Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

O. Ryland Tate, who was employed as a firefighter for the City of Danville, suffered a heart attack, did not return to work, and retired six months later. The City gave Tate the equivalent of his full wages in the form of sick leave pay. After his retirement, Tate used the balance of his accrued sick leave to obtain credit towards his retirement. The City subsequently paid indemnity benefits to Tate for his six-month period of disability pursuant to a Virginia Workers’ Compensation Commission award. The City then filed this action against Tate seeking recovery of his sick leave pay, arguing that Tate was not entitled to receive both sick leave pay and workers’ compensation indemnity benefits for the same disability period. The circuit court dismissed the City’s complaint, concluding that the court did not have jurisdiction to decide the City’s claim because the City did not ask the Commission for a credit against the workers’ compensation award for the amounts the City paid Tate for sick leave. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the City did not have the authority to recover sick leave pay from Tate on the basis that he had also received workers’ compensation for the same disability period. View "City of Danville v. Tate" on Justia Law

David Hartmann was injured during the course of his employment. After receiving surgery for his injury, Hartmann began experiencing dizzy spells. The Wyoming Workers’ Safety Compensation Division denied payment for the treatment Hartmann received for the dizziness. The Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) found that Hartmann failed to prove a causal link between his dizzy spells and his work injury. The district court reversed, concluding that the OAH failed to apply the second compensable injury rule. The Division appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s order to the extent it held the OAH failed to apply the second compensable injury rule but reversed the order remanding the case to the OAH for reconsideration, holding (1) the district court’s ruling was not an appealable order, but it is in the interest of judicial economy to treat the notice of appeal as a petition for review; (2) the OAH failed to invoke and apply the applicable law; and (3) when the applicable law is applied, the OAH decision to reject Hartmann’s evidence is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. View "State, ex rel., Dep’t of Workforce Servs. v. Hartmann" on Justia Law

Rivero was the elected sheriff of Lake County in 2011. He had been involved in an on-duty shooting while serving as a deputy. A year after Rivero became sheriff the district attorney announced that he had reopened the investigation, believing that Rivero had been untruthful, and informed Rivero of the intention to deem him a “Brady officer,” so that the district attorney would be obliged to inform any criminal defendant in a case in which Rivero might testify that he was subject to impeachment because of a finding that Rivero had provided false information in an official investigation. Rivero requested legal assistance from county counsel. County counsel responded that it could not represent either party in a dispute between county public officers, but recommended that Rivero be allowed to retain outside counsel at the county’s expense. The board of supervisors denied Rivero’s request. The trial court directed the county to provide independent legal counsel for Rivero pursuant to Government Code section 31000.6 for negotiations with the district attorney prior to the final decision. The court of appeal modified the decision, finding that Rivero’s right to independent counsel extends to a legal challenge to the designation as a Brady officer. View "Rivero v. Lake Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors" on Justia Law

In 2012, the governing board of Avera Marshall Regional Medical Center notified the hospital’s medical staff that it had approved the repeal of the medical staff bylaws and replaced them with revised bylaws. Avera Marshall’s Medical Staff, Chief of Staff, and Chief of Staff-elect commenced an action seeking a declaration that the Medical Staff had standing to sue Avera Marshall and that the former medical staff bylaws constituted a contract between Avera Marshall and the Medical Staff. The district court granted judgment for Avera Marshall and dismissed the case, concluding that the Medical Staff lacked the capacity to sue under Minnesota law and that the medical staff bylaws did not constitute an enforceable contract between Avera Marshall and the Medical Staff. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Medical Staff has the capacity to sue and be sued under Minnesota law; and (2) the medical staff bylaws constitute an enforceable contract between Avera Marshall and the individual members of the Medical Staff. Remanded. View "Medical Staff of Avera Marshall Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Avera Marshall" on Justia Law

At issue in this case is what ORS 654.086(2) means when it says that an employer "could not with the exercise of reasonable diligence know" of a violation. Employer CBI Services, Inc. performed work on a water treatment tank that was under construction. At that time, the tank consisted of a 32-foot-high wall that created a circular enclosure about 130 feet in diameter. It did not yet have a roof. Around the inside of the tank, there was a carpenter's scaffold, about four feet below the tank's top edge. The scaffold would prevent falls to the inside of the tank. There was no such scaffolding on the outside of the tank. An Oregon Occupational Safety and Health Division (OR-OSHA) safety compliance officer, Brink, conducted a safety inspection of the construction site. As he approached the water tank, he saw a worker sitting on its top rim. The worker, later identified as Crawford, was welding and did not appear to be using fall protection. Brink took several pictures. He then approached the site supervisor, Vorhof, who was working at ground level, inside the entrance to the tank, rigging anchor cables. Brink and Vorhof were about 65 feet from Crawford, who was visible from where they stood. Brink told Vorhof what he had seen. Vorhof looked up at Crawford, who was still sitting on the rim of the tank. Crawford was not wearing a safety harness and lanyard. Vorhof told Crawford to get down. While Brink was talking to Vorhof, he noticed a second worker, Bryan, also working without required fall protection. Brink later issued employer a citation and notification of penalty for two "items" (two serious safety violations). Employer disciplined Crawford, Bryan, and Vorhof as a result of the citation. At the time, employer had in place safety rules, precautions, and training mechanisms (including fall-protection training) and mandatory worksite safety meetings. The Court of Appeals held that the statutory phrase referred not to whether an employer "could" know (in the sense of being capable of knowing) of the violation; rather, the phrase referred to whether, taking into account a number of specified factors, an employer "should" know of the violation. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Appeals erred in its construction of ORS 654.086(2), but affirmed on other grounds. View "OR-OSHA v. CBI Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner was court-martialed for sexual abuse and assault and imprisoned for eighteen years. Approximately two decades after the conviction, Petitioner applied to the Texas Department of Licensing and Regulation for a tow truck operator’s license. The Department denied Petitioner’s application based on his conviction. Petitioner contested the denial. An administrative law judge (ALJ) from the State Office of Administrative Hearings recommended that the Department issue a license. The Department, however, revised the ALJ’s findings of fact and conclusions of law to reject Petitioner’s application. The trial court reversed the Department’s decision, concluding that the Department’s alterations of the findings and conclusions were unlawful. The court of appeals reversed, ruling that the Department’s modifications were improper because the ALJ misinterpreted a provision of the Texas Occupations Code concerning licensing restrictions where an applicant has previously been convicted of a crime. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Department’s revisions of the findings of fact and conclusions of law constituted error because the revisions were unsupported by the plain language of the statute. View "Thompson v. Tex. Dep’t of Licensing & Reg." on Justia Law

After the State Board for Educator Certification revoked the teaching certificate of a schoolteacher, the schoolteacher sued to overturn the revocation. The trial court concluded that the Board’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence and was arbitrary and capricious. The court issued a permanent injunction prohibiting the Board from revoking the schoolteacher’s revocation and refused to allow the Board to supersede the judgment pending appeal. The State sought mandamus relief challenging the trial court’s denial of supersedeas. The court of appeals denied mandamus relief and abated the merits of the Board’s appeal pending the Supreme Court resolution of a narrow procedural issue. The Supreme Court denied relief, holding that a trial court has discretion to prevent the Board from re-revoking a teacher’s professional license while the Board appeals the court’s rejection of the Board’s initial revocation. View "In re State Bd. for Educator Certification" on Justia Law

Across Big Sky Flow Testing, LLC appealed a district court judgment affirming an administrative law judge's award of benefits in the death of Dustin Bergsing. Dustin Bergsing, an employee of Big Sky, was stationed at an oil tank site. Bergsing's duties included gauging the oil in tanks two times per hour, switching tanks when necessary and requesting a truck to pick up oil when the tanks were full. Shortly after midnight on January 7, another employee was sent to the site when a high tank level warning occurred. The employee found Bergsing's body lying next to an unlatched tank cover, a log book showing he last logged a tank at 10:00 p.m. and his gauging tape which was cleaned, coiled and sitting on the tank. A toxicology report showed multiple hydrocarbon compounds and components of petroleum in Bergsing's blood and lungs. An autopsy showed pulmonary edema and heart failure. Big Sky argued the greater weight of the evidence and the applicable law did not support the determination Bergsing suffered a work-related death. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding a reasoning mind reasonably could have determined the findings were supported by the weight of the evidence.View "Across Big Sky Flow Testing, LLC v. WSI" on Justia Law

The Vermont Spay/Neuter Incentive Program (VSNIP) was created in 2006 to subsidize dog, cat, and wolf-hybrid sterilization procedures for low-income Vermonters. Sue Skaskiw and the organization she directed, Vermont Volunteer Services for Animals Humane Society (VVSA), administered the VSNIP program from its inception in 2006 until the expiration of Skaskiw's contract in October 2012. Defendant Vermont Agency of Agriculture initially managed the program but responsibility was transferred to defendant Department for Children and Families (DCF), a department within the Agency of Human Services, in 2011. Defendant Kristin Haas was an employee of the Agency of Agriculture; defendants Kathleen Smith and Carol Maloney were employees of DCF. Sometime after the program's inception, the Agency of Agriculture contracted with Skaskiw to run VSNIP. She still held the contract when responsibility shifted to DCF in 2011, but at that time DCF put the contract out for a competitive bid. Two bidders, Skaskiw and VT-CAN!, submitted proposals, and VT-CAN! won the contract. Skaskiw subsequently filed this lawsuit. Skaskiw appealed the trial court's decision to grant the motion to dismiss of defendants Vermont Agency of Agriculture, Department for Children and Families, Haas, Smith, and Maloney on Skaskiw's claims of defamation, violation of due process, economic interference, and failure to discharge a mandatory duty. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed.View "Skaskiw v. Vermont Agency of Agriculture" on Justia Law

Kevin Fink filed a petition requesting alternate medical treatment for knee injuries allegedly sustained during the course of his employment with Denison Municipal Utilities (DMU). The workers’ compensation commissioner sent DMU a notice providing that DMU was required to file a first report of injury pursuant to Iowa Code 86.12. When DMU failed to file the first report of injury, the deputy commissioner assessed $1,000 against DMU. The district court reversed the $1,000 assessment, concluding that the deputy commissioner incorrectly interpreted section 86.12 as authorizing the commissioner to demand DMU to file a first report of injury, that the first report of injury was not required by section 86.11, and therefore, the record lacked substantial evidence to support the assessment against DMU. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) in this case, DMU was required to file a first report of injury; and (2) the deputy commissioner’s decision that DMU failed to make a sufficient showing of good cause to avoid the $1,000 assessment pursuant to section 86.12 was supported by substantial evidence.View "Denison Mun. Utils. v. Iowa Workers’ Comp. Comm’r" on Justia Law