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in doing so. View "EEOC v. Ferrellgas, L.P." on Justia Law

In this case, the Nebraska Supreme Court reversed the lower court's denial of summary judgment, determining that the Lincoln Public Schools (LPS), a political subdivision, retained immunity from an employee's wrongful discharge claim under the discretionary function exemption of the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act (PSTCA). The plaintiff, Lynne Simpson, claimed LPS wrongfully terminated her in retaliation for her filing a workers' compensation claim. LPS asserted sovereign immunity and immunity under the PSTCA, arguing that its decision to terminate Simpson's employment was a discretionary act.The Nebraska Supreme Court held that employment and termination decisions generally involve a judgment of the kind that the discretionary function exemption is designed to shield. The court found that LPS's decision to terminate Simpson's employment involved an element of judgment, as LPS had to balance information about Simpson's performance against information about her criminal history and honesty issues. Therefore, the court concluded that LPS was entitled to immunity under the discretionary function exemption and remanded the case with directions to dismiss. The court did not rule on LPS's claim that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction due to the exclusivity provisions of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act, as it had already found that LPS was immune from suit. View "Simpson v. Lincoln Public Schools" on Justia Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of Minnesota, clerical and technical employees of the Anoka County Sheriff's Office, represented by the Law Enforcement Labor Services, Inc. (the Union), submitted a petition to the Bureau of Mediation Services (the Bureau) to determine an appropriate collective bargaining unit. The County opposed the unit, proposing a broader, county-wide unit. The Bureau found the County's unit to be the more appropriate choice. The Union appealed this decision, arguing that the Bureau had made numerous errors of law.The Supreme Court held that the Bureau did not improperly compare the Union's proposed unit to that of the County's. The Court determined that under the Public Employment Labor Relations Act (PELRA), overfragmentation is one of the "other relevant factors" that the Bureau is allowed to consider when analyzing statutory factors for a unit determination. However, the Court found that the Bureau gave priority and effectively controlling weight to its four-unit preference and the related overfragmentation concerns over the specific factors listed in PELRA. This was deemed to be an error of law.Consequently, the Court reversed the decision of the Bureau and remanded for further proceedings, instructing that a bargaining unit determination must now be made by the Bureau giving appropriate weight and consideration to the statutory factors in PELRA. View "Anoka County, Minnesota vs. Law Enforcement Labor Services, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves Joseph A. Jakuttis, a former officer and detective in the Dracut Police Department, who also served as a Task Force Officer for the federal Drug Enforcement Administration's Cross Borders Initiative. Jakuttis brought multiple federal and state claims against the Town of Dracut, certain Dracut police officers, and members of the federal law-enforcement task force. He alleged that he was demoted and faced retaliation after reporting serious criminal activities implicating two Dracut police officers, which he learned from a confidential drug informant.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Jakuttis's Bivens claims against Michael V. O'Hanlon and Richard P. Poirier, Jr., and his §1983 claim against the Town of Dracut, David J. Chartrand Jr., and Demetri Mellonakos. The court ruled that the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, as they could have reasonably thought that Jakuttis was speaking as part of his official duties rather than as a private citizen when he reported the misconduct, thus not clearly violating his First Amendment rights.The court also affirmed the dismissal of Jakuttis's state-law tort claims against Poirier, as Poirier was deemed to be acting within the scope of his federal employment during the relevant times. However, the court remanded the Massachusetts Whistleblower Act claim against the Town of Dracut and the Intentional Interference with Advantageous Economic Relationship claim against Chartrand and Mellonakos to the District Court. The court reasoned that these state-law claims should be resolved by a state court due to reasons of comity. View "Jakuttis v. Town of Dracut" on Justia Law

In this case, the plaintiff, Fallon Community Health Plan, Inc., adopted a policy requiring its employees to be vaccinated against COVID-19. The defendant, Shanika Jefferson, a home health aide employed by Fallon, sought a religious exemption from the vaccination requirement. Her request was denied, and her employment was terminated. Jefferson then applied for and was approved for unemployment benefits from the Department of Unemployment Assistance. However, Fallon contended that Jefferson was ineligible for the benefits and sought review of the decision. The board of review of the department, as well as a District Court judge, affirmed the decision.Fallon argued that Jefferson was disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits as per § 25 (e) (2) of General Laws c. 151A because she refused the COVID-19 vaccine in knowing violation of Fallon's reasonable policy and in wilful disregard of Fallon's interest in keeping its vulnerable patient population healthy. However, the Supreme Judicial Court disagreed with Fallon's contention. The court held that Jefferson did not engage in "deliberate misconduct", but rather made a good faith effort to comply with Fallon's policy by applying for a religious exemption. The court also found that Fallon failed to demonstrate that Jefferson should be disqualified on the basis of a "knowing violation" of that policy. The court considered the unique circumstances of the case, including Jefferson's sincere religious beliefs, which did not present her with a meaningful choice regarding vaccination. Therefore, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the decision of the lower courts, allowing Jefferson to receive unemployment benefits. View "Fallon Community Health Plan, Inc. v. Acting Director of the Department of Unemployment Assistance" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed a decision of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) regarding unfair labor practices alleged against New Concepts for Living, Inc. New Concepts sought review of an NLRB order determining that it engaged in unfair labor practices by pushing to decertify its employees' union. The NLRB affirmed the administrative law judge's dismissal of three charges against New Concepts but reversed his dismissal of five others.New Concepts, a nonprofit corporation providing services for people with disabilities, had been in a stalemate with its employees' union after the most recent collective bargaining agreement expired. Due to the union's inactivity, many employees expressed dissatisfaction and began a decertification movement. During this period, New Concepts suspended bargaining and issued memorandums to its employees about their right to resign from the union and stop the deduction of union dues. The NLRB found that these actions, as well as New Concepts' conduct during collective bargaining negotiations and a poll to assess union support, constituted unfair labor practices.The Court of Appeals disagreed, concluding that the NLRB's determinations were not supported by substantial evidence. The court found that New Concepts had both contractual and extracontractual bases for distributing the memorandums, did not unlawfully track employee responses, and provided adequate assurances against reprisals. Additionally, the court determined that New Concepts did not engage in bad faith bargaining and that its poll and subsequent withdrawal of recognition from the union were lawful. The court thus granted New Concepts' petition for review and denied the NLRB's cross-application for enforcement. View "New Concepts for Living Inc v. NLRB" on Justia Law

The case involved Sha’Lisa Lewis, a former correctional officer at the Federal Correctional Complex in Butner, North Carolina, who contested her termination from the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) during her probationary period. Lewis contended that she did not receive notification of her termination until after her probationary term had ended. She argued that she was denied due process protections, such as a proposed removal action and a reasonable opportunity to respond.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit examined the issue, focusing on the interpretation of 5 C.F.R. § 315.804, which mandates that an agency notify an employee in writing about the reasons for termination and the effective date. The court ruled that while the agency must notify the employee, the regulation does not necessitate the employee's actual receipt of the notice before the end of the probationary period. The court held that termination is effective if the agency does all that could be reasonably expected under the circumstances to deliver the notice before the end of the probationary period.In Lewis's case, the court concluded that BOP had made reasonable efforts to notify her of her termination before the end of her probationary period. Thus, the court affirmed that Lewis was effectively terminated as a probationary-period employee. View "LEWIS v. BOP " on Justia Law

The case pertains to J.G. Kern Enterprises, Inc. ("Company") and the National Labor Relations Board ("Board" or "NLRB"). After the Board certified a union to represent the Company's employees, the Company failed to engage in good faith bargaining for almost three months. When negotiations commenced, the Company refused to provide requested information about employee benefit plans. Two months after the certification year ended, the Company withdrew recognition from the Union, alleging the Union had lost its majority status.The Union filed unfair labor practice charges against the Company. The Board found that the Company had violated Sections 8(a)(1) and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act by delaying bargaining, refusing to consider a Union-administered benefit plan, refusing to provide requested information, and withdrawing recognition from the Union during the extended certification year.The Company petitioned for review, arguing that the Board erred in finding an unlawful withdrawal of Union recognition based on a retroactive extension of the original certification year, and that the Board had no legal basis to order the Company to bargain with the Union for an additional six months.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that substantial evidence supported the Board's findings that the Company committed the alleged unfair labor practices. The court concluded that the Board was free to choose which legal theory to rely on in addressing the unfair labor practice charges and that the Board acted within its discretion when it ordered an extension of the certification year and required the parties to bargain to remedy the Company’s unfair labor practices. The court, therefore, denied the Company’s petition for review and granted the Board’s cross-petition for enforcement of its order. View "J.G. Kern Enterprises, Inc. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

The Nebraska Supreme Court reversed a decision made by the Commission of Industrial Relations (CIR) that included corrections unit case managers within the protective service bargaining unit (PSBU), represented by the Fraternal Order of Police Lodge #88 (FOP 88). The case arose from a petition filed by FOP 88 to the CIR to clarify or amend the PSBU to include corrections unit case managers. The State of Nebraska appealed the CIR's decision, arguing that corrections unit case managers were supervisors and, hence, should not be in the same bargaining unit as their subordinates. The court deemed the CIR had erred in giving preclusive effect to its 2018 order, which certified FOP 88 as the bargaining representative for the PSBU. The court held that the issue of whether corrections unit case managers were part of the PSBU was not precluded by the 2018 order. The court remanded the matter back to the CIR to again determine whether the PSBU includes corrections unit case managers based on the existing record, with instructions to provide an explanation forming the basis for its ruling. View "Fraternal Order of Police Lodge #88 v. State" on Justia Law