Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Kelly Colvin was killed in an automobile accident while returning to Utah from a work project in Maryland. The accident occurred when Colvin was a passenger in a vehicle driven by his coworker, Joseph Giguere. Colvin’s widow and son sued Giguere, claiming that Colvin’s death was proximately caused by Giguere’s negligent driving. Giguere moved for summary judgment, asserting that the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act barred this suit because the accident occurred in the course of his and Colvin’s employment. The district court agreed and granted Giguere’s motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the accident occurred while Colvin and Giguere were carrying out a special errand for their employer, this action was barred under the Act’s exclusive remedy provision. View "Colvin v. Giguere" on Justia Law

Patricia Campatelli, the Register of Probate and Insolvency for Suffolk County, was suspended with pay pending further investigation of allegations of inappropriate conduct and mismanagement in the performance of her duties. Campatelli filed a complaint in the county court seeking a judgment declaring that the three court officials who placed her on administrative leave did not possess the authority to suspend her pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 4. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the Chief Justice of the Probate and Family Court Department, the Chief Justice of the Trial Court, and the Court Administrator possessed the authority to suspend Campatelli with pay. View "Campatelli v. Chief Justice of the Trial Court" on Justia Law

Daniel Brown was a City of Kenai employee who was accused of sexual harassment of female employees at the Kenai Recreation Center. But after a termination hearing, the Personnel Board of the City of Kenai stated that the basis for Brown’s termination was not sexual harassment but rather misconduct. Brown argued on appeal of that decision that the Board violated his right to due process by terminating him for misconduct without finding that he had committed the underlying acts of sexual harassment. He also argued that his termination violated the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The Supreme Court concluded that the Board had an adequate basis for its decision and that Brown’s termination did not violate the implied covenant of good faith or his right to due process. View "Brown v. City of Kenai, Personnel Board" on Justia Law

Joseph Talbot worked at Desert View Care Center as a nurse and was discharged due to a Facebook post that Desert View found violated its Social and Electronic Media Conduct Policy. Talbot applied for unemployment benefits, and an Idaho Department of Labor Appeals Examiner awarded him benefits. The Idaho Industrial Commission reversed, concluding that Talbot engaged in employment-related misconduct. Talbot appealed, arguing that Desert View never communicated its Social Media Policy to him. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Industrial Commission's decision. View "Talbot v. Desert View Care Center" on Justia Law

Vermont State Employees' Association (VSEA) appealed a Vermont Labor Relations Board decision which found that the State was not required to give certain compensation to state employees in the weeks and months following Tropical Storm Irene.The storm had a particularly devastating effect on the complex of state buildings in Waterbury. Governor Peter Shumlin authorized the complete closure of Vermont state government for one day. The closure notice stated that only authorized critical staff persons should report for work. In the days that followed, various work arrangements were necessary because the Waterbury complex was generally unusable. The Vermont Department of Human Resources indicated that agencies with offices in the complex had implemented their Continuity of Operations Plans (COOP). These plans allow only specifically authorized critical staff to work in order to continue an agency’s essential functions during and immediately following an emergency situation. All other employees in the complex were instructed that they "should not report to work unless specifically authorized to do so by a supervisor." Eventually, most of the state employees in the complex were assigned to new work stations as agencies moved their operations. At first, there was uncertainty about the work requirements and compensation for state employees who had worked in the complex. Over time, management reached a position on those policies. The position was unacceptable to VSEA, the union that represents the state’s classified employee workforce. VSEA charged that the State’s position was inconsistent with three collective bargaining agreements as well as a state personnel policy. When the parties could not resolve the conflict, VSEA appealed to the Vermont Labor Relations Board. VSEA contended that the Board erred in interpreting certain terms of the emergency closing provision of the collective bargaining agreements between the State and VSEA. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Grievance of VSEA" on Justia Law

A former teacher, Terum Hopper, filed a wrongful termination action against the Jefferson County Board of Education. The Board moved for summary judgment, arguing that Hopper’s tort claims were barred by governmental immunity and that Hopper was required to pursue the administrative remedies set forth in Ky. Rev. Stat. 161.790 to challenge the termination of his employment contract. The trial court granted the summary judgment motion as to the governmental immunity claims but denied the motion as to the breach of contract claims, declaring that Hopper was entitled to file suit on these claims rather than pursue administrative remedies. The Board sought a writ prohibiting the lower court from trying Hopper’s breach of contract claims. The court of appeals denied the writ, concluding that the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction over the claims and that the Board had an adequate remedy. The Supreme Court reversed and granted the writ, holding that because Hopper filed an action in the circuit court without first exhausting the administrative remedies provided in section 161.790, the circuit court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear his claim. View "Jefferson County Bd. of Educ. v. Hon. Brian C. Edwards" on Justia Law

Appellant worked for Christopher & Banks, a retail clothing store, when she slipped and fell while walking around her car, which was parked in the employee parking lot. Christopher & Banks subsequently denied Appellant’s injury claim, concluding that Appellant’s injury was not compensable because it did not occur on the store’s operating premises. An administrative law judge (ALJ) determined that Appellant’s injury was not compensable because it did not occur within Christopher & Banks’s operating premises. The Workers Compensation Board reversed, concluding that the evidence compelled a finding that Christopher & Banks directed its employees to park in either one of two spaces, that Appellant was parked in one of these spaces, and therefore, Appellant’s injury was within Christopher & Banks’s operating premises. The court of appeals reversed, determining that ALJ’s opinion was supported by substantial evidence and that the Board engaged in impermissible fact finding. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals erroneously reversed the opinion of the ALJ, as the ALJ’s findings were supported by evidence of substance and the Board engaged in impermissible fact finding. View "Hanik v. Christopher & Banks, Inc." on Justia Law

Lane, Director of CITY, a program for underprivileged youth operated by Central Alabama Community College (CACC), discovered that Schmitz, a state representative on CITY’s payroll, had not been reporting for work. Lane terminated her employment. Federal authorities later indicted Schmitz on charges of mail fraud and theft concerning a program receiving federal funds. Lane testified, under subpoena, regarding the events that led to Schmitz’s termination. Schmitz was convicted. Meanwhile, CITY experienced significant budget shortfalls. CACC’s president, Franks, terminated Lane and 28 others, citing those shortfalls. Franks rescinded all but two (Lane and another) of the terminations days later. Lane sued Franks in his individual and official capacities under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging retaliation for testifying against Schmitz. The district court granted Franks summary judgment, finding the individual-capacity claims were barred by qualified immunity and the official-capacity claims barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that Lane acted pursuant to his official duties when he investigated and terminated Schmitz. A unanimous Supreme Court reversed in part, first holding that Lane’s sworn testimony outside the scope of his ordinary job duties was protected by the First Amendment. Lane’s testimony was speech as a citizen on a matter of public concern. The critical question is whether the speech at issue is itself ordinarily within the scope of an employee’s duties, not whether it merely concerns those duties. Corruption in a public program and misuse of state funds involve matters of significant public concern; the form and context of the speech, sworn testimony in a judicial proceeding, fortify that conclusion. There is no government interest that favors Franks: there was no evidence that Lane’s testimony was false or erroneous or that Lane unnecessarily disclosed confidential information. Franks is entitled to qualified immunity in his individual capacity. Based on existing Eleventh Circuit precedent, Franks reasonably could have believed that a government employer could fire an employee because of testimony given outside the scope of his ordinary job responsibilities. View "Lane v. Franks" on Justia Law

The Union petitioned for review of the FLRA's decision finding, inter alia, that the IRS did not commit an unfair labor practice when Union representatives were excluded from "suitability" interviews of "covered" IRS personnel conducted by OPM investigators. Determining that it had jurisdiction to decide the Union's petition for review, the court concluded that the Authority reasonably construed the "representative of the agency" language in 5 U.S.C. 7114(a)(2)(B) to support a function and control analysis in determining its applicability vel non, and that the Authority's application of its interpretation to OPM-conducted suitability interviews of covered IRS personnel was not "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Natl' Treasury Employees Union v. FLRA" on Justia Law

Claimant DeAnne Muchow began working for Varsity Contractors in, 2011 as a human resources assistant. During her employment, she had an ongoing conflict with her supervisor and had lodged several complaints about her supervisor. The director decided to have a meeting with claimant and her supervisor in an effort to resolve the conflict. During the meeting, the claimant and her supervisor both stated that they had documentation outlining their complaints. The director told them to get their documentation and bring it back to his office. Claimant asked for time to better prepare her papers, but the director denied that request because he was leaving the next day on a business trip. He did give claimant a few minutes to look over her papers. She returned to her desk and after a few minutes printed her documents. She took the documents and walked toward the director, who was standing outside his office. The claimant waved the documents in the air, told the director she had them and was going to shred them, and walked past him toward the shredder. He told her not to shred them, but she continued to the shredder and shredded them. The director then discharged her for insubordination. Claimant applied for unemployment benefits, which were initially denied. She appealed, an appeals examiner held an evidentiary hearing by telephone. He later issued findings of fact and conclusions of law and reversed the ruling that claimant was not entitled to unemployment benefits. He held that as a matter of law there was no insubordination. The basis of his ruling was that the director’s order not to shred the documents was not a directive that the director was authorized to give and entitled to have obeyed, because the documents belonged to claimant and contained her personal notations about issues and problems she was having with a coworker. The employer then appealed to the Industrial Commission. The commission adopted the findings of fact made by the appeals examiner. However, the commission disagreed with the conclusions of law made by the appeals examiner: the held that the director requested the documents because they pertained to a conflict between two employees that he was attempting to resolve; that he had a reasonable expectation that his order not to shred the documents would be obeyed; and that the claimant chose to disregard the director’s order and shredded the documents. The commission concluded that her conduct constituted employment-related misconduct, and it reversed the decision of the appeals examiner and held that the claimant was not eligible for unemployment benefits. Claimant then appealed to the Supreme Court. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Commission. View "Muchow v. Varsity Contractors, Inc" on Justia Law