Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs had been firefighters for the city of Portland when they suffered disabling injuries. The city's charger required it to provide disability benefits to its police and fire employees who suffer injuries in the course of their employment that render them “unable to perform [their] required duties,” with a minimum disability benefit of 25 percent of the employee’s base pay, “regardless of the amount of wages earned in other employment.” The city originally determined that plaintiffs’ disabilities made them unable to perform their “required duties” and paid them disability benefits. Years later, however, the city created new job assignments that included some of the duties within the job classifications that plaintiffs had held when they were injured. Because the city gave the new job assignments the same job classifications that plaintiffs had previously held, the city maintained that plaintiffs were no longer disabled. The city therefore required plaintiffs to return to work and discontinued paying them the minimum disability benefit. Plaintiffs sued the city for breach of contract, and the circuit court granted summary judgment for the city. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded the city charter’s use of the term “required duties” meant core duties. Because there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the duties of plaintiffs’ new job assignments were the “required duties” for the job classifications that plaintiffs previously held, the Court further concluded that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the city.View "Miller v. City of Portland" on Justia Law

Petitioners, individually and in their capacities as representatives of 162 firefighters, filed a petition with the Fireman’s Civil Service Commission for the City of Charleston (the Commission) challenging the City of Charleston’s (City) method of calculating overtime wages. The Commission found that it lacked jurisdiction to hear Petitioners’ claims. Petitioners filed a complaint and petition for writ of mandamus in the circuit court, alleging that the City should not be permitted to unilaterally alter its method of calculating overtime pay and asserting that the Commission should be compelled to assume jurisdiction in the matter. The circuit court dismissed the Commission and granted summary judgment to the City. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Commission lacked jurisdiction to hear the underlying matter; and (2) no legal principle prevented the City’s action.View "Boggess v. City of Charleston" on Justia Law

Petitioner Professional Fire Fighters of Hudson, IAFF Local 3154 (Union), appealed a New Hampshire Public Employee Labor Relations Board (PELRB) decision that found respondent Town of Hudson (Town), did not commit an unfair labor practice. When each of the four earlier CBAs expired, but before the parties entered into a successor agreement, the Town provided Union members with step increases, despite the absence of an evergreen clause in the expired CBA. After the 2006 CBA expired in 2009, the Town’s budget included monies sufficient to fund step increases for eligible Union members in each of the budget years 2010, 2011, and 2012. All Union members received step increases between July 2009 and August 2011. In August 2011, the Town informed the Union by letter that the Town would no longer pay wage increases, including step increases. In response to the letter, the Union filed a grievance pursuant to the procedures in the 2006 CBA. The matter ultimately proceeded to arbitration. The Town argued that it had a right not to pay the step increases because the 2006 CBA did not have an evergreen clause and, under the applicable state law, a public employer is not required to pay step increases after a CBA has expired. The Union contended that the Town was required to pay the step increases because there was a binding past practice of paying such increases during status quo periods. The arbitrator determined that a public employer may, but is not required to, refrain from paying step increases during the status quo period, and, “[t]herefore, if the employer chooses to fund and pay step increases it is capable, in concert with the Union, of creating a binding past practice.” The arbitrator found that the initiation of step increase payments following the expiration of the parties’ most recent collective bargaining agreement was the continuation of a past practice. Accordingly, the arbitrator concluded that the Town violated the 2006 CBA and past practice between the parties when it failed to pay in accordance with the step schedule, and ordered the Town to pay the increases that had accrued since August 2011. The Town failed to comply with the arbitrator’s award. The Union filed a complaint with the PELRB alleging that the Town’s failure to comply constituted an unfair labor practice. The PELRB ruled in favor of the Town and dismissed the Union's complaint. The Union appealed. After review, the Supreme Court found no reversible error, and affirmed the PELRB's decision.View "Appeal of Professional Fire Fighters of Hudson, IAFF Local 3154" on Justia Law

The County of Riverside and the Riverside County Sheriff’s Department (collectively Department) demoted Deputy Jose Quintanar as a result of an incident in which Quintanar allegedly used excessive force. Pursuant to the applicable Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), Quintanar filed an administrative appeal. This triggered an evidentiary hearing before an impartial hearing officer. The hearing officer agreed that Quintanar had used excessive force and upheld the demotion. Quintanar then filed a petition for writ of mandate. The trial court, sua sponte, questioned whether the hearing officer was required to exercise independent judgment with respect to the nature of the discipline to be imposed, and if so, whether he had, in fact, done so. It remanded the matter to the hearing officer with directions to clarify whether he had exercised independent judgment. On receiving his reply, it determined that he had not exercised independent judgment and it issued a writ commanding him to do so. The Department appealed. After its review, the Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court that, under the MOU, the hearing officer was required to exercise independent judgment not only with respect to whether there were grounds for discipline, but also with respect to the nature of the discipline. The Court of Appeal disagreed with the trial court’s conclusion, however, that the hearing officer’s failure to use independent judgment was prejudicial. The hearing officer did indicate that, while he did not believe that he was required to exercise his independent judgment, the exercise of his independent judgment would not have changed the outcome. Hence, the Court reversed.View "Quintanar v. Co. of Riverside" on Justia Law

Petitioners seek vacatur of OSHA's Final Rule revising its Hazard Communication Standard requiring employers across industries to develop a program for classifying the dangers of workplace chemicals and conveying those dangers to their employees. Petitioners, businesses that handle and process grain and other agricultural products, and others, seek vacatur of the Final Rule as it applies to combustible dust. The court concluded that petitioners had express notice that combustible dust, however labeled, would be subject to the relevant requirements of the Final Rule; there was substantial evidence and an adequate explanation to support OSHA's decision to incorporate an interim definition of "combustible dust" and guidance until a more precise definitions is implemented in another rulemaking; petitioners' facial vagueness challenge is ripe for review; and on the merits, however, the vagueness claim fails because the Final Rule satisfies due process where the term "combustible dust" is clear enough to provide fair warning of enforcement, and OSHA has provided additional guidance on how the revised Hazard Communication Standard will be enforced. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review.View "Nat'l Oilseed Processors Assoc. v. OSHA" on Justia Law

Employee was discharged from employment with Employer for picket line violence. Thereafter, Employee filed a claim for unemployment compensation benefits. A Workforce West Virginia administrative law judge (ALJ) denied unemployment benefits, finding that Employee had been discharged for gross misconduct. The Workforce West Virginia’s Board of Review affirmed. The circuit court reversed and ruled that Employee was entitled to unemployment compensation benefits, concluding that the findings of fact of the ALJ, as adopted by the Board, were clearly wrong. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s final order and remanded to the circuit court with directions to reinstate the Workforce West Virginia decision denying unemployment compensation benefits, holding that the circuit court erred in finding that Employee’s acts did not constitute gross misconduct. Remanded.View "Alcan Rolled Prods. Ravenswood v. McCarthy" on Justia Law

An Employer appealed from a decision of the Workers’ Compensation Commission (Commission) ordering Employer to pay additional temporary total disability benefits to Employee, who was injured during his employment. After a jury trial, the trial court granted Employee’s motion for judgment and affirmed the award, concluding that the Commission decision was a piece of evidence that needed to be considered by the jury and that Employer was required to introduce the Commission decision into evidence. The court of special appeals reversed, concluding that Appellant was not required to move the award into evidence. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, in a de novo workers’ compensation jury trial, the appellant is not required to move the Commission decision into evidence.View "Gales v. Sunoco & Amer. Zurich Ins." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a retired Tampa firefighter, filed a class action complaint against the Board of Trustees of the City Pension Fund for Firefighters and Police Officers in the City of Tampa (Board), claiming that the Board failed to pay benefits under a firefighter and police officer pension plan established by local law. Parker and the Board agreed to a settlement, which the trial court approved. The trial court subsequently determined that Petitioner and others similarly situated were entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees. The Second District reversed the court’s decision to require the Board to pay the fees, instead concluding that the attorney’s fees were to be paid from the settlement proceeds. Specifically, the court concluded that the local law plan was “not part of the general statutory construct” of Fla. Stat. 175 and 185. The Supreme Court quashed the Second District’s decision, holding that the prevailing party attorney’s fees provisions of Fla. Stat. 175.061(5) and 185.05(5) are applicable to judicial proceedings to enforce claims under local law plans.View "Parker v. Bd. of Trs." on Justia Law

Claimant-appellant Kevin Hope injured his right shoulder in 2003 while he was working for Empro Professional Services. He argued to the Industrial Commission that the Idaho Industrial Special Indemnity Fund (ISIF) was liable for part of his income benefits because he was totally and permanently disabled due to pre-existing back and shoulder injuries that combined with his 2003 shoulder injury. If Hope's total and permanent disability resulted from the combined effects of his 2003 shoulder injury and impairments that pre-existed that injury, then ISIF was liable for the portion of income benefits caused by the pre-existing injuries. Hope appealed the Commission's order that ISIF was not liable for any of Hope's benefits. The Commission found that Hope was totally and permanently disabled, but had failed to prove that his disability was a result of pre-existing back and shoulder impairments combined with his last shoulder injury. Hope argued that the Commission's decision was based on errors of law and fact. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Commission's order.View "Hope v. Industrial Special Indemnity Fund" on Justia Law

Appellee, a home health nurse who provided in-home health-care services to clients of Visiting Nurse Association of Mid-Ohio (VNA), was injured in a vehicle collision while she was traveling to the home of a patient. Appellee had decided to transport her children and two friends to a mall on her way to the patient’s home. The Industrial Commission allowed Appellee’s claim for a neck sprain. VNA appealed. The trial court granted summary judgment for VNA, concluding that Appellee was on a personal errand at the time she was injured. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the accident and injury arose out of and occurred in the course of Appellee’s employment. Specifically, the court determined that although Appellee had intended to drop her passengers off at the mall, she had the dual intent to travel to her patient’s home, and when she was injured, she had not yet diverted from that path. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the doctrine of dual intent or dual purpose is not recognized in Ohio for purposes of determining eligibility for workers’ compensation benefits. Remanded.View "Friebel v. Visiting Nurse Ass’n of Mid-Ohio" on Justia Law