Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In 2004, Appellant sustained a work injury and received temporary total disability (TTD) benefits. Appellant returned to work from 2006 until 2008, at which time his back problems recurred. Appellant received TTD benefits until 2010. Appellant was later medically released to return to work, but because he could not find a job, he filed for unemployment compensation. Nev. Rev. Stat. 612.344 allows an individual who cannot find work after a period of temporary disability the option of using his work history for the fifteen months preceding his disability leave to determine his unemployment compensation instead of the fifteen months preceding his application. To qualify for this option, the application must be filed “within 3 years after the initial period of disability begins.” The Employment Security Division denied Appellant’s claim, concluding that because Appellant received disability benefits for his back injury starting in 2004, he could not use section 612.344’s alternative-calculation option because the statute’s three-year window closed in 2007. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the alternative-calculation option in section 612.344 renews when a temporarily disabled worker recovers and returns long enough to reestablish himself in the unemployment compensation system. View "Anderson v. State Employment Sec. Div." on Justia Law

The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court centered on the application of Michigan’s Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (WPA) to a contract employee whose contract was not renewed ostensibly because of the employee’s whistleblowing activities. A contract employee whose term of employment has expired without being subject to a specific adverse employment action identified in the WPA and who sought reengagement for a new term of employment occupied the same legal position as a prospective employee. The WPA, by its express language, only applied to current employees; the statute offered no protection to prospective employees. Because the WPA did not apply when an employer decided not to hire a job applicant, it likewise had no application to a contract employee whom the employer declined to rehire for a new term of employment. "The plaintiff in this case has no recourse under the WPA because he alleges only that his former employer declined to renew his contract, not that the employer took some adverse action against him during his contractual term of employment." View "Wurtz v. Beecher Metropolitan District" on Justia Law

Anthony Henry and Keith White filed suit against Laborers’ Local 1191, Michael Aaron (the union’s business manager), and Bruce Ruedisueli (the union’s president), alleging that their indefinite layoff from employment at the union was unlawful retaliation under the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (WPA). Henry and White had worked as business agents for the union until their terminations. They alleged that defendants asked several union members to repair the façade of the Trade Union Leadership Council building. The union recorded payments for the work as picket duty even though the members did not engage in picket duty on those days. Henry and White believed that Aaron was involved in criminal activity, including fraud, an illegal kickback scheme, and misappropriation of union funds. They also believed that the union had required members to work without proper safety precautions and without receiving union wages. Henry and White subsequently contacted the United States Department of Labor with their suspicions and informed the union of their decision to report the allegations. The Department of Labor investigated the allegations and referred the matter to an assistant United States attorney, who declined to intervene. Aaron later notified Henry and White that they had been indefinitely laid off from employment at the union. During the pendency of Henry and White’s action, Michael Dowdy and Glenn Ramsey (also business agents for the union) were terminated from their employment. Dowdy and Ramsey filed a separate WPA action against the union, Aaron, claiming that they had been terminated for their cooperation in the Department of Labor’s investigation and disclosing to investigators facts substantiating the allegations of criminal misconduct. Defendants moved for summary disposition in the Henry/White lawsuit and for partial summary disposition in the Dowdy/Ramsey lawsuit, alleging that the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA) preempted plaintiffs’ WPA claims and that, as a result, the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear them. The court denied both motions, concluding that the WPA’s protection of an employee against an employer’s retaliatory employment actions did not contravene the LMRDA. Defendants appealed in each case, reasserting their claim of LMRDA preemption and raising the new defense that the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) independently preempted the circuit court from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals consolidated the appeals and affirmed in an unpublished opinion. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that neither the NLRA nor the LMRDA preempted WPA claims premised on reporting suspected criminal misconduct. The NLRA did not cover the reporting of suspected criminal misconduct, while the LMRDA does not provide a union official with discretion to cover up suspected criminal misconduct by retaliating against employees who report their allegations. However, plaintiffs’ allegations of retaliation for their reporting of improper wages and an unsafe work environment cover conduct "arguably prohibited" by the NLRA and, as a result, must be litigated exclusively before the NLRB. As such, the Court affirmed in part the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded this case to the Circuit Court for further proceedings. View "Henry v. Laborers Local 1191" on Justia Law

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma certified three questions of Oklahoma law to the state Supreme Court. Plaintiff, a probationary police trainee, filed suit in the federal court pertaining his status as a probationary trainee under the terms of the municipality's collective bargaining agreement (CBA). The Supreme Court reformulated the first question, and answered questions one and two in the negative. Question three was not answered because it was dependent on an affirmative answer to question two. The questions certified to the Court were: (1) whether a probationary police officer in a municipality that has entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement ("CBA") with a recognized bargaining agent under the Fire and Police Arbitration Act,who is excluded by the terms of the CBA from having access to the grievance/arbitration process contained in the CBA in connection with the termination of his/her employment due to his/her probationary status, but who was also a member of the Police Pension and Retirement Systems, at the time of the termination of his employment, has a right to be terminated only for cause by OKLA. STAT. tit. 11, sec. 50-123(B) and, thus, was entitled to due process in connection with the termination of his/her employment; (2) whether the probationary police officer under that scenario had a statutory right to a hearing before a Police Pension Review Board as provided for by statute; and (3) if a probationary police officer had a statutory right to a hearing before a Police Pension Board of Review, must the officer request a hearing and when must the officer request a hearing, or must the municipality offer a hearing and when must the municipality offer a hearing? View "Brewer v. City of Seminole" on Justia Law

Employee Chester Rouse filed a wrongful termination suit against the Grand River Dam Authority (GRDA) and Daniel S. Sullivan. The petition alleged GRDA and Mr. Sullivan terminated him in retaliation for filing an overtime complaint under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Rouse also alleged the termination of his employment for filing this complaint violated Oklahoma public policy protecting whistleblowers who make external reports of unlawful activity by their employers. The trial court dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, ruling: (1) sovereign immunity barred Rouse's claim based on the federal Fair Labor Standards Act; and (2) the Oklahoma Whistleblower Act provided employee's remedy for the alleged wrongful termination, not state tort law. Rouse appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court held that the trial court correctly ruled that Rouse failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and properly dismissed this suit. View "Rouse v. Grand River Dam Authority" on Justia Law

In 2004, Appellant fell while working and strained her back. Appellant was awarded worker’s compensation benefits. In 2009, Appellant slipped and fell at work and injured her ankle. In 2010, Appellant sought temporary total disability and medical pay benefits from the Workers Compensation Division, which denied Appellant’s requests. After a contested case hearing, the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) upheld the Division’s denial of Appellant’s request for benefits, concluding Appellant did not meet her burden of proving that she suffered aggravation of a preexisting back condition as a result of a work related injury or that she suffered a second compensable injury. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the OAH did not err by failing to find a causal connection between the 2009 workplace incident and Appellant’s delayed back pain. View "Hirsch v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div." on Justia Law

Scott's Electric, Inc. was an electrical contracting business providing commercial, residential, industrial and farm services. Scott's employed Patrick Anderson, Adam Barton, Greg Boumont, Jason Richter, Michael Rick, Rick Schake, and Zach Scheeley as journeymen or apprentice electricians. In 2008, they filed claims with the North Dakota Department of Labor seeking unpaid wages from Scott's for travel time while driving company-owned vehicles. Their claims for unpaid wages spanned from April 1991 to March 2008. After investigating the claims, the Department notified Scott's of the wage claim determinations and requested payment of wages the Department determined to be valid and enforceable. After unsuccessful efforts to collect the unpaid wages, the Department took assignments in trust for wages from the claimants and brought this action to collect the unpaid wages, penalties and interest. After a bench trial, the district court ruled in favor of the Department and awarded a judgment for unpaid wages, penalties and interest against Scott's for $149,551.03. Scott's appealed. Concluding the district court's findings of fact were not clearly erroneous and the court did not missapply those facts to the controlling law, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "North Dakota ex rel. Storbakken v. Scott's Electric" on Justia Law

Petitioner Western Logistics, Inc. appealed the court of appeals' decision to affirm the Industrial Claim Appeals Office's decision that certain individuals were employees rather than independent contractors under Colorado law. The appellate court found that the individuals were not simultaneously providing services for others in the field, and were not free from petitioner's control and direction. Upon review of the specific facts of this case, the Supreme Court concluded the appellate court erred in affirming the Appeals Office's decision: because the court felt the independent-trade-or-business issue and the control-and-direction issue may have been related, the Court did not address the control-and-direction issue. The Court reversed and remanded the case to the court of appeals to vacate the portion of its decision that addressed the control-and-direction issue, then to remand the case to the Appeals Office for further proceedings. View "Western Logistics, Inc. v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented to the Colorado Supreme Court was whether an individual was an independent contractor as opposed to an employee for unemployment tax liability purposes. Waterman Ormsby was a geologist contracted to work on a project basis for Softrock Geological Services, Inc. In 2011, the Division of Employment and Training audited Softrock and issued a notice of liability on grounds that Softrock should have treated Ormsby as an employee for Colorado Employment Security Act (CESA) purposes. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals that whether an individual was "customarily engaged in an independent trade, occupation, profession, or business related to the service performed" was a question of fact. Whether the individual worked for another was not dispositive of whether the individual was engaged in an independent business. The Court disagreed with the appellate court, however, that whether an individual was engaged in an independent trade or business could be determined by applying a nine-factor test to create a presumption of an independent contractor relationship under statute. Instead, the Court held that the determination must be based on a totality of the circumstances test that evaluates the dynamics of the relationship between the putative employee and the employer. The factors listed in the statute might be relevant to that determination, but the statute does not provide an exhaustive list of factors to be considered. The case was remanded to the appellate court to return the case to the Industrial Claim Appeals office for further proceedings. View "Industrial Claim Appeals Office v. Softrock Geological Services, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2009, Appellant suffered injuries to both of his knees in a work-related accident. Appellant filed a request for loss of earning compensation. The Workers’ Compensation Court concluded that, notwithstanding findings of permanent impairment, because no permanent physical restrictions were specifically assigned by an expert for Appellant’s left knee, the court could not perform a loss of earning capacity calculation authorized under the third paragraph of Neb. Rev. Stat. 48-121(3) and that Appellant was thus limited to scheduled member compensation. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the compensation court erred as a matter of law in concluding that there must be expert opinion of permanent physical restrictions as to each injured member in order to perform a loss of earning capacity calculation under section 48-121(3). Remanded. View "Rodgers v. Neb. State Fair" on Justia Law