Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Wrocklage was a Customs and Border Patrol Officer for 12 years. While screening travelers at Sault Sainte Marie, Wrocklage was the first to screen the Millers, who declared that they were carrying “fruits and vegetables.” At a secondary inspection point, Officer Hendricks issued a $300 fine to the Millers for failing to declare lemons and seeds. Wrocklage and LaLonde, contacted their supervisor, Price, challenging the propriety of the fine. Wrocklage took home a copy of the Treasury Enforcement Communication System (TECS) report, which included Miller’s social security number, birth date, address, and license plate number. In an email to the Joint Intake Center, Wrocklage reported that he believed the Millers had been wrongly charged. Wrocklage attached the TECS report and copied Berglund, an employee in Senator Levin’s office. Within hours, Wrocklage realized that the TECS report had been attached, contacted Berglund, and, in response to his request, Berglund deleted the emails before opening the report. Wrocklage immediately self-reported to DHS, which determined that the report had been printed by LaLonde. Wrocklage stated that he “d[id] not recall” where he obtained the report. Wrocklage and LaLonde explained that they both printed copies and jointly presented copies to Price, so it was possible that the copies were switched. DHS removed Wrocklage from his position for improper possession of TECS information, unauthorized disclosures of TECS information, and lack of candor during the investigation. The Merit Systems Protection Board affirmed. The Federal Circuit vacated, finding the charges of unauthorized disclosure and lack of candor not supported by substantial evidence.View "Wrocklage v. Dep't of Homeland Sec." on Justia Law

To address economic conditions and projections demonstrating a severely underfunded plan, the Colorado General Assembly approved measured designed to protect present and future retirees by providing an adequately pension program. This appeal centered on changes made to the annual cost of living (COLA) that applied to increase each retiree's vested base retirement benefit. Plaintiffs in this case were retired public employees who contended that they had a contract with the State entitling each of them, upon retirement, to have their base pension benefit annually adjusted by the specific COLA formula in existence at the time they were eligible to retire, for the rest of their lives without change. The district court ruled they had no such contract right to an unchangeable COLA formula. The court of appeals disagreed, finding the retirees had a contract right to the formula in place at the time of eligibility for retirement or actual retirement based on the so-called "public policy exception," and remanded for further review to determine whether the legislature's act violated the Contract Clauses of the federal and state constitutions. The Colorado Supreme Court disagreed with the court of appeals, and agreed with the district court. The appellate court's judgment was reversed that the district court's judgment reinstated.View "Justus v. Colorado Public Employee's Retirement Association Pension Plan" on Justia Law

The Workers’ Compensation Commission found Employee to be totally and permanently disabled under the odd-lot doctrine and denied Employer and its Insurer (collectively, Employer) certain credits for disability payments previously received by Employee from other sources. The district court affirmed the Commission’s finding that Employee was totally and permanently disabled but reversed on the credit issue. The court of appeals reversed, holding (1) substantial evidence did not support the Commission’s award of permanent total benefits, and (2) the Commission was correct in its decision concerning the credits. On further review, the Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court’s finding that substantial evidence supported the Commission’s findings that Employee was totally and permanently disabled under the odd-lot doctrine; and (2) reversed the district court’s judgment regarding the issues concerning the credit due Employer.View "Gits Mfg. Co. v. Frank" on Justia Law

Petitioner was fired from her job at the Indiana Department of Workforce Development for alleged misconduct. After it was discovered that Petitioner kept several items of state property in her possession, Petitioner was charged with theft. The charges were later dismissed. Thereafter, the State filed an ethics proceeding against Petitioner, alleging that she violated 42 Ind. Admin. Code 1-5-12. After an adjudicative hearing, the Indiana State Ethics Commission found that Petitioner did commit the alleged violation and barred her from future State executive branch employment. The Supreme Court affirmed the Commission’s decision, holding (1) double jeopardy did not bar the proceeding before the Commission, and the criminal court’s probable cause determination was not binding upon the Commission; (2) there was sufficient evidence to support the Commission’s determination; and (3) the sanction imposed in this case was within the Commission’s discretion.View "Ind. State Ethics Comm’n v. Sanchez" on Justia Law

The City of Indio and its chief of police appealed a judgment which granted a permanent injunction in favor of the Indio Police Command Unit Association (the PCU), and two of its police officer members, prohibiting the City from implementing a planned reorganization of the City’s Police Department’s command staff until it demonstrated full compliance with the "meet and confer" requirements of the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA). They also appealed a postjudgment order granting the PCU its attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. The appellants argued the injunction was improper because the City sufficiently complied with its meet and confer obligations, and the trial court abused its discretion by awarding the PCU attorney fees. The Court of Appeal rejected their contentions after review of this case, and affirmed the judgment and postjudgment order.View "Indio Police Command Unit Assn. v. City of Indio" on Justia Law

After Employee was terminated from his position as a construction-equipment operator with the City of Cleveland, the collective-bargaining unit for construction-equipment operators employed by the City sought a writ of mandamus to compel the City Civil Service Commission to conduct a termination hearing before a neutral referee. The appellate court denied the writ, concluding that Employee had no clear legal right to a termination hearing, that the Commission had no clear legal duty to provide Employee with a hearing before a neutral referee, and that Employee had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Employee had a clear legal right to a hearing to challenge his termination; (2) the City was under a clear legal duty to appoint a referee to conduct a hearing; and (3) a writ of mandamus was the proper remedy because Employee had no adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.View "State ex rel. Mun. Constr. Equip. Operators’ Labor Council v. City of Cleveland" on Justia Law

Darlene Devlin had been married for more than 40 years when her husband died, then a civilian federal employee for nearly six years, entitling Darlene to Basic Employee Death Benefits (BEDB), 5 U.S.C. 8442(b)(1)(A), 8466(b). However, Darlene died before she could sign or file an application for BEDB. Her son, Devlin, completed, signed, and filed an application for BEDB on her behalf. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) denied the application, concluding that Darlene was not entitled to BEDB because she failed to submit an application for those benefits before her death. Devlin argued that his appointment as a co-administrator of his mother’s estate permitted him to sign and file the application for BEDB on her behalf. The e Merit Systems Protection Board and Federal Circuit affirmed the denial.View "Devlin v. Office of Pers. Mgmt." on Justia Law

When negotiations between the Teamsters and Harborlite reached an impasse, management told the union that unless it would agree to the company's final offer it would lock out union members and "immediately begin hiring permanent replacements for locked out employees." Several days later, the company backed off its threat: while it continued the lockout and began hiring new workers, it said that "until further notice" these workers would only be temporary. After three months, the company let its temporary workers go and permitted union members to return to work even though the union never did accept the company's purportedly final offer. The union petitioned the National Labor Relations Board, and the Board agreed with the union that the act of threatening to hire permanent replacement workers violated 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1). The Board ordered Harborlite to cease making such threats and to post a notice admitting its violation of the law. The union appealed the Board's decision, arguing that Harborlite's lockout was itself unlawful and therefore entitled its union employees to back pay. After review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the Board did not err in refusing to order additional remedial measures against the company, namely, back pay. View "Teamsters Local Union No. 455 v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Appellant represented Claimant in a workers’ compensation case. The Chief Administrative Law Judge (CALJ) entered an interlocutory order, which resulted in Claimant receiving temporary total occupational disability benefits. The claim was later returned to the active docket, and the parties reached a settlement. Appellant subsequently filed two motions for approval of attorney fees, requesting approval of $12,000 for work performed in obtaining the lump sum payment and requesting approval of $8,369 for work performed in obtaining the benefits which Claimant recovered from the interlocutory award. The CALJ granted Appellant’s motion for $12,000 but denied the motion for $8,369 in fees, concluding that Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.320(2)(a) caps attorney fees to a total of $12,000. On appeal, Appellant argued that an interlocutory proceeding in a workers’ compensation case should be considered separate from a claim for income benefits and therefore not subject to the statutory cap on attorneys fees established in section 342.320(2)(a). The Workers’ Compensation Board and Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the attorney fee for the entire proceeding in this matter was subject to the statutory maximum of $12,000 under section 342.320(2)(a). View "Watts v. Danville Housing Auth." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Janis McLean, a retired deputy attorney general, appealed a judgment of dismissal after the trial court sustained the demurrer of defendants the State of California and the California State Controller’s Office to her class action seeking waiting time penalties under Labor Code section 2031 for the failure to comply with the prompt payment requirements of section 202. She argued the trial court erred in ruling that the term "quits" in sections 202 and 203 did not apply to employees who quit in order to retire. The Court of Appeal agreed that in the context of sections 202 and 203, requirements applying to employees who quit also apply to employees who quit to retire. The Court therefore reversed the judgment as to the State of California. However, because the Court held that it was unnecessary to name the California State Controller’s Office as a defendant, and affirmed the judgment of dismissal as to the controller’s office. View "McLean v. California" on Justia Law