Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Charles Bell was employed by Sears from September 25, 2012, to May 16, 2013. During that period, Bell regularly filed for unemployment benefits with the Idaho Department of Labor (DOL). He received benefits for each week beginning with the week ending on Sept. 29, 2012, through the week ending on March 23, 2013. On March 26, 2013, the DOL discovered discrepancies between the weekly gross wages reported by Bell in his unemployment filings and the gross wages reported to the DOL by Sears. Based on the information provided by Bell, the DOL determined that Bell willfully misstated his gross wages for nineteen weeks in which he received benefits and that he was ineligible for benefits for nine weeks in which he claimed to have worked part-time hours despite working at least forty hours. Bell was disqualified from receiving benefits for fifty-two weeks, ordered to repay benefits he received for the relevant periods, and ordered to pay penalties for willfully misrepresenting his gross wages and the hours he worked in particular weeks. Bell appealed the Idaho Industrial Commission's holding that he willfully made false statements or willfully failed to report material facts for the purpose of obtaining unemployment benefits. Because the Commission’s decision was supported by substantial and competent evidence, the Supreme Court affirmed.View "Charles Bell v. Idaho Dept. of Labor" on Justia Law

In 1983, the four fingers of Dennis Varney’s left hand were amputated in a work-related accident. Three fingers were completely reattached and the fourth finger was partially reattached, but the fingers did not regain their full function. The Bureau of Workers’ Compensation awarded Varney compensation for the partial loss of use of his four fingers. In 1985 and 1990 two claims were allowed for one-third loss of use of Varney's index finger and for two-thirds loss of use of his other damaged fingers. In 2010, Varney filed a motion for a total loss of use of his index, ring, and little fingers. The Industrial Commission denied the motion. The Court of Appeals granted Varney’s request for a writ of mandamus, concluding that the Commission had applied the wrong legal standard for determining the loss of use of a finger. The Supreme Court reversed and denied the writ, holding that the Commission used the proper standard when examining the medical evidence as it related to the amount of function remaining in Varney’s three fingers and did not abuse its discretion in denying compensation for the total loss of use of those fingers.View "State ex rel. Varney v. Indus. Comm’n" on Justia Law

Andrea Schrecker was injured when she crossed a street where there was no crosswalk and was struck by a car. Schrecker had decided to skip her lunch break due to an absence of a co-employee that day and was going to get something to eat from a fast food restaurant across the street during her afternoon break when she was injured. An administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded that Schrecker’s injury occurred while she was within the course and scope of her employment and awarded her medical expense benefits and income benefits. The Workers’ Compensation Board concluded that the ALJ did not err in finding that Schrecker’s injury occurred in the course and scope of her employment. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Schrecker was not in the course and scope of her employment when injured because she undertook a route to seek personal comfort that exposed her to a hazard completely removed from normal going and coming activity and which was expressly prohibited by the Commonwealth and impliedly forbidden by her employer. Remanded for entry of an order dismissing Schrecker’s claim.View "US Bank Home Mortgage v. Schrecker" on Justia Law

At issue in these two cases was the applicable scope of Ky. Rev. Stat. 15.520, which sets forth specific procedural rights for police officers who are accused of misconduct and face the disciplinary processes administratively conducted by the police agency that employs them. Appellants in both cases were police officers who were subjected to administrative disciplinary actions that were initiated as a result of allegations that arose from within the police department itself. Both officers requested an administrative review procedure consistent with section 15.520. The requests were denied. Each Appellant sought review of the disciplinary actions in circuit court. The circuit courts concluded that the officers were not entitled to an administrative hearing subject to the due process provisions of section 15.520. The appeals courts affirmed, determining that section 15.520 applies only when the disciplinary action was initiated by a “citizens complaint.” The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 15.520 applies to both disciplinary proceedings generated by citizen complaints and those initiated by intra-departmental actions. Remanded.View "Pearce v. Univ. of Louisville" on Justia Law

Michigan corrections officers must perform several pre-shift and post-shift activities, including “punching a mechanical time clock,” “waiting in line” for security, and “walking to assigned locations.” These activities take place off the clock. Corrections officers and their union filed suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act and state law to recover overtime payments, 29 U.S.C. 206, 207; Mich. Comp. Laws 408.414, .414a. The Michigan Department of Corrections successfully moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on sovereign immunity grounds. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Without a past (or imminent future) violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress has no remedial power under Section 5 to authorize private lawsuits against the states; absent permissible Section 5 legislation abrogating the state’s immunity from suit, federal courts lack jurisdiction to entertain these FLSA claims against the Department of Corrections or to grant a declaratory judgment under Ex parte Young against the Department’s director, to address an alleged ongoing violation of the FLSA.View "Mich. Corrs. Org. v. Mich. Dep't of Corr." on Justia Law

Townsend worked as an Arkansas pharmaceutical sales representative for Bayer, selling Mirena, a contraceptive device. Townsend visited physicians, including Dr. Shrum. Townsend learned Shrum was importing from Canada a version of Mirena that was not FDA-approved, at half the cost of the approved version. Shrum had submitted Medicaid claims at the same rate as the approved version and bragged about $50,000 in extra profit. Townsend sought guidance from his superiors. Bayer told Townsend not get involved. Townsend called the Medicaid Fraud Hotline, although he feared losing his job. Shrum was charged with Medicaid fraud. Meanwhile, Bayer changed its method of reimbursing sales expenses. Not understanding the change, Townsend’s wife spent funds intended for those expenses, causing Townsend’s account to be closed temporarily. Although Townsend's account had been reactivated, Bayer fired him, claiming his closed account prevented him doing his job. Townsend sued, citing anti-retaliation provisions of the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3730(h).). A jury awarded Townsend back pay, doubled to $642,746, and $568,000 in emotional distress damages. The court denied front pay and ordered Bayer to reinstate Townsend. The Eighth Circuit affirmed on all issues except the emotional distress damage award and remanded to allow Townsend the option of accepting a remittitur of $300,000, or a new trial on emotional distress damages.View "Townsend v. Bayer HealthCare Pharm. Inc." on Justia Law

The issues this case presented to the Court of Appeal filed by the petitioners in this matter were two-fold: (1) whether the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board retain jurisdiction over a medical billing dispute pertaining to more than 300 consolidated claims, after the Legislature passed significant workers' compensation reform legislation that created a new administrative independent review process for the resolution of billing disputes; and (2) if the Board did retain jurisdiction over this dispute, was there substantial evidence to support the workers' compensation judge's (WCJ) findings of fact regarding his determination of the "reasonable fee" to be paid for arthroscopic knee procedures, arthroscopic shoulder procedures, and epidural injection procedures performed at three commonly managed ambulatory surgical center (ASC) facilities in San Diego County? After review, the Court concluded that although the text of the relevant legislation and resulting statutes was ambiguous, the most reasonable interpretation of the legislation was that it does not divest the Board of jurisdiction to decide the dispute at issue in this case. Furthermore, the Court held that the WCJ's findings were supported by substantial evidence.View "Cal. Ins. Guarantee Assn. v. Workers' Comp. App. Bd." on Justia Law

Duarte joined the California State Teachers’ Retirement System (CalSTRS) in 1993. He earned 2.023 years of service. He took unpaid personal leave for Duarte for the 1995-1996 school year and unpaid educational leave for 1996-1997 and 1997-1998. Duarte worked one season as a forest firefighter, attended law school, and worked as a paralegal. In 2003, Duarte returned to teaching in Oakland. On his second day he was assaulted and threatened by students. Duarte has not returned to teaching. In 2004, Duarte filed a worker’s compensation claim. After four evaluations, he entered into a stipulated settlement that indicated a “serious dispute” regarding the scope of Duarte’s disability. In 2006, Duarte sought social security disability benefits; it was determined that he was disabled from the date of the 2003 incident and became eligible for monthly disability benefits in 2005. Duarte’s student loans were forgiven. In 2008, Duarte sought CalSTRS disability retirement benefits. CalSTRS repeatedly asked Duarte to submit medical records and other documents. An ALJ upheld denial of Duarte’s application because he refused to complete the independent medical evaluation ordered under Education Code 24103 (b),. The trial court and court of appeal affirmed, rejecting an argument that the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars CalSTRS from relitigating his disability because several other state agencies have found him to be disabled.View "Duarte v. CA. State Teachers' Ret. Sys." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a trade group representing federal contractors, filed suit challenging the Department's revision of regulations requiring contractors to extend an invitation to job applicants to advise the contractor whether they believed they were covered by Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 793(a), as well as to analyze the resulting data. The revised regulations also adopted a utilization goal to serve as a target for the employment of individuals with disabilities. The OFCCP explained that these requirements are important means by which the Government can contribute to reducing the employment disparity between those with and without disabilities. Applying Chevron deference, the court concluded that the Department did not exceed its statutory authority, and the agency's exercise of rulemaking authority is a product of reasoned rulemaking and was not arbitrary nor capricious. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.View "Assoc. Builders and Contractors v. Shiu" on Justia Law

In 2000, while working at Homestake Mining Company, Michael Martz injured his shoulder. Martz was paid workers’ compensation benefits. In 2002, while working for McLaughlin Sawmill (Hills Materials), Martz injured the same shoulder. Hills Materials began paying benefits but, several years later, denied liability for further benefits. Martz petitioned the Department of Labor, contending that both employers were liable for benefits. Homestake was granted summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds. In regards Hills Materials, the Department rejected Martz’s argument that promissory estoppel precluded Hills Materials from denying liability and concluded that Martz failed to satisfy his burden of showing that the 2002 injury was a “major contributing cause” of his current condition. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Hills Materials was not estopped from denying liability for Martz’s current condition and need for treatment; and (2) Martz failed to establish that Hills Materials was liable for benefits where he did not prove a sufficient causal relationship between his 2002 injury and his current condition and need for treatment.View "Martz v. Hills Materials" on Justia Law