Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Gonzalez sued his former employer, the Waterfront Commission of the New York Harbor, a bi-state instrumentality of New Jersey and New York that was created in 1953 to investigate, deter, combat, and remedy criminal activity in the Port of New York-New Jersey. He sought to enjoin disciplinary proceedings initiated by the Commission as a violation of his rights under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the First Amendment. The Commission had determined that Gonzalez, an employee (detective) since 1999 had made false statement in an affidavit concerning another employee’s discrimination suit. The district court denied Gonzalez’s motion and ultimately stayed and administratively terminated the suit, finding that the Younger abstention doctrine precluded federal interference with the ongoing state disciplinary proceedings. While appeal was pending, the Supreme Court issued its 2013 decision, Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, clarifying the abstention inquiry and defining the outer boundaries of the abstention doctrine. The Third Circuit affirmed, concluding that the decision to abstain was appropriate under the Sprint decision. View "Gonzalez v. Waterfront Comm'n of NY Harbor" on Justia Law

In 1975, the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board certified Intervenor, AFSCME, District Council 89 ("Union") as the exclusive representative of a unit for purposes of collective bargaining which included, inter alia, prison security guards, special guards, and transportation, maintenance, and supply employees. Since the unit certification, Appellee Lancaster County and the Union have been parties to several collective bargaining agreements. However, notwithstanding the Board's certification of maintenance employees in the bargaining unit, the parties have not negotiated over the wages, hours, and conditions of employment for the Maintenance Mechanic I and Maintenance Mechanic II positions. In 2009, the County Commissioners adopted a reorganization plan that placed all County maintenance and custodial employees under the centralized Facilities Management Department. Two days later, the Union filed with the Board a petition for bargaining unit clarification which sought to include the positions of Maintenance Mechanic I and Maintenance Mechanic II in the unit of prison guards. The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court was whether county prison maintenance employees who supervise inmates constituted "guards at prisons" for purposes of collective bargaining unit placement under the Pennsylvania Employe Relations Act. After review, the Court held that the Commonwealth Court did not apply the proper level of deference in its appellate review of the decision of the Labor Relations Board which concluded that supervisory maintenance employees at issue were “guards at prisons” for purposes of collective bargaining. Thus, the Court reversed the decision of the Commonwealth Court and reinstated the Board’s determination. View "Lancaster Cty v. PA Labor Relations Bd." on Justia Law

A highly paid worker suffered a debilitating stroke while traveling for his employer. The employer did not think the stroke was work related, but it later accepted the claim and paid workers' compensation benefits. The statutory maximum compensation rate at the time of the injury was $700 a week. A little more than five months after the employee's stroke, an amended version of the Alaska Workers' Compensation Act took effect. Instead of an absolute maximum compensation rate, the amended statute set a variable rate indexed to the statewide average weekly wage. The employee asked for an increased rate of compensation, arguing that the law in effect at the time he was recognized as being permanently and totally disabled should govern his benefit amount. The Alaska Workers' Compensation Board, with one panel member dissenting, decided that the version of the statute in effect at the time of the injury was the applicable statute and consequently capped the employee's benefits at $700 a week for life. The dissenting panel member would have construed the statute as permitting increased benefits. The Alaska Workers' Compensation Appeals Commission affirmed the Board's decision. The employee appealed, arguing that the amount of his benefits did not fairly compensate him for lost wages during the period of his disability so that the date of his disability, rather than the date of his injury, should have been used to determine the version of the statute governing his claim. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Commission's decision.View "Louie v. BP Exploration (Alaska), Inc." on Justia Law

In August 2011, the Department updated the special procedures that establish the minimum wages and working conditions employers must offer U.S. sheepherders, goatherders, and open-range (cattle) herders before hiring foreign herders. Plaintiffs, U.S. workers experienced in herding claimed that the Department administers the temporary worker visa program in a way that gives herding operations access to inexpensive foreign labor without protecting U.S. workers. The court concluded that the district court erred in holding that plaintiffs lacked both Article III and prudential standing to bring this action where plaintiffs were injured by the Department's promulgation of the Training and Employment Guidance Letters (TEGLs) and fell within the zone of interests protected by the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. 1188(a)(1). On the merits, the court concluded that plaintiffs were entitled to entry of summary judgment in their favor where the Department violated the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 553, by promulgating TEGLs without providing public notice and an opportunity for comment. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Mendoza, et al. v. Harris, et al." on Justia Law

The issue this case presented to the Oklahoma Supreme Court centered on the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals' decision to reverse the trial court's order granting a temporary injunction against the Defendant-Appellant, the Oklahoma Military Department ("Department"), and the trial court's order overruling the Department's motion for new trial and to vacate the temporary injunction. The trial court temporarily restrained and enjoined the Department from making pay increases conditioned upon leaving the classified service. In 2011, 44 O.S. 2011, section 21.1 was amended to require personnel appointed as state employees in the Department to be in the unclassified service and to provide additional leave flexibility. To coincide with this amendment, the Department issued new policies on hiring, promotions and salary administration. The new policy references 74 O.S. 2011, section 840-4.2 (C), which provides existing classified employees may remain in the classified service when a classified position has been placed in the unclassified service. Section 7 of the new policy indicates this choice is only applicable to permanent classified employees. It also provided that permanent classified employees may choose to move to the unclassified service after submitting a written resignation from their classified position. Any future vacancies will be filled exclusively in the unclassified service. In late August 2012 a series of e-mails by the Department were sent detailing which classified employees would be eligible for a raise. The e-mails indicate a performance-based adjustment would be granted to those permanent classified employees who had received "exceeds standards" on their annual personal progress report. However, an additional condition excluded from the raise all permanent classified employees who did not elect to resign from the classified service and enter the unclassified service. These classified employees were required to submit their resignation letters by August 30, 2012, in order to accept the offer. Plaintiff-Appellee, the Oklahoma Public Employees Association ("OPEA"), on behalf of some of the Department's affected permanent and probationary classified employees, filed a petition for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. The Supreme Court held the trial court did not abuse its discretion in restraining and enjoining the Department from conditioning pay increases on declassification of permanent classified employees. The Court did, however, reverse the trial court's order as far as this provision of the order was applicable to probationary classified employees. The Court held that there was not the same protection to probationary classified employees as there was for permanent classified employees and the Department's actions concerning the probationary classified employee. The second provision of the trial court order enjoined the Department from: "[making] (2) an employee's raise or pay increase based solely upon such employee's status as a classified or unclassified employee." The meaning of this part of the order, the Supreme Court found, was unclear. The Supreme Court reversed this part of the trial court's order insofar as this provision could be interpreted to restrain and enjoin the Department from granting pay increases authorized by law. Furthermore, the Court held the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the Department's motion for new trial and to vacate the temporary order. View "Oklahoma Public Employees Assoc. v. Oklahoma Military Dept." on Justia Law

Robert Campbell quit his job as a school teacher in anticipation of accompanying his wife to Finland on her Fulbright grant. Campbell applied for unemployment benefits for the months between his resignation in June 2010 and his family's planned departure in February 2011. His request was denied because the Department of Employment Security determined that Campbell did not qualify for benefits as claimed under RCW 50.20.050(2)(b)(iii), known as the "quit to follow" provision. On appeal, the superior court reversed, but the Court of Appeals reinstated the agency action. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals and held that Campbell's resignation from his job seven months before the planned relocation was not reasonable as contemplated by the statute. View "Campbell v. Dep't of Emp't Sec." on Justia Law

Plaintiff injured his shoulder while working for Employer. Plaintiff was terminated later that year for “reduction of staff due to lack of work.” Employer accepted Plaintiff’s injury as compensable. In January 2009, Plaintiff began to receive unemployment benefits from Employer and Insurer (together, Defendants). In December 2010, Defendants sought to terminate payment of compensation, alleging that Plaintiff could no longer show he was disabled. The Industrial Commission concluded that Plaintiff was not entitled to disability payments made after December 2010 and that Defendants were entitled to a credit for any payments they had made after that date, finding that Plaintiff’s inability to find work was not due to his injury but to large-scale economic factors. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission properly concluded that Plaintiff failed to prove that his inability to earn the same wages as before his injury resulted from his work-related injury. View "Medlin v. Weaver Cooke Constr., LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were granted relief an action filed against Marion Haddad and the Holy Annunciation Monastery Church of the Golden Hills. Plaintiffs sought to satisfy the judgment, which represented the proceeds from a sale of property. The court ordered Holy Annunciation and Haddad to hold the proceeds of the sale in escrow, but Haddad deposited $40,000 of the proceeds in her retirement account with the State Board of Retirement. When Plaintiffs received no payment for the judgment, they brought this case in part to name the Board as trustee for the $40,000. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that Haddad’s retirement account was exempt from attachment and that the Commonwealth was immune from suit. The superior court granted Defendants’ motion. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding (1) Haddad did not have rights in the $40,000 she deposited with the Board, and therefore, those funds were not statutorily prohibited from being subject to attachment; and (2) the doctrine of sovereign immunity did not bar Plaintiffs from summoning the Board as trustee with respect to those funds. View "Randall v. Haddad" on Justia Law

Respondent began employment with the Raleigh County Emergency Services Authority in 2002. In 2010, the West Virginia Consolidated Public Retirement Board notified Respondent that he was ineligible to participate in the Public Employees Retirement System (PERS) because he had not worked the statutorily-required 1,040 hours per year necessary for participation in PERS. The Retirement Board upheld the denial. The circuit court reversed, concluding that the Board was equitably estopped from denying to Respondent participation in PERS. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Board was not prevented from denying to Respondent the right to participate in PERS where (1) Respondent’s employer erroneously informed him that he was eligible to participate in PERS; and (2) Respondent did not rely on the Board’s representations about his PERS eligibility in accepting the position with the Authority. View "W. Va. Consol. Pub. Ret. Bd. v. Jones" on Justia Law

Claimant was injured in a car accident on his way home from work. Claimant’s co-worker was driving the vehicle at the time. The Workers Compensation Board entered an award in favor of Claimant, deciding that Claimant’s injury arose out of and in the course of his employment. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Claimant’s claim was barred by the “going and coming” rule. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision and affirmed the Board’s decision, holding that there was substantial competent evidence in the record to support the Board’s finding that the accident occurred while Claimant was in the course and scope of his employment. View "Williams v. Petromark Drilling, LLC" on Justia Law