Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In 2010, the Workers’ Compensation Board found that Fay Johnson was injured while working for Home Depot USA, Inc. Home Depot agreed to pay Johnson benefits. In 2012, Johnson went missing. Later that year, Home Depot filed two petitions, one seeking permission to stop paying benefits and the other asking the Board to declare Johnson’s benefits forfeited. A hearing officer ordered that Johnson’s benefits be suspended until Johnson reappeared and dismissed the petition for forfeiture as moot. The Workers’ Compensation Board Appellate Division affirmed. Johnson’s attorney appealed on Johnson's behalf. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the hearing officer reasonably found that the statutory requirement that petitions for review of incapacity and for forfeiture of benefits be served on “other parties” was satisfied by service on Johnson’s attorney, who continued to represent her before the Board; and (2) the hearing officer had the authority to direct Home Depot to pay Johnsons’ benefits into a segregated account pending a hearing on the petitions and to suspend her benefits following the hearing.View "Johnson v. The Home Depot USA, Inc." on Justia Law

Jess Clayton was working at a nuclear facility owned and operated by Entergy Arkansas, Inc. and Entergy Operations, Inc. (collectively, Entergy) when he was injured by a falling steel beam. Clayton was an employee of Precision Surveillance Corporation at the time of the accident. Clayton sued Entergy and DP Engineering, Ltd., which was retained to provide engineering advice regarding the crane. Entergy and DP both filed motions to dismiss. The circuit court denied the motions. Entergy and DP petitioned for writ of prohibition, claiming that the circuit court was precluded from exercising jurisdiction over Clayton’s claims because jurisdiction lay exclusively with the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission to determine the applicability of the Workers’ Compensation Act. The Supreme Court granted the petitions,, holding that the circuit court acted without jurisdiction in deciding whether an employer-employee relationship existed between Walter, Entergy, and DP, as these determinations lay exclusively with the Commission.View "Entergy Ark. Inc. v. Pope County Circuit Court" on Justia Law

Entergy Arkansas, Inc. and Entergy Operations, Inc. (collectively, Entergy), the owner and operator of a nuclear plant, contracted with Precision Surveillance Company (PSC) to provide civil engineers for a project. Wade Walters, a PSC employee, died as the result of an accident at the plant. Plaintiff filed a personal-injury action in the circuit court, naming several defendants, including Walters, Entergy, and DP Engineering, Ltd. Co. Entergy filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, asserting immunity under the exclusive-remedy provisions of the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Act, or, in the alternative, a motion to stay pending a review by the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission. DP also filed a motion to dismiss. The circuit court denied the motions to dismiss. Entergy and DP filed petitions for writ of prohibition, contending that the circuit court was wholly without jurisdiction to determine the applicability of the Act to the facts of this case. The Supreme Court granted the petitions,, holding that the circuit court acted without jurisdiction in deciding whether an employer-employee relationship existed between Walter, Entergy, and DP, as these determinations lay exclusively with the Commission.View "Entergy Ark., Inc. v. Pope County Circuit Court" on Justia Law

Hopper was hired by the Social Security Administration, which requested that the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) conduct a background investigation. Fifteen months later, OPM challenged his application. Asked whether, during the past five years, he had been fired from any job, Hopper responded “no.” OPM alleged that Hopper had been fired from two positions with different companies and that, in response to a question requesting a list of all employment for the past five years, Hopper failed to report one of those positions. Hopper responded with supporting documents, claiming that he was not fired from either position and, if he failed to report a position, “it was an honest mistake.” OPM rejected Hopper’s assertions. SSA removed Hopper. While appeal was pending, the Merit System Protection Board issued decisions that questioned whether an individual who meets the definition of “employee” and is separated under an OPM suitability action retains a right to appeal as an “adverse action.” At a hearing, OPM refused to participate. The ALJ mitigated OPM’s action to a reprimand. The Board upheld the decision. The Federal Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the Board erred in approaching the case as an adverse action appeal, rather than as a suitability action under OPM’s regulations. The Civil Service Reform Act does not exempt suitability removals from Board jurisdiction.View "Archuleta v. Hopper" on Justia Law

In 2009, Patricia Damme injured her low back in a workplace accident. In 2013, Damme underwent surgery on her back. The surgery was a success. The Workers’ Compensation Court awarded Damme temporary total disability benefits from 2009 to 2013 and future medical care. Damme’s employer, Pike Enterprises, Inc. appealed, arguing, among other things, that the 2009 incident was not an injury but a “temporary symptom aggravation” of Damme’s preexisting back problems. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Workers’ Compensation Court did not err in (1) finding a causal relationship between the work-related injury Damme sustained in 2009 and the 2013 surgery; (2) determining that Damme’s 2013 surgery was reasonably necessary to treat her physical condition and pain symptoms; (3) finding that after her injury, Damme could not work until the surgeon who performed the surgery released her to return to work; (4) determining that Damme’s incarceration was not an event that barred her receipt of temporary total disability disability benefits; and (5) awarding nonspecified future medical benefits.View "Damme v. Pike Enters., Inc." on Justia Law

The H-2B visa program allows U.S. employers to seek admission of foreign workers to perform temporary unskilled non-agricultural work by demonstrating that the employment of foreign workers will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of U.S. workers. 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii), 1182 (a)(5)(A)(i)(I)-(II). The employer must obtain certification from the Department of Labor (DOL) that: qualified workers are not available at the “prevailing wage” in the U.S. to perform the employment in question, and the aliens’ employment will not adversely affect wages and working conditions of similarly employed U.S. workers. DOL has often changed its method for calculating prevailing wages without giving notice or an opportunity to comment and without explanation. Opponents challenged 20 C.F.R. 655.10(f) and the 2009 Wage Guidance, which authorized use of privately-funded surveys to set the prevailing wage for certain occupations. A district court ruled in favor of the opponents. Following notice and comment, DOL announced the 2011 Wage Rule, but has continued to use the 2009 Guidance, having postponed the 2011 Rule’s effective date because it was subject to congressional appropriations riders precluding its implementation. The district court dismissed a challenge. The Third Circuit reversed, holding that the case was ripe and that the 2009 Guidance was arbitrary and violated the APA.View "Comite de Apoyo a los Trabajad v. Perez" on Justia Law

In October 2010, Appellant slipped and fell down a flight of stairs outside of her workplace. In January 2011, Appellant was diagnosed with avascular necrosis (AVN) in the femoral head of her right hip. Eventually, the femoral head on her right hip collapsed due to the AVN progression, and in December 2011 Appellant received a total right hip replacement. The Wyoming Department of Workforce Services, Workers’ Safety and Compensation Division denied Appellant’s claim for medical treatment of the AVN, concluding that Appellant’s October 2010 fall did not cause her to then develop AVN. After a contested case hearing, the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) agreed and denied benefits. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the OAH’s findings of fact and conclusions of law were supported by substantial evidence and were in accordance with the law.View "In re Worker's Compensation Claim of Stevens" on Justia Law

The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board fined an uninsured employers Titan Enterprises, LLC, Titan Topsoil, Inc. and CCO Enterprises (collectively, "Titan," all owned by Todd Christanson) a substantial amount because they had operated for a significant period of time without carrying statutorily required workers’ compensation insurance. On appeal, the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission affirmed part of the Board’s decision, but it reversed the Board on the amount of the fine and remanded the case to the Board for further proceedings. The employer then asked the Commission for an award of attorney’s fees as a successful party on appeal. The State, Division of Workers’ Compensation, which had initiated the Board proceedings, opposed the award on the basis that it, too, had been successful on a significant issue. The Commission awarded the employer full fees of approximately $50,000. The Division petitioned for review of the fee award, and the Supreme Court granted review. Because the Commission failed to consider the Division’s partial success in the appeal, it reversed the Commission’s decision and remanded for further proceedings.View "Alaska Div. of Workers' Comp. v. Titan Enterprises, LLC" on Justia Law

Dillip Mullings owned a NAPA auto-parts store in Seward called Resurrection Bay Auto Parts, Inc. Mullings hired Dennis Alder to be the store manager, a position Alder held from 2006 to 2010, when he was terminated. Alder did not keep a time card, but it was undisputed that he typically worked from 6:30 a.m. to 6:30 p.m. Monday through Friday. The extent of Alder’s overtime was not at issue on appeal; Mullings conceded that Alder worked over 40 hours a week. It was also undisputed that Alder was paid a salary and did not receive overtime pay. Once terminated, Alder sought unemployment compensation from the State. The Department of Wage and Hour determined that Alder was entitled to overtime pay, and attempted to negotiate a settlement on his behalf with Resurrection Bay. Alder later sued seeking overtime pay. The employer claimed the Alder was exempt from the overtime laws, but the superior court found he was not and awarded overtime pay and liquidated damages. The employer appealed. Because the employer failed to show that the manager satisfied all four requirements of the overtime laws’ exemption for executive employees, the Supreme Court affirmed the finding that the manager was owed overtime pay under Alaska and federal law. Furthermore, the Court affirmed the superior court’s award of liquidated damages, because the employer failed to carry his burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that he acted in good faith.View "Resurrection Bay Auto Parts, Inc. v. Alder" on Justia Law

Minn. Stat. 176.081(1)(a) requires employers and insurers to pay attorney fees calculated by a statutory formula not subject to judicial review. In this case, Respondent injured his back while working for Employer. Employer and its insurer (together, Relators) settled with Respondent. Respondent’s attorney then sought an award of contingent attorney fees in an amount that was calculated by applying the statutory formula in section 176.081 but which disregarded the upper limit set by the formula. Relators objected, arguing that, in the absence of judicial review to ensure a fee award is not excessive, application of the statutory formula violates separation of powers principles. The compensation judge applied the statutory formula and concluded that $13,000 would adequately compensate Respondent’s attorney but refused to consider whether the statutory fee was reasonable. The Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals affirmed the compensation judge’s fee award. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Court will recognize the Legislature’s statutory formula as presumptively reasonable, and, absent exceptional circumstances, further judicial review of an award based on the statutory formula is unnecessary; and (2) Relators failed to present any exceptional circumstances to challenge this presumption.View "David v. Bartel Enters." on Justia Law