Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

At issue in this case was whether unpaid interns are entitled to the anti-retaliation protections of Wis. Stat. 146.997, Wisconsin’s health care worker protection statute. In the instant case, Asma Masri’s position as an uncompensated intern at the Medical College of Wisconsin (MCW) was terminated after Masri reported “clinical/ethical” concerns to an MCW administrator. Masri filed a retaliation complaint against MCW with the Equal Rights Division (ERD) of the Department of Workforce Development (DWD). ERD determined that Masri was not entitled to anti-retaliation protection under section 146.997 because the statute is limited to employees, and Masri was not an employee where she received no financial compensation. The Labor and Industry Review Commission (LIRC) affirmed. Granting due weight deference to LIRC’s decision, the circuit court and court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) LIRC’s decision is accorded due weight deference because LIRC has experience interpreting the meaning of “employee” and various statutes and is charged with administering section 146.997; and (2) LIRC correctly found that section 146.997 applies only to employees, a category that does not include interns who do not receive compensation or tangible benefits. View "Masri v. State Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n" on Justia Law

The question before the Court of Appeals in these three consolidated cases was the appropriate method for crediting payments made under a workers’ compensation award when that award is increased on appeal. At issue was whether the credits should be computed on the basis of the number of weeks paid or the amount of money expended. The Court of Appeals resolved the issue in favor of the workers in each case by relying on legislation passed specifically to supersede earlier decisions of the Court, holding that, when crediting an employer/insurer for payments made under a workers’ compensation award that is subsequently amended, credit should be given for the total amount of dollars paid under the initial award. View "W.R. Grace & Co. v. Swedo" on Justia Law

After Elms Construction Company, owned by Richard Elms (Elms), began installing windows and doors for Renewal by Anderson (Renewal), Elms fell from a ladder and injured his right foot. Elms filed a workers’ compensation claim with the Workers’ Compensation Commission, alleging that he was Renewal’s common law employee at the time of the injury. The Commission concluded that Elms was an independent contractor, rather than a common law employee of Renewal, and was therefore not entitled to collect workers’ compensation benefits. The circuit court reversed, concluding that Elms was Renewal’s common law employee. The court of special appeals vacated the circuit court’s opinion and remanded. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals’ opinion and remanded with directions to affirm the circuit court’s judgment, holding (1) the Commission misconstrued the law as applied to the facts when it concluded that Elms was an independent contractor and not an employee of Renewal; (2) the court of special appeals erred when it held that a statutory employment analysis under section 9-508 of the Workers’ Compensation Act must precede a common law employment analysis; and (3) by application of the common law to the facts of this case, Elms was Renewal’s employee at the time of the accident. View "Elms v. Renewal by Anderson" on Justia Law

Erickson was a U.S. Postal Service employee from 1988 to 2000, and also a member of the Army National Guard Reserve. He was absent from the Postal Service for lengthy periods while on active duty with the National Guard. Between 1991 and 1995 he was absent for more than 22 months, and between 1996 and 2000, he worked at the Postal Service for only four days. The Postal Service inquired whether he intended to return. Erickson replied that he would not return until he completed his tour of duty in September 2001. The Postal Service removed him for excessive use of military leave. Erickson re-enlisted with the Guard and remained on active duty through 2005. In 2006, he appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board alleging violation of his rights under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA). The Board rejected his claim under 38 U.S.C. 4312, holding that he had not made a timely request for reemployment and that military service was not a motivating factor in the termination. The Federal Circuit affirmed with respect to his reemployment claim, but reversed with respect to his discrimination claim. On remand, the Board found that Erickson had waived his USERRA rights by abandoning his civilian career, but on a second remand, ruled in favor of Erickson and granted him reinstatement with back wages and benefits. The Federal Circuit denied his application for recovery of attorney fees and expenses for the two appeals.View "Erickson v. U.S. Postal Serv." on Justia Law

Seventy-year-old James Higginbotham was employed by Industrial Contractors, Inc. ("ICI") as a welder and pipefitter in May 2010 when he sustained an injury to his left rotator cuff. The medical records demonstrated that Higginbotham's injury arose out of and in the course of his work for ICI. Prior to his injury, Higginbotham made $34.61 per hour, but only worked part time. He often traveled to work sites some distance from his home near Hazen, including a site north of Mandan. Since his injury, Higginbotham was no longer able to make the trip from Hazen to Bismarck without stopping, and he could no longer perform welding or pipefitting work. Higginbotham lived in a mobile home near Hazen, approximately 70 miles from Bismarck and 80 miles from Minot. He indicated he was having difficulty paying bills, which he did not have before the injury, and he wanted to maintain the lifestyle he had prior to his injury. Following left rotator cuff surgery, WSI referred Higginbotham to vocational rehabilitation with Kim Hornberger, a vocational rehabilitation consultant, who identified the first appropriate rehabilitation option for Higginbotham and developed a vocational consultant's report ("VCR"). The VCR concluded that it was appropriate for Higginbotham to return to an occupation in the statewide job pool suited to his education, experience, and marketable skills: cashier, telephone sales representative, gaming dealer, and greeter, and the expected income of $332 per week exceeded 90% of Higginbotham's pre-injury income of $227 per week. WSI approved the vocational plan and notified Higginbotham that it intended to discontinue his benefits. Higginbotham asked for reconsideration, and WSI issued an order affirming the rehabilitation plan and denying further disability benefits. Higginbotham appealed, and an ALJ affirmed the WSI order. Higginbotham appealed the ALJ's decision, and the district court affirmed. Higginbotham now appeals the district court judgment. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Higginbotham v. WSI" on Justia Law

Before the 2013-2014 school year, the Dickinson Education Association and the Dickinson Public School District conducted negotiations and developed and agreed upon a series of negotiated master agreements that contained the terms and conditions of employment between the certified staff and the District. Between December 2012 and May 2013, the Association and the Dickinson Board of Education held collaborative bargaining team meetings for purposes of formulating a negotiated agreement. The Association and the District's negotiations covered various provisions for both the 2013-2014 and 2014-2015 school years, but the parties were ultimately unable to come to a resolution on all issues. In May 2013, after declaring an impasse, the parties sought the involvement of an education fact-finding commission. The Commission's report recommended: (1) a two-year contract; (2) that all items previously agreed to remain in the agreement; (3) the Board's final offer on salary in year one and year two of the two-year contract; and (4) the addition of one professional development day in year two of the contract. In late-July 2013, with the parties still unable to reach an agreement, the District unilaterally issued contracts based on the Commission's recommendations, containing provisions for the 2013-2014 and 2014-2015 school years. In August 2013, the Association petitioned the district court for a writ of mandamus and also filed an application for temporary restraining order and other supporting documents. The district court granted an alternate writ of mandamus, suspending the continuing contract offers made by the Board for the 2013-2014 school year, prohibiting the District from requiring the contract offers be returned until further court order, and ordering the District to execute a negotiated agreement for only the 2013-2014 school year. Later, district court issued an order quashing the alternate writ of mandamus and ordering that individual teaching contracts for the 2013-2014 school year based on the Board's final offer were due September 13, 2013. The Association's petition for writ of mandamus remained pending, and the parties agreed the issue before the court was whether the District could unilaterally issue contracts for the 2014-2015 school year based on the negotiation process. In October 2013, the district court granted the petition, concluding the unilateral offer of a two-year negotiated agreement was not lawful in North Dakota and the Association was entitled to an order of mandamus requiring the District to offer the Association a one-year negotiated agreement for the 2013-2014 school year. The District appealed. Finding no abuse of discretion or reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Dickinson Education Association v. Dickinson Public School District" on Justia Law

Appellant was an officer with the Glacier County Sheriff’s Office (GCSO) from 1995 to 2010 and occasionally investigated the deaths of people he knew. In 2010, Appellant pled guilty to two misdemeanors and resigned from the GCSO. In 2011, Appellant applied for disability retirement benefits from the Sheriffs’ Retirement Systems, alleging that he was permanently disabled due the post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) he developed while working at the GCSO. The Montana Public Employees’ Retirement Board (PERB) denied Appellant’s disability claim, concluding that Appellant’s PTSD was not permanently disabling. The district court affirmed PERB’s decision to deny benefits. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not misapprehend the effect of the evidence presented and properly determined that the findings of PERB were not clearly erroneous. View "Fauque v. Mont. Pub. Employees Ret. Bd." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint against his employer, the U.S. Army, alleging that his direct supervisor harassed and discriminated against him on account of his disability. The Army dismissed the complaint as untimely, and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) affirmed. Plaintiff subsequently filed a complaint with the district court, asserting discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation claims. The district court construed these claims as claims brought pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act. The district court found that Plaintiff’s administrative complaint was untimely filed and ordered that Plaintiff’s claimed be dismissed because Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and did not qualify for equitable tolling. The First Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims, holding that the district court correctly found that Plaintiff’s administrative filing was untimely and did not abuse its discretion when it denied Plaintiff’s request for equitable tolling on the insufficiently supported basis of mental illness. View "Vazquez-Rivera v. Figueroa" on Justia Law

Martin began working for California’s Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) in 2000, and Sphar began working for CDCR in 2002. They were dismissed in 2004 and challenged their dismissals. In October 2008, an administrative law judge found that the dismissals had been unjustified and revoked them. The ALJ’s decision provided that a hearing would be set if the parties were “unable to agree as to salary, benefits and interest due under Government Code section 19584.The two were reinstated to employment. CDCR sought a writ of mandate to overturn the decision to include merit salary adjustments and physical fitness incentive pay (PFIP), and claimed that the offset to backpay for money earned from other employers should have included overtime pay. The CDCR also challenged the Board’s decision that Sphar would be compensated at salary range “K,” for which he had not qualified at the time of his dismissal. The superior court ordered that the offset include overtime pay, but denied the remainder of the petition. The court of appeal affirmed, concluding that section 19584 authorized the inclusion of merit salary adjustments and PFIP in the award, authorized Sphar to be compensated at salary range “K,” and required the inclusion of overtime pay in the offset. View "Dept. of Corrs. & Rehab. v. State Pers. Bd." on Justia Law

Johnson County Sheriff’s Department Master Deputy Michael Maurer cracked a department vehicle’s windshield with a binder while attempting to shoo away a horsefly. Maurer initially reported that the cracked windshield was caused by a rock, but after a fellow deputy reported the true facts, Maurer eventually admitted his responsibility in damaging the windshield. After an investigation and hearing, the Johnson County Sheriff terminated Maurer’s employment for violating the department’s standards on truthfulness. Maurer appealed to the Johnson County Sheriff’s Civil Service Board (CSB), which reversed the Sheriff’s decision. The district court vacated the CSB’s decision and remanded to the CSB. On remand, the CSB upheld the Sheriff’s decision to terminate Maurer. The district court affirmed the CSB’s second decision. The court of appeals affirmed both district court decisions, upholding Maurer’s termination. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals’ decision affirming the district court’s decision to vacate the CSB’s first decision, holding that the CSB exceeded the scope of its authority and its decision was not substantially supported by the evidence. View "Denning v. Johnson County Sheriff's Civil Serv. Bd." on Justia Law